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2023 (12) TMI 1437
Violations of the SEBI laws - violation of 1993 circular - Funds of the credit balance clients utilized by the appellant for settlement obligations of the debit balance clients - appellant had violated the 1993 circular by mixing clients’ funds with its own funds in the pool account and used the mixed funds for its own purposes. It was also alleged that funds pay out from the stock exchange towards client trades were not transferred to the designated client bank account and that “G Value” of trades on number of days had come out negative - HELD THAT:- The 1993 circular nowhere stipulates any formula for computation of deemed misuse of client funds. The 1993 circular only provides the principles of segregation of the client funds from brokers’ own fund. We find that this Tribunal in the matter of Arihant Capital Markets Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was not called upon to decide whether the funded portion of the bank guarantee was to be taken into consideration while calculating the balances with the stock exchange / clearing corporation. The treatment of bank guarantee introduced in the 2016 circular was not existing in the 1993 circular and the treatment of this bank guarantee introduced in 2016 circular was not considered by this Tribunal in Arihant Capital Markets Pvt. Ltd. [2021 (10) TMI 1463 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI] matter and in other cases cited by the respondent. Thus, merely picking up the phrase from the order passed by this Tribunal does not give any right nor can it hold that the 2016 circular was a reiteration of the 1993 circular.]
There is no misuse of the clients funds and since there is no failure on the part of the appellant to segregate monies of the client nor monies of the client have been misused by the appellant for its own purposes, no penalty under Section 23D of the SCRA could be imposed.
However, we find that the appellant has failed to change the nomenclature of the bank accounts of the client as required to be done under the 1993 circular. Even though, it is a technical breach and there is no misuse of the client funds, nonetheless, if something is required to be done in a particular manner and the same is not done in that fashion, then there is a violation of that circular. Considering the aforesaid that it is only a technical breach, we are of the opinion that in the given circumstances for the two show cause notices, a penalty of Rs. 20 lakh in total would be sufficient for the purpose of this case.
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2023 (12) TMI 1436
Unauthorize investment advisory activities through a website without obtaining a registration under the SEBI - violation of Section 12(1) of the SEBI Act read with Regulation 3(1) of the IA Regulations - HELD THAT:- The argument of the appellant appears to be attractive but the same cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the appellant had applied for registration as a Research Analyst on August 26, 2021 whereas the evidence on record indicates that the appellant was carrying on investment advisory services under the name and style of Restock Research from December 2020 onwards and had also collected a sum from his clients while providing different packages of investment strategies. We also find that the website through which the appellant was carrying out investment advisory services also indicated that the appellant was registered with SEBI which was totally false and gave a wrong picture to the investors.
Thus appellant was carrying out investment advisory services without getting itself registered under Regulation 3 of the IA Regulations. In addition, the appellant was misleading its investors that it was registered with SEBI as an investment advisor and, therefore, played a fraud in violation of Regulation 3 and 4 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003.
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2023 (12) TMI 1435
Penalty proceedings u/s 15HB of the SEBI Act - non-compliance of directions issued by the Whole Time Member (WTM) u/s 11B of the SEBI Act - HELD THAT:- Directions issued under Section 11B are under Chapter-II of the SEBI Act, which gives powers to the Board to issue such directions as are necessary to protect the interest of the investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market by such measures as it thinks fit. Such directions issued under 11B are in the nature of orders which are passed after due enquiry.
Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition defines ‘direction’ to mean an order. The word ‘order’ has also been defined in the same Black’s Law Dictionary Seventh Edition as a command, direction or instruction, a written direction or command delivered by a court or judge. Thus, direction and order are synonymous terms and are interchangeable.
The word ‘directions’ issued by the Board under Section 15HB is different and distinct from the directions issued u/s 11B after due enquiry and adjudication. There are many directions issued under the Regulations and the Circulars requiring a person to do an act in a certain manner. For example, a person is required to comply with a certain provision within a stipulated period. Failure to comply with such directions issued by the Board under the Act, Regulations, Rules or Circulars if not complied with may invite penalty. If penalty is not specified under Chapter-VIA from Section 15-A to Section 15-HAA for failure to comply with such type of directions then penalty can be imposed after adjudication under the residuary clause Section 15HB.
