|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 280 Records
-
1951 (3) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... returnable date the appellant contended that the sanction of the Central Government was void because it was not given by the Government of the State. On the decision going against him he appealed to the High Court and to the Privy Council. The appellant’s contention having thus failed, the Magistrate proceeded with the trial on the 26th of November, 1949. The only question which is now presented for our decision therefore is whether there was any sanction granted by the Government before the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued the notice under section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code On the 25th March, 1949. To that the clear answer is that the Government had given its sanction for the prosecution of the appellant before that date. It seems to us therefore that the appellant’s contention that the Magistrate had to take cognizance of the offences without the previous sanction of the Government is untenable and the appeal fails. Appeal dismissed
-
1951 (3) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... decree in O. S. No. 4 of 1940 on the file of the Sub-Court, Rajahmendrawaram, would operate as res judicata. It is true that in formulating the points argued before us, we stated that as one of the question that arose for consideration; but in the course of the judgment we did not consider it, as presumably, it was not seriously pressed before us. The facts which we stated before wo formulated the points also indicate that there are absolutely no merits in that point either. In a suit for partition between the mortgagors the plaintiff who was already on record as defendant 19 in his capacity as a lessee applied to be made party as a mortgagee. The petition was dismissed by the Court, though with an observation that he was already on record. But in the judgment it was expressly stated that the validity of the assignment in favour of the plaintiff was left open. In the circumstances no question of res judicata arises. 17. In the result the application is dismissed with costs.
-
1951 (3) TMI 24 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... servant of a licensed victualler having knowingly supplied liquor to a constable on duty without the authority of his superior officer, it was held that the licensed victualler was liable to be convicted although he had no knowledge of the act of his servant. In dealing with the case, Blackburn J. observed thus - "If we hold that there must be a personal knowledge in the licensed person, we should make the enactment of no effect." There are many other cases in England in which the same view has been enunciated, and some of them have been collected and classified in the judgment of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen( 1895 IQB. 918,922), The principle laid down in these cases has been followed in several cases in this country also. In this view, the appeal is allowed in part, and while the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant on the first charge in both the cases are quashed, the conviction and sentence on the third charge in the second case are affirmed.
-
1951 (3) TMI 23 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of their Lordships, the function of subsection(2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is conferred by sub-section (1), and "the rules" which are referred to in the opening sentence of subsection (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub-section (1); the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section(1), as, indeed is expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)". "There can be no doubt--as the learned Judge himself appears to have thought--that the general language of sub-section (1) amply justifies the terms of rule 26, and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned Judge expressed in relation to subsection (2)". This accords with our view of the effect of subsections (1) and (2) of section 3 of the Act. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant’s bail bond is cancelled and he is ordered to surrender. Appeal dismissed.
-
1951 (3) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f the assessee is going to Sathankulam and staying for long periods of time so as to make his mother's house his second home. His business keeps him in Ceylon and his visits to Sathankulam appear to have been sporadic. He has no establishment maintained for him in Sathankulam. The dwelling place at Sathankulam is maintained for the parents of the assessee and not for the assessee himself. The fact that the assessee remits money now and then for the maintenance of his wife or his aged parents does not mean that the dwelling house owned by his mother and in which his parents live becomes a dwelling place maintained for him. He may maintain his wife or parents and from this circumstance it cannot be said that the mother's house is maintained for the assessee. For these reasons we answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the Commissioner of Income-tax. The assessee will get ₹ 250 the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1951 (3) TMI 21 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat the Tribunal should have decided the case on merits and the dismissal of the appeal for default could not be said to be a hearing of the appeal and its determination. The provisions of Section 20 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act are in pari materia with Section 31 of the Indian Income-tax Act. In my opinion the word determination in Section 20(2) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act must be construed to mean a decision on the point raised in the case and not merely an order of dismissal for default. It is clear that the Commissioner acted illegally in dismissing the appeal for default and confirming the assessment without giving reasons in support of his order. For these reasons I would answer the question referred to the High Court in the negative. There will be no order for costs. (1) 1950 18 I.T.R. 928. SARJOO PROSAD, J.-I agree. The reference in both the cases should be answered in the manner indicated and for the reasons stated by my learned brother. