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Showing 141 to 160 of 16421 Records
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2023 (12) TMI 1167
Cancellation of GST registration of the premise - availment of of input tax credit without there being any corresponding movement of goods - non-application of mind - HELD THAT:- A bare reading of the provision would clearly demonstrate that the invocation of the provisions of Sub-Section 2(a) of Section 29 of the A.P.G.S.T. Act, is available only in the event of there being a determination by a competent Tribunal or Court holding that the registered dealer has in fact contravened the provisions of the Act.
It is not in dispute and it is clearly admitted by the learned Government Pleader that the petitioner firm is a going concern, implying and meaning thereby that the petitioner is also providing livelihood to others. In the event, their registration is cancelled, it would automatically result in closure of business and would sound a death knell to the productivity of the petitioner resulting in loss of livelihood, not only to the management, but also to such other persons employed by them.
The Writ Petition deserves to be allowed in part.
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2023 (12) TMI 1166
Validity of show cause notice (SCN) u/s 73 - demand based on improper Audit Report u/s 65(3) - Violation of principles of natural justice - petitioner had no ‘not less than 15 working days’ of statutory period to file the response to the SCN for Audit u/s 65 - HELD THAT:- Section 65 (3) of Andhra Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 clearly provides that the registered person shall be informed by way of a notice not less than fifteen working days prior to the conduct of audit in such manner as may be prescribed - Rule 101 (4) of the Rules, 2017, thus also provides that the proper officer may inform the registered person of the discrepancies noticed, if any, as observed in the audit and the said person may file his reply and the proper officer shall finalise the findings of the audit, after due consideration of the reply furnished.
In the present case, the notice does not comply with sub-section (3) inasmuch as there is no clear ‘not less than 15 working days’ time prior to the conduct of audit. The audit has been finalized on 29.09.2023 based on the revised notice, which notice though revised on 04.09.2023 itself, but was uploaded on 14.09.2023. As such the registered dealer had the information of the notice on 14.09.2023 - From that date upto 29.09.2023, there are no clear 15 working days. The findings have been finalized by the Audit Officer within the statutory notice period, without waiting for completion of the statutory notice period. The petitioner’s reply is dated 28.09.2023, which though reached on 03.10.2023, was submitted within the statutory period, and even it be taken that it could not reach in time, as it was sent on 28.09.2023, the audit could not be finalized and the audit report could not be submitted on 29.09.2023.
In the present case, what is found from perusal of the show cause notice under Section 73, is that there is a reference of the Audit Report dated 29.09.2023, and therefore, it cannot be said that in the present case the show cause notice is independent of the audit report. It is based on the audit report, which in turn is not in accordance with the statutory provisions but is in violation of the principles of natural justice as also the due procedure of law.
The impugned show cause notice under Section 73 of the Act is set aside - respondent authorities/competent authorities are directed to pass fresh order/report on the audit, after taking into consideration the petitioner’s reply dated 28.09.2023 received on 03.10.2023 and consequent there upon to proceed further in accordance with law - petition allowed in part.
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2023 (12) TMI 1165
Interest on the claim of the refund - petitioners could not file the return of income claiming refund in time and such return was filed after condoning delay by the respondent under section 119(2)(b) - interest on the compensation amount is paid for acquisition of the agricultural land of the petitioners - TDS deducted under wrong section as correct section for deduction of tax at source is section 194A and not section 194C - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the amount of refund is already paid to the petitioners and therefore, as a natural corollary, the petitioners are entitled to have the right to get interest on such amount of refund claim.
Even as per sub-section(2) of section 244A of the Act, 1961, as it existed during the relevant AY 2013-2014, when the proceedings resulting in the refund are not delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee whether wholly or in part, the period of the delay so attributable only can be excluded from the period for which interest is payable under subsections (1) or (1A)or (1B) to section 244A of the Act, 1961.
In the facts of the case, the words "or the deductor, as the case may be," which is inserted with effect from 01.04.2017 would not be applicable as the petitioners have been permitted to file the refund claim for the AY 2013-2014 after condonation of delay and such delay in claiming the refund cannot be said to be attributable to the petitioners as the petitioners were not made aware about the deduction of tax at source by the deductor in absence of issuance of Form No. 16-A which was mandatorily required as per Rule 31(3) of the Rules.
In view of the foregoing reasons, the petitions succeed and are accordingly allowed. The respondent is directed to grant interest on the refund claim from the date of deposit of the TDS till the date of refund as per the provisions of section 244A of the Act, 1961. Such exercise shall be completed within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
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2023 (12) TMI 1164
Validity of Reopening of assessment - Sanction for issue of notice u/s 151 - whether valid approval was granted in terms with Section 151? - What are the essential requirements for initiation of a reassessment proceedings under Section 147 of the Act of 1961 and to what extent the Court under Article 226 can interfere? - HELD THAT:- First, the power to be exercised by the authority to grant the approval for issuance of the notice under Section 148 is not a mere formality but is an important safeguard against any arbitrary exercise by the Income Tax Officer to reopen reassessment proceedings. The second aspect is that Section 151 of the Act of 1961 specifically mandates who would be the authority inasmuch Sub-Section (1) of Section 151 of the Act of 1961 relates to issuance of notice under Section 148 after the expiry of the period of 4 (four) years from the end of the relevant assessment year and the authority would be the Principal Chief Commissioner or the Chief Commissioner or the Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner who had to arrive at the satisfaction on the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for issuance of such notice. On the other hand, in respect to all other cases, i.e. up to four years, the authority would be the Joint Commissioner which is the authority defined in Section 2(28C). It is also pertinent that the Act of 1961 does not stipulate that the power which had been entrusted by the Act to an Officer can be exercised by any superior officer.
