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Showing 221 to 240 of 18016 Records
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2023 (12) TMI 1218
Approval of Resolution Plan - Appellant are personal guarantors of the Corporate Debtor - HELD THAT:- The Resolution Plan does not absolve the personal guarantors from their guarantee. The law well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of LALIT KUMAR JAIN VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. [2021 (5) TMI 743 - SUPREME COURT], that by approval of resolution plan the guarantees are not ipso facto discharged. The resolution applicant has taken liability of only one crore, the other liabilities of the personal guarantors are not discharged.
There are no ground to interfere with the approval resolution plan within meaning of Section 61 - the order of the Adjudicating Authority approving the Resolution Plan need not be interfered - there is no merit in the Appeal - appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1217
Maintainability of section 7 application - time limitation - dispute raised regarding the liability of the Corporate Debtor towards the Financial Creditors and the guarantee by the Respondent - HELD THAT:- This is one such case in which direction has to be issued to the Tribunal to admit the application filed under Section 7 of the Code in view of the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its order dated 25.03.2022 wherein it has been held that the debt and default both are present in this case but the Tribunal did not admit the application only on the issue that the Application was found to be barred by limitation. The question of limitation was taken to the higher court and ultimately it has been proved that the application was within the limitation. In such circumstances, the Tribunal should not have gone in for further investigating on the issue as to whether there is debt and default in the present case for the purpose of admission of the application.
The Tribunal is directed to admit the application filed by the Appellant on the next date of hearing and pass further necessary orders in accordance with law - Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1216
Refund of the amount paid during investigation but not appropriated by the department after conclusion of such investigation - Refund barred by limitation under the provisions of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or not - HELD THAT:- The refund claim filed by the Appellant cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation as what was paid by the appellant was not tax as envisaged under the Finance Act, 1994. Thus, the amount paid by the Appellant would not take the character of tax but is simply an amount paid under a mistake of law. The provisions of Section 11B ibid would, therefore, not be applicable to an application seeking refund thereof. Moreover, since the retention of the amount in issue by the department is without authority of law, the question of applying the limitation prescribed under Section 11B ibid would not arise.
For a service to be taxable, it is necessary that the service has to be rendered by one person to another and without a perceived service money contribution cannot be held to be a consideration which is liable to tax. The authority concerned is duty bound to refund such amount as retention of such amount would be in violation of Article 265 of the Constitution of India which mandates that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Since Service Tax received by the concerned authority is not backed by any authority of law, in view of the provisions of Article 265 of the Constitution of India, the authority concerned has no right to retain the same.
The judgment of MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT] has been considered and interpreted by several judgments including the Karnataka High Court in COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS), BANGALORE VERSUS KVR CONSTRUCTION [2012 (7) TMI 22 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], by this Tribunal in the case of M/S. ASL BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL GST & CX, JAMSHEDPUR [2020 (1) TMI 431 - CESTAT KOLKATA]. The said judgments have concluded that statutory limitation periods are not applicable to amounts paid under mistake of law.
Thus, it is concluded that the statutory limitation period prescribed under Section 11B is not applicable to the refund claimed by the Appellant since the amount paid by the Appellant is not a tax.
The present appeal is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1215
Levy of service tax - Business Auxiliary Service - services of 'Sizing of coal' to customers - HELD THAT:- The issue is no longer res integra, as the Tribunal Kolkata Bench has decided the issue in favour of the Appellant in the case of COMMR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE & S. TAX, BOLPUR VERSUS M/S INTEGRATED COAL MINING LTD. [2021 (1) TMI 179 - CESTAT KOLKATA] where it was held that By discharging the tax liability on the job work charges as well as by discharge of VAT liability on ‘brought out’ items used for fabrication at site, the scope for considering the activity as manufacture is eclipsed entirely.
The Appellant is not liable to service tax under the category of 'Business Auxiliary Service' and hence the demands confirmed in the impugned order is not sustainable - the demands of duty along with interest and penalty confirmed in the impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1214
Non/short-payment of service tax - contention of the appellant was that it had neither issued the invoice nor had received the amount mentioned in the notice - principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- In view of the factual position as to whether the service tax paid by the consortium partner of the appellant was linked with the invoice issued by the consortium partner, it would be in the fitness of things that the adjudicating authority examines this issue and it would be not appropriate to examine this issue in this appeal.