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1951 (3) TMI 20 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... de to the department of the Government was not liable to be charged with sales tax. After he was informed of the decision of the Government of Bihar he promptly applied for registration to the appropriate authorities. Learned counsel also referred to a letter dated 22nd December, 1944, addressed by the Sales Tax Officer to the assessee, to the effect that meat was exempt from sales tax and the business need not be registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act (vide Annexure A, printed at page 5 of the paper-book). Upon these facts it is clear that there was no wilful default committed by the assessee within the meaning of Section 10(5) of the Act and the penalty imposed by the Sales Tax Authorities ought not to have been levied. I would therefore answer this question in favour of the assessee. Since the assessee has failed as regards the two questions I hold that he should pay costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. SARJOO PROSAD, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1951 (3) TMI 19 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ction with which the High Court is invested under Section 21 of the Act is of an exceptional nature and is limited by the express terms of the section that the High Court is in seisin of only such question of law as has been duly raised in the state- ment of the case. I do not therefore propose to examine the question raised by Mr. P.R. Das on behalf of the assessee. But it is right to state that in the petition made by the assessee for reference before the Board of Revenue no such question was formulated. In the order of the Board of Revenue at page 16 of the paper book it is mentioned that usual notice had been sent in the prescribed form calling for the return and all relevant documents and such notice was duly issued and served upon the assessee. Upon all these grounds I would answer the questions referred to the High Court in the affirmative. The assessee must pay the cost of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. SARJOO PROSAD, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1951 (3) TMI 18 - VINDHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in the Sales Tax Ordinance may have a chance of criticising the proposed amendment. On notice, it is open to the assessees to inpress upon the Government the inadvisability of the proposed amendment. The law also intends that at the end of the month, Government should reconsider them in the light of public opinion. The amendments having been made without notice and reconsideration they are invalid being in violation of Sec- tion 6(2). In the result I hold that the sales tax was rightly enforced. No direc- tion is called for against the levy of the sales tax. A direction of the nature of the mandamus is issued on the opposite party calling upon them to give effect to Schedule II as it stood originally and not to give effect to the amendments made by the Sales Tax Com- missioner. The applicants having failed over most of their grounds, they should pay costs to the opposite party of Rs. 50 in each of the 2 cases. Applica- tion No.55 is summarily dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
-
1951 (3) TMI 17 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the tax under consideration relates to a period earlier to the amendment. The amendment in Mysore is introduced to remove possible doubts that may be entertained in construing the provisions of the Act. Even without the amendment, this Court had come to the conclusion that criminal Courts have no jurisdiction to question the validity of the tax. The prosecution has proved the liability of the assessees on facts in the first two cases and on law in the last mentioned case. I am, therefore, of opinion that the convic- tion in all the three cases should be upheld. Regarding the sentence, the amount of fine levied in Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 164 and 165 is Rs. 25 each, which is by no means heavy but the levy of Rs. 150 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 290 appears to be rather severe, and I, therefore, reduce it to Rs. 50. In the result, with the modification of sentence in Criminal Revision Petition No. 290, all the petitions fail and are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
-
1951 (3) TMI 16 - HIGH COURT OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN
Winding up - Distribution of property of company ... ... ... ... ..... depositing any amount in the Anchal Savings Bank will arise. All parties shall have their costs from out of the assets in the hands of the liquidator. It is now represented on behalf of the official liquidator that there are shareholders who have not been traced and who may come forward later and claim payment of the moneys to them. We take the view that the surplus amounts in the hands of the liquidator need not be deposited in the Anchal Savings Bank as directed by the Court below. We consider that the proper direction to give is that the liquidator shall deposit amounts in his hands which he has not succeeded in disbursing in the court below to the credit of Company Petition No. 6 of 1120 on the file of the Mavelikara District Court. The court below shall remit it to the treasury as Civil Court Deposit. As and when the shareholders or their legal representatives who claim payment of these moneys come forward it will be open to them to apply to the court below for payment.
-
1951 (3) TMI 13 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called and Restriction on exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, Etc.
-
1951 (3) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Requirements with respect to memorandum and Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... thing which he does not like to do. Should a depositor for a fixed term like to get back his money he will be entitled to get it minus the interest which he must forego or pay as the case may be. (5) If the shareholders of the two banks at meetings properly called want to vary the scheme in any manner they will be entitled to do so, The discharge of the injunction will be subject to these conditions. The opposite party will have their costs of these proceedings in this Court. As to the application for transfer of the case to this Court, both parties agree that this is one of those cases which should be so transferred, with which I agree. I, therefore, order that this case (Suit No. 57 of 1951) pending in the Court of Mr. Y.L. Taneja, Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi, be transferred for trial to this Court. The record is already here and it need not therefore go back. It shall be put up for hearing in due course before such Judge as is appointed by my Lord the Chief Justice.
-
1951 (2) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ; and that the Court of Queen's Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential, has been erroneously found." 7. There can be no doubt that the present case falls within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, because here the Act has entrusted the Controller with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether there is non-payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is non-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Therefore, even if the Controller may be assumed to have wrongly decided the question of non-payment of rent, which by no means is clear, his order cannot be questioned in a civil court. It seems to us that on this short ground this appeal must succeed, and we accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree of the courts below. The appellants will be entitled to costs throughout.