Whether the non-communication of the entire satisfaction note would vitiate the reassessment proceedings? - For conferment of jurisdiction, the recording of reasons is no more essential but recording of reasons would only be essential in terms with Sub-Section (2) of Section 148 for the Assessing Officer to issue any notice under Section 148. It is also pertinent herein to take note of that the words ‘he, may, subject to the provisions of Section 148 to 153’ as appearing in Section 147, makes the legislative intent further clear that for assessing or reassessing such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment, the Assessing Officer has to do so or for that matter exercise the jurisdiction by satisfying the mandate of Section 148 to 153.
This Court also finds it relevant to mention that the provisions of Section 147 as well as the provisions of Section 148 to 153 do not mention that the reasons so recorded prior to issuance of notice under Section 148 is required to be furnished to the assessee. As decided in S. Narayanappa [1966 (9) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT] there is no requirement in any of the provisions of the Act or any Section laying down as a condition for initiation of proceedings that the reasons which induced to the Commissioner to accord sanction to proceed under Section 34 must also be communicated to the assessee.
Furnishing of the reasons is not required as per the provisions of the Act of 1961 and the said aspect had been judicially also accepted.
Now therefore the question arises as to why the Supreme Court in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. [2002 (11) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT] had observed that the reasons upon being requested has to be furnished which would provide an opportunity to the assessee to file objection against such reasons and further the Assessing Officer has to pass an order on the said objection and thereupon proceed - From a perusal of the said judgment in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. (supra), it would clearly show that the said judgment is not an authority that the reassessment proceedings would be nullified for not furnishing the reasons. It is the opinion of this Court that if an objection is filed on the basis of the reasons so provided and the said objection is rejected, then it may be a good ground for the assessee to assail the assessment/reassessment order in an appeal. However, the reassessment proceedings cannot be nullified by way of writ petition on the ground that the reasons in the entirety was not furnished. The rationale behind the said opinion of this Court is taking into account that it is well settled that the existence of the belief is justiciable whereas the sufficiency of the reasons for forming the belief is not. Therefore, if an assessee has to challenge the existence of the belief, the same can be done so in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution which is also well settled. Further, it is also the opinion of this Court that the existence of the belief cannot be challenged before the Assessing Officer as it touches upon his own jurisdiction. However, as the sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief cannot be challenged in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the assessee would have a right to file objections against the sufficiency of the reasons for forming the belief by the Assessing Officer. It is in that context, the Supreme Court in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. (supra) made the said observations.
Bogus LTCG - exemption u/s10(38) denied - assessee sold shares (penny stocks) as identified by SEBI and Investigation Wing, Kolkata during FY 2010-11 - HELD THAT:- From the reasons so recorded as above noted and reading conjointly with the computation of income with the detail so given in the reasons for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961, it cannot be said that there was no existence of reasons to believe that the income had escaped assessment. Further to that, the reasons so assigned were neither vague nor indefinite. The reasons had a live link for the formation of the requisite belief. This Court during the course of hearing inquired with the learned counsel for the Petitioner as to how certain shares were shown in the computation of the income as purchased at nil value whereas were sold at certain amounts. The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that they were bonus shares which had no purchase costs. He however admitted that in the computation of the income, the same were not reflected as bonus shares issued at nil value. Under such circumstances also this Court is of the opinion that there existed reasons to believe for reopening of the assessment.
Non-compliance to Section 151 - The plea of non-compliance of Section 151 of the Act of 1961 is plea challenging the very reassessment proceedings and in the opinion of this Court, the said plea had to raise specifically in the pleadings else entertaining such plea on oral submissions would violate the principles of natural justice.
This Court finds it relevant to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Sharma and Others Vs. Union of India and Others [1980 (11) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Supreme Court observed that the Court should ordinarily insist on the parties being confined to their specific written pleadings and should not permit deviation from them by way of modification or supplementation except through the well known process of formally applying for amendment. It was further observed that if undue laxity and a too easy informality is permitted to enter the proceedings of a Court, it will not be long before a contemptuous familiarity assails its institutional dignity and ushers in chaos and confusion undermining its effectiveness. It was categorically observed that oral submissions raising new points for the first time tend to do grave injury to a contesting party by depriving it of the opportunity to which the principles of natural justice hold it entitled of adequately preparing its response.
In view of the above settled propositions and the facts that the Petitioners in all the writ petition above have not taken the plea of non-compliance to Section 151 of the Act of 1961, the same cannot be allowed to be raised by way of an oral submissions.
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2023 (12) TMI 1163
LTCG - Deduction u/s 54B - investment in purchase of new agricultural land was made by the assessee not in his own name, but in the name of his wife - interpretation of “exemption clause” - HELD THAT:- It will be apt to refer the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Tax and Others [1991 (8) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT] wherein it has been observed that the choice between a strict and a liberal construction arises only in case of doubt in regard to the intention of the legislature manifest on the statutory language.
Wife of the appellant cannot be termed as an ‘assessee’ as per Section 2 (7) of the IT Act. So enlarging the scope of the assessee as defined under Section 2(7) to envelope the wife of the appellant to envelop the transaction to “exemption” would amount to superseed the legislative requirement and the spirit of the provision.
When the person who claimed “exemption or concession” he has to establish that he is entitled to that exemption or concession. A provision providing for an exemption, concession or exception, as the case may be, has to be construed strictly with certain exceptions depending upon the settings on which the provision has been placed in the Statute and the object and purpose to be achieved.
Plain reading of Section 54B would show that the benefit is available to the assessee and when the exemption is demanded. In absence of any ambiguity the scope of definition of ‘assessee’ cannot be enlarged so as to include the wife of the assessee. In other words, the exemption clause has to be construed strictly.
Applying the well settled principles of law and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the ITAT was justified in holding that the deduction under Section 54B of the IT Act cannot be allowed to the assessee as the land was not purchased in his own name. Decided against assessee.
