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Showing 121 to 140 of 147 Records
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1981 (10) TMI 27 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the aforesaid case appears to have different field to play, inasmuch as in that case there was failure to furnish the returns in accordance with the requirement of s. 139 of the Act and there was also failure to furnish a return after the notice under s. 148 of the Act. In view of the discussion aforesaid, we answer the question referred to us thus On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the penalty under s. 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the A.Ys. 1965-66, 1968-69 and 1969-70 was leviable for the delay of only 10 months relating to the default on notices under s. 148 and that no penalty is leviable for the default committed under s. 139 in the course of the original proceedings, nor such penalty proceedings could be initiated at the time of reassessment for the aforesaid years. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs of this reference.
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1981 (10) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Authorised Representative, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... titled to appear before the E.D. authorities at the time when the impugned order was passed. Counsel for the petitioner also contended that no opportunity as contemplated by the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 61 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, was given to him before passing the impugned order. The argument is wholly misconceived. The Asst. Controller passed the impugned order not on the ground that an order under s. 61(3) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, had been made against the petitioner, but on the consideration that the petitioner was not qualified to appear in estate duty proceedings on account of his failure to fulfil the qualifications required by s. 83 read with T. 41 of the Act. The order passed by the Asst. Controller appears to be correct. The petition is accordingly dismissed. A prayer has been made for the grant of a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We, however, do not feel that it is a fit case for grant of leave. The prayer for leave is refused.
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1981 (10) TMI 25 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Priority Industry, Taxing Statute ... ... ... ... ..... red to leave it to the Tribunal to adjust its decision in the light of the observations made herein and the common parlance test enunciated in Ramavatar Budhaiprasad s case 1961 12 STC 286 (SC), after finding the material facts. On behalf of the Revenue, however, it has been fairly stated that such an exercise may be avoided because if the court is inclined to take the view that straw-board is comprehended within the meaning of the word paper , then kraft paper, which is used for wrapping purposes, would certainly be covered by the Word paper . Under the circumstances, even as regards kraft paper, we are of the opinion that the view of the Tribunal was erroneous in law. For the foregoing reasons, the question referred for our opinion is answered in the negative, that is to say, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee, so far as both the articles, namely, straw-board and kraft paper, are concerned. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1981 (10) TMI 24 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... The other point that is raised in O. P. No. 1080 of 1980-J relates to the question as to whether the wealth-tax paid is a deductible item of expenditure. It is by now well settled by the various decisions of this court, including the decision reported in George Oommen v. State of Kerala 1977 110 ITR 546 (Ker), that wealth-tax paid by an assessee on his agricultural lands is an allowable deduction under S. 5(j) of the Agrl. I.T. Act, 1950, provided the expenditure was wholly and exclusively incurred for the purpose of deriving agricultural income. In this particular case whether the expenditure was so incurred or not, is a matter to be gone into by the assessing authority. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions are allowed quashing the orders of the Commissioner declining to exercise the jurisdiction. The revisions shall be taken back on file, and disposed of by the Commissioner according to law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. No costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 23 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... the decision in CIT v. Shaw Wallace and Co. 1932 2 Comp Cas 276 (PC) AIR 1932 PC 138. This decision emphasised the fact that a profit arising out of business could be charged to income-tax only if the business was carried on during the previous year and compensation paid on account of cessation of business was not chargeable, as it was not the product of a business or, in other words, profit. Such compensation is some sort of solatium for not carrying on the business. According to their Lordships of the Privy Council such compensation was not revenue. We are, therefore, of opinion that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the sum of Rs. 48,361 out of the total amount of Rs. 55,291 received by the assessee as compensation was not chargeable to tax as a revenue receipt during the assessment year 1975-76. Our answer to that question is in the affirmative. Costs will be borne by the revenue. Advocate s fee Rs. 100.
