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Case Laws
Showing 261 to 280 of 280 Records
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1951 (1) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titled to the relief he has asked for. 12. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs, both here and below., Certified for one counsel. 13. By consent the landlord is appointed receiver without security and without remuneration to withdraw the rent which is in deposit in the Rent Controller's office. When he takes out the money he will give credit to the tenant for the amount withdrawn. Filing of accounts by the receiver 'is dispensed with. 14. Arthur Trevor Harries, C.J. I agree. In my view the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1950, apply to this case as the application was pending when that Act came into force. 15. I should prefer to offer no opinion at the present moment on the question whether or not the decree could be regarded as a decree made on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. I leave the question open for decision where it is essential to decide the question.
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1951 (1) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... nclude the matter. It is therefore clear that the three receipts amounting in all to over ₹ 98,000 were receipts of interest beyond eight years of this assessment. The sums could not be assessed under Section 34 and if these amounts are eliminated then quite clearly the assessment on the sum of ₹ 79,532 under Section 34 cannot be sustained. The answer therefore to question (3) must be in the negative. Mr. Atul Gupta has addressed no argument to us on the matters raised in question (4) and he agrees that that question should be answered in the affirmative. Question (1) appears to us to be a purely hypothetical question and in any event, having regard to the view which we expressed on question (3), it is conceded that question (1) does not really arise and does not require an answer. Question (2) also does not arise having regard to our answer to question (3) and it is also conceded that that question need not be answered in these proceedings. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l those steps in order to satisfy himself that the loss which occurred with the original disappearance was a permanent loss and if so to define for himself the exact quantum of the loss which he must face after all his efforts? The consideration by which the matter has to be reasonably judged is pithily put in 'Burnett v. Huff', 288 US Rep 156 77 Law Edn 670, at p. 783 in the passage quoted by my learned brother in his judgment, in this way, viz., "that the requirement that losses be deducted in the year in which they are sustained calls for a practical test." 39. For the reasons given in the foregoing as well as in my learned brother's judgment I agree that the answer to the reference must go in favour of the assessee on the first question. I also agree in the order as to costs proposed by my learned brother I express no opinion on the second question, as I find it unnecessary to do so, in view of my answer to the first. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (1) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urt is defective in not taking into consideration the different detailed reasons given by the Sessions Judge for rejecting the rest of the evidence alleged to prove the guilt of the appellant. In our opinion the High Court was in error in convicting the appellant of murder and we have, therefore, reversed the decision of the High Court. The reasoning of the High Court that the accused had not made any attempt to show that the ornaments belonged to him is clearly fallacious. The failure or omission of the appellant to prove that fact does not in any way help the prosecution in proving the guilt of the appellant. In our opinion the observations of the Sessions Judge in the concluding para. 31 of his judgment deserve careful notice by the State authorities. 10. As the ornaments are not proved to be the ornaments of the deceased, no conviction under Section 404, I. P. C., can also be sustained. The ornaments which are lying in the lower court should be returned to the appellant.
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1951 (1) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xcept the standard set up by the prudence and experience of merchants. But so far as this case is concerned we are not troubled with the distinction. In our view the case is plain. It is quite clear that this sum of ₹ 2,100 was not paid for acquiring any assets of the business itself. We may say that the sum of ₹ 600 was paid for acquiring the agency business, but that is not the case with the payment of ₹ 2,100 which was paid with a view to keep a competitor out of the area in which the assessee was carrying on its business. Therefore it can in no sense be called a capital expenditure. It was, as the Tribunal has found, a sum which was paid for the purposes of the business and as such it comes within the purview of the section set out above. The Tribunal was right. The answer to the question must be in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Certified for one counsel. HARRIES, C.J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1951 (1) TMI 34 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ady Dinbai Petit V. M. S. Naronha A.I R. (33) 1946 Bom 407 at p. 414 (I. L. R. (1946) Bom 832), all this does not make them parties. Hence a writ cannot be issued against them though a direction to the Union to direct; its employees to desist from recovering income-tax can be issued & will serve the purpose of the petnr. 29. For the above reasons, we hereby accept this petn. & issue a writ to the Union of India directing it not to levy income-tax on the income of the petnr. accruing, arising or received in Rajasthan excluding the area of the formes covenanting State of Bundi, prior to 1-4-1950, & to instruct the Income-tax Officers, who are its employees, not to demand from the petnr. any return of income for any period prior to 1-4-1950 or any account books for that period, or other information for the purpose of making any assessment of income-tax or collect the tame for the above period. The resp. will pay costs to the petnr. which are assessed at ₹ 600.