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2023 (12) TMI 1162
TP Adjustment - Comparable selection - ALP for calculating the interest payable on NCDs - assessee’s contention was that the Ld. TPO has selected the comparable companies having secured debentures and / or not in the Solar Power Sector - HELD THAT:- As not disputed by the Revenue that the assessee has issued NCDs as unsecured and had agreed the rate of interest of 13%. The key criteria for determining the interest rate is the risk involved. When the loan given is unsecured, the risk is higher and there would be a higher rate of interest. In our considered view, the relationship of a holding / subsidiary is not the criteria for determining the interest with respect to secured / unsecured debt instruments.
We find from the submissions of the AR that when the filters of secured or guaranteed are applied in the list of comparables, the rate of interest and the 65th percentile worked out to 14.25% which is over above the interest rate paid by the assessee. Further, when the companies in the Wind / Thermal Power Sectors are excluded, the 65th percentile worked to 14.25% which is over and above the interest rate paid by the assessee company.
As relying on V R Surat (P.) Ltd [2023 (8) TMI 631 - ITAT SURAT] and Vena Energy KN Wind Power (P.) Ltd [2022 (12) TMI 712 - ITAT BANGALORE] Revenue has not brought any material / case / any contrary decision before us. Therefore, respectfully following the above decisions, we are of the considered view that the rate of interest charged by the assessee company is at Arm’s Length basis and therefore the ground No. 1 & 2 raised by the assessee are allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1161
Revision u/s 263 - Incorrect claim of weighted deduction u/s 35(1)(ii) allowed by AO on donation made - assessee had pointed out that this claim was duly examined during assessment proceedings when the assessee had placed relevant documents proving its eligibility to the claim of and even the genuineness of the claim by furnishing documents pointing out that the donation had been made through banking channels and the donee Institute had furnished receipts and certificates issued by CBDT showing that it was approved for receiving donations u/s. 35(1)(ii) - HELD THAT:- A very important fact which emerges is that the Institute, to which donation was made by the assessee during the impugned year and weighted deduction claimed thereon u/s. 35(1)(ii) of the Act, was not approved for the said purposes for the impugned year.
The fact on record available with the Ld.CIT is that the approval granted to the said Institute expired on 31/03/2006. Impugned year before us is A.Y 2015-16. The Advisory issued by the CBDT in December-2018 brought this fact to the notice of all its Field Officers. Therefore, the fact on record was that the said Institute was not approved for receiving donations u/s. 35(1)(ii) of the Act during the impugned year.
Thus there can be no two views that when the assessment order was passed by the AO, assessees claim to weighted deduction u/s 35(1)(vii) of the Act was impermissible in law. And it is a foregone conclusion therefore that the allowance of the said claim in assessment framed was patently incorrect. The assessment order was obviously in error in having allowed a patently ineligible deduction to the assessee.
This is probably the simplest and most straight forward example /instance of an assessment order being erroneous causing prejudice to the Revenue, for a valid exercise of revisionary jurisdiction.
All arguments of assessee against the revisionary order passed by the Ld.CIT fail and are of no consequence in the backdrop of the fact, as noted above by us, that the assessee was not eligible to claim weighted deduction on the said donation u/s 35(1)(ii) of the Act.
Even if the assessee and the AO had bonafidely claimed and allowed respectively the deduction based on documents furnished by the said Institute, the fact still remains that the claim was not allowable as per law. What is material for claiming deduction is its eligibility as per law and not the intention with which it is claimed, whether bonafidely or malafidely. Even a bonafidely claimed deduction if found ineligible in law, it cannot be allowed to the assessee.
Also on a patently ineligible claim there can be no question of the AO taking a plausible view in allowing assesses claim. As approval was not inexistence after 31/03/2006 and the said Trust was subsequently receiving donations fraudulently. The subsequently issued advisory of the CBDT only reiterates the fact of donations to the said institute being ineligible for deduction to donors u/s. 35(1)(ii) of the Act.
In view of the above, we have no hesitation in upholding the order of the Ld.CIT holding the assessment order erroneous for having allowed a patently ineligible claim of weighted deduction to the assessee. Decided against assessee.
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2023 (12) TMI 1160
Addition in an intimation order u/s 143(1) - AO/CPC jurisdiction to make an adjustment in an Intimation Order u/s. 143(1) - exemption claimed u/s 10 was denied and treated as profits and gains of business or profession.HELD THAT:- According to the provisions of section 143 (1) (a) of the act where the total income or loss is required to be computed adjustment prescribed in clause number (i) to (vi) can be made only after giving an intimation to the assessee for such adjustment either in writing or in electronic mode. We do not find any such intimation is given to the assessee of such adjustment holding that the claim of exemption made by the assessee is incorrect. Therefore, such adjustment is made in contravention of the provision of section 143 (1) of the Act and hence, it is not sustainable.
Even otherwise on the merits of the issue we find that exemptions claimed by the assessee is with respect to dividend from mutual fund which is exempt under section 10 (35) of the income tax act, interest from tax free bond which is exempt under section 10 (15) of the Act and the long-term capital gain on consolidation of mutual funds which is exempt under section 10 (38) of the act. Therefore, even otherwise the impugned income in dispute is exempt which is confirmed by the ld. CIT (A) also.
Therefore, as the impugned adjustment is without intimation to the assessee and further the income is held to be exempt by the CIT (A) , we do not find any reason to sustain the intimation passed u/s 143(1) of The Act . In view of this Ground no 1 is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1159
Condonation of delay of 444 days in filing this appeal - HELD THAT:- The reason for the delay has not been explained to the satisfaction of this Court - the Civil Appeal is dismissed on the ground of delay.
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2023 (12) TMI 1158
Interpretation of statute (policy circular) - whether the Policy Circular Notice No. 22/2015-20 dated 29.03.2019 issued by the respondent No. 3 is applicable to the EPCG Authorisation issued prior to 5.12.2017 or not?
HELD THAT:- In terms of paragraph no. 1.03 of the FTP, power of DGFT is restricted only to lay down the procedure which is to be followed by the exporter or the importer. DGFT while exercising such powers, notifies the procedure to be followed by the exporter or the importer but there is no power to amend/update the FTP.
