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Showing 341 to 360 of 835 Records
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1969 (8) TMI 22
Issues Involved:
1. Exemption of manager's bungalow, staff quarters, and labor lines as "dwelling houses" under Section 2(e)(ii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.
2. Classification of the above buildings and premises as "out-houses" under Section 2(e)(ii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.
3. Justification of allowing exemption for only 60% of the value of store-houses used for both agricultural and non-agricultural purposes.
4. Treatment of electrical machinery, batteries, transmission lines, grinding machinery, motor cars, and lorries as tools and implements under Section 5(1)(ix) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Exemption of Manager's Bungalow, Staff Quarters, and Labor Lines as "Dwelling Houses":
The assessee claimed exemption under Section 2(e)(ii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, for the value of certain buildings, including the manager's bungalow, staff quarters, and labor lines, as "dwelling houses." The Tribunal held that the term "dwelling house" is narrower than "residence" and applies only to human residences. Since a limited company cannot have a dwelling house, the Tribunal rejected the claim. The High Court referenced the case of Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax and answered the question in the negative, ruling against the assessee.
2. Classification as "Out-Houses":
The assessee alternatively argued that the buildings could be classified as "out-houses." The Tribunal and the High Court examined the definition and context of "out-house" and concluded that an out-house must be connected to or near a main building. The Tribunal found no evidence that the buildings in question were connected to any main building. The High Court agreed, stating that the term "out-house" must be understood in its common dictionary meaning, which implies a connection to a main building. Consequently, the High Court answered this question in the negative and against the assessee.
3. Exemption for 60% of the Value of Store-Houses:
The Tribunal had allowed 60% exemption for store-houses used for both agricultural and non-agricultural purposes. However, Dr. Pal, representing the assessee, did not press for an answer to this question during the reference. Therefore, the High Court declined to answer this question.
4. Treatment of Machinery and Vehicles as Tools and Implements:
The Tribunal found that none of the items of machinery, including motor cars and lorries, could be treated as "tools and implements" under Section 5(1)(ix) of the Act. The High Court referenced the case of Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Co. Ltd., concluding that motor cars and lorries do not qualify for exemption. However, electrical machinery, batteries, transmission lines, and grinding machinery may qualify as "tools and implements" if used exclusively for raising agricultural produce. The High Court noted the absence of a definite finding by the Tribunal on the exclusive use of these items for agricultural purposes and remanded the matter for further findings.
Conclusion:
The High Court ruled against the assessee on the questions of exemption for manager's bungalow, staff quarters, and labor lines as "dwelling houses" and "out-houses." It declined to answer the question on the 60% exemption for store-houses and remanded the issue of machinery and vehicles as tools and implements for further findings on their exclusive use for agricultural purposes. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
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1969 (8) TMI 21
Assessment - assessee was a Vysia and his so-called wife was a Sudhra and that beyond the fact that there was only the tying of thali, there was no other ceremony - Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee was entitled to be assessed in the status of HUF - Held, yes
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1969 (8) TMI 20
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer in issuing notice under section 148 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Whether the petitioner disclosed all material facts fully and truly during the original assessment for the year 1952-53.
3. Validity of reopening the assessment based on the alleged non-disclosure.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer in Issuing Notice under Section 148:
The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer in issuing the notice under section 148 of the Act. The notice stated that the officer had reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax for the assessment year 1952-53 had escaped assessment. The petitioner argued that the conditions precedent for assuming jurisdiction under section 147 were not met. The court examined whether the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that the income had been under-assessed due to the petitioner's failure to disclose all material facts fully and truly.
2. Whether the Petitioner Disclosed All Material Facts Fully and Truly During the Original Assessment:
The petitioner contended that all primary facts necessary for the assessment were disclosed during the original assessment for the year 1952-53. The court noted that mere production of account books and balance-sheets was not sufficient; the petitioner had a duty to specifically bring to the notice of the Income-tax Officer all primary facts related to the impugned item. The court found no intrinsic evidence to show that the impugned primary fact was brought to the notice of the then Income-tax Officer, Sri A. K. Jana. The court emphasized that if the attention of the Income-tax Officer had been invited to this transaction, it would have been reflected in the original assessment order.