Section 15HB cannot be invoked for noncompliance of any directions issued under Section 11B after enquiry and adjudication.
Thus, an adjudicatory order passed under Chapter IV or under Chapter VIA, after enquiry and adjudication can be enforced like a decree u/s 28A. Penalty proceedings cannot be initiated for non-compliance under Section 15HB.
We are further of the opinion that the appellants having resigned in 2011 were not in a position to comply with the direction of the WTM to bring back the money as they were no longer in-charge of the Company. Thus, there is no willful failure on the part of the appellant to comply with the order of the WTM.
We are of the view that the provisions of Section 15HB cannot be utilized for imposition of penalty for non-compliance of an order of the WTM passed under Section 11B of the SEBI Act.
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2023 (12) TMI 1434
Rejection of application moved by the Appellants – Defendants under Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Section 19(6) to (10) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 - jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the Plaintiff for recovery of loss, damages, and compensation - HELD THAT:- Sub Section 1A of Section 13 provides that a person aggrieved by a judgment or order can file an appeal, however, the said provision is to be read in conjunction with the proviso which specifically states that an appeal shall lie only from orders which are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC. The occurrences of the expression “shall” and “specifically” in the proviso has to be noted for correctly understanding the legislative intent in framing the scheme of Section 13 of the Act of 2015. It is also noteworthy that the order under challenge in this appeal has been passed by the learned trial court rejecting the Application moved by the Defendants under Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 11(d) of the CPC. Such an order is not enumerated in Order XLIII of the CPC, though Rule 1(a) of Order XLIII enlists an order passed under Order VII Rule 10 for returning the plaint. Thus, Order XLIII enlists the order passed on an Application under Order VII Rule 10 if it is allowed, however, it does not enlist the order in case such an Application is rejected.
The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of D & H India Ltd. [2020 (3) TMI 1458 - DELHI HIGH COURT] held the appeal to be maintainable by observing that the Court in that case was not concerned with the challenge to the order passed under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, rather under Order V of Chapter II of the 2018 Rules of the High Court.
Conclusion - Section 13(1A) of the Act of 2015 would lie only against the judgment and orders which are enumerated or enlisted under Order XLIII of the CPC. An order rejecting an Application moved under Order VII Rule 10 or Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC is not enumerated or enlisted in Order XLIII of the CPC hence, such an order is not appealable.
The instant appeal is not maintainable - Appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1433
Priority of charges - Seeking directions to the Liquidator of Corporate Debtor to allow to realize corporate debtor’s Assets specifically charged to the Applicant under the provisions of Section 52 of the Code read with the Liquidation Process Regulations 2016 - whether the after satisfaction of charge in a financed assets in favor of lender outside the Consortium lenders get automatically vested as first charge in favor of Consortium lender, or such charge in favor of Consortium Lenders over the same assets, refinanced subsequently by another lender outside the Consortium lenders, remains second charge as a collateral security?
HELD THAT:- It is admitted fact that no NOC was taken from the Consortium lenders by the Applicant or Corporate Debtor while refinancing the assets earlier financed by Tata Capital Limited, however, the charge on these assets created in favor of Applicant is registered in the records of the RoC in terms of Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013. The Applicant had sought NoC from earlier financier of these assets i.e. Tata Capital Limited.
It has been consistent understanding with the lenders that the assets financed by lenders outside the Consortium lenders shall be charged in favor of such financier and the Consortium shall have only second charge as collateral security. It is pertinent to note that the charge over such assets was never given as primary security in favor of Consortium lenders by the Corporate Debtor. The existence of charge in favor of Applicant was in public domain, being validly registered with RoC. Accordingly, the applicant remains the first charge holder over these assets, and it can not be said that after satisfaction of earlier charge, the second charge gets converted into first charge and it shall supersede any subsequent first charge.
