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Showing 461 to 480 of 18686 Records
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2022 (12) TMI 1104
Appreciation of evidence - failure to give any evidence indicating that the substance “Pyridoxal 5 Phosphate” - extraordinary delay of more than four years between the initial site inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint - powers of Respondent/ Drugs Inspector under Section 22 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - HELD THAT:- Upon perusal of the legal nature of the impugned substance, it can be seen that the impugned substance has been categorized as a bulk food substance falling under the definition of food as per Section 3(1)(j) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. The impugned substance has specifically been mentioned as a food ingredient in Serial No.4(ii) of the Schedule-I of the Food Safety and Standards Regulations, 2016 - It is also worth mentioning that the Respondent has made no effort to prove that the alleged substance is only a drug and not a food- manufacturing substance. No scientific evidence or otherwise has been furnished to prove that the alleged substance is solely used for manufacturing drug and not food items. Prima Facie, due to the lack of evidence adduced by the Respondent in the four-year period between the initial enquiry and the complaint, this court cannot presume that the alleged substance can only be classified as a “drug”.
There has been a gap of more than four years between the initial investigation and the filing of the complaint, and even after lapse of substantial amount of time, no evidence has been provided to sustain the claims in the complaint.
In the present case, the Respondent has provided no explanation for the extraordinary delay of more than four years between the initial site inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint. In fact, the absence of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer some sinister motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings - While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint.
It must be noted that the High Court while passing the impugned judgment, has failed to take into consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is true that the quashing of a criminal complaint must be done only in the rarest of rare cases, it is still the duty of the High Court to look into each and every case with great detail to prevent miscarriage of justice. The law is a sacrosanct entity that exists to serve the ends of justice, and the courts, as protectors of the law and servants of the law, must always ensure that frivolous cases do not pervert the sacrosanct nature of the law.
The impugned order dated 23.08.2021 passed by the High Court is not liable to be sustained and is hereby set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2022 (12) TMI 1103
Continuing unlawful activity - Offence of organised crime - whether an FIR under the 2015 Act (Special enactment) is maintainable in law or can be registered if there is no FIR registered against the Accused after the promulgation of the 2015 Act for any offence under the Indian Penal Code or any other statute?
HELD THAT:- It is plain from a bare reading of the non-obstante Clause in the Sub-section that the power to grant bail by the High Court or Court of Sessions is not only subject to the limitations imposed by Section 439 of the Code but is also subject to the limitations placed by Section 20(4) of the 2015 Act. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions are: the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the Accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the Accused being not guilty has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression 'reasonable grounds' means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the Accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provisions requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the Accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Thus, recording of findings under the said provision is a sine qua non for granting bail under the 2015 Act.
If the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VERSUS SHIVA @ SHIVAJI RAMAJI SONAWANE & ORS. ETC. AND MEHMOOD KHAN YAKUB KHAN PATHAN ETC. ETC. [2015 (7) TMI 1420 - SUPREME COURT] is looked into closely along with other provisions of the Act, the same would indicate that the offence of 'organised crime' could be said to have been constituted by at least one instance of continuation, apart from continuing unlawful activity evidenced by more than one chargesheets in the preceding ten years.
If 'organised crime' was synonymous with 'continuing unlawful activity', two separate definitions were not necessary. The definitions themselves indicate that the ingredients of use of violence in such activity with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefit are not included in the definition of 'continuing unlawful activity', but find place only in the definition of 'organised crime'. What is made punishable Under Section 3 is 'organised crime' and not 'continuing unlawful activity'. If 'organised crime' were to refer to only more than one chargesheets filed, the classification of crime in Section 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(ii) on the basis of consequence of resulting in death or otherwise would have been phrased differently, namely, by providing that 'if any one of such offence has resulted in the death', since continuing unlawful activity requires more than one offence. Reference to 'such offence' in Section 3(1) implies a specific act or omission.
The dictum as laid by this Court in Shiva alias Shivaji Ramaji Sonawane does not require any relook. The dictum in Shiva alias Shivaji Ramaji Sonawane is the correct exposition of law.
The appeal stands disposed of.
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2022 (12) TMI 1102
Cancellation of registration of petitioner - no valid reason provided - HELD THAT:- Perusal of both these orders dated 26.05.2022 and 11.10.2022 show that no valid reason was given for cancellation of registration. Despite requested for, no details were provided and prima facie reply of the petitioners have not been considered. To our opinion, the show-cause notice dated 26.05.2022 does not specify the reason for which the allegation of wrongful availment or utilization of Input Tax Credit (ITC) or refund of tax is made. As the show-cause notice does not contain reason to justify the action of the respondent, it is violative of principles of natural justice.
