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Showing 101 to 120 of 236 Records
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1981 (1) TMI 136 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... It is for this purpose that the chitty money had been utilised. It would be seen from the assessee s letter that the chitty commenced in 1972-73 and terminated in 1976-77. Ordinarily in respect of chitties, the profit or loss could be ascertained only on the termination and it is the assessee s case that in respect of the two chitties for which the assessee had been subscribing the loss amounts to Rs. 35,929. The correctness of the figure is not doubted. This excess amount is an expenditure incurred by the assessee in the course of the business and for the purpose of raising funds introduced in the business. It cannot therefore, be said that there is no direct nexus between the assessee s business and the chitty loss. Even if the excess payment cannot be strictly classified as interest on borrowings falling under s. 36(1)(iii) of the IT Act, it is business expenditure allowable under s. 37. We, therefore, confirm the order of the AAC. 7. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 135 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... r, etc. 2,05,083.12 2,04,700 6. Residence . 1,68,900 7.Commercial Building 2,67,584.13 1,58,100 . 8,63,286.08 9,38,174, Net increase Rs. 74,888.00 . We think there is no point in interfering with the valuations in respect of the first five items. The difference is marginal. In respect of the 6th and 7th items it appears that it is one property which consisted of certain shops in front, open land and other residential building. The grievance of the A.P. is that in valuing the shops in front, the Department has taken the capitalisation method and added to it the value of land. His contention is that the value of the land should not be added. But this contention has been accepted by the Appl. Controller. What has been added is only Rs. 7,907 and the Appl. Controller has already allowed a deduction of Rs. 15,000. We do not find any other matter for interfering with the valuations. So the value fixed by the Appl. Controller would be maintained. 13. Both the appeals are dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 134 - ITAT COCHIN
Winnings From Lotteries ... ... ... ... ..... eceipt even though the amended section 2(24) came into force from 1-4-1972. 16. We also feel that if this amount is taxed on its receipt in April 1972, such assessment would in effect bring into operation the amended definition of income, retrospectively, i.e., before 1-4-1972, which was clearly not the intention of the Legislature. That this new definition was not to be given effect to before the assessment for the assessment year 1973-74 is clear from section 59 of the Finance Act, 1972. The attempt of the revenue to tax this amount on the receipt basis should be considered to be an attempt to reach an income which is beyond the pale of assessment because it had accrued at a time when it was not income. We consider it is an attempt to give effect to this amendment beyond the period intended by Parliament. 17. We, therefore, hold that this amount of Rs. 46,000 cannot be included in the total income of the assessee for the assessment year 1973-74. 18. The appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 133 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... t controverted by the Revenue. We have not been shown that there were any sales of medicines to outsiders merely with the motive of trade. In fact, noting has been pointed out in the order of the CIT except for saying that in view of the ratio of the Madras High Court decision and the observations of the Supreme Court in cases cited supra, action was justified. It is clear that the ratio of a case has to be applied to the facts of a particular case. In the case before us, the entirety of the facts shows that two individual doctors one of whom was lady acting as a doctor joined together to provide medical facilities because of their personal abilities and skill acquired through learning and such facilities were provided only to further the medical practice and not to run a business. Thus on the merits, therefore, there was no case as such. Therefore, in our opinion the order made by the CIT is liable to be cancelled on each of the above grounds. We do so. 24. Appeals allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 132 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... est motivated with the purpose of evading the requisite tax. The assessee paid the advance-tax on the basis of the returns of the minors. This advance-tax has been refunded after the assessment of the minors were completed as NA. Whether the instrument of partnership was before the ITO in which these minors were shown as admitted to the benefits of partnership in which their mother was a partner and the mother has shown in the returns of the minors that they were having share from that firm, the peculiar facts clearly show that necessary information had been projected to the ITO from which it would not be possible for the assessee to wriggle out and conceal any income. Furnishing of inaccurate particulars, if any, was not with the intention or motive of concealing the income. On the peculiar facts of the case, therefore for any of the assessment years under appeal there was no justification for imposing penalty. We, therefore cancel the penalties levied. 17. Appeals allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 131 - ITAT CALCUTTA-E
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... ... ..... he joint family, would clearly indicate the intention of the testator that the properties were to be held as joint family properties. This is further strengthened by the award given by Dr. B.C. Roy. This award also refers to partition (clause 6). Shri Jhumratlal Ahir, Shri Motilal Ahir and Shri Nawaratanlal Ahir were to pay specified sums to Shri Jawaharlal Ahir and Shri Pannalal Ahir to equalise the shares. Arrears of maintenance from April 1943 to November, 1946 amounting to Rs. 11,000 were directed to be paid to the mother of the assessee. Reading the documents together in our opinion, the properties of Chunilal Ahir were held as joint family properties with its sub-sequent partition on 11th Dec., 1946 by virtue of the arbitration. Hence, it is to be concluded that what the assessee received was joint family property and therefore, he was within his rights in partitioning the assets received from his father. We agree with the ld. AAC and dismiss the Department al appeals.