By the impugned policy circular, respondent No. 2 has in effect amended the FTP with retrospective effect to the EPCG Authorisation issued prior to 5.12.2017 under the guise of mere procedural changes for third-party exports. By amendment in paragraph no. 5.10(c), respondent No. 2 has taken away the benefit which was available to the petitioners under FTP 2009-14 and original FTP 2015-20 prior to 5.12.2017 inasmuch as prior to revision even in case of third party exports, full realised value of shipping bill was to be taken into consideration for the fulfillment of export obligation which was restricted to actual payment from third party exporter after 5.12.2017.
In facts of the case, under the guise of amendment in HBP with policy circular dated 29.03.2019, respondents nos.2 and 3 have tried to make changes in FTP so far as the application of such amendment in para 5.10 (c) of the HPB to the EPCG Authorisation issued prior to 05.12.2017- the date of amendment which is the exclusive domain of the Central Government.
The amendment in para 5.10(c) from 05.12.2017 can be made applicable to the EPCG Authorisation issued from the said date only and the date of issuance EPCG Authorisation under FTP cannot be ignored under guise of policy decision by applying the same to all third-party exports made after 05.12.2017. The respondents have jurisdiction to amend the HBP for availing the benefit under the EPCG Scheme in view of the revised FTP 2015-20 (mid term review) but such amendment cannot affect the conditions stipulated in the EPCG Authoristion already issued for the benefit under the EPCG Scheme framed under the provisions of FTDR Act and FTP 201520. Revised FTP 2015-20 would be applicable only from 05.12.2017 and hence any amendment made in 5.10 (c) of the revised HBP 2015-20 can apply to the EPCG Authorisation issued under the revised FTP 2015-20 only - The respondents were therefore not justified in the issuance of the circular dated 29.03.2019 to apply the amendment in para 5.10(c ) of the revised HBP to all exports made after 05.12.2017 ignoring the date of issuance of the EPCG Authorisation prior to 05.12.2017.
The impugned policy circular dated 29.03.2019 is therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of respondent no. 3 as respondents nos.2 and 3 have no power to deny the benefit under the EPCG Scheme under the original FTP 2015-20 in respect of the EPCG Authorisation issued prior to 5.12.2017 and such benefit of availing full value of shipping bill under the EPCG Authorisation issued prior to 5.12.2017 could not have been curtailed by respondent nos.2 and 3 by applying revised HBP 2015-20 either under the FTDR Act or FTP - amendment made in paragraph no. 5.10(c) of the revised HBP2015-20 read with policy circular dated 29.03.2019 is invalid so far as the same is made applicable to the Authorisation under the EPCG scheme issued prior to 5.12.2017.
Petition allowed in part.
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2023 (12) TMI 1157
Jurisdiction - power of designated offcer to issue SCN - HELD THAT:- The Petitioner needs to canvas such legal position as asserted in the present proceedings before the adjudicating officer, who as fairly pointed out on behalf of the respondents would certainly take into consideration all such contentions including the issues on the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Canon India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs [2021 (3) TMI 384 - SUPREME COURT] and pass appropriate orders on the show cause notice.
The petition is accordingly disposed of directing the Respondents to adjudicate the show cause notice as expeditiously as possible and in any event within a period of six months from today. As the show cause notice is issued about four years back, there cannot be any further delay on such adjudication.
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2023 (12) TMI 1156
Smuggling - Absolute confiscation of the seized gold of foreign marking - penalty under Section 112(b ) of the Customs Act, 1962 - prohibited item or not - denial of proper opportunity to present his case and no opportunity was granted to cross examine the witnesses - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The Act does not define the expression ‘restricted goods’, but the decisions referred to above, have interpreted the expression ‘prohibited goods’ under Section 2(33) so as to include restricted goods. In terms of the definition of ‘prohibited goods’ in Section 2(33) even prohibited goods could be imported or exported, subject to compliance with the terms and conditions as prescribed but if import is not done lawfully as per the procedure prescribed under the Customs Act or any other law for the time being in force, in that event the said goods would fall under the definition of ‘prohibited goods’. The necessary corollary is that goods being imported if not subjected to check up at the customs on their arrival and are cleared without payment of customs duty are treated as ‘smuggled goods’.
Since the conditions for import of gold as per the notification issued by DGFT and the restrictions imposed by RBI have been violated, the gold in question has to be treated as ‘prohibited goods’ under Section 2(33). Consequently, it would fall within the definition of ‘smuggling ‘ under Section 2(39) which will render such goods liable to confiscation under Section 111 or Section 113 of the Act.
Having come to the conclusion that the gold seized of which the appellant claimed to be the owner without any valid documents of purchase, has to be treated as ‘prohibited goods’ and gold falls under the category of ‘dutiable goods’ but the appellant failed to prove that the liability to pay the customs duty was discharged and by necessary implication the seized gold are ‘smuggled goods’, it is held that the seized goods are liable for confiscation under Section 111(d) whereby goods which are imported or attempted to be imported contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under the Act or any other law for the time being in force, would be liable for confiscation. Also absolute confiscation is justified in the facts of the present case where the trail of events show that the appellant is engaged in procuring gold of foreign origin in illegal manner and the multiple stands taken by him on the face of it were false as the alleged supplier M/s. Sai Buillion had denied having supplied any gold to the appellant after 08.12.2014 and also stated that on 29.01.2015, Shri Rahul son of the appellant approached his father for providing a bill for one Kg. gold, but they declined as they had not supplied any gold.
The submission of the learned counsel that there was no proposal for absolute confiscation in the show cause notice stands nullified - it is the discretion of the adjudicating authority to decide with reference to the facts and circumstances and based on relevant considerations - the authorities below have rightly exercised the discretion in not granting provisional release of the seized goods in terms of Section 110 A read with Section 125 of the Act.