3. Validity of Reopening the Assessment Based on the Alleged Non-Disclosure:
The court analyzed the law under section 147 of the Act, which allows reopening of assessments if the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to disclose all material facts. The court cited several Supreme Court judgments establishing that the belief must be held in good faith and have a rational nexus to the formation of the belief. The court found that the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that the under-assessment occurred due to the petitioner's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment year 1952-53. The court noted discrepancies in the accounts that were not apparent until the examination of accounts for the assessment year 1963-64, which justified the reopening of the assessment.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the conditions precedent for issuing notice under section 148 were fulfilled. The Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax had been under-assessed due to the petitioner's failure to disclose all material facts fully and truly. Therefore, the notice was not without jurisdiction. The writ application was dismissed with costs, and the reopening of the assessment was deemed valid.
Writ application dismissed.
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1969 (8) TMI 19
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of proceedings under section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act.
2. Assessability of Rs. 3,06,000 for the assessment year 1945-46 or 1947-48.
3. Assessability of Rs. 25,000 for the assessment year 1946-47 or 1947-48.
4. Permissibility of including other items in reassessment under section 34.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Proceedings under Section 34(1)(a):
The crux of the case revolved around whether the proceedings initiated under section 34(1)(a) were valid. The Tribunal held that the notice issued under section 34(1)(a) was bad in law, emphasizing that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. The Tribunal concluded that the reopening of the assessment was due to a mere change of opinion by the successor Income-tax Officer, rather than any omission or failure by the assessee. The court underscored that for the Income-tax Officer to assume jurisdiction under section 34(1)(a), there must be reasonable grounds to believe that income had escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to disclose material facts, which was not the case here.
2. Assessability of Rs. 3,06,000:
Given the answer to the first question, this issue became moot. However, the Tribunal had noted that the sum of Rs. 3,06,000 received by the assessee on April 8, 1946, had its origin in a sum of Rs. 3,00,000 deposited in a bank in Jaipur in December 1944. The Tribunal held that this amount could only be included for the 1945-46 assessment, not for 1947-48, as it existed as early as December 1944.
3. Assessability of Rs. 25,000:
Similarly, this issue was rendered academic due to the answer to the first question. The Tribunal found that the sum of Rs. 25,000, credited in the assessee's books on December 31, 1945, was liable to be included only for the 1946-47 assessment, not for 1947-48.
4. Permissibility of Including Other Items in Reassessment:
The court clarified that once an assessment is validly reopened under section 34, the Income-tax Officer can include other items that had escaped assessment. However, since the proceedings under section 34(1)(a) were held to be invalid, this question was deemed academic. The court cited precedent to affirm that a valid reopening under section 34(1)(a) allows a de novo assessment, encompassing all escaped incomes.
Conclusion:
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the proceedings under section 34(1)(a) were invalid as there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts. Consequently, questions regarding the specific years for assessing Rs. 3,06,000 and Rs. 25,000 were not addressed. The court also reiterated that a valid reopening under section 34 permits the inclusion of all escaped incomes in the reassessment. The assessee was awarded costs from the revenue.
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1969 (8) TMI 18
While making gift amount was transferred to the donees without reserving any right in that amount - Whether the gift was voidable and as such the interest accruing on the aforesaid gifted amount did not accrue to the family for income-tax purposes - Held, yes
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1969 (8) TMI 17
Issues:
Assessment of unregistered firm after assessing share income from one partner.
Analysis:
The case involved a question of law regarding the assessment of an unregistered firm after assessing the share income from one of the partners. The firm in question was involved in supplying stores to the military department on contract. The assessment for the firm for the year 1959-60 was completed after one of the partners had already been assessed on his share income from the firm. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal both held that it is legal for the Income-tax Officer to assess both the partners of an unregistered firm and the firm itself. The Tribunal relied on a previous decision by the Allahabad High Court in Hazari Ram Mohan Ram v. Commissioner of Income-tax to support their conclusion.