Whether the service tax to the extent of Rs. 6,42,177/- has been paid on the excess income of Rs. 51,95,614/- by the service tax recipient, namely, M/s Bihar Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.? - HELD THAT:- In view of the nature of controversy that has arisen, it would be appropriate if this issue is also again examined by the adjudicating authority after providing an opportunity to the appellant to submit relevant documents to establish the link between the invoice and the service tax paid by M/s Bihar Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.
Whether service tax was required to be paid on the amount of Rs. 31,84,835/-, which amount was shown in the books of account as “work-in-progress” by the appellant? - HELD THAT:- The Commissioner (Appeals), after having noted all the submissions, recorded a finding that it was for the appellant to have shown by positive evidence that it had not received the amount as advance and since it could not substantiate this fact, the demand had to be upheld - The Commissioner (Appeals) completely erred in recording this finding. It was for the Department to have established that the appellant had received the payment in that particular year, more particularly when the contention of the appellant was that it had not received any payment and the amount was only shown as “work-in-progress” in the balance sheet. This demand, which has been confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals), therefore, deserves to be set aside.
The present appeal has to be allowed in part.
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2023 (12) TMI 1213
Levy of penalty - non discharge of tax liability - availment of irregular CENVAT Credit - suppression of facts or not - amount already reversed by the appellant was proposed to be appropriated against the said demand - HELD THAT:- The present case is merely a case of non discharge of tax liability, same cannot be equivalent to an intentional and positive act to evade payment of duty. The onus to prove such an act is upon the department. There are no iota evidence proving any positive intentional act of the appellant to evade the duty. The appellant was regularly/claiming credit of duty paid on coal as their input i.e. coal was exempted till 1.3.2011. They continued availing said credit for subsequent few more months due to inadvertence or ignorance on the part of the appellant to take into consideration the amendment which came into effect on 1.3.2011 making coal as an excisable goods. Thus it is far a different situation than an intention to evade payment of duty. The tax returns were otherwise regularly undisputedly filed. There is also no demand of excise duty on the coal from the appellant which otherwise stands paid. This apparent fact makes it clear that there is no suppression of facts, nor any element of fraud, mis-statement on the part of the appellant.
It is also observed that the amount which is ordered to have been appropriated was reversed much prior to issuance of SCN. The SCN should not have been issued in view of proviso to section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994.
The order imposing equal penalty of Rs.46,21,582/-, is not sustainable and the order under challenge is set aside to that extent - Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1212
Maintainability of appeal - appeal dismissed as it was not filed within the time stipulated in section 85 (3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the appeal was presented before the Commissioner (Appeals) even beyond the extended period of one month after the expiry of the normal period of limitation of two months.
In SINGH ENTERPRISES VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., JAMSHEDPUR [2007 (12) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court observed The Supreme Court held that the period upto which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is limited by the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Act and the position is crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of thirty days after the expiry period of sixty days.
In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Singh Enterprises, the Commissioner (Appeals) did not commit any error in dismissing the appeal - Appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1211
Extended period of limitation - suppression of facts or not - mining service or not - service of blasting the rocks/boulders from the quarries, loading them into trucks and transporting them to the site of the crusher - HELD THAT:- As per section 73 of the Act, demand of service tax not paid or short paid can be raised only within the normal period of limitation. However, extended period of limitation can be invoked, if the non-payment or short payment of service tax is on account of fraud or collusion or willful statement or suppression of facts or violation of the provisions of the Act or Rules with an intent to evade payment of service tax. Evidently, fraud, collusion and willful statement have an in-built element of mens-rea. Without the intent being established, these cannot be alleged. As far as the suppression of facts is concerned, it has been held in a series of judicial pronouncements that since the words suppression is used along with words, such as, fraud, collusion and willful statement mere omission cannot be called suppression and intent has to be established. It has now well settled position of law.
