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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 827 Records
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1962 (11) TMI 63 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in, the same Law Lord in the course of his opinion referred to with approval the dictum in Ryall v. Hoare 1923 2 K.B. 447, 454, namely, "...a casual profit made on an isolated purchase and sale, unless merged with similar transactions in the carrying on of a trade or business is not liable to tax" and also the following dictum of Lawrence L.J. in Leeming v. Jones 1930 1 K.B. 279, 362 "It seems to me in the case of an isolated transaction of purchase and re-sale of property there is really no middle course open. It is either an adventure in the nature of trade, or else it is simply a case of sale and re-sale of property." In the light of these decisions and the authoritative pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Saroj Kumar Muzumdar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1959 37 I.T.R. 242., we have no hesitation in answering the question referred to us in the negative with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (11) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... al's marriage no consideration passed from the bridegroom to the bride's father, the father must be held to have made a gift of the girl to the bridegroom. To put in other words there was 'Kanyadhan' in Bangaru Ammal's marriage. We therefore reject this contention. Lastly reliance is placed on the conduct of the appellant in not questioning the correctness of the finding given by the learned Subordinate judge in his application for delivery that the marriage was in Asura form. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to explain his conduct but in our opinion nothing turns upon it. If the marriage was not in Asura form as we held it was not, the conduct of the appellant could not possibly make it an Asura marriage. In this view it is not necessary to give opinion on the other questions raised in the appeals. In the result the decrees of the High Court are set aside and both the suits are dismissed with costs throughout. One hearing fee. Appeals allowed
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1962 (11) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted without being used or consumed in the municipal area. In this view of the matter it was not necessary for the Municipality to follow the procedure for imposing taxes when the section was amended. The tax still remained the same. Its nature, incidence or rate were not altered. In our opinion, the company was liable to pay octroi tax on goods brought into local area, (a) to be consumed by itself or sold by it to consumers direct and (b) for sale to dealers who in their turn sold the goods to consumers within the municipal area irrespective of whether such consumers bought them for use in the area or outside it. The company was, however, not liable to octroi in respect of goods which it brought into the local area and which were re-exported. But to enable the company to save itself from tax in that case it had to follow the procedure laid down by rules for refund of taxes. For the reasons above stated this appeal must fail. It will be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... satisfied that the assessee's principal place of business since 1955 is Hyderabad, and that he accordingly determined the place of business as Hyderabad and falling within the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer, Wealth-tax Circle, Hyderabad. The notice of assessment specified therein dealt with the assessment of Devidayal & Co., unregistered firm for the years 1960-61 to 1961-62 and on the individual for the said years 1960-61 and 1961-62 under the Income-tax Act, the Wealth- tax Act and the Expenditure-tax Act. Apart from this, there is a notice under section 34 for the year 1952-53. In any case, as we have stated, we are not called upon to consider that question in this writ petition, because it is the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to determine the place of business that is challenged, and we are of the view that that order is valid and cannot be quashed. In this view, the petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ringed. But it cannot be forgotten that in the first instance Government of the State admitted the ’Provincialised’ teachers into a single unit of employment and thereafter by retrospective provision they have sought to provide a differential treatment between the two sections constituting one unit. It is against this differential treatment that the protection of Art. 16 is claimed and in our judgment avails. In our view the High Court was right in holding that the rules in so far as they provide for differential treatment between the members of the’ State Cadre’ and the ’Provincialised Cadre’ in the matter of promotion to the higher scale must be regarded as invalid. The appeal must therefore fail. BY COURT In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court striking down r. 2(d) and (e) and r. 3 in so far as it relates to promotions is set aside. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.
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1962 (11) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ome-tax purposes is not of any relevance in the present case, for one reason, the said owner did not say so in his evidence and for the other, it was not indicated in the charge or in the evidence. In the charge framed, she was alleged to have defrauded the insurance company and the only evidence given was that if it was disclosed that Nalini was a minor, the insurance company might not have paid the money. But as we have pointed out earlier, the entire transaction was that of Dr. Vimla and it was only put through in the name of her made minor daughter for reasons best known to herself. On the evidence as disclosed, neither was she benefited nor the insurance company incurred loss in any sense of the term. In the result, we allow the appeal and hold that the appellant was not guilty of the offence under ss. 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction and sentence passed on her are set aside. Fine, if paid, is directed to be refunded to the appellant, Appeal allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f 1952 is struck down as unconstitutional and of no force and effect. We may add, however, that learned counsel for the respondents has stated before us that if a claim is made even now under Chap. II by the petitioner within thirty days of our judgment, even though it' may be time-barred as from the date of the proclamation issued under S. 6, the Forest Settlement Officer will entertain it and consider the claim as required under Chap. II. We therefore allow the petition in part and strike down the U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, No. XV of 1952 as unconstitutional. The rest of the prayers in the petition are rejected, subject to the petitioner being free to take such steps as may be open to him in law to establish his right whatever it may be under the registered lease of June 1952 and subject to the State having the right to contest the said claim. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs oft this petition. Petition allowed in part.