The Tribunal referred the question of law to the High Court, which analyzed the issue based on the charging section of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The court highlighted that the charging section imposes tax on different assessable entities, including individuals, Hindu undivided families, companies, local authorities, firms, and other associations of persons. The court emphasized that the tax can be levied either on the firm or its partners individually, but not on both simultaneously. This interpretation was supported by the Supreme Court's decisions in cases such as Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kanpur Coal Syndicate and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Murlidhar Jhawar and Purna Ginning and Pressing Factory.
The court further explained that once the income of an association has been charged to income-tax in the hands of the members individually, there cannot be a fresh assessment of income in the hands of the association. This principle was established in earlier cases like Joti Prasad Agarwal v. Income-tax Officer and was reaffirmed by subsequent decisions, including Commissioner of Income-tax v. Murlidhar Jhawar and Purna Ginning and Pressing Factory. The court clarified that the Income-tax Officer cannot assess the same income twice, once in the hands of the partners and again in the hands of the unregistered firm. The judgment concluded that the Income-tax Officer cannot proceed to assess the income of the firm after it has already been taxed in the hands of the partners. Therefore, the court answered the question referred by the Tribunal in the negative, in favor of the assessee, and awarded costs to the applicant.
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1969 (8) TMI 16
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the sums of Rs. 15,774 (1958-59) and Rs. 10,466 (1960-61) represented revenue expenditure deductible in computing the income of the assessee under section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1922.
2. Applicability of section 10(2)(ii), section 10(2)(v), and section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.
3. Determination of whether the expenditure was capital or revenue in nature.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Deductibility of Expenditure under Section 10:
The primary issue was whether the sums of Rs. 15,774 and Rs. 10,466 incurred by the assessee for repairs to its godowns and dye-houses could be considered as revenue expenditure deductible under section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Tribunal initially disallowed these expenses, treating them as capital in nature, but allowed depreciation at prescribed rates. The question referred to the court was whether these amounts represented revenue expenditure deductible in computing the income of the assessee.
2. Applicability of Section 10(2)(ii), Section 10(2)(v), and Section 10(2)(xv):
Section 10(2)(v):
According to the Tribunal, allowance for current repairs under section 10(2)(v) could only be made to an assessee who is the owner of the depreciable asset. However, the court noted that the language of section 10(2)(v) does not restrict the allowance to owners alone. The term "current repairs" was interpreted in previous cases to mean petty repairs, not substantial repairs. The court distinguished the present case from previous cases, noting that the repairs did not enhance the value of the buildings but merely made them fit for business use.
Section 10(2)(ii):
The court found that under the terms of the lease, the landlords were not bound to carry out any repairs, and there was no obligation on the lessee to undertake substantial repairs. Therefore, the expenses in question were not allowable under section 10(2)(ii).
Section 10(2)(xv):
For an expenditure to be allowable under section 10(2)(xv), it must not be covered by clauses (i) to (xiv), must not be capital or personal expenditure, and must be incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The court found that the expenditures were not covered by section 10(2)(ii) or section 10(2)(v), thus satisfying the first condition. The court also determined that the expenditure was not capital in nature, as it did not create an enduring benefit for the assessee's business, given the short duration of the lease. The expenditures were incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the assessee's business, satisfying the remaining conditions of section 10(2)(xv).
3. Nature of Expenditure:
The court addressed the contention that the expenditure was capital in nature due to its substantial amount. However, it emphasized that the test is not the quantum of expenditure but whether it resulted in the creation of an asset or advantage for enduring benefit. Since the assessee was a lessee for a short period, the repairs did not provide a permanent benefit, and thus, the expenditure was not capital in nature. The court referenced the principle laid down by Viscount Cave in Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd., which was approved by the Supreme Court, to support this view.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the expenditures of Rs. 15,774 and Rs. 10,466 were allowable as business expenditures under section 10(2)(xv) for the respective assessment years 1958-59 and 1960-61. The assessee was entitled to deduct these amounts in computing its income. The court answered the question in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee, awarding costs of Rs. 200 to the assessee.
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1969 (8) TMI 15
Loss sustained in the speculative transactions which are in the nature of a business cannot be construed as "business expenditure" - such loss should, however, be taken into account in any other business consisting of speculative transactions
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1969 (8) TMI 14
Issues:
Jurisdiction of Tribunal to rehear a matter due to non-consideration of a material ground.