Violation of principles of natural justice - denial of proper opportunity to present his case and no opportunity was granted to cross examine the witnesses - HELD THAT:- Despite repeated summons the appellant did not appear before the Investigating Agency and merely sent a letter admitting his statement recorded under section 108, which during his life time (as he expired on 18.08.2018 during the pendency of the appeal) he never retracted the said statement. As per the settled law, the said statement is admissible in evidence and is binding on the appellant. The appellant during his life time had never asked for cross examination and hence no such plea can be raised at this stage.
Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., MADRAS VERSUS SYSTEMS & COMPONENTS PVT. LTD. [2004 (2) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT], where it has been held that it is a basic and settled law that what has been admitted need not be proved. We therefore reject the contention as raised on behalf of the appellant as frivolous and baseless.
Lastly, the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that request was made for retesting of the seized gold by melting purity because the contents of the Panchnama was not recorded correctly and the purity certificate was also issued without any basis but the same was not allowed - It is found from the records that on 29.01.2015, on the date of search itself, a Certified Jewellery Appraiser was called on spot who tested the recovered gold by touchstone method in the presence of two independent witnesses and certified the recovered gold - reliance placed on the decision of the High Court of Kerala in the case of MAMMU AND ANOTHER VERSUS ASSTT. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE [1981 (1) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM], where it has been held that, since no definite tests have been prescribed under law, whether an article is gold of particular quality and purity, it has to be borne in mind that the opinion of an expert on this point is relevant under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. The plea is of no significance but an attempt and tactics to delay the adjudication proceedings, particularly in view of the marking on the gold biscuits “AL Etihad, Dubai) and the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Act.
The issue of confiscation of seized gold under Section 11 upheld - the appellant for his acts of omission and commission have rendered himself liable to penal action under Section 112(b) of the Act - appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1155
Classification of imported goods - various parts and sub-parts or accessories of cellular mobile phones - to be classified under CTH 85177090 or under CTH 39209999? - demand of differential duty alongwith interest and penalty.
Can an exemption notification issued by the Government under Section 25 of the Customs Act determine the classification of the goods? - Can a scheme notified by the MeiTY determine the classification of the goods? - Is the differential duty recoverable from the appellant? - Is interest recoverable from the appellant? - Were the imported goods liable to confiscation under Section 111(m) (although they were not actually confiscated) because the classification of the imported goods in the Bill of Entry is, according to the Revenue, incorrect? Consequently, was the penalty under Section 112 imposed correctly? - HELD THAT:- As per Section 17 the importer or exporter has to self-assess duty and the proper officer can re-assess the duty. Both the self-assessment by the importer (or, as the case may be, the exporter) and the re-assessment by the proper officer fall under the definition of assessment as per Section 2(2). If the proper officer re-assesses the goods, unless the importer accepts the re-assessment in writing, he has to give a speaking order. Thus, the importer (or exporter) and the proper officer are competent to classify the goods and assess the duty payable on them - After the duty is assessed on the imported goods and the duty is paid, the proper officer clears the goods for home consumption under Section 46. Once this action is completed, they cease to be imported goods, they cease to be dutiable goods and the importer ceases to be the importer.
Assessment concludes the determination of the liability of the importer to pay duty and is similar to a decree under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - The Commissioner (Appeals) does not assess but either affirms, modifies or annuls the assessment order. In this process, the Commissioner (Appeals) may also decide the issue of classification of the goods.
A question which arises is if a Bill of Entry which is only self-assessed by the importer without any re-assessment can it also be appealed against to the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 128. The larger bench of the Supreme Court held in ITC LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, KOLKATA -IV [2019 (9) TMI 802 - SUPREME COURT] in the affirmative.
Demands under Section 28 - HELD THAT:- The power to assess duty lies with the importer and the proper officer. Classification, valuation and applying an exemption notification, are all part of the process of this assessment. Hence, the power to decide the classification lies with the importer during self- assessment, with the proper officer during re-assessment and while issuing an SCN under Section 28 and while adjudicating, with the Adjudicating Authority and with any appellate authority in the judicial hierarchy who deals with the appeals. Classification cannot be decided by anybody else (such as a MeITY in this case) for two reasons. First, they do not have the authority to assess under Section 17 nor have any appellate powers to modify the assessment. Second, their orders, letters, notifications, etc. are executive actions performed at the discretion of the government and are not quasi-judicial or appealable decisions. Therefore, any HSN code indicated against any goods in any policy of MeITY or any other Ministry cannot determine the classification of the goods under the Customs Tariff. Of the three grounds on which the classification is proposed to be changed in the SCN, the policy of MeITY as a ground cannot, therefore, be sustained.
Exemption notifications - HELD THAT:- The goods cannot be reclassified based on the exemption notification issued under Section 25 or on the basis of any policy of the Ministry. Notifications or policies can be issued, modified or withdrawn but the classification of the goods under the tariff will remain the same. Only if the tariff itself is amended can the classification change.
Confiscation of goods under Section 111(m) and consequent penalty under Section 112 - HELD THAT:- The case of the Revenue in this appeal is that the classification of the goods by the importer was not correct. Even if the classification is not correct, it does not render them liable to confiscation under Section 111(m). Similarly, there could be cases where, according to the Revenue, the exemption notification claimed during self assessment will not be available to the imported goods. The importer self-assessing the goods must apply his mind when classifying the goods. Classification of the goods by the importer, even if it is not in conformity with the re-assessment by the proper officer or even if it is held to be not correct in any appellate proceedings does not render the goods liable to confiscation under Section 111(m) - no penalty can be imposed under Section 112 on the appellant for the alleged wrong classification. The appellant cannot be penalized for holding a different view than the proper officer.