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1981 (1) TMI 130 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
Internal Audit ... ... ... ... ..... ces, boundary walls, oil tanks, pipes, mill siding, gates, garages, roads, wells etc. and buildings wherein the business was carried on in the name and style of Ganges Flour Mills, Ganges Oil Mills and Ganges Tin Works situated in Harrisgunj, Cantonments, Kanpur. These premises alongwith plant and machinery etc. had been leased out on 29th December, 1956 by the Karta of the family. The lease deed was formally executed on 21st January, 1957. The schedule to the lease deed indicates the machinery and building leased out. Since the entire property was leased out to the firm and no building in the compound was excluded from the premises it could not be said that some buildings where the members of the HUF lived remained separate and did not form part of the lease. There was thus no escapement of income of the HUF. We, therefore, hold that the learned AAC rightly cancelled the assessments. The order of the AAC is accordingly upheld. . Both the appeals by the Revenue are dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 129 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... business which were being carried on by him. The reliance by the assessee on the case law does not help him because those cases were such where expenses had been incurred in relation to the business which was being carried on by the assessee. In the case of AAC-Vickers Babcock Ltd. vs. CIT (1976) 103 ITR 321 (Bom) it was held by the Bombay High Court that where an expenditure is incurred while the business is going on and is not incurred either for extension of the business or for the substantial replacement of its equipment, the aim and object of the expenditure would determine whether it is a capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure. In the present case it was altogether a new line of business which has contemplated in respect of which the expenditure had been incurred. The object of the expenditure was to bring into existence a new manufacturing business. In view of this the expenditure claimed could not be allowed as a revenue expenditure. 6. The appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 128 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... on the valuation date inter alia other than an amount of tax payable under the Act, which is outstanding on the valuation date for more than 12 months. As already stated above, the assessee filed the returns for the years under consideration under s. 18B on 8th July, 1974. The assts. of the assessee for the asst. yrs. 1964-65 to 1973-74 for which those returns were filed were made on 27th July, 1974 and the Demand Notices, as brought out in para 2 above were served on the assessee-HUF on 5th Aug, 1974, As such, it cannot be said, as held by the wealth-tax authorities, that the said amount of Rs. 52,427 was the wealth-tax liability outstanding against the assessee for more than 12 months on 31st Dec, 1974. sec.2 (m) (iii) of the Act is, therefore, not authorised in the present case. This view of ours finds support from the ratio of the decision of the Allahabad High Court relied upon by the ld. counsel for the assessee. 6. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 127 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... the above arguments. Since the aforesaid legal arguments recorded in para 19 above go to the root of the case and since the wealth-tax authorities have not recorded any findings thereon, we set aside the order of the AAC in the matter of the valuation of the properties at Generalganj and restore and same to his file for deciding the question of valuation of those properties afresh in accordance with law, while so deciding as to whether the assessee is entitled to retain the valuation of the said properties as on 1st April 1971, in respect of those properties and whether the provision of s. 7(4) of the Act r. 1BB of the Rules were applicable in the present case or not. In case his findings are in the negative, he will once again decide the question of valuation of the said properties for each of the years under consideration. 21. In the result, the appeals by the Department are partly allowed and the cross objections by the assessee are partly allowed for statistical purpose.