As held by this Court in AGGARWAL DYEING AND PRINTING WORKS VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & 2 OTHER (S) [2022 (4) TMI 864 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], reasons are heart and soul of the order and non-communication of the same itself amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing resulting into miscarriage of justice. Therefore, applying the same principle, as the show-cause notice dated 26.05.2022 is bereft of any reasons, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and hereby quashed and set aside. The order of cancellation of registration dated 11.10.2022 is also quashed and set aside.
Petition disposed off.
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2022 (12) TMI 1101
Excess claim of input tax credit (ITC) - show cause notice as well as notice of personal hearing were uploaded in the common portal which is an accepted mode of service of notice under Section 169 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- On due consideration, we are of the view that it would only be in the interest of justice if the petitioner is granted an opportunity of hearing by the Assistant Commissioner before passing a fresh order in accordance with law.
The matter remanded back to the file of Assistant Commissioner (ST), Maredpally Circle, Hyderabad - petition disposed off.
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2022 (12) TMI 1100
Levy of GST - Supply of service or not - services provided by the University of Kola relating to affiliation granted to colleges for imparting education - amount collected by way of affiliation fee, are exempted vide S. No 66 of Notification No.12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 or not - HELD THAT:- The amendment was proposed to exempt services relating to admission to, or conduct of examination for admission to all educational institutions, as defined in the notification (definition 2(y) of Notification No. 12/2017-CT(R)). Thus the entry at 66(b)(iv) seeks to exempt only those services provided to such institution in relation to admission of students or conduct of examination for such admission to all the educational Institutions, including the higher educational institutions, which were not exempted up to this amendment.
On examination of clarification in Circular No. 177/09/2022-TRU, we don't found that affiliation fees so collected by applicant from its affiliated colleges is exempt. Further we would like to refer Circular No. 151/07/2021-GST dated 17.06.2021 regarding Clarification regarding GST on supply of various services by Central and State Board (such as National Board of Examination) wherein it is clarified at SI.4 (iii) that 18% GST will be applied to other services.
In the case at hand, it is evident that the affiliation services provided by the applicant enables the said institution to conduct the course/programme and do not relate to admission of students to such course/programme in the said institutions or conduct of examination for such admission in the said institution. Also, the exempted services on the conduct of examination is that related to the admission to such institution and not related to the examination based on which degree/title, etc are conferred to the students, as is being claimed by the applicant, though we do not part any opinion on the claim of the applicant that they extend such services to the institutions by extending the affiliation - affiliation fees so collected by the applicant is not exempted under the entry SI.No.66 of Notification No. 12/2017-C.T.(Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as amended.
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2022 (12) TMI 1099
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Allowability of expenses incurred on advertisement and marketing by the Petitioner - change of opinion - Reopening beyond period of four years -
As decided by HC [2021 (11) TMI 776 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] Once the Assessing Officer had applied his mind in the regular assessment proceedings of Petitioner having incurred advertisement and marketing expenditure, it is not open for the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment - when the primary facts necessary for assessment are fully and truly disclosed, the Assessing Officer is not entitled to a change of opinion for commencing proceedings for reassessment. AO could not have reopened the assessment merely on the basis of change of opinion
HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and hence, the special leave petition is dismissed.
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2022 (12) TMI 1098
Education cess as a disallowable expenditure u/s 40(a)(ii) - assessee states that in view of the amendment vide the Finance Act, 2022 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2005 to Section 40(a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the present appeal has to be allowed.
HELD THAT:- In view of the statement made, we direct that the Education cess paid by the respondent-assessee would not be allowed as an expenditure under Section 37 read with 40 (a) (ii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Assessee states that they have also paid the applicable tax on the disallowance.
Recording the above, the appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms, without any order as to costs.
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2022 (12) TMI 1097
Deductions u/s 80-IBA - writ of Mandamus to direct the Respondent to extend the time period for completion of construction projects from five years to seven year under section 80-IBA(2) (b) - HELD THAT:- The Petitioner’s claim to be discriminated against, on the basis that its members are similarly situated to persons covered under the provisions of section 80-IAC of the Act. In order to prove the element of discrimination, the Petitioner would be required to plead specific facts to demonstrate that its members as a class and those covered by the provisions of section 80- IAC of the Act are similarly situated
The Petitioner would be required to make out a case for the issuance of a writ of Mandamus in exercise of powers vested in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for directing the Respondent, or for that matter, the legislature to legislate and extend the timelines in the provisions of section 80-IBA(2)(b) of the Act, 1961 as claimed in the petition.