Are the front cover, middle cover and back cover of cellular mobile phones imported by the appellant classifiable under CTH 85177090 (as claimed by the appellant) or under CTH 39209999(as held in the impugned order)? - HELD THAT:- Applying the first Rule of Interpretation, the front cover, middle cover and back cover cannot be classified under CTH 3920- the vapor deposition (lamination) takes it out of the description of CTH 3920 and thermoforming and CNC milling, being processes beyond printing and surface working take them out of the scope of chapter note 2(s). It is also found that a specific entry (parts of mobile phones) prevails over a general entry (articles of plastic) as per Rule 3(a) of Interpretation and the later entry (Chapter 85) in the tariff prevails over the earlier entry (Chapter 39) as per Rule 3(c). However, it is well settled legal principle that the Interpretative Rules must be applied sequentially. Once Rule 1 decides the classification, it is not necessary to go through the other Rules of Interpretation such as Rule 3(a) and 3(c).
The case of PR. PACKAGINGS PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., NEW DELHI-II [2001 (10) TMI 142 - CEGAT, COURT NO. II, NEW DELHI] was based on Trade Notice No. 67/86 dated 30-9-1986 issued by the Bombay Collectorate which was in favour of the assessee and was binding on the officers. The question in HARIRAM GOVINDRAM VERSUS COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY [1997 (6) TMI 98 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI] was related to classification of the covers of the outer covers of the cassettes. Relying on Board‘s order dated 29-7-1994 issued under Section 37B of the then Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the classification was decided in favour of the assessee.
Thus, the rejection of the appellant’s classification of the front cover, middle cover and back cover of mobile phones under CTH 85177090 in the impugned order and their re-classification under CTH 39209999 cannot be sustained and needs to be set aside.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1154
Revocation of Customs Broker License - forfeiture of security deposit - Violation of Advance Authorisation scheme - duty free import which were diverted in the local market illegally instead of using the same imported goods for manufacture of export goods - contravention of Regulations 10(d) and 10(n) of CBLR, 2018 - HELD THAT:- Sufficient and reasonable opportunity was given to the appellants before passing an order, in respect of charges framed against them and there is no infirmity of the impugned order in not following the principles of natural justice in this regard.
The appellants have duly filed the ex-bond bills of entry as per the documents given by the importers and they were not aware of the purported diversion of the imported goods. In the instant case, the violations was found by the department only on the basis of specific intelligence developed by DRI, KZU and communicated in their offence report dated 30.06.2021, much later after the clearance of ex-bond warehoused goods, and hence the appellants CB cannot be found fault for the reason that they did not advise their client importer to comply with the provisions of the Act. Further, as the purported diversion of imported goods was not known to the appellants, the non-compliance by the importer of license/Advance Authorisation conditions in respect of imported goods could not have been brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner of Customs (DC) or Assistant Commissioner of Customs (AC) by the appellants CB - violation of Regulation 10(d) ibid, as concluded in the impugned order is not sustainable.
Violation under Regulation 10(n) - HELD THAT:- Circular No. 9/2010-Customs dated 08.04.2010 clearly explains the provision of CBLR/CHA Regulations which require the Customs Brokers to verify the antecedents, correctness of Import Export Court (IEC) Number, identity of his client and the functioning of his client in the declared address by using reliable, independent, authentic documents, data and information. The said guidelines provide for the list of documents that is required to be verified and that are to be obtained from the client importer/exporter. it is also provided that any two documents of among such specified documents is sufficient for fulfilling the obligation prescribed under Regulation 13(o)/10(n) of CHALR, 2004/CBLR, 2018. In the present case, the appellants CB had obtained the KYC documents and submitted the same to the Customs Department - there are no legal basis for upholding of the alleged violation of Regulation 10(n) ibid by the appellants in the impugned order.
In the instant case, the suspension was continued during the inquiry proceedings for about 12 months till the completion of inquiry proceedings and revocation of CB license by the impugned order - the order of revocation of appellant’s CB license has been passed on 23.09.2022 i.e., about 14 months and 23 days from the date of offence report. Though the time lines indicated in the CBLR, 2018 provide for completion of the inquiry proceedings, if calculated from the date of receipt of offence report, would require such an order under Regulation 17(7) ibid to be issued within 270 days, we find that there is no case for inordinate delay as the adjudication was done within a reasonable period of time.
The appellants could have been proactive in fulfilling their obligation as Customs Broker for exercising due diligence, particularly when the import documents were obtained from the importers through an intermediary in ensuring that all documents relating to imports are genuine, the KYC documents given by the importer are also genuine and that these are not fake or fabricated. Thus, to this extent the appellants CB are found to have not complied with the requirement of sub-regulation 10(n) and thus imposition of penalty in not being proactive for fulfilling of regulation 10(n) of CBLR, 2013 alone, is appropriate and justifiable.
There are no merits in the impugned order passed by the learned Principal Commissioner of Customs (General), Mumbai in revoking the CB license of the appellants; and for forfeiture of entire security deposit, inasmuch as there is no violation of Regulation 10(d) of the CBLR, 2018, and the findings in the impugned order is contrary to the facts on record - in view of the failure of the appellants to have acted in a proactive manner in fulfilment of the obligation under Regulation 10(n) ibid, particularly when they had received the documents from importer through intermediary, it is justifiable to impose a penalty of Rs.10,000/-, which would be reasonable.
Appeal allowed in part.
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2023 (12) TMI 1153
Oppression and Mismanagement - Regarding implementation of the Resolution Plan is pending for adjudication - Sections 388B, 397, 398, 401, 402 and 408 of the Companies Act, 1956 - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that the Appellant has filed the application no. 03 of 2014 for seeking various reliefs which is already mentioned herein before but this is also not in dispute that while the application was pending, an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 filed by the Canara Bank as the financial creditor against M/s Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited (Corporate Debtor therein) which was assigned CP No. 41/7/HDB/2017 has been admitted vide order dated 05.07.2017 and the Adjudicating Authority has initiated the CIRP proceedings. It is also not in dispute that the said CIRP proceedings have reached to the stage of consideration of Resolution Plan.
In such circumstance, once the Company against which the aforesaid application has been filed by the appellant on the allegation that there is mismanagement in the company and fraud has been played by the persons in control of the company, has gone into CIRP and, moratorium is imposed on Section 14 and the reins of the Companies are handed over to the IRP, the present application by itself does not survive as no relief be granted in the said application.