Analysis:
The case involved an appeal against the judgment of a single judge regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to rehear a matter where a material ground was not considered. The assessee, in this case, was assessed for income tax and excess profits tax for specific accounting periods. The issue arose when the Tribunal did not address the adjustment of standard profits, a crucial aspect raised by the assessee in the appeals. The Tribunal disposed of the appeals without considering this significant ground, leading to the filing of review applications by the assessee.
The main question revolved around whether the Tribunal had the inherent jurisdiction to rectify the error made by not considering a vital ground and subsequently rehear the matter to ensure justice between the parties. The judgment delved into the relevant provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act, particularly sections 19 and 21, to determine the scope of the Tribunal's powers in such situations.
The judgment analyzed the arguments presented by the income tax department's representative, focusing on the applicability of section 35 of Act 11 of 1922 to the proceedings under the Excess Profits Tax Act. It was established that the omission of section 35 in section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act indicated a deliberate choice by the legislature, thereby concluding that section 35 did not apply to the review applications initiated by the assessee.
Furthermore, the judgment addressed the contention that a Tribunal lacks inherent power to rectify errors to the prejudice of a party. By citing various legal precedents, including Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab and Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the judgment established that courts and Tribunals possess inherent jurisdiction to rectify their mistakes causing prejudice to a party, even in the absence of specific statutory provisions for review.
In conclusion, the judgment upheld the decision of the single judge, S. C. Manchanda, affirming that the Tribunal indeed had the inherent jurisdiction to rectify the error made in not considering the crucial ground raised by the assessee. The appeal challenging the Tribunal's jurisdiction was dismissed, emphasizing the court's duty to correct its own errors to prevent injustice to the parties involved.
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1969 (8) TMI 13
Assessees applied to the Tribunal under section 66 of the Act for reference to the court on the ground that a partner of a firm could not be assessed to income-tax without prior assessment of the firm itself - held that, it is legal to assess the partner's share income from firm, prior to raising a separate assessment on the firm
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1969 (8) TMI 12
Issues:
1. Assessment of income from undisclosed sources for the assessment year 1944-45.
2. Validity of assessment in the name of the Hindu undivided family post-partition.
3. Interpretation of sub-section (2) of section 25A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addressed the issue of assessing income from undisclosed sources for the assessment year 1944-45. The Income-tax Officer included two cash-credits in the assessment for that year, which were later found to be relevant to the assessment year 1943-44. The Tribunal corrected the assessment for 1944-45, but the Income-tax Officer issued a notice for the assessment year 1943-44. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the assessment for 1943-44, leading to a legal challenge by the assessee on various grounds, including the partition of the joint Hindu family.
2. The main contention revolved around the validity of the assessment in the name of the Hindu undivided family post-partition. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner recognized the partition of the family, but the assessment order by the Income-tax Officer was issued before this recognition. The debate centered on the applicability of sub-section (2) of section 25A of the Act, which deals with assessment after the partition of a Hindu undivided family. The tribunal acknowledged the timing discrepancy but highlighted that even under sub-section (2) of section 25A, assessment of the total income received by the joint family was permissible.
3. The interpretation of sub-section (2) of section 25A was crucial in determining the assessment's validity. The assessee argued that the assessment should have been conducted following the procedure outlined in this section, emphasizing the timing of the partition recognition. However, the court referred to precedents from various High Courts, indicating that even after the partition of a joint family, assessment on the erstwhile undivided Hindu family was permissible under section 25A(1) of the Act. The court clarified that the question of apportionment among family members did not arise in the present reference, ultimately ruling against the assessee and affirming the validity of the assessment in the name of the Hindu undivided family.
In conclusion, the judgment addressed the assessment of income from undisclosed sources, the validity of assessment post-partition, and the interpretation of section 25A of the Income-tax Act, ultimately ruling in favor of upholding the assessment in the name of the Hindu undivided family.
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1969 (8) TMI 11
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of whether the disputed land was "agricultural land" for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of whether the disputed land was "agricultural land" for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act:
The assessee was assessed under the Wealth-tax Act for the year 1962-63. The Wealth-tax Officer included a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 representing the value of a plot of land owned by the assessee, which the assessee contended was agricultural land and thus not liable to assessment. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeals, leading to a reference to the High Court under section 27(3)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act.