Conclusion - The Applicant holds valid 1st charge over the assets stated in Schedule K of the application and is entitled to enforce security interest thereon in terms of section 52 of the Code. The Respondent is directed accordingly.
Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1432
Dishonour of cheque - acquittal of the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - sufficient grounds to warrant interference with the Trial Court's findings - HELD THAT:- Any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against any person who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto. DW.1 in her evidence has stated that she has borrowed Rs.1,50,000/- from the complainant and Smt.Kashibai was standing as surety for the said amount. The said Smt.Kashibai insisted the accused/DW.1 to repay the loan to the complainant. As per her instruction, the accused said to have paid Rs.1,25,000/-. The accused had to pay the balance and intimated the complainant to return the cheque and also informed the complainant that the balance would be paid at the time of returning the documents.
On conjoint reading of Sections 20 and 87 of the N.I Act, it makes it clear that the provision of Section 87 are subject to those of Sections 20, 49, 86 and 125 of the Act. When the accused / drawer of the cheque signed the cheque and issued blank cheque to the complainant, if any alteration appears on the body of the cheque, such alterations need not require the consent of the accused / drawer of the cheque. In this way, the Trial Court has committed error in recording the acquittal on the ground that the cheque is materially altered. Therefore, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is liable to be set aside.
Conclusion - i) The judgment and order dated 26.10.2018 passed in C.C.No.25323/2017 by the XII and XXXVII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (S.C.C.H-8) at Bengaluru is set aside. ii) The respondent / accused is convicted for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act and she is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.3,00,000/-, in default of payment of fine, she shall undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1431
Unexplained income - cash deposits in his bank account and additional estimated income - CIT(A) noted assessee’s submissions that the said account was joint account with his brother and the deposits were made by the brother - HELD THAT:- As we find that a copy of the assessee’s brother affidavit is produced before us which stated that the said account was a joint account of his and younger brother and the first name was of assessee’s brother and the second name is the assessee. Further, the brother of the assessee has sworn on affidavit that all the money deposit was his and his younger brother has nothing to do with the deposits.
We find that in the interest of justice, this additional evidence needs to be verified at the level of AO. Hence, we restore the file to AO and AO shall verify all these submissions and decide as per law. Needless to add, assessee should be given adequate opportunity of being heard.
Assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2023 (12) TMI 1430
Challenge to allocation of Rs.5 lakhs in a Resolution Plan approved by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Indore Bench - appellant is an operational creditor - HELD THAT:- The Appellant has filed the claim of Rs.26,06,41,424/- and the claim was admitted for the same amount. The nature of claim was mentioned as contingent liability. As appeal was pending against the assessment order. The amount of Rs.5 lakhs which was allocated the Appellant being operational creditor, Appellant was entitled for allocation of the amount which is not less than the amount which the Appellant would have been paid in event the Corporate Debtor is liquidated. It is not shown that the amount of Rs.5 lakh is below the amount which the Appellant was entitled in the event of liquidation of the Corporate Debtor - thus, no error can be found out in allocation of Rs.5 lakhs in the Resolution Plan.
Conclusion - The Operational Creditor was held to be secured creditor on the basis of relevant statutory provisions whereas there is no basis to contend that the Appellant is secured operational creditor. There are no error in the impugned order approving the Resolution Plan.
Appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1429
In the case before the Gujarat High Court, presided over by Honourable Mr. Justice Bhargav D. Karia and Honourable Mr. Justice Niral R. Mehta, the petitioners, represented by Mr. Amal Paresh Dave, challenged an Order-in-Original dated 30th October, 2023. The Central Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal had previously remanded the matter to the Adjudicating Authority, emphasizing the necessity of allowing cross-examination as mandated by Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Despite this directive, the Adjudicating Authority issued the impugned order without granting the petitioners the opportunity for cross-examination, asserting that Section 9D was not applicable. The petitioners cited the precedent set in Manek Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2016(334) E.L.T. 302 (Guj.), to support their argument. The Court issued a notice, returnable on 24th January, 2024, to address these issues.