The two SCNs merely state that the appellant had not disclosed the value of the taxable services which it had rendered correctly in its ST-3 returns and, therefore, presume that the appellant had an intention to evade payment of service tax. There is not an iota of evidence in either of the SCN of this intent - Both the SCNs further state that had the audit not conducted scrutiny of the records, the short paying the service tax would not have come to notice. It is a matter of fact that all the details were available in the records of the appellant. The appellant was required to furnish returns under section 70 with the Superintendent of Central Excise which it did. It is for the Superintendent to scrutinize the returns and ascertain if the service tax had been paid correctly or not. If the assessee either does not make the returns under section 70 or having made a return, fails to assess the tax in accordance with the provisions of Chapter or Rules made thereunder, the Superintendent of Central Excise can make the best judgment assessment under section 72.
The fact that the alleged short payment came to light only during audit does not prove the intent to evade payment of service tax by the appellant, but it only proves that the Range Superintendent had not done his job properly. For these reasons, it is found that the demand for the extended period of limitation cannot be sustained.
It is evident that neither SCN has given any opportunity to the appellant to defend its case for the period after 01.07.2012. Both SCNs only proposed the demand under the head “Mining Services” for the period pre 01.07.2012 as well as period post 01.07.2012. As far as the demands for the period pre 01.07.2012 are concerned, it is already held that the extended period of limitation was wrongly invoked in both the SCNs and, therefore, demand cannot be sustained. The legal provisions pertaining to the post 01.07.2012 have not been invoked and the appellant was not put to notice although the Commissioner has, in the impugned order, confirmed the demand on the ground that the services rendered by the appellant were not covered by the negative list.
It is a well settled legal principle that the adjudicating authority cannot travel beyond the SCN. Therefore, he could not have confirmed the demand under the provision after 01.07.2012. Under these circumstances, it is found that the demand in the impugned order is not sustainable and needs to be set aside. Consequently, the demand of interest and the penalties imposed also need to be set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1210
Non-payment of service tax - gross amount of commission received by the appellant under ‘business auxiliary service’ - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) indicates that what was examined by the Commissioner (Appeals) was whether the services rendered by the appellant would fall under ‘business auxiliary service’, as defined under section 65 (19 (vi) of Finance Act, 1994, or under ‘business support service’ as defined under section 65 (104c) of the Finance Act, 1994. After a careful analysis of services provided, the Commissioner (Appeals) after noticing that business support service was subjected to levy of service tax from 01.05.2006 and since there was no amendment in the definition of ‘business auxiliary services’, recorded a categorical finding that the activity of the appellant would not fall under ‘business auxiliary service’. The demand made for the period April, 2005 to March, 2006 was, therefore, set aside.
On perusal of the order dated 23.04.2012 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) shows that a categorical finding has been recorded that the services would appropriately fall under the category of business support service, which service was made taxable with effect from 01.05.2006. The period involved in the present appeal is prior to 01.05.2006.
The order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) cannot, therefore, be sustained and is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1209
Levy of penalty - wrongly passing on the Modvat Credit - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the Order-in-Original bearing in mind the fact that while the appellant was purchasing scrap from Maruti Udyog at the rate of Rs. 9000/- − 10000/- MT, it was selling the same at the rate of Rs. 7000/- − 9000/- MT. Although before the original authority, the appellant appears to have set up a case of having graded the scrap according to quality and value, the said Authority had on a due appreciation of the evidence led, found no basis to accept that explanation and consequently proceeded to levy the penalties.
The issues that are raised principally relate to an appreciation of evidence and since no question of law appears to arise, the appeal shall stand dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1208
CENVAT Credit - trading activities/exempt services - Management Consultancy Service - service is used exclusively in or in relation to the manufacture of exempted goods or providing exempted service - absence of ISD registration at the time of availing credit - extended period of limitation.
CENVAT Credit - trading activities/exempt services - Management Consultancy Service - service is used exclusively in or in relation to the manufacture of exempted goods or providing exempted service - HELD THAT:- As far as admissibility of cenvat credit of trading activity, the Hon’ble Madras High Court in Ruchika Global Interlinks [2017 (6) TMI 635 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] held Having regard to the rule, position and given the admitted fact that no separate accounts were maintained by the appellant, with regard to the taxable and non-taxable services, clause (c) of sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 of 2004 Rules would apply.