Thus, no error has been made by the Ld. Tribunal in dismissing the application as such. The appeal is thus found to be without merit and is hereby dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1152
Restoration of the name of the Company in the Register maintained by the Registrar of Companies - HELD THAT:- Since the Company Agerson Telecommunications Pvt. Ltd. is having substantial assets and liabilities, it cannot be said that the Company is not carrying on any business for operations - In spite of present Order, the RoC shall be free to take any other steps, punitive or otherwise, under the Act for non-filing/late filing of statutory returns/documents against the Company and Directors.
The Impugned Order dated 24.09.2021, passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Bench – V is set aside - The name of the Appellant Company is restored to the Register of Companies subject to the compliances imposed - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1151
Locus to maintain the appeal - Board of Directors of LITL illegally reconstituted in the absence of IDBI having attended the meeting - Appellants not heard before passing the Impugned directions - undergoing change in the management, pursuant to the approval of the Acquisition Plan - HELD THAT:- In the instant case LITL in whose name the Shares still stood, is a `person aggrieved’ as the admitted fact is that second tranche of consideration for the transfer of Shares remained unpaid. There are no hesitation to hold that the Appellant’s legal rights have been affected and hence, falls within the ambit of the definition of `person injured or damaged in a legal sense’. Therefore, it is observed that the Appellants Appeal is maintainable, specifically having regard to the fact that the Second Appellant M/s. KRS Erectors has purchased the First Appellant Company as a `Going Concern’ on an `as is where is basis’ and is a `person aggrieved’ as its `pecuniary interest’ is directly affected.
Appellants are aggrieved parties as the title of the CCPS still stands in their name and not hearing the Appellants and giving such directions would construe violation of Principles of Natural Justice. Needless to add, the Second Appellant/M/s. KRS Erectors Private Limited, which is the Company having acquired the First Appellant Company as a `going concern’ is an ‘aggrieved party’ and it has the locus to file this Appeal.
It is the main case of the Respondent that the subject 42,00,00,000 CCPS falls outside the scope of the approved Acquisition Plan. It is the case of the Appellants that Clause 5.10 of the Acquisition Plan makes it clear that unearned receivables pertaining to the period prior to the initiation of the CIRP other than those specified which are realised after the approval of the Resolution Plan shall be shared equally between the First Appellant and the stakeholder - It is not in dispute that in the Register of Members of the Sixth Respondent Company shows that 42,00,00,000 CCPS were held in the name of the First Appellant. The case of the Respondent that the second tranche of consideration was not paid as contemplated under the SPA dated 30.03.2012 only because the Appellant had failed to obtain the approval of the lenders and the payment was conditional to the approval, cannot be sustained as a ground for the said directions as the fact remains that the said Agreement was admittedly amended from time to time on account of non-approval of the lenders and the balance consideration for the said 42,00,00,000 CCPS was not paid and hence, the question of the contract having been concluded and the Shares thereafter being held in trust by LITL does not arise. If the terms of the Agreement have been adhered to, then the question of the Shares being held in trust by LITL would come into the picture.
The sum and substance of Clause 3.2(ii)(c) of the SPA is that LITL shall arrange the necessary approvals from the Lenders in whose favour such shares are pledged or Non-Disposal Undertaking is created; REPL shall accede under the terms of the financing documents as may be required by the Lenders and that LITL shall get dematerialisation of these shares, until such time, the said shares would be held in trust by LITL for REPL, however, in the books of the Company, the name of LITL shall continue as holder of these shares.
It is seen from the record that the subject CCPS do not form part of the Assets of the `Process Document’ and neither fall in the exclusions list and when the Shares are still in the name of the First Appellant Company which were required to be transferred to REPL subject to the amount received and receipt of approvals from the lenders of Lanco Anpara, we are of the view that the subject CCPS could not have been transferred without the payment being received and also without the consent of the Monitoring Committee of the Second Appellant Company - The conduct of the Respondents in transferring the shares during the pendency of the Appeal specifically when the matter was being heard at length due to the chequered history and the fact that the Impugned Order did not reflect the factual matrix, is not appreciated.
Though initially, it was opined that this matter be sent back to the Adjudicating Authority for hearing afresh, keeping in view that substantial time has been spent before this Tribunal in understanding the factual matrix of the matter and the matter was heard at length over a considerable period of time, and having regard to the fact that IBC is a time bound process, it is held that the Appeal itself be decided.
The Impugned Order passed by the Adjudicating Authority is set aside and any actions taken by the Respondents during the pendency of the Appeal are rendered otiose - appeal allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1150
Violation of principles of natural justice - observations against the erstwhile Liquidator / the Appellant - Impugned Order was passed in the absence of appellant - whether the Adjudicating Authority was justified in making some observations against the erstwhile Liquidator / the Appellant herein, and directing the Registry to forward a copy of the Compliance Affidavit and report of the Court Commissioner to IBBI? - HELD THAT:- The chronology of dates and events establishes that the Appellant was present and heard on several dates specifically regarding the issue on hand. It is pertinent to mention that when the Advocate Commissioner was appointed to facilitate the handover of the documents and implement the Order of the Adjudicating Authority regarding the transition of the control and custody of the statements, records and assets of the Corporate Debtor Company, there was no whisper of protest by the Appellant herein or any bonafide submission before the Adjudicating Authority that the transition would be done within the time frame given by the Adjudicating Authority. The fact that one weeks’ time was given and thereafter, the Adjudicating Authority had directed both the parties to meet, cooperate and implement the Order is not denied - the Appellant was very much present for all previous hearings, relevant to the matter on hand, the Advocate Commissioner was appointed only on account of the situation which has arisen based on the non-handing over of the said documents to the new Liquidator / First Respondent, and therefore, his contention that Principles of Natural Justice was not adhered to, is untenable.
