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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 706 Records
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1961 (12) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the dividend income of ₹ 11,09,332 received from the Binod Mills was chargeable under the War Profits Tax Ordinance ?
Held that:- The dividend received by the respondent from the Binod Mills Ltd. was properly included by the assessing authorities in the computation of the taxable profit of the respondent under the Ordinance and that the High Court erred in answering the reference in favour of the assessee. We have already pointed out that the High Court did not deal with or express any opinion on the two subsidiary contentions urged by the respondent with reference to the first question. Those points were also naturally not argued before us and we do not express any opinion on them. It is obvious that the reference cannot be disposed of without deciding these contentions and the case would have to be remanded to the High Court for dealing with these subsidiary points. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of ₹ 40,000 paid to Mr. J. H. Philips on his retirement from the service of the company was not an admissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 ?
Held that:- The proper test to apply in this case is, was the payment made as a matter of practice which affected the quantum of salary or was there an expectation by the employee of getting a gratuity or was the sum of money expended on the ground of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business. But this has not been shown and therefore the amount claimed is not a deductible item under section 10(2)(xv). Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (12) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether under section 54(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, no court shall be entitled to require the appellant to produce before it the said documents as they formed part of the record of an assessment proceeding taken before the relevant income-tax authority?
Held that:- We cannot accept the argument of learned counsel that the order directing the production of the documents was made under section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that that section is not hit by the prohibition under section 54 of the Income-tax Act. This argument is advanced on the basis that the non abstante clause in sub-section (1) of section 54 of the Income-tax Act only relates to the Indian Evidence Act and not to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The non abstante clause cannot restrict the embargo placed on the court under section 54 of the Income-tax Act : the said clause only operates to make it clear that the said general ban prevails notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Evidence Act. That apart, section 54 of the Income-tax Act contains in effect an unconditional prohibition against a public servant producing any such document, and that prohibition does not exclude any criminal process from its operation. We, therefore, hold that there are no merits in this contention either. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (12) TMI 2 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AT DELHI
Natural justice - Speaking order - Personal hearing ... ... ... ... ..... ation of the material upon which these two authorities acted. Furthermore, the Collector of Customs, Visakhapatnam, did not give the petitioners a hearing or an opportunity of representing their case and rebutting or explaining the material upon which he acted. There appears to me to be no adequate reason why the quotations given in the trade journals for Calcutta could be accepted as the final word in determining the prices available at Visakhapatnam. I would, therefore, accept these petitions and direct that re-assessment be made in the light of the observations made in the judgment. In the Bombay case referred to above a direction was given by Chagla C.J. that the petitioners would have an opportunity of filing appeals against the reassessment and the limitation would start from the date upon which reassessment was made. I would make a similar order in this case also. The petitioners will recover costs of these petitions which we assess at a consolidated figure of Rs. 500.
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1961 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the terms of Rule 10A of the Excise Rules, 1944 were insufficient to cover the cases of the appellants and that in consequence the demand made on them and the attempt to recover the sums by resort to the coercive process provided for by Section 11 of the Central Excise Act was illegal and without statutory authority?
Held that:- a duty of excise is a tax-levy on home-produced goods of a specified class or description, the duty being calculated according to the quantity or value of the goods and which is levied because of the mere fact of the goods having been produced or manufactured and unrelated to and not dependent on any commercial transaction in them. The duty in the present case satisfies this test and therefore it is unnecessary to seek other grounds for sustaining the validity of the tax.
The words "deficiency in duty if the duty has for any reason been short-levied" are, in our opinion, wide enough to include cases of deficiency arising like those in the circumstances of the present case, viz., where 8 annas out of the 14 annas of the duty has been collected in the first instance but 6 annas remains to be collected. We consider, therefore, that there is no substance in the objection that Rule 10A is not wide enough to cover the recovery of the duty from the appellants. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (11) TMI 87 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ighbour or co-partner a peaceful and comfortable life and avoids litigation and ensures homogenous society, and, therefore, such a limitation imposed. by the law of pre-emption cannot but be regarded as reasonable in the interest of the general public. I am fortified in this view by the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of Sardha Ram, AIR 1960 Punj 196 (FB), above-mentioned, which, on a review of various authorities has laid down that the restrictions imposed by the law of pre-emption are reasonable in the interests of the general public. From this point of view, also, there is no infringement of Article 39(1)(f) of the Constitution. 18. In sum, it must he held that the customary law of pre-emption is constitutional and valid. Accordingly, I would answer the question in the negative and dismiss the appeal. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. Vaidynathier Ramaswami, C. J. 19. I agree. R.K. Choudhary, J. 20. I agree.