Further, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Lally Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. [2018 (7) TMI 1679 - DELHI HIGH COURT] held In the present case, the assessee’s argument that there is no mechanism to reverse credit, once taken, in the opinion of this Court, cannot be accepted. The assessee was well aware of the exact nature and extent of its service tax liability. It was also aware of the eligible service tax inputs. Therefore, when it did claim successfully and unchallenged input credits in respect of activities that were not subjected to service tax levy, it was aware that the claim was excessive and could not be justified.
Extended period of Limitation - HELD THAT:- On the issue of invoking extended period of limitation on similar circumstances, lordships of Delhi High Court held that Being conscious of its trading activity and that it was not liable to service tax (since it did not include the amounts earned from that business, in its returns) meant that the assessee was aware of what it was doing. It cannot now take shelter under the plea that non-trading activity was expressly exempt from claiming credit, in 2011. That amendment made no difference, given that trading was never taxable under the Finance Act, 1994. In these circumstances, the Revenue was justified in invoking the extended period of limitation in this case - Thus, the confirmation of demand with interest by the learned Commissioner invoking extended period of limitation on cenvat credit availed on trading activity is upheld.
CENVAT Credit - absence of ISD registration at the time of availing credit - HELD THAT:- The issue is also covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Hinduja Global Solutions Ltd, [2022 (4) TMI 71 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT]. Their Lordships following the judgment of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court and Madras High Court, held that cenvat credit cannot be denied to the assessee prior to its registration as an ISD, since the same is procedural irregularities - the appellant is entitled to avail cenvat credit of Rs.15,83,168/-.
Thus, the impugned order is modified to the extent of confirming inadmissible cenvat credit of Rs.79,22,225/- attributable to trading activity and applicable interest of Rs.15,38,789/- paid on the said credit amount; since the cenvat credit and applicable interest is paid much before the issuance of show-cause notice, the appellant is entitled for the benefit of 25% of penalty imposed under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act read with Rule 15(4) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - demand of cenvat credit of Rs.15,83,168/- confirmed with interest and equivalent penalty before ISD registration is hereby set aside.
Appeal disposed off.
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2023 (12) TMI 1207
Calculation of Excise duty - includability of the sales tax concession retained by the Appellant in the assessable value for the purpose of levy of Central Excise duty - suppression of facts or not - extended period of limitation - penalty - HELD THAT:- The Appellant has not suppressed any information from the department. There were decisions of the Tribunals that the sales tax concession retained by the assesses is not required to be added in the assessable value for the purpose of levy of Central Excise duty. Thus, it is observed that the appellant cannot be faulted for not including the same in the assessable value. As there is no evidence of suppression of facts available on record, it is held that the demand confirmed by invoking the extended period is liable to be set aside.
In the present case, it is observed that the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Authority has failed to show any positive act of suppression on the part of the Appellant. The details of VAT collected and retained are reflected in the audited Profit & Loss account and balance sheet of the impugned periods. Therefore, we hold that extended period of limitation as provided under section 11A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 cannot be invoked for recovery of the short paid duties. The Circular issued by the Board also supports this view. Following the above Circular issued by the Board, the extended period cannot be invoked in this case to demand duty. Accordingly, penalty also not imposable in this case.
The appeal is disposed by way of remand for calculating the duty, payable for the normal period of limitation, with consequential relief, if any, as per law.
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2023 (12) TMI 1206
Exemption to goods manufactured in a factory workshop and used for the maintenance of machinery installed in the factory - Exemption to capital goods and inputs captively consumed within the factory of production - applicability of N/N. 65/95-CE and 67/95-CE - denial of benefit on the ground that acetylene gas has not been manufactured in the workshop - denial also on the ground that acetylene gas has been used for repair and maintenance of machineries that are not used for the manufacture of final goods, the exemption will not be applicable.
HELD THAT:- The Appellant claimed the exemption of captively consumed acetylene gas under the Notification 65/95 as well as under 67/95. The adjudicating authority has denied the exemption for the acetylene gas consumed within the factory for repair and maintenance of railway track, railway wagon, loco and in certain shops and departments for repair and maintenance of machineries under the Notification 65/95. However, it is observed that they are eligible for the exemption under the notification 67/95, since the said railway track, rail wagons, and locomotives are integral to the manufacture of the goods - The inability to transport the inputs and intermediate products in the absence of rail traffic will cause stoppage of production and can also result in damage of the plant and machinery.