We find the present petition is grossly lacking in sufficient pleadings as would be required from making out a case of discrimination as claimed by the Petitioner. The petition lacks all material particulars required to be stated in the pleadings, to draw some parity or similarity between members of the Petitioner and persons stated to be covered by the provisions of section 80-IAC of the Act.
Further applying the ratio laid down in Supreme Court Employees Welfare [1989 (7) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT] this Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a writ of Mandamus to the Respondent and much less to the legislature, directing the legislation in the nature sought by the Petitioner in the reliefs claimed in the petition.
We are of the opinion that no writ of Mandamus would lie to direct the legislature and accordingly, we dismiss the petition.
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2022 (12) TMI 1096
Exemption u/s 10(37) - entitlement of a person for exemption under Clause 37 Section 10 - land needed for the public purpose within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act - acquisition of the land at Village Dindoli by the SMC was for the Sewage Treatment Plant - whether land not being used as an agricultural land two years prior to the transfer to SMC? - HELD THAT:- CIT(Appeals) and the ITAT both have held rightly that the acquisition of the land at Village Dindoli by the SMC was for the Sewage Treatment Plant and this is a compulsorily acquired land under the provision of Section 107 of the GTP & UD Act. The land was needed for the purpose of Town Planning Scheme or the Development Plan and therefore, it was deemed to be the land needed for the public purpose within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act.
Deed of transfer of the land was signed between the SMC represented by the Director of the Town Planning and the assessee along with his family members - The proceedings u/s 77 of the BPMC Act were pending at the time of registration of sale deed for transfer of property and pending the reservation, efforts were made by the farmers and SMC to negotiate the price of land to be transferred in favour of the SMC to avoid the compulsory acquisition of the land by SMC under Sections 77 and 78. This negotiation had been vetted by the Standing Committee of the SMC vide its Resolution No. 1758 dated 28.12.2007 where the SMC had agreed to pay land owners at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per sq.mt for their land and to not invoke provisions of Sections 77 and 78 (Compulsory Acquisition) of Gujarat Town Planning Act.
The land had been transferred by the registration of sale deed by the assessee and the SMC where the purchaser had to pay stamp duty at the prevalent market rate to avoid any kind of litigation. This was a better way worked out by the authority and the land owners. This had resulted into the Assessing Officer finding it not to be a compulsory acquisition, but, more a voluntary transfer. However, this Court in case of other assessee being Dipak Kalidas Pauwala [2016 (4) TMI 431 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] has held the requisite conditions of Section 10(37) to have been fulfilled.
The issue raised in the instant case is that the agricultural land owned by the respondent assessee should have been used for a period of two years immediately before the date of transfer for the agricultural purpose and that aspect is missed out by all authorities.
As noticed that before the Ao, the department has not raised the issue and the order AO was further challenged before the CIT (Appeals) and thereafter, before the Tribunal where, by a concurrent finding they have held in favour of the respondent. These are the factual aspects of the land not being used as an agricultural land two years prior to the transfer to SMC. This being a factual aspect never having been raised by the department and none of the authorities having opined anything on this, that cannot furnish the ground for disallowing anything under Section 10(37) of the Act. Tax Appeal is dismissed.
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2022 (12) TMI 1095
Imposition of Cost on Income Tax officers - Reduction of cost imposed by our judgment in SR COLD STORAGE VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND 3 OTHERS [2022 (8) TMI 806 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] - respondents have acted arbitrarily, illegally without jurisdiction, caused harrassment to the petitioner and abused power conferred under the Act, 1961, which resulted in creation of illegal demand of income Tax - HELD THAT:- As considering the request and steps being taken by the respondent-department to improve its working so as to rule out possibility of harassment of genuine assessees in the hands of the departmental-officers, we reduce the cost from Rs.50 lacs to Rs.5 lacs with the consent of learned counsel for the petitioner and accordingly modify our judgment dated 11.08.2022 in respect of cost only. The cost shall be deposited by the respondents within one month from today in terms of the directions given in the judgment in SR COLD STORAGE [supra].
