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Showing 281 to 300 of 19685 Records
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2015 (12) TMI 1629
Interest subsidy granted under TUF scheme - whether revenue or capital in nature - Held that:- We do not find any merit in the order passed by the lower authorities treating the subsidy so received as revenue receipts. Accordingly, the AO is directed to treat the subsidiary in all the years under consideration are capital in nature. See Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. vs CIT (1997 (9) TMI 3 - SUPREME Court) - Decided in favor of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1628
Eligibility for interest free sales tax deferral benefit - natural justice - deferral benefit passed on to M/s.Bilt Industrial Packaging Company Limited (BIPCO) along with the unit - whether Eligibility Certificate originally granted to M/s.Servall Paper Board Limited was co-extendable to the subsequent buyers? - Held that: - When the 2nd Respondent by proceedings 8.12.2003 granted approval to the transfer of the deferral facility, the finding of the 1st Respondent in the impugned order that the Petitioner is not entitled to such facility is baseless. Even after cancellation of the the registration certificates, a direction was given to include the turnovers of the Unit, while passing final assessment order. Further, the 1st Respondent without issuing any prior notice and looking into the GOs, the registration certificates and without considering the records and the agreement and the returns filed by the Petitioners, passed the impugned order, without any basis - matter on remand with regard to the violation of the conditions in respect of the products manufactured other than the one so specified and converted the same into a different commercial commodity in some other forms by the Petitioner - petition allowed by way of remand.
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2015 (12) TMI 1627
Natural justice - ex-parte decision - validity of order of Tribunal - pre-deposit - the assessment orders were passed by the Assessing Officer in absence of representative of appellant since there were some internal disputes between them. Be that as it may, assessment was made ex-parte. The Commissioner (Appeals) had dismissed the appeal because appellant was unable to deposit the entire amount of tax with interest by way of pre-deposit - Held that: - we would have wished the Tribunal had not made such strong observations in a pre-deposit matter when various issues were never considered by the Commissioner (Appeals) and were not directly at issue before the Tribunal - considering the fact that the assessment proceedings were framed ex-parte and question is of pre-deposit at first appellate stage, we direct the appellant to deposit sum of ₹ 5 lacs with the department by way of pre-deposit latest by 15.1.2016, upon which, the appeals would be entertained by the Commissioner on merits being uninfluenced by observations of the Tribunal in the impugned judgement - order of Tribunal reversed - appeal allowed - decided in favor of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1626
Maintainability of appeal - monetary limit - Held that: - there are four Appeals and in each appeal amount involved is less than ₹ 5 Lakhs. Even if total amount which is ₹ 5,85,741/- is taken for the purpose of monetary limit, now as per the revised amount in the Board's Instruction dated 17-12-2015, the appeals involving ₹ 10 Lakhs and below are liable to be dismissed as per litigation policy - Appeals filed by the Revenue on litigation policy dismissed, being not maintainable.
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2015 (12) TMI 1625
Constitutional validity of the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act - levy of luxury tax on Direct to Home Services - legislative incompetence of the State Legislature - whether the cable TV connection enjoyed by a customer could be termed as a luxury enjoyed by the Customer? - Held that: - The levy of luxury tax under the same enactment– The Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976– on broadcasting services provided by cable operators, was also found to be within the legislative competence of the State legislature. Inasmuch as it is the case of the petitioners in these writ petitions that the services rendered by them are similar to the services provided by the cable operators, I do not see any reason to deviate from the views expressed by the division bench of this court on the legislative competence of the State legislature in introducing the levy of luxury tax on DTH services.
The levy of service tax is traceable to Entry 97 of List I of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution, which is a residual entry. The power, to legislate under a residual entry in List I, is available to the Parliament only in respect of matters that are not relatable to any specific entry in Lists II and III. Thus, once it is found that the legislation in question is relatable to Entry 61 of List II, then the Legislative competence of the State Legislature is absolute and it is the validity of the Central Legislation, in respect of the same field of legislation, that would come under a cloud.