The said railway track, rail wagons, and locomotives are integral to the manufacture of the goods of the Appellant and are therefore they can be considered as machineries installed in the factory for the manufacture of the goods. It is observed that Notification 67/95 exempts from payment of duty all goods specified therein manufactured in a factory and used within the factory of production in or in relation to manufacture of final products. The scope of this notification is wide enough to cover the acetylene gas manufactured by the Appellant and used in the traffic department for repair and maintenance of railway track, wagons etc., and the acetylene gas used in 26 shops/departments for repair and maintenance of machineries.
The issue of whether railway tracks used in the plant form a part of manufacture is no longer res-integra since the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S JAYASWAL NECO LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, RAIPUR [2015 (4) TMI 569 - SUPREME COURT] held the use of railway tracks inside the plant not only form the process of manufacturing, but it is inseparable and integral part of the said process inasmuch as without the aforesaid activity for which railway tracks are used, there cannot be manufacturing of pig iron.
Thus, the use of railway tracks are meant for production of goods. The acetylene gas used in 26 shops/departments for repair and maintenance of machineries was also used in connection with the manufacture of the finished goods for the Appellant - the Appellant is eligible for the benefit of exemption notification no. 67/95-CE. Hence, the demand confirmed in the impugned order by denying the benefit of exemption notifications 65/95 or 67/95 is not sustainable.
The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1205
Seeking release on regular bail - claiming bogus refund on account of input tax credit - use of false and fabricated documents - HELD THAT:- A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ashwani Kumar Vs. State of Punjab [2023 (6) TMI 188 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] examined the provisions of Sections 57 & 58 of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005, providing for penalty for failure to issue invoices and use of false invoices and observed that allegations of the FIR are squarely covered under the provisions of Sections 57 & 58 of the 2005 Act. It was further observed that the 2005 Act is a complete Code in itself and there is no provision provided in the 2005 Act for registration of the FIR. It was further observed that the 2005 Act only provided for imposition of penalty in case there is any contravention of its provisions and since the 2005 Act is a special law, principle of generalia specialibus non derogant would apply, meaning thereby it would operate in exclusion to the general law i.e., the IPC.
However, this Court notices that in the absence of factual matrix in Ashwani Kumar’s case, it is not possible to comment as to whether in those cases also, there were allegations regarding bogus refund of input tax credit based on false and fabricated documents. In these circumstances, it will be a debatable issue as to whether the provisions of IPC shall be applicable to the present case or not.
No explanation is given in the FIR about the delay of more than 5 years so as to write a letter to the Superintendent of Police, Sirsa on 11.12.2019 to take action against the culprits and then another approximately one year for getting the FIR registered on 24.10.2020.
Thus, no purpose shall be served by keeping the petitioners detained, particularly when no apprehension has been expressed by ld. State counsel that if released on bail, petitioners may abscond from justice - petition allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1204
Addition of Truck, Tripper, Dumper, JCB, Crane, Dozer, etc. to the registration certificate - Rule 13 of the Act, 1957 read with Section 8(3)(b) of the Act, 1956 - HELD THAT:- A registration certificate was issued to the petitioner according to Rule 5(1) of CST (R&T) Act, 1957 on 09.02.2011. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is indulged in the construction of roads etc. and in that process, he had plied various types of equipment, machinery including Trucks, Trippers, Dumpers, JCBs, Cranes, Dozers, Mixers etc. whereas, in the registration certificate, these articles were not included earlier, therefore, he moved an application to include these commodities which was declined by the Commercial Tax Officer, Durg and only Soil (Murum) was allowed to be included in the certificate as the same is the raw material used for construction of the road - Section 8(3)(b) of the Act, 1956 says that a dealer would be entitled to get a rebate in the tax for goods of the class or classes specified in the certificate of registration according to rules made by the Central Government to be used by him in manufacture or processing of goods for sale or mining or in general or distribution of electricity.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.K. Cotton [1964 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] while dealing with Section 8(3)(b) of Act 1956 and Rule 13 of the Act, 1957 has clearly held that the intention must be to use the goods as raw materials, as processing materials, as machinery, as plant, as equipment, as tools, as spare parts, as stores, as accessories, as lubricants, as fuels etc. and the restricted interpretation is not warranted. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held in no uncertain terms that articles used in the process of manufacture would be liable for concessional tax, even though such articles may not be incorporated in the manufactured end-product.