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2022 (12) TMI 1094
Capital gain computation - Jantri rates v/s DVO’s report - scope of invoking provisions of section 50C - AO empowered to reject the report of the valuation officer - AO to ascertain the fair market value, referred the matter to the Department Valuation Officer’s (DVO) but rejected the DVO’s report, on the ground that the sale instance of A.Y.2008-09 were considered when the old Jantri rates were prevalent - HELD THAT:- Since, section 50C provides the rate adopted or assessed by the Stamp Duty Authorities is to be considered for the purpose of Section 50C - AO was not correct in adopting the market value assessable for the purpose of stamp duty, as said the provision has been inserted in the section 50C with effect from 01/10/2009, and applicable from A.Y.2010-11.
Tribunal has rightly observed that once valid reference to the valuation officer is made under section 50(C)(2) of the Act, assessing officer is not empowered to reject the report of the valuation officer. This finding of the Tribunal is supported by the decision of coordinate bench in the case Ravjibhai Nagjibhai Thesia [2016 (9) TMI 645 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT]
Therefore, we could not find any error in the findings of the Tribunal that the A.O. is not justified in adopting the value other than as adopted by the stamp duty authority. No substantial question of law.
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2022 (12) TMI 1093
Jurisdiction to initiate Reopening of assessment - validity of order under Section 148A(d) - Petitioner also challenges the order passed by the CIT (International Taxation–2), Mumbai, in purported exercise of powers under Section 127 - Notices u/s 148 A(b) and the consequent notice u/s 148 of the Act are challenged on the ground that the said order and notice could be sustained only, if the initial notice under Section 148 A(b) of the Act had been issued by the concerned A.O. at Delhi.
HELD THAT:- In the present case, it is stated that while notice under Section 148 A(b) of the Act was issued by the officer at Bombay, the order under Section 148A(d) as also the notice 148 of the Act were issued by the A.O. at Delhi, which thus cannot be upheld.
Prima facie, we are satisfied with the argument of Mr. Mistri, learned Senior Counsel that a part of cause of action has accrued to the Petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, inasmuch as the initial notice under Section 148 A(b) of the Act was issued by the A.O. in Mumbai and that this Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition, more so when this Court had proceeded to exercise jurisdiction in the case of the Petitioner while entertaining a challenge to the initial notice under Section 148 of the Act, issued under the unamended provisions of Section 148 of the Act as it existed before 01st April, 2021.
Issue notice to Respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 5, returnable on 13th January, 2023. Objections be fled within six weeks from today.
There shall be ad-interim relief in terms of prayer clause ‘d’ of the petition.
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2022 (12) TMI 1092
Assessment u/s 153A - addition of penny stocks LTCG - incriminating material found during search or not ? - HELD THAT:- We find that this is an unabated assessment. Hence, de hors incriminating material, addition is not sustainable in assessment u/s 153A. This issue is duly decided by Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Kabul Chawla [2015 (9) TMI 80 - DELHI HIGH COURT] - Other decisions referred by ld. CIT (A) are also germane. Accordingly, following the precedent, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the ld. CIT (A). Accordingly, we uphold the same. Appeal filed by the Revenue stands dismissed.
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2022 (12) TMI 1091
Income deemed to accrue or arise in India - Amount received by on account of transfer of trademark and brand name - Whether be treated as royalty under Article 12 of India – Turkey Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), instead of capital gains under Article 13 of the DTAA - assessee is a non-resident corporate entity incorporated under the laws of Turkey and a tax resident of Turkey - HELD THAT:- As relying on Hilton Roulunds Ltd. case [2018 (4) TMI 1485 - DELHI HIGH COURT] licensee acknowledges the licensor’s rights and title over the trademark, the manner of use of trademark/brand name is specified and restricted in the TLA and the licensee is bound by such conditions/restrictions. TLA authorizes the licensor to terminate the agreement in case of any breach of the conditions. That being the case, it has to be held that it is a case of licence conferring right to use the trademark/brand name and not assignment/transfer of brand name/trademark in favour of the licensee.
Thus we have no hesitation in holding that the consideration received by the assessee for permitting the right to use of brand name/trademark under TLA is nothing else but in the nature of royalties as defined under section 9(1)(vi) read with Article 12(3) of India – Turkey tax treaty. Therefore, we concur with the view expressed by learned DRP. Grounds are dismissed.