There are no illegality or infirmity in the Impugned Order - appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1149
Withdrawal of the application for approval of the Resolution Plan - breach of addendum dated 18.06.2021 and the conditions of LoI - Issuance of fresh Form G - forfeiture of performance guarantee - exclusion of the period in the CIRP.
Whether after approval of the Resolution Plan by the CoC, the Appellant- Successful Resolution Applicant has committed breach of addendum dated 18.06.2021 and the conditions of LoI? - HELD THAT:- The Resolution Applicant who was permitted to participate in the Resolution Process was on account of its net worth, its background and experience. It is on record that while examining the eligibility of the Resolution Applicant, its net worth was examined with reference to ‘Shoora Capital’ and in the net worth of Resolution Applicant’s, group was claimed in the Resolution Plan - it is clear that the Resolution Applicant has undertaken in the addendum to the Resolution Plan dated 18.06.2021 as well as by LoI dated 28.07.2021 that it shall not change its shareholding in directorship and constitutional pattern of the Resolution Applicant for a period of 5 years from the effective date and for changes if any. Approval of two leading Financial Creditors shall be obtained. Replies to emails received from the Resolution Applicant indicate that no approval was taken from the Financial Creditor for effecting any change in constitutional pattern of the Resolution Applicant and directorship - Adjudicating Authority after considering the submissions has rightly come to the conclusion that the breach was committed by the Resolution Applicant of the addendum dated 18.06.2021 and the conditions as included in the LoI dated 28.07.2021.
Whether in the facts of the present case, CoC was precluded from taking any decision to issue fresh Form G and to withdraw the Resolution Plan which was earlier approved? - HELD THAT:- Present is a case where in essence we may say it is a case of sale of Resolution Plan approved by the CoC to third party. CoC approves the Resolution Plan looking to the credentials of the Resolution Applicant and its credibility and finances. When very basis of Resolution Applicant is knocked out and it changes its constitution substantially the CoC cannot be faulted in view of breach of the conditions by the Resolution Applicant, application for approval of the Resolution Plan be withdrawn - it is concluded that the Resolution Applicant has violated the addendum of the Resolution Plan as well as undertaking as given in the LoI and the Adjudicating Authority has rightly returned the finding.
Whether the decision of the CoC dated 21.12.2022 forfeiting the performance guarantee of Rs.20 Crores given by the Appellant is not in accordance with law? - HELD THAT:- Regulation 36B (4A) provides that performance security shall stand forfeited if the Resolution Applicant of such plan, after its approval by the Adjudicating Authority, fails to implement or contributes to the failure of implementation of that plan. Regulation (4-A) comes in operation after approval of the Resolution Plan and it provides that ‘performance security shall stand forfeited’ - Present is not a case where CoC has passed Resolution dated 21.12.2022 in reference to Regulation 36B (4-A). The minutes of the meeting specifically refers to clause 13.2 of the RFRP. The action of the CoC is fully covered by clause 13.2 of the RFRP and there is no occasion to resort to Regulation 36B (4-A) of the Regulation. Regulation 36B (4F) only contemplate one contingency that where performance security shall stand forfeited but the said provision does not exclude forfeiture of performance security in other conditions as contemplated in RFRP. We, thus, are of the view that the decision of the CoC for forfeiting the performance security is in accordance with RFRP. It is to be noted that at no point of time, any provision of the RFRP was challenged and Resolution Applicant has undertaken to abide by all terms and conditions of the RFRP.
Whether the Adjudicating Authority was not entitled to grant exclusion of the period in the CIRP? - HELD THAT:- The exclusion of the time granted by the Adjudicating Authority was consequent to decision taken to allow the application for withdrawal of the Resolution Plan. The order passed by the Adjudicating Authority granting exclusion of time is consequential to the order passed in IA No.985 of 2023. The Adjudicating Authority in its impugned order has made observations in paragraph 32(ix) and (x) as extracted above that the Corporate Debtor Company is a going concern and there is buoyancy in the market for its products of non-ferrous metals. It is well settled that the object and purpose of the IBC is to revive the Corporate Debtor and when the Adjudicating Authority has taken decision to issue fresh Form G by excluded the period from 05.02.2021 till passing of the order, no exception can be taken to said direction - there are no error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority excluding the period from 05.02.2021 till passing of the order in the CIRP and issuing direction to issue fresh Form-G.
Appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1148
Challenge to direction to Resolution Professional and CoC to move an application before the Hon’ble Supreme Court for seeking clarification in context of the order dated 21.11.2013 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that resolution plan has been approved with 100% CoC and the same has also received approval by the Adjudicating Authority by the impugned order.
On looking into the order dated 21.11.2013 a direction was to Sahara Group of Companies not to part with any movable and immovable properties until further orders. Direction to Sahara group of companies not to part with movable and immovable properties can have no bearing with resolution plan submitted by Successful Resolution Applicant for consideration by the Adjudicating Authority. The order dated 21.11.2013 cannot be read as any kind of restraint order in the CIRP process of the Corporate Debtor Baghauli Sugar & Distillery Ltd. & Anr. which is also a Sahara group of company.
The clarification which was given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the aforesaid order clearly indicate that Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that on the strength of the order dated 21.11.2013 no proceedings before National Consumer Dispute Resolution Commission can be stopped. Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically made it clear that order dated 21.11.2013 shall not prevent the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission from proceeding and passing order in accordance with law. The aforesaid clarification is also relevant with regard to CIRP Process of the Corporate Debtor and the intent and purpose of the order dated 21.11.2013 is very clear as clarified in order dated 27.04.2016.
The order dated 21.11.2013 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has no fetter in the CIRP process of the Corporate Debtor nor it can fetter the approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority which has been approved by 100% CoC - Adjudicating Authority committed error in putting a condition in the order approving the resolution plan that Resolution Professional and CoC to obtain a clarification from the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to order dated 21.11.2013.
Appeal allowed.
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