Even if the levy of service tax is traceable to Entry 92C of List I of the VII Schedule, an application of the doctrine of pith and substance would clearly indicate that the levy is essentially on the luxury provided through the provision of DTH services. The aspects theory of taxation that was recognised by the Supreme Court in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India – [1989 (5) TMI 50 - SUPREME Court] would operate against the petitioners to find that the State legislature had the competence to legislate on the aspect of “luxury” provided by the petitioners to their customers, notwithstanding that the Parliament may have the legislative competence to legislate on the aspect of “service” rendered to the customers.
While the State Legislature has the legislative competence to levy a tax on the luxury provided by a Direct to Home [DTH] Broadcasting service provider, the levy of luxury tax on DTH service providers to the exclusion of a similar levy on cable operators with effect from 01.04.2011 is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Taxes, if any paid by the petitioners during the period from 01.04.2011, shall be refunded.
The notice demanding tax for the period from 1.4.2010 to 31.3.2011 was stayed during the pendency of the writ petition, with liberty to the respondents to pass fresh orders after complying with the rules of natural justice, and in particular, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard - appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2015 (12) TMI 1624
Deposit of interest - the petitioner having deposited the demand made earlier duly for the assessment year 2008-09 - the accrued tax liability/arrears were stayed to the extent of 50 % on payment earliar but the petitioner was required to pay the tax at the prevailing rate for the future period.
Held that: - when the writ petition was filed by the petitioner before the High Court the tax that being demanded was for the assessment year 2008-09. The words, "future period" in the order of the Supreme Court would denote any tax liability that would arise or accrue after the date of the order passed by the Supreme Court, i.e., after 18th of January, 2012. - even if any assessment order is passed after 18th of January, 2012 but relates to any assessment year prior to 18th of January, 2012 would come under the category requiring the accrued tax liability/arrears to be paid up to 50% and the balance 50% by way of bank guarantee. The words "future period" would include such demand for the period subsequent to 18th of January, 2012.
The impugned demand notice requiring the petitioner to pay further amount towards the interest compound is patently misconceived and based on wrong interpretation of the interim order of the Supreme Court - the petitioner has already deposited 50% of the accrued tax liability alongwith interest for the assessment year 2008-09 and therefore, was not required to pay any further amount - petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2015 (12) TMI 1623
Clearance of molasses - demand of duty on the ground that the sludge had reportedly been used in the castings units for preparing binders/cores, as the same could not be used anywhere else and the same is correctly classifiable under Tariff sub-heading 3824.90 and attracting Central Excise duty @ 16% adv - whether the appellant is liable to pay duty on sludge during the period or not? - Held that: - the reliance is placed on the decision of Apex Court in the case of Bajaj Auto Ltd. [2015 (8) TMI 197 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Apex Court hold that aluminium dross and ash emerged only as by-products during die-casting of aluminium parts as no manufacturing process involved and hence no excise duty is payable thereon. We hold that as molasses is not manufactured item, the duty is not payable thereon - In this case also as molasses/sludge emerges without any manufacturing process and in that case the excise duty is not payable by the appellant - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2015 (12) TMI 1622
Deduction u/s 80IB(10) - Held that:- The Tribunal in the case of assessee for assessment year 2007-08 [2013 (2) TMI 289 - ITAT MUMBAI] identically, deliberated upon the issue and finally held that the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Act. No contrary facts were brought to our notice by either side in respect of development project carried out in Dharavi Slum Area. Following the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal wherein, the circular of the Board Regulation no. 33(10) of DC rules for Greater Mumbai, 1991, read with provision of notification no. PB-4391/4080(A)/UD-II(ROP)dt. 03/06/1992 along with conditions therein, Notification no. 2 of 2011, dated 05/01/2011, issued by CBDT, decision from Hon’ble Apex Court in CIT vs. Alom Extrusion Ltd.(2009 (11) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT) and Allied Motors P. Ltd. vs. CIT (1997 (3) TMI 9 - SUPREME Court), were considered, thus, we find no infirmity, on this issue, in the order of the Ld.CIT(A). It is affirmed. - Decided in favour of assessee
Eligible for deduction u/s 80 IB(10) - Disallowance to rent expenses - assessee paid rent to close relatives and did not produced the details of the premises taken on rent, purpose of utilization of the premises for business purposes and genuineness of the transaction - Held that:- Even if, the said expenses are disallowed, the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 80 IB(10) on enhanced income for the project as the said expenses worked laid against the income from the eligible project by placing reliance upon the decision in Liberty India Ltd. (2009 (8) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT) wherein held that the devices adopted to reduced on inflate the profits of eligible business has to be rejected while calculating deduction u/s 80IB.