The High Court of Patna in the matter of M/s Larson & Toubro [1994 (12) TMI 313 - PATNA HIGH COURT] and the High Court of Calcutta in the matter of Nagarjuna Constructions [2014 (3) TMI 1043 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] while dealing with similar issues included machinery, plant, equipment, tools, spare parts, stores, accessories, fuels, lubricants etc. in the registration certificate according to the provisions of Section 8(3)(b) of Act, 1956 and Rule 13 of Act, 1957.
Thus, the authorities have committed an error of law in rejecting the application moved by the petitioner to include the articles mentioned in the application - the order passed by Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Durg is hereby set aside and the application moved by the petitioner under Section 8(3)(b) of the Act, 1956 is hereby allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1203
Dishonour of Cheque - restoration of complaint - whether the negligence either on the part of the petitioner or his counsel in prosecution of the complaint can be a ground for not restoring the complaint? - HELD THAT:- The present complaint pertains to cheques total amounting to Rs.89,00,000/- which were dishonoured due to insufficient funds. There is no dispute by the respondent regarding the fact that the said cheques were signed and issued by him and also regarding the dishonour of the cheques on the ground 'Funds Insufficient'. The petitioner is stated to be a qualified doctor. The petitioner was under the impression that he would be adequately represented by his previous counsel. The various orders passed by the trial court are reflecting that the petitioner and his counsel were not diligent in the prosecution of the complaint. However, mere negligence either on the part of the petitioner or his counsel in prosecution of the complaint should not be a ground for not restoring the complaint. The petitioner cannot be allowed to be suffer due to the negligence of his previous counsel.
The impugned order dated 07.12.2016 passed by the trial court is set aside - the complaint is ordered to be restored to its original number before the trial court subject to the cost of Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent on the next date of hearing before the trial court.
The petitioner and the respondent are directed to appear in person before the trial court on 15.01.2024 at 2:30 p.m. for further directions.
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2023 (12) TMI 1202
Dishonour of Cheque - discharge of legal liability or not - Society is not a body corporate - applicability of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - HELD THAT:- Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act deals with the liability of the Company and provides that where the offence is committed by a Company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the commission of the offence. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the provisions that in the case of a Company, the Company as well as the office bearers are liable. Hence, the company is primarily liable and the office bearers are vicariously liable.
It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ANEETA HADA VERSUS GODFATHER TRAVELS & TOURS (P.) LTD. [2012 (5) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT] that it is not permissible to prosecute the Directors in the absence of the Company - in view of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the submission that the prosecution of the Company is necessary before prosecuting its office bearers has to be accepted as correct.
It is an admitted position that the Himalayan Mahila Avam Jan Kalyan Sansthan is registered under the Societies Registration Act. Section 14 of the H.P. Societies Registration Act provides that every Society shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is registered having perpetual succession and a common seal - This Section specifically provides that the Society shall be a body; hence, the submission that the Society is not a body corporate is not acceptable.
The complainant could not have filed a complaint against the petitioner and respondent no. 3 without impleading the Company to an accused. The prosecution of the petitioner in the absence of the Company is bad - the complaint titled Mukesh Kumar vs Anjana Kumari and another quashed qua the petitioner pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sarkaghat against the petitioner and the consequent proceedings arising out of the same are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner.
Petition allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1201
Detention of goods and vehicles while in transit with valid invoices - Onus on the purchase to prove the genuineness of transaction - Revenue initiated proceedings against seller / supplier of goods - suspension of registration of the supplier - High Court has held that, In essence, the petitioners (purchaser) have to establish their own credentials but not the 4th respondent (supplier of goods). In that view, the 1st respondent (GST Department) is not correct in roping the petitioners in the proceedings initiated against the 4th respondent without initiating independent proceedings U/s 129 of CGST/APGST Act against the petitioners. - However, liberty was granted to initiate proceedings against the petitioners U/s 129 of CGST/APGST Act, 2017.