-
1951 (2) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n by Panchayati Adalats or compel them to exercise their jurisdiction & do their duty. They are, therefore, judicially subordinate to this Ct. 23 In view of the apologies tendered by all the three opposite parties I do not think it necessary to take any severe action against any of them. The main responsibility lies on opposite party No. 1 who got the matter published in the paper & he should be saddled with the costs of these proceedings including fee of the learned Govt. Advocate which may be assessed at ₹ 160. Subject to this the apologies may be accepted. Raghubar Dayal, J 24 I agree. 25 By the Court. -- We accept the apology of J. N. Wilson & Kedar Nath Tiwari & cancel the notice issued against them. We find Brij Bhushan Misra guilty of contempt of Ct., but, in view of his apology, pass no order against him except that he should pay the costs of the appct. assessed at ₹ 200 & also the Govt. Advocate his fee, which we assess at ₹ 160.
-
1951 (2) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... e steps to prohibit the transfer to Pakistan of the proceeds of such transfer, if any. In my opinion, the restriction on the power of disposal of immovable property contained in Section 20 of the Ordinance, as it stands, is an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the intending evacuee's right as a citizen under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. It is, however, unnecessary to make any order in this case on that ground, because it is not alleged that there has been any attempt at transfer by the applicant which has not met with approval of the Custodian. 23. As we have held that the applicant was rightly declared to be an intending evacuee within the meaning of the definition in the Ordinance, the only thing we can do at present is to dismiss the application. There will be no order as to costs. 24. The petitioner will have a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution that this case involves a question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
-
1951 (2) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e to reply to the assessees letter dated the 20th April, 1950, asking for extension of time and has thus denied justice to the petitioners firm. No grounds for not granting any extension of time as asked for are forthcoming and in fact there was no express order refusing extension and so the petitioner could not even have the opportunity of taking recourse to Section 33A of the Act and ask the Commissioner to exercise his power of revision (See Moti Lal v. Uttar Pradesh Government where the alternative remedy of appeal could not be availed of because no grounds of the order were forthcoming). In my view this petition should succeed in part and this Rule is made absolute to the extent that the respondent is directed to forbear from taking any steps or further steps for enforcing the notice of demand dated the 30th March, 1950, issued under Section 29 of the Act until the disposal of the appeal. The petitioners are entitled to costs of the present proceedings. Petition allowed.
-
1951 (2) TMI 23 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t be deemed to be an order prejudicial to the assessee. 4. It was contended by the applicant's advocate that as no proviso analogous to the 2nd proviso contained in Section 33A of the Indian Income-tax Act has been enacted in the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1939, the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council cannot be said to apply to ascertain the meaning of words used in Section 28(2) of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act. We are unable to accept this contention. The relevant words in Section 28(2) of the Assam Act, namely, "an order under section 27 enhancing an assessment or otherwise prejudicial to him" must bear the same interpretation as has been put upon them by their Lordships of the Privy Council on words used in Section 33 of the Indian Income-tax Act. 5. The result is that we decline to order the Assam Board of Agricultural Income-tax to state the case to this Court. The petition is rejected with costs. Ram Labhaya, J. - I agree.
-
1951 (2) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the kinds of transfer contemplated in that section. Similarly, Section 12 implies that lease is a transfer of property. Illustration (a) to Section 25 is of a lease of a farm & so is also the illustration to Section 43. If a lease of property were not to be regarded as a transfer of property within the meaning of Chap. II, a considerable difficulty would be caused by not applying provisions like those in Sections 43, 62, etc., to such a transfer. We must, therefore, hold that the transfer of Immovable property contemplated by Section 53A includes a transfer by lease." 10. Having regard to all the considerations which we have set out above, we have come to the conclusion that the lease is a transfer of Immovable property within the meaning of Section 53A, T. P. Act. We are of opinion, therefore, that the decisions arrived at by all the Cts. below as well as by Bavdekar J. in second appeal were correct & this Letters Patent appeal should be dismissed with costs.
-
1951 (2) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... year" as so determined for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1938, and that for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1939; or (d)the "previous year" as so determined for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1939, and that for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1940 Provided that in no case shall any period of less than nine months be taken as a standard period". In the present case the standard periods are 1936-37 and 1038-39. For the reasons given above, in our view, the Excess Profits Tax Officer was wrong in his mode of calculation. He first went into the question of status of the assessee under Section 4A, while determining the income under Section 10 for the standard period. That is clearly wrong under Rule 1 of the Schedule. In our view, the Tribunal was right and the sum of ₹ 66,386 cannot be ignored from calculation of profits for the standard period. We answer the question in the affirmative. Harries, C.J.-I agree.
....
|