As that during assessment proceeding the details of payment of rent of ₹ 1,20,00/- is to Shri. Amit Ringshia and Shri. Aditya Ringshia, with respect to Andheri office premises and ₹ 1,80,000/- to Shri. K.G. Ringshia (HUF) for our office premises in Vile-Parle were filed by the assessee. The payment of rent was duly authenticated by relevant documents. No Contrary decision or facts were brought to our notice by either side and more specifically the Revenue. Thus, we find on infirmity in the conclusion drawn by the Ld. CIT (A) in deleting the addition .- Decided in favour of assessee
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2015 (12) TMI 1621
TDS u/s 194C - contract of supply of material - nature of Composite contract - Held that:- In the present case we have three contracts, one for supply of goods/equipment, another for erection and another for civil engineering works. The dispute in the present case also is with respect to the deduction of tax with respect to the contract pertaining to supply of goods. The examination of the general terms and conditions of the contract here also proves that after the bid offered by the contractor is accepted and the assessee decides to award the contract to the successful bidder, a divisible contract covering the entire scope of the partial/total turnkey has to be entered into with the successful bidder.
Upon careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present case, in our considered opinion, the same is identical to the issue dealt with in the case of CIT vs. Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. [2012 (6) TMI 204 - Karnataka High Court ]. Learned D.R. could not point out any feature in the contract in the present appeal whether distinguish it from the facts mentioned in above appeal dealt by the Hon’ble High Court. Hence following the above decision, we hold that the contract of supply of material is a separate distinct contract and on which no deduction is permissible u/s 194C.
We further find that in the present case the assessee is not liable to deduct tax at source on the supply portion as per Explanation (iv) (e) to section 194C. Section 194C mandates that a person responsible for paying any sum for carrying out any work in pursuance of the contract between the contractor and a specified person shall at the time of credit of such sum with the account of the creditor or at the time of payment thereof deduct a specified sums as incometax.
The Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Glenmark Pharmaceutical Ltd. [ 2010 (3) TMI 289 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT ] has clearly expounded that if the property in the product manufactured passes to the customer upon delivery and the material that was required was not sourced from the customer/purchaser but was independently obtained by the manufacturer from a person other than customer, the contract entered into by the assessee was not a contract for carrying on work within the meaning of section 194C.Considered from this point of view also the assessee is not liable for deduction of tax at source on the equipment good supply contract. - Decided in favour of assessee
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2015 (12) TMI 1620
Transfer pricing adjustment - services at arm's length - MAM selection - TNMM or CUP - Held that:- We are of the considered opinion that the agreement is an intrinsic one and that it is wrong to split the same and hold that some services are at arm’s length and some services are not.
CIT(A) accepted TNMM to arrive at the ALP, in respect of certain services received by the assessee and in the same breath, has rejected the analysis undertaken by the assessee under the TNMM in respect of other services. We are informed by the assessee that, the authorities have accepted TNMM as MAM in the subsequent years. The Revenue has to be consistent in its approach. In our view, the TPO analysis of the assessee using TNMM as the MAM has to be accepted. When there is an agreement for services and certain services out of a bundle of services are undisputedly rendered, the entire agreement has to be viewed as a whole. Whether the services have actually resulted in a benefit to the assessee or not is not material. The conclusion of the Ld.TPO that the services have not resulted in any benefit and that no independent entity would have made such a payment is in the realm of surmises and conjunctures and not backed by any material. Thus the ALP determined by the assessee company is accepted and the TPO adjustment is deleted.