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1951 (1) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of our Constitution or of the Preventive Detention Act. In Iswar Das v. The State(1) the question was not raised or argued as it was made clear in the judgment itself. In view of what I have stated above, I am of the opinion that as the grounds originally communicated to the detenu were relevant to the objects which the Act had in view and as there is no proof of mala fides the obligations cast upon the authorities under article 22 (5) which have been reproduced in section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act have been fully complied with. Even according to the views expressed by the majority of my colleagues I would be prepared to hold that the particulars subsequently supplied along with the grounds originally supplied fully enable the detenu to make his representation. In my opinion there has been no contravention of the fundamental rights of the detenu. I would, therefore, (1) Not reported. allow this appeal and reverse the decision of the Bombay High Court. Appeal allowed.
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1951 (1) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or repealed was by the force of the provisions of article 13 itself and did not result from the decision of the courts. It is also unnecessary to examine the further argument of the learned Attorney-General that in any case since 1868 in this country the rule of construction of statutes is the one laid down by section 6 of the General Clauses Act,1868, and that though in express terms that statute may not be applicable to the construction of article 13(1) of the Constitution, yet that rule is a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and has become a rule of common law in this country and should be applied even to cases where statutes become void by rea son of their being repugnant to the Constitution. For the reasons given above I see no force in this appeal and I would accordingly dismiss it. MUKHERJEA J.-I am in entire agreement with the view taken by my learned brother Fazl Ali J. in his judgment and I concur both in his reasons and his conclusion. Appeal dismissed.
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1951 (1) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... clearly impose an obligation on the assessee to pay tax on the profits arising from this transaction. It seems to me that the language of the statute only imposes that obligation when plant or machinery is sold or discarded and no obligation arises when plant or machinery is acquired compulsorily by Government and the owner is left to accept what Government is pleased to offer him. If the word "sale" in this sub- section was capable of two meanings we should have to give it the meaning more favourable to the subject. But in my judgment the word "sale" can never include a transaction such as the one envisaged in Rule 83 of the Defence of India Rules. In the result, therefore, I am bound to hold that the view of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be sustained and I would answer the question submitted in the negative. The assessees are entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two Counsel. BANERJEE, J.--I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1951 (1) TMI 30 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oners to produce their account books and other documents. On the other hand, they could exercise the particular power only if the order were a judicial one. We are not prepared to hold that the Commissioner in making the order did some- thing which he was incompetent under the Act to do. The only error committed by him was in not hearing the petitioners before taking the particular step. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the proceedings commenc- ed by the Assistant Commissioner at the instance of the Commissioner are without jurisdiction and that consequently the petitioners are not bound to comply with the notice served upon them by the Assistant Commissioner. It would of course be open to the Commissioner to issue a notice to the petitioners under Section 22(7) of the Act and, after hearing them, to decide whether the case calls for the reopening of the assessment already made. Accordingly, we allow this petition with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1951 (1) TMI 29 - WEST BENGAL HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y statute from sales tax. The expression has not been qualified in any manner. The learned Commissioner appears to have restricted its meaning to the prepared paste meant for being used directly in a hooka, thereby reading more into the statute than appears in its wording. The law being what it is, the petition must be granted and the learned Commissioner s decision reversed as not being based on law. At the same time it appears that the wording in question is too vague and indefinite. Most probably tobacco has been used here in place of the Bengali term Tamak which usually refers to the prepared tobacco, the tobacco leaves being described in Bengali as Tamak Pata to distinguish them from the prepared product called Tamak . But the statute being in English, the English dictionary meaning has to be accepted in the absence of a statutory definition. The petition for revision is allowed and the decision of the learned Commissioner of Commercial Taxes reversed. Petition allowed.
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1951 (1) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the offence is not the accused in the case. Though Jacob may be made liable if the proper procedure had been followed as a partner of the firm-on that question I do not express my final opinion be is not liable as the firm is the person who made the default and who should have been prosecuted. The learned State Prosecutor relied upon the judgment of Chandra- sekhara Aiyar, J., in Akulu Paddayya Naidu, In re(1). In that case the notice was served on the firm represented by one of the partners and both the partners of the firm were accused. As both the partners were made accused, the learned Judge presumably treated the firm as accused and convicted both the partners who constituted the firm. In this case I cannot treat the firm as the accused as one of the accused only was prosecuted in his personal capacity. I agree with the Court below and hold that the order of acquittal is correct. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Appeal dismissed. (1) 1947 1 S.T.C. 165 1947 M.W.N. 603.