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1961 (11) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... so as to pass title thereof to the addressee. If, on the other hand, the facts and circumstances of the case disclose an implied request by the creditors to send cheques by post, the post office would be constituted as agent of the address for the purpose of receiving payments. 23. There can be little doubt in the present case that there was an implied request by the assessee to the Government of India to send the cheques by post. They were so sent and they were duly accepted during all the three years of account. It must, therefore, be held that payments made by the Government of India in respect of articles delivered to the military department under this category should be held to have taken place at New Delhi, that is, within the taxable territories. 24. We, therefore, answer the second question referred to us also in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Advocates ₹ 250. 25. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (11) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion in respect in respect of interest on capital and owner service. IT this principal that by adopted both by the Assistant Controller and by the Central Board of revenue, the former at three years' purchase while the latter reducing it to nearly less than half thereof. It is no doubt true true if one of the two methods recognised in "Diamonds Death Duties" 13th Edn. 511 were to be adopted, allowance has got to be made for interest on capital. But under that method the number of years purchase will have to be increased. Taking the entire circumstances into consideration we cannot say that the procedure adopted by the Central Board of Revenue is opposed to sound principles of accounting. While answering the question referred to us in T. C. No. 81 of 1960 in manner indicated above we hold that the assessment of value of the goodwill attached to Ambi's Cafe by the Central Board of Revenue is Unassailable. There will be no order as to costs. Answer accordingly.
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1961 (11) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the respondent in redressing the said grievance is outside the scope of the Act, and therefore beyond the powers conferred on it by s. 5. The proper remedy in such a case may be to make a comprehensive reference of the dispute to the competent industrial tribunal and invite the tribunal to make a proper award in that behalf. We are, therefore, inclined to take the view that cls. 3 to 7 which form an integral scheme are outside the purview of the powers conferred on the respondent by s. 5 of the Act and must therefore be declared to be ultra vires. It is common-ground that these clauses are severable from cls. 1 and 2 and that their invalidity does not affect the validity of the said two clauses. 27. In the result Civil Appeals Nos. 415 and 417 are allowed and Civil Appeals Nos. 416 and 418 are dismissed. Respondent to pay the costs of the petitioners in Civil Appeals Nos. 415 and 417. One set of hearing costs. 28. C.A. Nos. 415, 417 allowed. 29. C.A. Nos. 416, 418 dismissed.
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1961 (11) TMI 83 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -section (2) does not come into play. 15. It seems to us that on the principle laid down in this decision, in so far as the assessee is concerned, there was no income which could come within the ambit of any tax law in any of the previous years in question. There could accordingly be nothing against which any adjustment or set off could be made in any of those years. As has been pointed out, unless the loss could be computed under section 24(1) of the Act, there could be question of any carrying forward under section 24(2) . In our opinion, at not time prior to the introduction of the Indian Income Tax Act was the assessee in receipt of any income which could be brought within the scope of section 24 of the Act. It follows that there could be no computation of a loss under such circumstances or its carry forward under section 24(2). 16. We answer the questions against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsels fee ₹ 250. Order accordingly.
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1961 (11) TMI 82 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... came entitled to the stock-in-trade as owners by virtue of the bequest, there was no cost value to them and that they could, therefore, adopt the market value of the goods as the basis of valuation of stock-in-trade. We cannot see how the principles of that decision can at all apply to the present case where the assessee himself was a partner in the firm and continued the business, after the retirement of the other partner, Shantilal Navalchand. There is no question in the present case of an owner putting his property into the business for the first time. The business continued uninterrupted, there having been only the retirement of a partner. There was continuity in regard to the assets and liabilities of the old firm. The assessee would, therefore, be entitled to write off such of the debts as had become bad and irrecoverable during the year of account. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee, who will be entitled to his costs.
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1961 (11) TMI 81 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y improbable that the statute should not go on to make that liability effective. A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable". The result, therefore, is that a penalty can be properly imposed under sub-section (1) of section 46 on a legal representative where the tax due under an assessment made on his deceased predecessor or under an assessment made against him under section 246(2) is not paid and the default is committed by the legal representative in regard to the payment of such tax. I may mention that I am supported in this view by the learned authors of the treatise on The Law and Practice of Income-tax by Sir Jamshedji Kanga and Palkhivala. It follows that there is no force in the second point of the learned counsel also and it must be overruled. For the reasons stated above the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1961 (11) TMI 80 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... contract. The contract was a contract of lease and there was a transfer. But a right to eject a tenant arises from that, and it is not independent of the lease and therefore, I cannot accept Mr. Ghose's argument that a right to eject a tenant is not a right arising from a contract or that a lease ends with the transfer of property. It arises out of a contract, though ejectment is not a term of the contract for the enforcement of which the present suit has been instituted. Evidently the contract is for tenancy and if the term of tenancy is terminated, a suit can be filed and therefore, this suit is intimately connected with the contract and arises from the contract and is not independent of the contract. 11. In that view of the matter, I must allow the appeals with costs, set aside the judgment of the appeal court, restore that of the trial court and direct that the suits should be dismissed. 12. Leave to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent asked for is granted.