It is stated at the Bar that, for A.Y. 2010-11, the DRP has accepted the ALP determined by the assessee, in respect of GVP services, VIPFS services and Ticketing Hub Services.
Thus we are of the considered opinion that with regard to PSM and RIS segments, even if cost plus method is taken as the MAM, the markup charged by the AEs is within the +/-5% range, allowed under second proviso to section 92C of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, these services can be considered to be at arm’s length.
Regarding GVP services, VIPFS services and Ticketing Hub Services, the service charges paid by the Assessee, represents the actual cost incurred by the AEs, without any markup. Hence these can be considered to be at arm’s length. Thus we are of the opinion that the services received by the assessee should be considered to be arm’s length. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1619
Denial of exemption under N/N. 49/50-2003-C.E., dated 10-6-2003 - area based exemption - whether the appellant has commenced the commercial production on or before 31-3-2010 to avail the benefit of Notification No. 49/50-2003-C.E., dated 10-6-2003 or not? - Held that: - the appellant has cleared the goods on commercial consideration and the production of goods is not in dispute. The appellant has sold the goods against consideration therefore, the clearance made by the appellant qualifies the definition of commercial production.
The appellant has commenced the commercial production on 31-3-2010, therefore, we hold that the appellant is entitled for the benefit of Notification No. 49/50-2003-C.E., dated 10-6-2003.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2015 (12) TMI 1618
Depreciation claimed on motor car - disallowance on the alleged ground that vehicles were not registered in the name of the company - Held that:- Following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ICDS Ltd (2013 (1) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT ) we hold that the assessee is entitled for claim of depreciation on the vehicles used by it even though it has been purchased in the name of the Director. We, therefore, set aside the findings of the Ld. CIT(A) and direct the AO to allow the claim of depreciation - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1617
Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) - Held that:- Show cause notice u/s. 274 of the Act is defective as it does not spell out the grounds on which the penalty is sought to be imposed. Following the decision in the case of CIT Vs. Manjunatha Cotton & Ginning Factory [2013 (7) TMI 620 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ] we hold that the orders imposing penalty in all the assessment years have to be held as invalid and consequently penalty imposed is cancelled.
For the reasons given above, we hold that levy of penalty in the present case cannot be sustained - Decided in favour of assessee
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2015 (12) TMI 1616
Tax on the ‘capital gain’ on a ‘transfer’ - transfer of an Agricultural land to non- agriculturists - Held that:- Entire amount of sale consideration was refunded and original documents with respect to this property were also received back by the assessee. The perusal of the above clearly shows that transfer was illegal in the eyes of law from the very beginning and therefore, it can be clearly said that the transfer was void ab initio. No legal rights had accrued to the parties on execution of sale deed, as the same was void ab initio in the eyes of law. No transfer of the impugned land had taken place, and therefore, no amount of ‘capital gain’ was taxable as per law.
Under the given facts, we should keep in mind the concept of ‘Real Income’ theory. According to this theory, an assessee can be made to pay tax only and to the extent of income actually earned by him, and not beyond that. In the facts before us, the accepted factual and legal position is that no valid transfer (of the impugned land) had taken place as per law, and therefore, no question can arise of earning of ‘capital gain’ and taxing the same under the income tax law. It is further noted by us that it is settled law that an assessee can resile from its return if it is found at any later stage that the income offered therein was not taxable in accordance with law. Immediate reference can be made on the judgment of in the case of Bharat General Reinsurance(1970 (12) TMI 5 - DELHI High Court), which was subsequently approved in the case of Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co Ltd vs CIT (1990 (11) TMI 3 - SUPREME Court ) - Decided in favour of assessee
Claim of long term loss in respect of investment in shares disallowed - Held that:- We agree with the view taken by the lower authorities that a loss or gain can arise u/s 45 of the Income Tax Act 1961 only from “transfer” of a capital asset, effected in the previous year. Since, no transfer of the aforesaid shares was effected during the previous year, therefore, no claim of loss could have been allowed to the assessee, as per law. The contention of the Ld. Counsel that provision for decline in value of investment has been made because of mandatory requirement of Accounting Standard-13, is also not sustainable for the reason that accounting entries are not determinative for the taxability or otherwise of the transactions of the assessee. It is settled law that taxability of the transactions of the assessee has to be determined in view of the provisions of the Income Tax Act, and not on the basis of entries made in the books of accounts by the assessee. Therefore, keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the said loss was not allowable - Decided against assessee
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2015 (12) TMI 1615