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2023 (12) TMI 1428
Seeking grant of bail - alleged involvement in the offences U/s. 13(2), R/w.13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 1988 - acquisition and possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income by the Petitioner - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, in the case in hand the learned court has issued summon directing the Petitioner to appear with an option either to appear in person or through pleader. No order of NBW has been issued even though the offence alleged is non-bailable in nature.
Adverting to the provision enumerated U/s 209 Cr.P.C it is apt to mention that the Special Court upon appearance of a party pursuant to the institution of a case by the Directorate subject to the restrictions enumerated U/s 45A of the PMLA relating to bail, inter alia, may remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of the trial.
Conclusion - While this court is not inclined to grant relief prayed for directs that in the event the Petitioner appears before the learned Special Court in seisin over the matter and move for grant of regular bail, the same shall be considered on its own merit, keeping in view the developments in law as laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Vijay Madanlal Choudhury v. Union of India [2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] vis-à-vis the facts emerges in the case in hand in their proper perspective and further that Petitioner has cooperated with the investigation so far as acknowledged by the opposite party too and dispose of in accordance with law without being influenced of any observation made herein.
The ABLAPL stands disposed of accordingly.
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2023 (12) TMI 1427
Validity of order passed u/s 148A(d) as petitioner was not granted a personal hearing before the impugned order was issued - HELD THAT:- Petitioner is correct in submitting that if only a personal hearing was granted, perhaps the impugned order under Section 148A(d) would not have been passed.
In the circumstances, without going into the merits of the matter and keeping open the rights and contentions of the parties, the impugned order issued u/s 148A(d) is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded for denovo consideration to the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO).
FAO shall pass an order in accordance with law after giving personal hearing to petitioner, notice whereof shall be communicated to petitioner atleast 5 working days in advance.
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2023 (12) TMI 1426
Addition u/s 68 - cash sales during the demonetization period - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- As the cash sales is always more than Rs. 20 lakhs per day which went as high as Rs. 45.55 lakhs. The total sales from 28.08.2016 to 03.09.2016 is Rs. 1,30,42,002/- which means that cash sales of 8 days are more than cash sales from 01.011.2016 to 08.11.2016. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that there is nothing unusual in the cash sales during 01.11.2016 and 08.11.2016.
Nowhere in the assessment order the AO has mentioned that after inflating the alleged cash sales the assessee has frequently revised its VAT returns. It is not the case of the AO that the assessee has shown alleged cash sales without having sufficient stock in hand during that period. Not a single instance of defect is pointed out in the audited books of account. The entire assessment is based on assumptions/presumptions, surmises and conjectures de hors of the facts on record. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2023 (12) TMI 1425
Unexplained cash credit u/s 68 - Bogus share transactions - AO has doubted the purchase and sale of shares and observed that the price rise is not commensurate with the financials of the investee company - as submitted purchases and sale of shares are supported by evidences and are genuine and the assessee has substantiated with various details with the authorities - addition u/sec 69 in respect of estimated commission expenditure
HELD THAT:- The assessee has substantiated with all details and information and the AO has relied on the investigation report of income tax department and treated the long term capital gains on sale of shares as not genuine.
A.O. has not made any enquiry or independent investigation and relied on the statement of the parties and the assessee’s name is not included in the list of investigation report.
The fact remains that the assessee has submitted the requisite details in respect of purchase and sale of shares and were not disproved. The transaction of purchase and sale of shares is through banking channel. Hon’ble Tribunal in the case of Sangeeta Newal Agarwal [2022 (11) TMI 1545 - ITAT MUMBAI] dealt on the same scrip of share and for the same assessment and has granted relief to the assessee.