Taxation of royalty income at the rate of 15% as per the treaty provision instead of applying the lower rate of tax as per the provisions of the domestic law - HELD THAT:- We find, the claim of the assessee has neither been examined by learned DRP, nor by the AO. Therefore, we restore this issue to the Assessing Officer for examining assessee’s claim with reference to the provisions of treaty and section 90(2) of the Act. Needless to mention, the assessee must be provided reasonable opportunity of being heard before deciding the issue.
Set off of royalty income against the long term capital loss - HELD THAT:- Having heard the parties, we find, this issue also has not been addressed either by the DRP or by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, we restore this issue to the Assessing Officer for examining assessee’s claim, keeping in view the provisions of section 71(3) of the Act. Before deciding the issue, the assessee must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. This ground is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2022 (12) TMI 1090
Addition of trade payables above on lakh - addition to the income of the assessee company - CIT-A deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- Appreciating the matter on record it can be observed that primarily on the basis of no adverse observations on the purchases the Ld. CIT(A) had deleted the additions at the same time perusal of the order of Ld. CIT(A) took into consideration the fact that assessee had only submitted part evidences of confirmation - Bench is of opinion, if assessee was not having sufficient time for filing confirmations before Ld. AO, an attempt could have been made to file those before Ld. First Appellate Authority. However, Ld. CIT(A) instead of proceeding to make an inquiry on this own or to given opportunity to the assessee, deleted the additions made by the Ld. AO.
AO was proceeding with assessment on limited scrutiny as to mismatch in sale and large current liability in comparison to total assets, then only for the reason for not questioning purchases the opinion of Ld. AO could not have been interfered, when otherwise before Ld. CIT(A) there was no additional material or evidences. That being so, the grounds raised by revenue are sustained. The Appeal of Revenue is allowed and impugned order of Ld. CIT(A) is set aside and one of Ld. AO is restored.
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2022 (12) TMI 1089
Exemption u/s 11 - assessee could not produce its books of account during the assessment proceedings without appreciating that the books of account could not be produced before the Ld. AO as the same were impounded by the DGIT(Exemption) under section 131(3) - AO traversed beyond the direction of the Tribunal to verify whether expenses incurred by the assessee were utilized for the purpose of the Trust, and all other conditions relating to allowability of deduction under section 11 were satisfied or not which has been upheld by the Ld. CIT(A) - On examination of the books of account and comments/opinion of FSL, the Ld. AO came to the conclusion that books have not been written on day to day basis but in a few sittings - HELD THAT:- The above allegation alone is not sufficient to make ad hoc disallowances of 50% of expenses in the absence of any adverse finding even after examining the books duly supported by the bills and vouchers. Not even single instance has been brought on record to suggest that expenses were incurred for purposes other than the purposes to fulfill the objects of the assessee Trust. There is clear cut finding that payments were made through account payee cheques. No defect has been found in any item of receipts and expenditure. Explanation as to why income from all centers showed vast difference in comparison to expenditure was given by the assessee which explanation has not been considered nor adversely commented by the Ld. CIT(A). We, therefore, delete the ad hoc 50% disallowances out of the expenses in both the years.
There is nothing in the order of the Ld. AO to show that the conditions for claiming exemption under section 11 have not been satisfied in the AYs under consideration. Moreover in CIT vs. Indian Institute of Engineering Society [2012 (11) TMI 1243 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] and Indian Institute of Banking and Finance [2018 (4) TMI 197 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] have held that benefit under section 11 cannot be denied on the ground that the assessee has not obtained exemption from prescribed authorities under section 10(23C) of the Act.
Denial of exemption under section 11 of the Act to the assessee Trust in these two AYs is not justified. Exemption under section 11 of the Act deserves to be allowed to the assessse in both the years.
Accordingly, the assessee succeeds in all its effective grounds of appeals in both the AYs involved i.e. AYs 2006-07 and 2008-09 relating to denial of exemption under section 11 and disallowances out of expenses claimed. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2022 (12) TMI 1088
Exemption u/s 11 - Application of provisions of "Accumulation of income" for Notional Income (Rent) - annual value of any property is to be determined - two properties leased out by assessee are not the fair market value of rental income and it is only nominal value and he compared the prevailing market rent in the area - As per AO assessee charitable trust owns land leased out the same and the two tenants are specified persons u/s.13(3 hence, provisions of section 13(1)(c) of the Act are applicable to the case of the assessee - HELD THAT:- As going through the CBDT Circular No.005P (LXX-6) dt. 19th June, 1968 cited above, which has been considered in the case of Rao Bahadur Calavala Cunnan Chetty Charities [1979 (8) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and Ganga Charity Trust Fund [1985 (10) TMI 67 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] we are of the view that the ‘accumulation’ or ‘application’ in section 11(1)(a) of the Act must be of real income and as per the CBDT circular No.005P(LXX-6) cited above, makes it clear that the word ‘income’ in section 11(1)(a) must be understood in commercial sense. The entire income of the trust in the commercial sense has been spent for the purpose and not the notional income. But in the present case before us, the assessee has violated the provisions of section 13(1)(c) r.w.s. 13(1)(b) of the Act, as the assessee has received rent from two tenants who are specified persons u/s.13(3) of the Act and hence, clear violation of provisions of section 13(1)(c) r.w.s. 13(1)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the assessee is not entitled for claim of deduction.