Revision u/s 263 - "prejudicial to the interest of revenue" - multiple share transfers by assessee - Held that:- On verification of the notices and u/s 142, the questionnaires and replied thereto, we find that the AO probed into the aspects of each of the related concerned, facts relating to the multiple share transfers by the assessee company repeated over the short span of time, facts relating to the purchase of shares by the assessee with no adequate funds from Universal for consideration lower than the market price, raising of the funds through the OFCDs route from the INSTANT and clearing of the liabilities to the Universal etc. We also examined and the following annexures reflect the fact of verification of the details relating to the Share purchase transactions from the UNIVERSAL for the lower price. When the AO formed an opinion on an issue ( ie amount of premium on the OFCD), the CIT cannot sit on the judgment seat as the review officer u/s the provision of section 263 of the Act. Judgmental law does not permit the same.
The assessee purchased the shares from the said Zensar, KEC, Spencer and Co Ltd and the transactions are considered by the AO genuine. Fact of verification of the share purchase transaction is very much on records. We find the AO is aware of and informed of the facts relating to the purchase price of the said shares, being lessor than that of the FMV. Considering the facts narrated by the Sri Mehta, we find that the AO conducted necessary enquiries in to various aspects of the said purchase transactions and opined to make addition on account of „excess premium‟ only and invoked the provisions of section 56 of the Act and not on account of the said share purchase transactions involving Zensar, KEC, Spencer and Co Ltd. Therefore, we find no error in the order of the AO, whether of legal or factual nature on that account.- Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1614
Deemed dividend addition u/s 2(22)(e) - Held that:- As decided in assess;s own case in AY 2005-06 if the share premium amount is taken out of Reserves and Surplus, the assessee is having negative balance under the head profit and loss account which means that it has accumulated losses for the year ending 31.3.2005, which lead to only logical conclusion that there cannot be any question of deemed dividend. The findings of the Ld. CIT(A) are accordingly reversed. The AC) is directed to delete the addition made on account of deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. - Decided in favour of assessee
Assessment u/s 153A - whether an addition which is not on the basis of incriminating material as found during the search operation can be made where the assessment has attained finality? - Held that:- Addition made is not based on the incriminating material during the search and the assessment which is already attained finality cannot be disturbed. The additional ground also decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (12) TMI 1613
Double disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) - prohibition of carrying forward losses u/s 79 - amalgamation - Held that:- We find that the assessee has itself disallowed and added to its income ₹ 12,30,374/- while filing the return of income on the basis of note in clause 17(f) of the tax audit report as per Table A (supra). We further note from the comparative statement of disallowance u/s.40(a)(ia) of the Act that the A.O. again disallowed and added ₹ 17,97,259/- to the income of assessee as stated in para 6 of the A.O. order, the break up of which is given in Table B (supra). The ld. CIT(A) while disposing of the appeal before him allowed relief in respect of ₹ 5,76,899/-as mentioned in Table B (Total B) meaning thereby that double disallowance in respect of ₹ 12,20,360/- (Rs.12,15,060 + 5300) as which stands added to the total income of the assessee suo motto on the basis of tax audit report. On the basis of these facts, it is apparent that the disallowance in respect of ₹ 12,20,360/- has been made twice, first by the assessee on his own and secondly by the A.O. We, therefore, delete the disallowance/addition - Decided in favour of assessee
Rejection of assessee’s claim for setting off of brought forward losses - Held that:- As decided in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX Versus SELECT HOLIDAY RESORTS PVT LTD. [2013 (1) TMI 187 - DELHI HIGH COURT] as during the earlier period 98% of the assessee’s share were held by IIPL the holding company, which was amalgamated with the assessee company. However, after merger of the shareholder of the IIPL continued to be shareholder in the assessee company. Thus, the shareholders beneficially entitled to 98% of the shares continued to be same. In these circumstances, prohibition of carrying forward losses placed by Section 79 does not operate. The same issue was also come up before Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. AMCO Power System Ltd.[2015 (10) TMI 2385 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ] has affirmed the same.- Decided in favour of assessee
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2015 (12) TMI 1612
Addition u/s 68 - peak credit theory application - Held that:- We find from the copy of the account of the Syndicate Bank in the books of the assessee that the all deposits were of less than ₹ 50,000/- and the money was regularly withdrawn in cash by the assessee. In the present circumstances the addition of entire amount of deposits into bank of ₹ 29,79,700/- was wrong and cannot be sustained. We find reasoning in the submissions of the ld.AR that in such scenario where the regular deposits and withdrawals from the bank were made for the purpose of business of the assessee, the income could be assessed on the basis of peak cash credit only.
