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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 827 Records
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1962 (12) TMI 38 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hole of which the business could have been carried on. It was to meet this situation that the proviso to rule 39(1) was framed. There is no inconsistency between the provisions of the statute and the proviso to rule 39(1). The latter operates in a field not occupied by any of the relevant statutory provisions, and was framed to provide for circumstances for which there was no provision elsewhere. We, therefore, hold that the proviso to rule 39(1) is not ultra vires on the ground on which it has been struck down by the judge (Revisions). Accordingly, our answer to both limbs of the first question is in the affirmative. The second question is merely an amplification of the first. We answer that also in the affirmative. There shall be no order as to costs. We further direct that a copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax and the Commissioner of Sales Tax. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (12) TMI 37 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sales Tax Act, 1947, was held to be legal, not requiring the assent of the President (vide Motipur Zamindary Company (Private) Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Another ). The Travancore-Cochin High Court has also held that rule 7(1)(k) and rule 20(2) of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Rules, which do not impose any direct and immediate restrictions on the freedom of trade, would not be hit by Article 301 (vide A.V. Fernandez v. State(2)). 10.. On a careful consideration of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the decisions referred to above, we have no hesitation in holding that the amendment does not contravene any of the provisions in Part XIII of the Constitution and as such the introduction of the Bill effecting the amendment did not require the prior sanction of the President. 11.. In the result, we hold that there in no substance in any of the contentions raised by the petitioner. The petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f all this the real nature of the nuts was left intact. The process to which bristles were subjected by the assessee does not differ in essence from the process to which arecanuts were subjected in that case. We find that the case is not governed by the explanation II(ii) to section 2(h) and the proceeds of sale of bristles were not to be included in the assessee s turnovers for the assessment years. The question is answered in the negative. Since reported as Badri Prasad Prabha Shanker and Another v. Sales Tax Commissioner U.P., Lucknow 1963 14 S.T.C. 208. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., as required by section 11 (6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the Commissioner, Sales Tax, shall get his costs of this reference, which we assess at Rs. 100 from the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (12) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f all this the real nature of the nuts was left intact. The process to which bristles were subjected by the assessee does not differ in essence from the process to which arecanuts were subjected in that case. We find that the case is not governed by the explanation II(ii) to section 2(h) and the proceeds of sale of bristles were not to be included in the assessee s turnovers for the assessment years. The question is answered in the negative. Since reported as Badri Prasad Prabha Shanker and Another v. Sales Tax Commissioner U.P., Lucknow 1963 14 S.T.C. 208. We direct that copies of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar to the judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., as required by section 11 (6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. We further direct that the Commissioner, Sales Tax, shall get his costs of this reference, which we assess at Rs. 100 from the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (12) TMI 34 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , 1954, and the relevant registration certificate returned to the Excise and Taxation Office and that no business of whatsoever nature was conducted by the said concern after 28th October, 1954. These two annexures clearly do not afford sufficient material to justify the conclusion that the Assessing Authority had not proceeded to the best judgment assessment till 4th October, 1961, or within three years. Tax laws in our country are largely premised or based on the theory of self-assessment and the taxpayer usually makes out his return computing the tax on it and files the return and pays the tax. It naturally calls for and requires honesty from a great majority of the taxpayers in order to make the tax administration feasible. In this background also this Court should be slow in interfering on writ side with the departmental proceedings intended to investigate into the dealings of the assessees. This petition thus also fails and is dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the whole from being proceeds of sale. It has been held in Messrs George Oakes v. State of Madras 1962 13 S.T.C. 98 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1352. and George Oakes (Private) Ltd. v. State of Madras 1961 12 S.T.C. 476 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1037. that a dealer s turnover includes the sales tax realised by him from buyers. Weighing dues are not distinct from sales tax in this respect. Sales tax is realised in addition to the price and for payment to the State still it is to be included in proceeds of sale and there is no justification for not including weighing dues. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. Copies of this judgment should be sent to the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, U.P., and the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar as required by section 11(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The assessee should pay to the Commissioner the costs of this reference, which is assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (12) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r. In addition, disputed questions of fact were in issue and this Court declined to issue the writ prayed for when the assessee had other special remedies open to him. In this appeal, this Court is exercising its jurisdiction under the Madras Sales Tax Act, so that the scope of its powers is certainly wider than in the case of writ jurisdiction. On an examination of the facts in the present case, we are clearly of the view that the inference that could properly be drawn from the materials that were available was certainly the one that was in fact drawn by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The inference reached by the Board that the assessee should have collected this additional tax in a disguised form is not one which naturally flows from the material, from whatever point of view that material might be considered. It follows that the order of the Board cannot be sustained. The petition is allowed. The appellant will get its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
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1962 (12) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appropriation of goods amounted to transfer of property by the retail dealer to another person?