The question formulated for the court was: "Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in holding that the disputed land was not agricultural land on the relevant date for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act?"
Relevant Provisions:
- Section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act: Tax is payable on the net wealth.
- Section 2(m) of the Act: Defines "net wealth."
- Section 2(e) of the Act: Defines "assets" and excludes agricultural land.
Facts and Evidence:
- The land in question was recorded as a mango orchard in the survey khatian of Patna City Municipality published in 1933.
- The land was situated at Bhattacharjee Road, in the heart of Patna, surrounded by residential buildings.
- The land was sold in July 1962 for Rs. 1,50,000.
- In previous assessments, no tax was levied on this land.
Arguments and Findings:
- The assessee argued that the land was agricultural, as evidenced by the survey khatian and a certificate from the Road Transport Corporation's Branch Manager, stating the land had banana trees, palm trees, and other vegetation.
- The Wealth-tax Officer's inspection in November 1962 found no evidence of extensive cultivation, only a few palm trees.
- The court noted that the inspection was after the valuation date (March 31, 1962) and the certificate from the Branch Manager lacked a date.
- The court referenced several decisions to define "agricultural land," including:
- Deen Mohammad Mian v. Hulas Narain Singh: Mango orchard as agricultural land under Bihar Tenancy Act.
- T. Sorijini Devi v. T. Sri Kristna: Mango grove as agricultural land under Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act.
- Paramananda Das v. Sankar Rath: Agricultural land includes land for raising valuable plants or trees.
- Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income-tax: Cultivation and human skill required for land to be agricultural.
- Commissioner of Income-tax v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy: Cultivation and integrated agricultural activity required.
- Rasiklal Chimanlal Nagri v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax: Nature or character of the land determines if it is agricultural, not the owner's intention.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that there was no satisfactory evidence of the land being used for agricultural purposes on the valuation date. The land's location in a residential area and its high sale price indicated it was not agricultural. The Tribunal was justified in holding that the disputed land was not agricultural land for the purposes of the Wealth-tax Act. The reference was answered in the affirmative, with no order for costs.
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1969 (8) TMI 10
Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the properties held by the deceased Mahanth (personal or trust properties).
2. Applicability of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, to the properties of Madra Math.
3. Validity of the ex parte assessment by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Nature of the Properties Held by the Deceased Mahanth:
The primary issue was whether the properties belonging to Madra Math were personal properties of the deceased Mahanth or held by him as a trustee. The Assistant Controller and the Central Board of Revenue concluded that the properties were personal properties based on the judgment in Title Suit No. 1 of 1932 by the District Judge of Gaya. The District Judge found that the properties were to be enjoyed by the Mahanth and his disciples, with no indication of a public trust. However, the properties were not deemed personal properties either. The learned District Judge concluded that the properties were subject to a private trust, thus negating both the plaintiff's claim of a public trust and the defendant's claim of personal property.
2. Applicability of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, to the Properties of Madra Math:
The court had to determine if the properties were liable for estate duty under the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The accountable person argued that if the properties were trust properties, whether public or private, estate duty would not be applicable. The court referred to sections 22 and 23 of the Act, which exempt property held in trust from estate duty. Section 22 specifies that property held by the deceased as a trustee for another person is not deemed to pass on the death of the deceased. Section 23 addresses settled property, indicating that if the interest of any person under the settlement fails or determines by reason of death, the property does not pass by reason only of such failure or determination. The court concluded that since the properties were held under a private trust, they were not subject to estate duty.
3. Validity of the Ex Parte Assessment by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty:
The Assistant Controller finalized the assessment ex parte due to the failure of the accountable person to produce supporting documents. The court noted that even in ex parte assessments, the assessing authorities are bound to consider all material on record. The accountable person's argument that the assessment was arbitrary and lacked consideration of relevant material was noted but not addressed in detail due to the conclusion on the primary issue of the nature of the properties.
Conclusion:
The court held that the properties of Madra Math were trust properties of a private character and not personal properties of the deceased Mahanth. Consequently, the properties were not liable for estate duty under the Estate Duty Act, 1953. The court quashed the order of estate duty as unsustainable and answered the reference in the negative. The application was allowed, and the ex parte assessment was deemed unjustified in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
Separate Judgments:
Wasiuddin J. concurred with the judgment and agreed with the conclusions reached.