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1951 (1) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t out to us what materials the authorities should have considered which they did not consider. It appears to us that they considered all available materials and came to a conclusion. Learned Advocate for the appli- cants did not say that the authorities made the assessment order dis- honestly or vindictively. He suggested that the order was made capriciously. But no evidence has been placed before us to enable us to accept the suggestion. It may be that the authorities were wrong, but that does not mean that they were capricious in the finding they made. In this case, on the facts before us, we hold that the authorities did apply their mind and tried their best to come to a correct conclusion. Even if they were wrong, the applicants cannot be helped in any way. On these considerations we answer the question in the affirmative. The respondent is entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two Counsel. HARRIES, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1951 (1) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ... ... ... ... ..... order staying the order of Mookerjee, J., but it was thought that the meeting which had been ordered to be held had not been held. It now transpires that the meeting ordered by Mookerjee, J., had been held and therefore the stay order which this Bench issued was wholly infructuous. The stay order issued by this Bench was ultimately vacated, and in any event it never was effective. What effect the meeting ordered by the court will have upon the subsequent meeting in December is a matter on which we express no opinion. A point was taken as a preliminary point that no appeal lay in this case. I do not think it is necessary to discuss that matter, but I wish to make it clear that we do not hold that an appeal does lie. However as there are no merits in the appeal it is unnecessary to consider that preliminary point, because even if an appeal lay it would fail. In the result therefore this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Certified for one counsel. Banerjee, J. mdash I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Power of court to rectify register of members and Winding up – Liability as contributories of present and past members
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1951 (1) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Powers of tribunal on hearing petition ... ... ... ... ..... He held that since the vast majority of the shareholders of the firm were in Pakistan, the order of the Assistant Custodian, declaring the firm to be an evacuee firm and taking over its properties is correct. This is obviously wrong. The Assistant Custodian at Madras cannot take over properties belonging to a company registered in Calcutta, i.e., in West Bengal, to which neither the Ordinance nor the Act extends. Then the Custodian went on to make a curious order, namely, that the share of the 25 non-evacuee shareholders in the not assets of the firm will be refunded to them, but they cannot do any business in the name of the firm in this district. Evidently, the Custodian did not realise that in effect he was ordering the winding up of the company. He had no jurisdiction to pass any such order and any proceeding for having the company wound up must be taken only in the High Court at Calcutta. His order also must be, and is hereby, quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1951 (1) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meeting and Proceedings – Representation of corporation at meetings of companies & creditors
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1951 (1) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Meeting and proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to order meeting to be called ... ... ... ... ..... earned counsel for the respondent, objected to the appointment of a chairman by the court on the ground that thereby the court would be interfering with the internal management of the company which it had no jurisdiction to do. But we find that section 79(3) itself contemplates the giving of directions by the court as to the manner in which a meeting of the company can be held and conducted. Section 76 expressly confers on the Court the power to call or direct the calling of a general meeting of the company. If the court can call for a meeting, we presume the court can also appoint a person to conduct that meeting, who will be the chairman to preside over it. We, therefore, modify the order of the learned Judge and direct that the meeting may be conducted by the advocate to be appointed by us in this order who will preside at the meeting as its chairman. He shall also scrutinise the proxies which had been duly deposited in time under article 42 of the Articles of Association.
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1951 (1) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order, Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof and Preferential payments
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1951 (1) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether petitioner has been denied the fundamental right of equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to him by Article 14 of the Constitution.?
Held that:- The discrimination, if any, was not brought about by the two Ordinances, but by the circumstance that there was no Income-tax Act in Nabha and consequently there was no case of assessment pending against any Nabha assessees. In any case the provision that pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities accrued and the proceedings commenced is a reasonable law founded upon a reasonable classification of the assessees which is permissible under the equal protection clause and to which no exception can be taken. In our opinion the grievance of the alleged infringement of fundamental right under Article 14 is not well founded at all.
The protection against imposition or collection of taxes save by authority of law is secured by Article 265 and not by Article 31(1), the questions urged by Dr. Tek Chand do not really arise and it is not necessary to express any opinion on them on this application. Those questions can only arise in appropriate proceedings and not on an application under Article 32. In our judgment this application fails on the simple ground that no fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed either under Article 14 or under Article 31(1) and we accordingly dismiss the petition.
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