Accordingly, we direct the AO to delete the additions and allow the grounds of appeal in favour of the assessee.
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2023 (12) TMI 1424
Denial of benefit of exemption u/s 11 - Assessee society is set up for religious activities while claiming charitable status -
HELD THAT:- Appellant/revenue, fairly concedes that the question of law proposed in the instant appeal is covered by the order titled Director of Income Tax (Exemption) v. M/s Indian Evangelical Team [2015 (10) TMI 2865 - DELHI HIGH COURT] AND [2022 (7) TMI 1578 - DELHI HIGH COURT] as endorsed the opinion of the CIT(A) that the assessee was entitled to claim charitable status u/s 11 of the Act. In so holding it relied upon its preview views for AY 2009-10. No substantial question of law arises.
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2023 (12) TMI 1423
Applicability of Doctrine of priority of interest as contemplated under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - power of attorney is inadmissible in evidence or not - HELD THAT:- The first plaintiff claims ownership based on the sale deed dated 20.05.2004 executed by the second plaintiff based on an unregistered General Power of Attorney and affidavit. Already answered that the General Power of Attorney and the declaration of facts in the form of an affidavit are inadmissible in evidence. Now the question of priority between two registered documents is required to be considered. Where there is a competition between two registered documents (relating to the same property) both of which are registered, the question of priority between them is to be determined with reference to the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act. If there are successive transfers of the same property, the later transfer is subject to the prior transfer.
Reverting to the facts of the case, the sale deed in favor of the fourth defendant is dated 08.10.2003 and the sale deeds in favor of defendants 5 and 6 are dated 26.04.2004. Whereas the sale deed in favor of first plaintiff is dated:20.05.2004. The registered sale deeds in favor of defendants 4, 5 and 6 were first in time than the sale deed in favor of the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff purchased the property already sold, he cannot question the sale deed to be void and hence to have a mileage on the situation - The transferor cannot prejudice the rights of the transferee by any subsequent dealing with the property. Taking note of the settled proposition of law, the successive transfer of the same property i.e., transfer by the second plaintiff in favor of the first plaintiff is subject to the prior transfer that was made in favor of defendants 4, 5 and 6.
Conclusion - Both Courts are not right in accepting the plaintiff’s contention. They overlooked the settled principles and erroneously went ahead and decreed the suit.
The judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are unsustainable in law - the Regular Second Appeal is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1422
Bogus Long Term Capital Gain - sale of shares of Global Capital Markets Ltd., a penny stock - period of holding of shares - AO that the price movement of the company were not supporting by financial fundamentals of the company - ITAT deleted addition -
HELD THAT:- Assessee has sold shares after seven years and therefore, the proximity of time between the buy and sale of shares cannot be considered as an accommodation entry in penny stock company within a short period of about one year to book bogus of Long Terms Capital Gain or loss to defraud the Revenue.
AO and CIT(A) have ignored such facts which were considered by the Tribunal to arrive at a finding of fact that the assessee has to be treated as an investor and cannot be treated to have engaged in fraudulent activity or manipulation activity.
Tribunal, therefore, considering the period of holding of shares by the respondent assessee, arrived at a finding that the Long Term Capital Gain earned by the assessee is not a significant amount and therefore, held that the assessee cannot be said to have taken an accommodation entry by entering into transaction of shares in the penny stock company.
No error in the finding of facts and the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the investment made by the assessee was longstanding and genuine and was not the penny stock company on the basis of which the Long Term Capital Gain was wrongly claimed. No substantial question of law.
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2023 (12) TMI 1421
Disallowance pertaining to the exaggerated profit of captive power generating unit by claiming higher rate than the cost price or the market price charged by it on the supply of power made by it to 3rd party i.e., State Electricity Board - HC [2008 (9) TMI 949 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] decided against the revenue.
Appellant(s) mentioned that in the judgment [2023 (12) TMI 417 - SUPREME COURT] ought to have been allowed, being filed by the assessee(s).