Held that:- Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner(s), we are not inclined to interfere in the matter.
The Special Leave Petitions (SLP) filed by the revenue dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1200
Validity of AO’s order with no DIN number mentioned - Communications emanating from the revenue - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the AO’s order shows that it is clear in the body of AO’s order, no DIN number is mentioned nor there is any reason of not mentioning the DIN number in order of the AO. In such a situation, the AO order will lose its validity. Subsequent separate communication of DIN is a superfluous exercise.
As regards, reference to the decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court by the ld. DR for the Revenue, we find that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. (1973 (1) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] has held that if two views are possible one in favour of the assessee is to be adopted. In this regard, we are referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs Brandix Mauritius Holdings Ltd. [2023 (4) TMI 579 - DELHI HIGH COURT] as held that no communication shall be issued by any income tax authority relating to assessment, appeals, orders, statutory or otherwise, exemptions, enquiry, investigation, verification of information, penalty, prosecution, rectification, approval etcetera, to the assessee or any other person, on or after 01.10.2019 unless it is allotted a computer-generated DIN. Decided against revenue.
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2023 (12) TMI 1199
Gain on sale of land - nature of land - assessment order passed by treating the land as capital asset as it falls in the City limit - HELD THAT:- We find that Assessing Officer made reference for DVO for valuation of assets on the date of transfer however, report of DVO was not received, the Assessing Officer brought the surplus earn to taxation under the head “short term capital gains”. The Ld.CIT(A) on filing detailed written submission, though called the remand report on various submissions and evidences of the assessee, however, still the action of the Assessing Officer was confirmed. We find that the main contention of assessee right from the beginning is that the impugned land situated in rural area of village Lajpore, which does not fall within the limit Surat Municipal Corporation. Merely, State Government declared the area of village Lalpore for industrial use would not if so facto will not bring the area in a Municipal limit.
Assessee before us has explained that the AO picked up the word ““shehri sankul aavali chhe”, the real meaning of such words is that land falls in urban development area. On appreciation of such contention, we find merit in the submission of Ld. AR for the assessee that mere falling of land within the urban development area or notified area for industrial development of said area would not automatically bring the area in municipal limit unless and until a separate notification is not issued by State Government for including a particular area within municipal limit.
No such material was brought on record by AO and he simply assume the jurisdiction on the basis of certain recital in the sale deed and formed his opinion that the impugned land falls in city limit.
Assessee has filed sufficient evidence in the form of Land Revenue Record that said land was used for agricultural purposes by the certificate of Land Revenue Authority. Further, the assessee has filed certificate of Gram Panchyat that village Lajpore is not under the area of Surat Municipal Corporation. The assessee has also filed notification of State Government about extension of limit of municipality from time to time, copy of which is available at page No.72 to 81 of paper book, wherein the village Lajpore is not included in Surat Municipal Corporation. The assessee has also filed extract / details from the website of Home Department of Government of Gujarat, wherein the village Lajpore is administered under Panchayat Raj Act and administered by Sarpanch, meaning thereby the provision of Village Panchayat is not ceased to exist. The population of village is less than 10,000 as per Population Census,2011, copy of such details are available on page No.82 to 84 of the paper book. The assessee has also filed notification of Revenue Department of State Government, wherein the land of village Lajpore (Lajpore) is declared as reserve for non-agricultural and industrial development. As recorded above, that by mere declaration of area under industrial development, it would not be automatically include in municipal limit. For bringing the area in municipal limit a separate notification of State Government is required. In the notification placed on record about extension of Municipal limit of Surat Municipal Corporation, the area of village Lajpore is not included in municipal limit.
Thus on the basis of the various evidence filed thus concluded the assessee has sold agriculture land which cannot be considered as capital asset and the surplus earned on its sale would not be taxable. So far as reliance by ld CIT(A) on the case law of Sarifa Bibi Mohamed Ibrahim & Other (supra) is concerned, we find that the facts of said case are different with the facts of the case in hand. Thus, the ground of the appeal is allowed.
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