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1961 (11) TMI 79 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or artificial income, as provided in the Schedule to the Act." Again in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Crown Life Insurance Co. 1956 30 ITR 365 it was held that where the assessee derived income from securities as profits or gains from the insurance business and not of any other business, and as the profits or gains from insurance business could only be computed in accordance with the Schedule to the Income-tax Act, and not in accordance with section 12 the income could not be assessed under section 12. It seems to us accordingly that the contention of the assessee in the present case that despite the mode of computation enjoined by the Schedule, the income is still attributable to the several heads of income and is consequently eligible for the various exemptions and deductions contemplated in the other parts of the Act cannot be supported by authority. We answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
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1961 (11) TMI 78 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this being incidental to the admission of the benefits of the partnership, interest paid cannot be properly excluded from the income of the minors. Consequently, the interest paid also is includible in the income of the minors under section 16(3) of the Act. In Chouthmal Kejriwal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1961 41 ITR 570. Sinha C.J. and Mehrotra J. decided that when a minor was admitted to the benefits of he partnership in a firm in which his father was a partner and the minor had supplied capital, any income accruing to the minor as interest in the capital was an indirect result of his being admitted to the benefits of partnership and had to be included in the total income of his father under the provisions of section 16(3)(a)(ii ) of the Income-tax Act. We express our respectful assent to this principle. It follows, on this question the view of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is correct. The second question is answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1961 (11) TMI 77 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h disposition as is mentioned in Section 10-A, or for that matter in Section 16, of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act. 25. To sum up my conclusions on the arguments presented before us are- (1) that when land is owned jointly by members of a joint Hindu family and the question of surplus area under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (X of 1953) arises, the share of each individual owner in the land is to be considered; (2) that when a member of a joint Hindu family owning land jointly with others claims that he has only a particular share in it, he is entitled to prove that fact by all legal evidence and such proof cannot be confined to the entries in the record-of-rights; and (3) that when a partition of joint family property occurs, there is in law no transfer or other disposition of property within the meaning of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act. 26. With these conclusions the present writ petitions can be placed before a Single Bench for final decision.
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1961 (11) TMI 76 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessment, for very many repairs have the result of enabling income to be earned in future years as well as in the year in which they are effected." For these reasons we hold that all the three questions referred to the High Court in this case must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Income Tax department. In other words, the assessee is entitled to deduct the expenditure of ₹ 31,955 and ₹ 11,400 incurred as cost of replacement of the sleepers for the assessment years 1951-52 and 1952-53, respectively, and deduct the expenditure of ₹ 7,511 for replacement of parts of the boilers for the assessment year 1951-52 and the expenditure of ₹ 15,921 incurred as cost of two new fire-boxes and for reconditioning of boilers of two old locomotives for the assessment year 1952-53. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. There will be a consolidated hearing fee of ₹ 250 for both the cases. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (11) TMI 75 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the end of every three years and will be eligible for re-election." (xi) In the event it becomes necessary for the Company to increase the number of its Directors beyond the maximum fixed by its Articles, in pursuance of any direction of the Industrial Finance Corporation of India to appoint more than one director, then this order shall not prejudice the right of the Company to alter its Articles to provide such increase in accordance with the provisions of law. (xii) The Company is restrained from taking any steps for further increase of share capital in future in any manner before giving effect to this order. (xiii) The Company shall immediately send a copy of the order made herein to the Registrar of Companies, Orissa, Cuttack. (xiv) Liberty to the parties to apply to this Court. 56. The petition for reliefs prayed for herein is accordingly, allowed in terms as aforesaid. In the circumstances of the case, each party to pay its own costs in this proceeding throughout.
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1961 (11) TMI 74 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e dated September 7, 1959, was barred by limitation. It also appears to me that in a matter like this, apart from the provisions of section 35(5), there is an inherent power in the Income-tax Officer to correct at least such an error as occurred in this case, by reason of the fact that proceedings before an Income-tax Officer are judicial proceedings and partake of all the incidents of such proceedings vide Suraj Mall Mohta v. A.V. Visvanath Sastri 1954 26 I.T.R. 1, 13; 1955 1 S.C.R. 448. The possession of an inherent power of correction of an inadvertent error is one of the incidents of such proceedings. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was held to possess such power in Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1952 22 I.T.R. 104, 108. It follows that the rectification of the mistake committed by the Income-tax Officer could properly be made by him by the impugned ORDER. The writ petition has no force and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (11) TMI 73 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Tribunal legally give any "direction" within the meaning of the second proviso to section 34(3). So far as the other three sums of monies are concerned the Tribunal made it clear that the petitioner had not concern with these three sums of monies and if these there sums of monies were liable to be taken into consideration they could be considered only in the assessment of a person other than the petitioner. It follows that reliance in respect of these three sums of monies also could not be based on the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34. It has not been sought to be argued on behalf of the income-tax department that if the proviso is not applicable the notices are not beyond time. The result, therefore, is that this writ petition must succeed. It is accordingly allowed. A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the two notices under section 34 dated September 7, 1959. The petitioner shall be entitled to the costs of the petition. Petition allowed.
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