Whether such transfer amounted in law to sale?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The levy and collection of sales tax on motor spirits and lubricants consumed by the company cannot therefore be regarded as illegal unless it is found that the goods were of the ownership of the company, and for reasons already set out the question whether the goods consumed belonged to the company must be left to be determined under the Act. The first question raised in the petition cannot therefore be determined by this Court as it could not be determined by the High Court.
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1962 (12) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the company is liable to pay sales tax in respect of goods consumed for its motor vehicles during the period in question?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. If it is competent to the Sales Tax Officer to adopt a proceeding, to bring to tax consumption of goods by the company for its own vehicles, relying upon the first part of the definition of "retail sale" in section 2(1), because of the terms of the agreement and other relevant surrounding circumstances, it will be open to him to do so.
The petition will therefore be allowed and a writ will issue declaring that the order of assessment made by the first respondent dated December 26, 1960, in so far as it relates to levy of tax on motor spirit and lubricants consumed during the period of assessment for the vehicles of the company is invalid. The respondents will pay the costs of this petition to the company.
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1962 (12) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellants were personally liable to refund the amount paid to them?
Held that:- by section 15 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Life Insurance Corporation is entitled to demand that any amount paid over to any person without consideration, and not reasonably necessary for the purposes of the controlled business of the insurer be ordered to be refunded, and by sub-section (2) authority is conferred upon the Tribunal to make such order against any of the parties to the application as it thinks just having regard to the extent to which those parties were respectively responsible for transaction or benefited from it and all the circumstances of the case. The trustees as representing the trust have benefited from the payment. The amount was, it is common ground, not disposed of before the Corporation demanded it from the appellants, and if with notice of the infirmity in the resolution, the trustees proceeded to deal with the fund to which the trust was not legitimately entitled, in our judgment, it would be open to the Tribunal to direct the trustees personally to repay the amount received by them and to which they were not lawfully entitled. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (12) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Annual Return – Penalty for not filing ... ... ... ... ..... is that the offence is a continuing one. Under section 162 of the Companies Act, if a company fails to comply with any of the provisions contained in section 159, 160 or 161 of the Companies Act, every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine of Rs. 50 for every day during which the default continues. The company would be committing offences as soon as it fails to submit annual return or balance-sheet and it is liable to be prosecuted. But if in spite of conviction the company fails to comply with the provisions of the Act it is liable to be punished with a fine of Rs. 50 for each day s default. But in this case the petitioner has been acquitted of the offences under sections 162 and 220 of the Companies Act and there is no question of further default. The plea of autrefois acquit raised by the petitioner is well founded and it is upheld so far as the present prosecution against the petitioner is concerned. The criminal revision case is allowed.
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1962 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34, as amended in 1953, saves the proceedings impugned?
Held that:- proceedings under section 34(1)(a) of the Act were started against Kalavatibai for the assessment years 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47 in respect of the business which her husband, Jagannath Ramkishan, had claimed to be a partnership business of the respondent's Hindu undivided family and himself. Two orders were passed by the Income-tax Officer for those years. Kalavatibai took appeals against those orders and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on October 10, 1956, in allowing those appeals gave a finding that the business belonged to the partnership as claimed by Jagannath Ramkishan and the Income-tax Officer was authorised to make assessments under the provisions of section 34 on the said partnership as also on the respondent for the assessment years 1944-45, 1945-46 and 1946-47. Thereupon, a notice was issued with regard to the three assessment years on February 18, 1957, against M/s. Jagannath Fakirchand and Jagannath Ramkishan. These notices were challenged and were held to be illegal. Against that order of the High Court this appeal is brought on a certificate of the High Court under article 132(1) and article 133(1)(b) of the Constitution. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ings which could no longer benefit them and could only ensure for the good of their transferees. It is, therefore, obvious that this circumstance clinched the case in favour of the executants. The crucial circumstance in the present case, namely that a smaller extent was sold for a higher amount in discharge of an earlier mortgage of a larger extent for a smaller amount was not present in that case. The said crucial circumstances make the two cases entirely dissimilar and therefore the said judgment of this court is not of any help in construing the document in question. On a consideration of the cumulative effect of the terms of the document in the context of the surrounding circumstances we hold that the document in question is not a mortgage but a sale with the condition of repurchase. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct. 8. The appeal fails and as the advocate for the respondent is not present in Court it is dismissed without costs. 9. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (11) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... accused persons is a police officer above the rank of a constable, shall not be cognizable except by a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate not lower than a second class Magistrate. 19. If the legislature had intended to limit the application of s. 161(1) offences under the Police Act only, it would have instead of using the words in any case of alleged offences used words like in any case of offences against this Act. It appears clear that the legislature deliberately gave the protection of s. 161(1) to offences against any law and there is no justification for our limiting that protection to offences under the Police Act only. It must accordingly be held that the prosecution against the appellant should have been dismissed in accordance with the provision of s. 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act. 20. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and order that the case against him be dismissed. 21. Appeal allowed.