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1969 (8) TMI 9
Issues:
1. Competency of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to entertain objections to the Gift-tax Act's constitutionality.
2. Constitutionality of the Gift-tax Act in imposing tax on gifts of land and building.
Analysis:
The High Court of Rajasthan addressed the issue of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's competence to entertain objections to the constitutionality of the Gift-tax Act. The Tribunal had referred two questions to the court under section 26(1) of the Act. The first question was whether the Tribunal had the authority to decide objections regarding the Act being ultra vires or unconstitutional. The second question pertained to the Act's constitutionality in imposing tax on gifts of land and building. The case involved an assessee who gifted a bungalow to his wife and sons, which was taxed by the Gift-tax Officer. The assessee raised the argument that taxing gifts of land and buildings fell under the State List of the Constitution. The Tribunal, after examining the constitutional validity, concluded that the provisions taxing gifts of immovable property were beyond the powers of Parliament.
The court considered precedents set by the Supreme Court, emphasizing that taxing authorities are not concerned with the validity of taxing provisions. The Tribunal's authority to delve into the Act's constitutionality was challenged, with the argument that it was constituted under the Indian Income-tax Act, not the Gift-tax Act. Definitions under the Act clarified the roles of Appellate Tribunal, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and Gift-tax Officer. The court highlighted that while officers under the Income-tax Act could perform Gift-tax functions, the Gift-tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioners were creations of the Gift-tax Act.
Regarding the scope of appeals, the court noted that objections to the vires of the Act could not be entertained by the Gift-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Consequently, the assessee could not raise such objections before the Tribunal. Referring to Supreme Court decisions, the court emphasized that if objections to the Act's vires could not be raised at lower levels, they could not be raised before the Tribunal either. Therefore, the Tribunal lacked the authority to refer questions on the Act's constitutionality to the court.
In conclusion, the court answered the first question negatively, indicating that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to entertain objections to the Gift-tax Act's constitutionality. Consequently, the court did not address the second question. No costs were awarded in this matter.
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1969 (8) TMI 8
An agriculturist businessman purchased 2 plots of agricultural land - a university established near the land and consequently the price of land increased - businessman sell the plots at great profit - assessee purchased these plots only by way of investment and they cannot be treated as held for the purposes of business or in order to undertake a venture in the nature of trade
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1969 (8) TMI 7
Whether in determining the net value of the assets u/s 7(2), the value of the company's fixed assets as shown in its balance-sheet as on the valuation date should have been substituted by the w.d.v. of these assets as per the company's income-tax record - whether for determining the net value of assets, an adjustment on account of normal depreciation of the fixed assets from the date of revaluation of the assets to valuation date was justified - Appeal of revenue is allowed by way of remand
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1969 (8) TMI 6
Best Judgment Assessment - Agricultural ITO can not proceed directly to assess to best of his judgment u/s. 20(4) without serving a notice u/s. 19(2)- If no return is made in response to a public notice under s. 19(1) of the Act and no individual notice is served u/s. 19(2) there would be no pending proceedings and it would be a case of escaped assessment - revenue appeal dismissed
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1969 (8) TMI 5
Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the distribution to the assessee of the amount attributable to land acquisition compensation received by the U Ltd., was in the hands of the assessee, receipt of dividend within the meaning of s. 2(6A) of the IT Act, 1922. - Order passed by the High Court is, therefore, set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court
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1969 (8) TMI 4
Asset - allowable expenditure - right to receive a share of the income was a mere right to any annuity where the terms and conditions relating thereto precluded the commutation of any portion into a lump sum grant. The word 'annuity' should be given its popular and dictionary meaning and not the signification which it has assumed as a legal term owing to judicial interpretation - Assessee's appeal is dismissed
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1969 (8) TMI 3
Determining the net value of the assets of the assessee u/s. 7(2) - no material produced by the assessee to demonstrate that the written down value is the real value - Tribunal was right in directing that the written down value of the fixed assets of the assessee should be adopted as the value thereof, instead of their balance sheet value
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9911796707