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1962 (11) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... slature. We must therefore hold that the Validation Act is not ultra vires the powers of the legislature under entry 54, for the reason that it operates retrospectively." The State Lagislature has power to levy a fee under the Seventh Schedule, List III, Item 28 read with item 47. The Legislature was, therefore, competent to levy a fee for rendering services in connection with the maintenance, supervision and control over the religious institutions and it was competent to levy the fee retrospectively. If the amounts received by the State have been expressly regarded as fee collected by the Commissioner tinder the provisions as amended and account has to be made on that footing between the Government and the Commissioner, challenge to the vires of s. 82 (2) must fail. In our view the High Court was right in declaring ss. 52(1)(f), 55, 76(1) & (2), 80, 81.,and 82 intra vires. The appeals therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d one because with the efflux of 3 or 5 years' period, they will automatically come under the scheme framed under the Act. The operation of s. 17 has already been discussed, and it has already been indicated that an establishment coming under the exemptions granted or to be granted under s. 17 does not mean that the establishment bears less burden of its share of contribution to the fund. It has not been contended before us that the petitioners' establishment does not come within the general rule laid down in s. 1 (3) of the Act or within the scope of the scheme framed under s. 5. It is equally clear that all hotels and restaurants come within' the scope of the notification impugned in this case. Hence, there is absolutely no reason for complaint that the petitioners' establishment of that class has been chosen for hostile discrimination. As all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners fail, the petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 54 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... provision. Reading the deed of wakf as a whole, the dominant intention appears to be charitable. The question which we are asked to answer is the following "Whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, on a true construction of the several clauses of the trust deed dated July 6, 1953, as a whole the income of the assessee is exempt from taxation under section 4(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act?" In view of what we have stated above, our answer to the question is in the affirmative. The learned Advocate-General, who appears for the Commissioner of Income-tax, intimated to us that the correct copy of the deed of wakf was never supplied to the department and that reliance was only placed on the translation which, in our view, is incorrect in material particulars. In this view of the matter, we consider that the fair order to make as regards costs would be that each party should bear its own costs and we order accordingly. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (11) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inserted so that after the amendment the rule that a suit by a creditor should be brought in a representative capacity would apply as much to a suit set aside a summary order under O. 21, r. 63, as to other suits. It was not suggested that there was anything in the terms of the amended s. 53 (1) which referred to a defence to a suit and, in fact, learned Counsel did not contend that if a defence under s. 53 (1) could be raised by defeated attaching-creditor such a defence had to be in a representative capacity, and we consider that learned Counsel was correct in this submission. From a provision as to how a plaintiff, if he filed a suit, should frame it, we can see no logical process by which it could be held that a defendant cannot impugn the validity of the sale which is voidable at his instance. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the legal point urged on behalf of the appellant. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed,
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1962 (11) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the rule can be said to be valid and the practice prevailing irregular inasmuch as in some cases security may perhaps have been demanded from the petitioner without full examina- tion as to the special features of the case?
Whether the rule cannot be sustained in so far as it vests the discretion in the highest Court of this country and can be used only in cases where for reasons like those contemplated by Order 25 r. 1 & 2 and 0.41 r. 10 an order of security is made?
Held that:- It is true that if the discretion is exercised by the Court in favour of impecunious petitioners and orders for security are not passed in their cases, no hardship will be caused to them. But it seems to us that what would be left to the discretion of the Court on this construction of the rule, is really a matter of the right of impecunious petitioners under Art. 32. That is why we think that the impugned rule in so far as it relates to the giving of security cannot be sustained.
The petition is allowed and the order passed against the petitioners on December 12, 1961, calling upon them to furnish security of ₹ 2,500/- is set aside.
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1962 (11) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant is liable to pay excise duty on the cloth and yarn manufactured and produced by it in accordance with the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 which provisions were extended to the territory of the State of Rajasthan on April 1, 1950.
Whether the same appellant if liable to pay income-tax in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 from the date on which those provisions were extended to the territory of the State of Rajasthan?
Held that:- Appeal rejected. The question of frustration of the contract was canvassed and gone into. The courts found that the contract was frustrated. In view of the findings it is now unnecessary to consider that question.