HELD THAT:- Accordingly, paragraph ‘56’ of the said judgment may be read as under:
“56. For the aforesaid reasons, all the Civil Appeals barring C.A. No.9920/2016 are hereby dismissed. Since C.A.No.9920/2016 is filed by the assessee(s), the same is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to cost.”
The Registry is directed to do the needful.
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2023 (12) TMI 1420
Delay of almost three years in filing the petition - retrospective amendment to Section 50 of the WBGST Act - HELD THAT:- Petitioner is not a company, not an individual and it must have the service of legal professionals. Though there is no limitation in the writ proceeding but if such type of claim is entertained by such inordinate delay without any proper explanation and particularly by the petitioner who is a company and not an individual cannot which take plea of ignorance of law and if the writ petition is entertained after three years of passing of the impugned order there will be floodgate of cases.
Petition dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1419
Reference to dispute resolution panel - Order u/s 144C bound to comply with the time frame stipulated u/s 144C(13) - whether the impugned order passed by the assessing authority was without jurisdiction? - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, Ext. P3 is dated 09.12.2013. Hence, the assessing officer was bound to pass the assessment order in conformity with the direction of the DRP before 31.01.2014. However, the assessing officer has passed Ext. P4 assessment order only on 27.03.2014, which was served on the petitioner on 31.03.2014. The respondents could not produce any document before this Court to prove receipt of Ext. P3 directions dated 09.12.2013 issued by the DRP. According to the petitioner, they received Ext. P3 on 27.12.2013. Ext. P4 assessment order was passed by the assessing authority on 27.03.2014, which is beyond the period stipulated in Section 144C(13) of the Act.
Whether the provisions in Section 144C are only procedural or not? - Section 144C is inserted in the Finance Act, 2009 with a view to provide a speedy disposal to create an alternative dispute resolution mechanism within the Income Tax Department. If the provisions of Section 144C as mandated by the statute are not strictly adhered to, the entire object of providing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism in the form of DRP would stand defeated.
The legislature had clear intention while the said provision was inserted in 2009 to facilitate an expeditious resolution of disputes on a fast track basis. If the assessing officer fails to pass any order in accordance with the statutory provisions, as mandated under Section 144C, it will defeat the entire exercise and render the same futile.
The directions in Ext. P3 given by the DRP are binding on the assessing officer, who has to finalize the assessment order even without affording the assessee an opportunity of being heard. There was nothing more to do by the assessing officer than to pass an assessment order on receipt of Ext. P3.
Once the statute has prescribed limitation period for passing a final order, the officers of the Department should act accordingly in order to provide the assessee an expeditious resolution of the disputes. The impugned orders were passed by the assessing authority beyond the time prescribed under Section 144C(13). Therefore, impugned order passed by the assessing officer cannot be sustained.
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2023 (12) TMI 1418
Revision u/s 263 - allowance/deduction u/s 80P(2)(a) or 80P(2)(d) with regard to interest received from Surat District Cooperative Bank - HELD THAT:- We find that the Surat District Cooperative Bank is a cooperative society registered under Gujarat State Cooperative Societies Act. Tribunals held that the cooperative banks are primarily cooperative societies and interest earned on deposits with such cooperative bank is exempt u/s 80P(2)(d) of the Act.
The Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Surat Vankar Sahakari Sangh Ltd. [2016 (7) TMI 1217 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] also held that the assessee cooperative society was eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) in respect of gross interest received from cooperative bank without adjusting interest paid to said bank.
No doubt that in the assessment order, there is no discussions of the issue of deduction of interest income earned by assessee on fixed deposits from Surat District Cooperative bank, still we found that the assessment is not erroneous on the deduction u/s 80P(2)(d), as the same is consonance with the decision of Surat Vankar Sahakari Sangh Ltd. [2016 (7) TMI 1217 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] and the various other decisions of this Tribunal. Thus, the twin condition for invoking section 263 is not satisfied. Decided in favour of assessee.
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