AO framed the assessment ex-parte without giving an opportunity to the assessee, whereas the ld.CIT(A) dismissed the appeal of the assessee after rejecting the contentions of the assessee of applying peak credit theory or presumptive tax scheme under section 44AD of the Act. Under the present circumstances, we are of the opinion that ends of justice would be met if the assessee is brought to tax on the basis of peak credit worked out on the basis of deposits and withdrawals. Accordingly, we set aside the order of ld.CIT(A) and direct the AO to assess the income of the assessee on the basis of peak credit theory in the bank account of the assessee after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. - Decided in favour of assessee for statistical purposes.
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2015 (12) TMI 1611
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - disallowance of salary and tenant accommodation charges - Held that:- Neither at the time of assessment stage nor at the time of penalty proceedings or even during appeal proceedings, the assessee has rebutted the findings of the ld.AO, by any documentary evidence that, it has actually incurred any genuine expenditure under the head salary, or tenant accommodation charges. Once the ld.AO has proved that the vouchers of these expenses are not reliable at all, the assesee could have produced some of the employees and the tenants before the ld.AO to disprove the findings. As the assesee failed to do so, the belief that the claim of expenses under the head salary and tenant accommodation charges are not genuine, strengthens. Moreover, the assesse had agreed for an adhoc disallowance in respect of the technical errors to buy peace and to avoid litigation. - Decided against assessee
Addition u/s 68 - Held that:- In the present case, ostensibly, the assessee had furnished the details of the loan taken from the 8 parties along with the PAN numbers before the ld.CIT(A). It was submitted before the Ld.CIT(A) that due to unavoidable circumstances, the assessee could not produce the third part evidences i.e., confirmation letters etc., at the time of assessment proceedings. The ld.CIT(A) instead of remanding the details furnished by the assessee to the ld.AO, rejected the same without giving any cogent reasons. Further it is observed that the ld.AO has not recorded his satisfaction in respect of the cash credits The aforesaid features does not establish that the cash credits shown in the books of accounts remained unexplained. Therefore we are inclined to delete the penalty levied by the ld.AO on the cash credits - Decided against revenue
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2015 (12) TMI 1610
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - addition on account of remission of liability u/s 41(1)- Held that:- Assessee has admitted in its written submissions before the authorities below that, there was no likely hood of these payments being made to the suppliers(creditors). The assessee therefore, has surrendered, in view of detection made by the Ld.AO. Had it been the intention of the assessee to make full and true disclosure of its income, it would have filed the return declaring an income inclusive of the amount, which was surrendered later during the course of the assessment proceedings. Consequently, it is clear that the assessee had no intention to declare its true income. The AO, in our view, has recorded a categorical finding that he was satisfied that the assessee had concealed true particulars of income and is liable for penalty proceedings under Section 271(1) (c ).
We therefore following the ratio in the case of MAK Data Pvt. Ltd. (2013 (11) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT ), uphold the view of the Ld.CIT(A) that, in the absence of any explanation in respect of the surrendered income, the first part of clause (A) of Explanation 1 is attracted. - Decided against assessee
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