Accordingly assessee trust cannot be assessed on notional rental income in term of CBDT Circular No.005P(LXX-6) dt. 19th June 1968
AO will deny exemption u/s.11 of the Act, in regard to the income declared by assessee and will assess the same to tax in term of section 164(1) of the Act.
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2022 (12) TMI 1087
Deduction u/s 80IA - deduction denied on non-filing of Form 10CCB along with the return of income - HELD THAT':- As assessee filed the audit report in Form 10CCB for claiming deduction under section 80IA of the Act on 13.11.2017. The processing of return under section 143(1) of the Act was done by the CPC, Bengaluru and issued intimation dated 16.03.2019, which is much after the filing of audit report.
This being the case, this issue is squarely covered by the decision of AKS Alloys (P.) Ltd. [2011 (12) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] which was duly affirmed by CIT v. G.M. Knitting Industries (P.) Ltd. [2015 (11) TMI 397 - SC ORDER] as held that even though necessary certificate in Form 10CCB has to be filed along with the return of income, but, even if the same was filed before the final order of assessment was made, the assessee is entitled to claim deduction under section 80IB of the Act.
Thus we are of the considered opinion that once the assessee has filed an audit report in Form 10CCB on 13.11.2017 and processing of return under section 143(1) was done by the CPC, Bengaluru on 16.03.2019, which is an event much after, the assessee is fully entitled to claim deduction under section 80IA of the Act. Accordingly, we set aside the orders of authorities below on this issue and direct the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of deduction under section 80IA of the Act. Thus, the ground raised by the assessee is allowed.
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2022 (12) TMI 1086
Approval u/s 80G(5) - application for registration in Form No.10AB rejected on non submission of mandatory information - HELD THAT:- It is apparent from the records that the assessee has submitted most of the information asked for in the notice of hearing such as PAN, Society Registration Certificate, Bye Laws, Details of Members of the Society, copies of income tax returns, financial statements at the time of submission of application for registration u/s 80G itself before the Ld.CIT(E).
On perusal of the written submissions filed in the paper book and the medical reports submitted by the assessee, we find that it is a fit case to grant one more opportunity of being heard to the assessee to furnish all the details / information sought by the Ld.CIT(E) - We set aside the order passed by the Ld.CIT(E) and remit the matter back to the file of the Ld.CIT(E) with a direction to grant one more opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Appeals of the assessee are allowed for statistical purpose.
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2022 (12) TMI 1085
Revision u/s 263 - deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) on the interest received from the cooperative banks - whether assessee is eligible to claim deduction on interest earned from Co-Operative Banks u/s 80P(2)(d) of the Act ? - HELD THAT:- As in the case of Surat Vankar Sahakari Sangh Ltd. [2016 (7) TMI 1217 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] held assessee-cooperative society was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in respect of gross interest received from co-operative bank without adjusting interest paid to said bank.
In the case of Surendranagar District Co-op. Milk Producers Union Ltd. [2019 (9) TMI 978 - ITAT RAJKOT] held that assessee-co-operative society could not claim benefit of section 80P(2)(d) in respect of interest earned by it from deposits made with nationalised/private banks, however, said benefit was available in respect of interest earned on deposits made with co-operative bank.
In the case of Totagars Cooperative Sale Society [2017 (1) TMI 1100 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] held that the interest income earned by a cooperative society on its investments held with a co-operative bank would be eligible for claim of deduction under Sec.80P(2)(d) of the Act.
In view of the aforesaid decisions of Honourable High Court of Gujarat and other cases cited above, Principal CIT erred in holding that the order passed by AO is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue on account of allowability of interest earned by the assessee on interest earned by the assessee from cooperative banks, coupled with the fact that Ld. AO had made due enquiries on this issue during the course of assessment proceedings.Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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9911796707