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1981 (1) TMI 126 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... t assessee took the matter by way of Writ to the Allahabad High Court and their Lordships have held that the Addl. CIT lost jurisdiction under s. 263(1) of the Act to revise the order of the ITO, as the assessment order had merged wholly into that of the appellate order of the AAC. Although the aforesaid decision of Gujarat High Court and the Madras High Court in Puthuthotam Estates (1943) Ltd. have taken the contrary view, we respectfully following the aforesaid decision of the Allahabad High Court, upheld the preliminary objection raised by the representative for the assessee before us that the CIT had no jurisdiction in the present case under s. 263(1) of the Act, as he lost that jurisdiction, in view of the assessment order of the assessee for the year under consideration having wholly merged into that of the AAC. 6. Having come to the above conclusion, we are not recording our findings upon the merits of the case. 7. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 125 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... . On these facts, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a Karta of an HUF did not cease to be a coparcener, and as a coparcener he had a right to claim partition. The Karta could, therefore, partition the property of the HUF. In any case by was of family arrangement, such a partition could be made. The partial partition was, therefore, valid. In the light of this decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, it cannot be denied that on the point at issue, a view to the contrary to that taken by the tax authorities and stated hereinbefore is possible. Once that conclusion is arrived at, the present case is not a case of mistake apparent from record, the two views on the point at issue being legally possible. The ITO could not therefore, rectify the earlier order passed by him under s. 171(3) of the Act. We hold likewise. Having held so we are not deciding the other arguments advanced by the partner before us. 8. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 124 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... part of the assessee to disclose those particulars fully and truly. Subsequent valuation and sales could not be said to have been foreseen by the assessee on the dates, when those returns were filed. It was up to the WTO when all the material facts were disclosed to hold an enquiry, if required, and find out the correct market value of the said property. This in action on the part of the WTO at that stage cannot be equated with the alleged failure of the assessee to disclose all the material facts fully and truly. Further, there is no material worth the name on the basis of which it can be said that the WTO, at the time of the reopening of the assessment, had any reason to believe that any part of the net wealth of the assessee has escaped assessment on account of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts. We, therefore, agree with the AAC in this behalf. 6. In the result, the appeals by the Revenue fail and are hereby dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 123 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... ction. This ground is, therefore, rejected. 6. The last ground is that the CIT (A) was not correct in disallowing the claims of Rs. 36,400 which was bonus paid to workers. It was pointed out before the CIT (A) that minimum bonus of 8.33 per cent was payable to the workers. The provision for that had been allowed by the ITO. However, the assessee had claimed further amount of Rs. 36,400 in respect of which there was an agreement between the assessee and his employees on 25th Feb., 1975 which was after the close of the accounting period. The CIT (A), therefore, held that this claim could not be allowed in this year. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the assessee and we are of the view that CIT (A) was justified in disallowing this claim on the ground that the agreement for the payment of this additional amount had been arrived at in the later year. The claim could be allowed only in the year when the agreement was entered into. 8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 122 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... lso of no consequence, because the act of the firm of M/s. Sangathan Weekly by transferring the said amount of Rs. 39,688 to the new account in the name of Bhagwan Das for M/s. Modern Construction Co s account proves nothing but the requisite agreement amongst all the partners of M/s. Sangathan Weekly to contribute that amount by way of capital in the said firm of M/s. Modern Construction Co. We, therefore on the facts and circumstances of the case and the material on record hold that the assessee was a partner in M/s. Modern Construction Co. representing himself and his three other partners in M/s. Sangathan Weekly. The addition of Rs. 33,740 made to the total income of the assessee is, therefore deleted. We may aid that similar addition has been made in the assessment of M/s. Sangathan Weekly for the year under consideration and that assessment in this behalf will be the substantive and not the protective assessment. 6. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 121 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... e with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and as they have come to the assessee they would be owned by him in his individual capacity and not as parts of the HUF. This position would follow from the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Rakshapal Ashok Kumar (1968) 67 ITR 164 (All). The position might have been different if the property held by the father was ancestral property or ancestral business. In view of the above decision we hold that the assessee has not been to establish that his status was that of Karta of HUF vis-a-vis the money lending business carried on by him. The status which has been taken as individual appears to be correct and we, therefore decline to interfere with the orders of the lower authorities. 6. There are other grounds of appeal also regarding quantum but no submission have been made before us regarding the same. We have perused the order of the AAC and we find it to be reasonable. 7. The appeal are therefore dismissed.