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1962 (11) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Application under article 226 of the Constitution made by the respondent-assessee for a writ quashing an order of assessment made under section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 questioned - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. State sought leave to contend that the order of July 30, 1957, could be supported under section 35 of the Income tax Act. This leave was refused for such a point was not raised in the court below and the action by the revenue authorities had expressly been taken under section 34 of the Act.
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1962 (11) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case it was necessary for the Income-tax Officer to initiate action under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act in order to tax the deemed income distributed by virtue of the order under section 23A(1) of the Act made in the case of the A. C. E. C Private (India) Ltd. ?
If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative whether the notice served on 1st April, 1954, was out of time ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As an assessment cannot be made under section 23A of the Act because that section does not make provision for an assessment to be made and assessment can only be made under section 34 of the Act. Answer given by the High Court to the second question was correct and the assessment made under section 34(1)(b) of the Act after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was out of time.
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1962 (11) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on its true construction, subsection (10) of section 35 applies in a case where a company declares dividends by availing itself wholly or partly of the amount on which a rebate of income tax was earlier allowed to it under clause (i) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part 1 of the relevant Schedules to the Finance Acts, when such dividends were declared prior to the coming into force of the sub-section, that is prior to April 1, 1956?
Whether sub-section (10) can apply to an assessment which had been made before sub-section (10) came into force?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Interpretation of section 35(10) as opined in the judgment of the High Court was right. Unable, to agree with the respondent that the language of sub-section (10) by necessary implication takes the legal fiction back to a period earlier than April 1, 1956
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1962 (11) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the right to refund was a right existing an September 1, 1956?
Whether it appertained to the life insurance business of the appellant within the meaning of section 7?
Whether the right to the refund was one appertaining to the life insurance business?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As considered as a separate business no tax would have been payable out of its assets and so, as between the two departments, no part of its income was liable to be applied in payment of the tax. The entire amount of Rs. 3,245.25 should be refunded to it. The balance which must represent the deduction out of the income of the life insurance business or an amount treated as paid in respect of that business and therefore appertaining to it, should be made over to the respondent Corporation. This is the view taken by the Tribunal and with it we agree
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1962 (11) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
Whether provisions of Explanation 2 added to section 5 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act are discriminatory against agricultural income from rubber plantations?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The provision for the computation of agricultural income from tea plantations has to be different and is to be found in the Rules made under section 59(3) of the Income-tax Act for determining the proportions of agricultural income and income from business in the entire income from the sale of tea. The difference in the provisions for the computation of agricultural income from tea plantations and from rubber plantations is therefore based on good reasons. Thus the provisions of Explanation 2 are not discriminatory against agricultural income from rubber plantations.
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1962 (11) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the proportionate profits on the sale proceeds aggregating. Rs. 9,53,304 for the assessment year I94I-42 and Rs. 6,04,588 for the assessment year I942-43 or any part thereof were received by or on behalf of the assessee company in British India ?
whether the order passed asking for a supplemental statement with a direction for taking additional evidence was permissible to the High Court under section 66(4) of the Income-tax Act?
Held that:- The Appellate Tribunal held that the income did not accrue to the assessee in Baroda State but did not decide the question whether she was entitled to the benefit of the Taxation Concessions Order. The High Court field that the Taxation Concessions Order did not apply to the assessee but did not decide the question as to whether the income had accrued to the assessee in Baroda State. Thus, the Appellate Tribunal raised one question and the High Court answered another. This court held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in going out of the point raised by the Appellate Tribunal and decided a different point of law and that section 66 of the Income-tax Act empowered the High Court to answer a question of law arising out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal and it did not confer any jurisdiction to decide a different question of law not arising out of such order but it was possible that the same question of law may involve different facts and the High Court could amplify the question to take in all the facts but the question must still be one arising out of the Appellate Tribunal's order which was before the Tribunal or was decided by it. It could not decide an entirely different question.
The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Tribunal to submit a supplemental statement of the case aftertaking additional evidence.
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1962 (11) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT
Praying for a declaration that the Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1961 enacted by the Kerala State Legislature, is null and void - that the State's power to tax income from tea to agricultural income-tax is limited to taking 60% of the income computed for the purpose of the Indian Income-tax Act as if it were income derived from business and for the issue of appropriate orders to the respondents, viz., the State of Kerala.
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Declare that Explanation 2 to section 5 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act added by the Amendment Act does not cover the expenses incurred in the upkeep or maintenance of immature tea plants from which no income has been derived during an accounting year and that the agricultural income derived from tea plantations will be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Income tax Rules - writ be issued to the respondents restraining them, their agents and servants, from enforcing or acting upon the provisions of Explanation 2 to section 5 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act against the Karimtharuvi Tea Estates Ltd., Kottayam, viz., petitioner No. 1.
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