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1962 (11) TMI 89 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d appeal did not amount to a finding that the judgment thereof was accepted to be correct. We are however unable, with the greatest respect, to agree with the aforesaid observation, for it seems to us that as soon as the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 of 1950 particularly the former were dismissed by this Court whatever the reason for the dismissal was the judgment of the trial Court on the common issues became final so far as those suits were concerned, and having become final, they cannot be subsequently registered in an appeal between the same parties, particularly when the other essential conditions of Section 11 are also present. 23. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is that F. A. S. Nos. 365 and 366 of 1951 are barred under Section 11, Civil P. C., to the extent of the decision of the five issues, which were common in the four connected suits. The appeal will now be returned to the learned single Judge with our opinion.
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1962 (11) TMI 88 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the bank. In doing so, it has to take the necessary risk of such employees embezzling money and even committing theft. The money that was taken is admittedly the stock-in-trade of the assessee, a banking company. The fact that the money was taken not during office hours, but on a holiday, does not affect the question for decision if the incurring of the loss was incidental to the carrying on of the business. We have no doubt that, on the facts and in the circumstances stated above, the loss incurred was incidental to the conduct of the business. The case will fall within the principles stated by the Supreme Court in Badridas Daga v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1958 34 I.T.R. 10. We follow that decision and answer question No. 2 in the negative and question No. 3 in the affirmative and both in favour of the assessee. In view of the answer to questions Nos. 2 and 3, question No. 1 does not call for any answer. The parties will bear their costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (11) TMI 87 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... , are not allowable under section 10(2) because of the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 10. If it was a kind of cess that is contemplated under clause (ix) of sub-section (2) then it would have been allowed. But since it is a cess payable on the profits or gains of any business or calculated at a proportion on the basis thereof, it is excluded by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 10. The Appellate Tribunal, therefore, came to the right conclusion. The question that has been asked is as follows "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount paid by the assessee company as cess for roads, public works and education, was allowable as deduction under section 10(2)(ix) or section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act read with section 10(4) of the said Act ?" The answer is in the negative. In other words, it is not allowable as a deduction. The respondent is entitled to costs. Certified for two counsel. D. Datta, J. - I agree.
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1962 (11) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
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... ... ..... Respondent No. 5. The orders of appointment were made on the 22nd of April 1961 and the petitioners have presented their petitions as late as the 7th of July 1962. Thus, there is a delay of more than 1 year-2 months. The only reason for the delay that has been given is that the petitioners were making certain representations. But this is no reason for them not to have come to this Court at a much earlier stage. We are of the opinion that the Writ petitions deserve to be dismissed on this ground as well. The third objection is that the petitioners had made certain scandalous reflections in their Writ petitions against the then Chief Justice and the petitions deserve to he dismissed on that ground alone. nOW that they have withdrawn, the scandalous allegations, we only express our strong disapproval of the conduct of the petitioners in making such reflections. 17. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the Writ Petitions are dismissed with one set of costs to the respondents.
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1962 (11) TMI 85 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e order of rectification for it is that which rectifies the assessment order and effects the final quantification of tax liability. Before the order of rectification there was no under-assessment. Such under-assessment came into existence because of the order of rectification and, therefore, the information must be subsequent information and the Income-tax Officer had no right to take action under section 34(1)(b). 9. As regards the second ground on which the Income-tax Officer had sought to take proceedings under section 34, the same has not been pressed before us by the learned Advocate-General and it is not necessary for us to consider the same. 10. In the result, we have to hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Officer was not right in making a reassessment under section 34(1)(b) and we answer the question in the negative. We order that the respondent do pay the assessee, costs of the reference. 11. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (11) TMI 84 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the assessee, which do not form part of the commutation amount, are income and liable to tax and (2) that the aforesaid interim allowances are not exempt under section 4(3)(vii) of the Indian Income Tax Act and (3) that payments subsequent to April 1, 1950, towards the commutation amount and in partial discharge therefore would not be liable to taxation for the obvious reason that if any of such payments had been made towards commutation payable to the petitioner, and since it is in partial discharge of the commutation amount, it would be a capital receipt and as such not liable to be taxed. 13. In the result, out answer to question No. 1 is that the value of the shares owned by the assessee in the limited companies will be properly includible in his net wealth subject to the application of rule 2 of the Schedule to the Wealth-Tax Act and our answer to the second question is in the affirmative. Let the reference be answered accordingly with costs. Advocates fee ₹ 100.
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