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1981 (1) TMI 120 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... 7(b) was invalid as held by the Supreme Court in the case of 119 ITR 996. 8. However, in respect of the asst. yr. 1977-78 audit had also communicated to the ITO that he had ignored the provisions of s. 80J (6A). This in our opinion was merely communication of law and not the interpretation of law. As the re-assessment proceedings for the asst. yr. 1977-78 could stand on this information alone, the re-assessment proceedings have to be held to valid. The fact that the opinion of the audit party on legal position was also made a basis could not invalidate the initiation of proceedings as it was based on an information communicated by the audit party. We, therefore, hold that the reopening of the assessments for the asst. yr. 1975-76 and 1976-77 were bad in law but it was valid for the asst. yr. 1977-78 9. On merits the CIT (A) has set aside the assessments and we therefore allow the appeals for the asst. yrs. 1975-76 and 1976-77 and dismiss the appeal for the asst. yr. 1977-78.
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1981 (1) TMI 119 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... ent. No doubt, in the assessment proceeding additions were made as the assessee could not explain the excess sales on those dates. However, when the assessee was now relying on a letter from the Hyderabad party stating that goods have been supplied by that party to the assessee on different dates, it was necessary to rebut the contention of the assessee by examining that party and then coming to a definite conclusion. The ITO has not examined that party and, therefore the rejection of the explanation of the assessee cannot be said to give a positive evidence of concealment by the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, it will have to be held that the penalty is imposed as the explanation of the assessee has not been found to be satisfactory. It has not been even held to be false. In these circumstances, we hold that this was not a fit case for imposition of penalty under s. 271(1)(c). The order of penalty is, therefore cancelled. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 118 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... ned Counsel for the assessee argued that the evidence produced by him had not been considered by the authorities below, the id Deptl. Rep relied on the orders of the authorities below. The ITO is aware of the business carried of by the assessee. He should also be aware of the manufacturing process adopted by the assessee and the working of its machinery, Therefore, it should not be difficult to give a finding whether the assessee is using corrosive chemicals or not. As facts have not been found out property, we find that in the fitness of things this point should go back to the ITO for taking a final decision in the matter. He should call upon the assessee to produce evidence along with expert opinion regarding the use of corrosive chemicals in the machinery. If the assessee s claim is substantiated he would allow depreciation at the higher rate. We therefore restore this part of the order of the CIT (A) to the ITO. 7. The appeal by the assessee is treated as partly allowed.
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1981 (1) TMI 117 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
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... ... ..... R 10 (SC) held that when a particular claim for deduction did not come under any of the sub-clauses of s. 10 (2) of the 1922 Act it could be claimed under s. 10. Having regard to this decision we feel that the CIT (A) ought to have considered the assessee s claim under s. 28 of the 1961 Act. This is particularly so since he has recorded certain facts in paragraph 10 of his order referred to above. These facts are already on record and do not require any further investigation. Therefore, in our opinion, the additional ground should not have been brushed aside by the ld. CIT (A). We also feel that he has to examine further the question regarding the date on which the debt became bad in view of the letter from the Ministry of Industries. We, therefore, deem it fit to set aside the order of the ld. CIT (A). We accordingly set aside his order and restore the appeal to him for fresh disposal according to law. 7. The assessee s appeal is treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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