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1981 (10) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... n under s. 148 because of an audit objection. The ITO must conclude the assessment on the material produced before him, and he cannot fall back upon some objection to reopen the assessment. A somewhat identical question came for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Killick Industries Ltd. 1980 126 ITR 147, and the Division Bench took the view that the ground that the income had not been assessed under the correct heading was a case of mere change of opinion, and that did not entitle the ITO to initiate proceedings for reopening the assessment. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court and of this court, the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax was totally irregular and the impugned notice dated March 18, 1978, is required to be struck down. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 21 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Representative Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... he case. The authors of the trust and the beneficiaries are not identical as contended by counsel. The trust deed did contemplate acquisition of business by the trustees. The acquisition of the business under annex. E agreement was one which was clearly contemplated at the time of the agreement dated March 30, 1972, and had been fully authorised by the second paragraph of cl. 5 of the trust deed. As observed by the Tribunal in para. 11 of its order, the business is as much a part of the trust as the sum of Rs. 40,000 . The income arising out of the business activities was, therefore, one to which section 161 did apply. In the light of the foregoing discussions, the reference is to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. We do so, but without making any order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1981 (10) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment, HUF, Partition, Wealth Tax Act, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... as to the tact of partition. The learned judges further observed that there was no distinction between s. 20 of the G.T. Act and s. 25A of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, in principle. This decision would have applied if really there is a joint family in the present case. We have pointed out that even before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force Kamatchisundaram and Subbarayalu had become divided and, therefore, there was no question of any joint family which could be assessed and which could be deemed to continue until a record is made regarding the factum of partition. We do not find, therefore, anything to support the stand taken by the Department in this case. The result is that the first question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As we have held that s. 20 does not apply to this case, the answer on the second question would also be in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1981 (10) TMI 19 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , and on a proper construction of section 171 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and having regard to the rights and titles of the assessee-HUF under Hindu law over the income, business and the properties with which the business was carried on, the income arising from the business comprised in Shri Mahabir Rice Mills is not properly assessable in the hands of the assessee-HUF ? For the reasons set out above we hold that the learned Tribunal was not correct in rejecting the application of the Revenue u/s. 256(1) of the Act. We hold that the grounds of refusal are not justified in law. The question is prima facie a question of law, this is a live question of law. We are of the opinion that the question posed does arise out of the decision of the learned Tribunal. Therefore, we require the learned Tribunal to state the case and refer the question of law in accordance with law. In the result, this application is allowed. However, there is no order as to costs. T. C. DAS J.-I agree.
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1981 (10) TMI 18 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Revenue in their memorandum of appeal or orally. In our opinion, the Tribunal has impliedly answered the questions in the negative on the authority of its earlier decision wherein it had turned down the contentions. Without a determination of these questions expressly or impliedly, the Tribunal could not have reached the conclusion that the trust properties were not the properties of the assessee and the WTO was not justified in assessing the trust properties in the hands of the assessee HUF. Thus the Tribunal had determined the questions impliedly against the Revenue. For the foregoing reasons we hold that we are not satisfied with the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal. We are of the opinion that the questions posed do arise out of the decisions of the Tribunal. Therefore, we require the learned Tribunal to state the cases and refer the questions of law in accordance with law. In the result the applications are allowed. However, there is no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Dividends, Income, Relief U/Ss. 85 And 85A ... ... ... ... ..... Schedule to the Income-tax Act is valid in law ? We must return an affirmative answer in favour of the assessee for these two questions as well. In this very tax case, T.C. No. 1659 of 1977, there is an additional question which calls for our consideration and decision. That question is as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the benefit under sections 85 and 85A should be granted with reference to the gross dividend income without deducting proportionate management expenses ? It is, however, unnecessary for us to dilate on this matter since there is a direct decision of the Supreme Court in Cloth Traders (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT 1979 118 ITR 243, which covers the case. Following that precedent, the above question of law is answered in the assessee s favour and against the Revenue. Having regard to the results of the references, the assessee is entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1981 (10) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but the return itself. There is no question of a retrospective operation of the amended provision at all. The question is, as to when the act of concealment occurred. If an act of concealment is the basis for applying the law, then the date of filing the return will be the crucial date and the law as in force on that date will be applicable for deciding the quantum of penalty. Hajee K. Assainar s case 1971 81 ITR 423, relied on by the Appellate Tribunal, was overruled by a larger Bench of the same High Court in CIT v. K. Ahamed 1974 95 ITR 599 FB . Therefore, K. Assainar is no longer good law. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Addl. CIT v. Hiralal Munnalal 1980 124 ITR 728, has taken the same view. Accordingly, we answer the question in the negative and hold that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the amendment of s. 271 (1)(c) with effect from April 1, 1968, will not be applicable even though the return was filed on January 8, 1969. There is no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Company, Reserves, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... on rendered by this court in Southern Roadways v. CIT 1981 130 ITR 545 FB . Following that decision, we answer this question in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The last question for our consideration is, whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amounts deducted or rebates allowed under the provisions of Ch. VI-A of the I.T. Act, 1961, formed part of the total income for I.T. assessment and that, therefore, the capital should not be reduced by the amounts referable to such deduction under r. 4 of the Second Schedule to the C. (P.) S.T. Act, 1964. The answer to this question has been furnished by a decision of this court in Addl. CIT v. Bimetal Bearings Ltd. 1977 110 ITR 131. According to that decision, this question has got to be answered against the Revenue and we answer this question accordingly. Having regard to the nature of the findings rendered by us, in all the three questions referred to above, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 14 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ing the original assessment proceedings, cannot be regarded to be a failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts within the contemplation of s. 147(a) of the Act. In Lokendrasingh v. ITO 1981 128 ITR 450, also it has been held by this court that (headnote) When primary facts were already before the Income-tax Officer and after some routine enquiry, the Income-tax Officer could have assessed the income on the basis of such information, it is not open for him to invoke the provisions of s. 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and reopen the assessment even though he may have omitted to notice the facts mentioned in the return by oversight. In view of the discussion aforesaid our answer to the question referred is as under On the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in holding that the proceedings under s. 147(a) of the I.T. Act, 1961, were validly initiated against the assessee in respect of the A.Ys. 1967-68 and 1969-70.
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1981 (10) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Legal Expenses ... ... ... ... ..... he question was to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. As we have pointed out above, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the nature of the plaint containing the allegations of mismanagement, misappropriation, fraudulent and secret transfer of the firm s assets and the relief for protection of the assets of the firms, the said legal expenses of Rs. 25,599 claimed by the assessee as allowance in computing their business income would be considered in this case to be expended by them wholly and exclusively for the purpose of their business, to be covered by s. 10(2)(xv) of the Indian I.T. Act of 1922. In our view, the tax authorities ought to have allowed the said legal expenses of Rs. 25,599 as deductions in computing the income of the assessee from business. In that view of the matter, we would answer the question referred to us as under In the negative and in favour of the assessee. Revenue to pay costs of the reference.
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1981 (10) TMI 12 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Reference To High Court ... ... ... ... ..... order of the Tribunal is based on no reasoning and in fact the same, to a great extent, is self-contradictory. It is well settled that when a reference is made to the High Court, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be looked upon as final. In other words, the appeal is not finally disposed of. It is only when the High Court decides the case, exercises its advisory jurisdiction, and gives directions to the Tribunal on questions of law, and the Tribunal reconsiders the matter and decides it, that the appeal is finally disposed of. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Esthuri Aswathiah v. CIT 1967 66 ITR 478. In view of what has been stated above, we, therefore, refuse to answer the question referred to us and send the case back to the Tribunal for passing a fresh order, and redecide the, appeal of the assessee after hearing the parties, in accordance with law. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 11 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Enduring Nature, Foreign Company, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... t, as summarised by the income-tax authorities and by the Tribunal, appears to us to show that the agreement was merely for the purpose of running the business and not for acquiring any asset of an enduring nature. The contention for the Commissioner was that the Tribunal appeared to proceed on a misapprehension that unless there was a transfer of any right or asset to the Indian company from the foreign company, the amount would always have to be taken as revenue expenditure. The proposition found in the order of the Tribunal is somewhat wide. What is obviously meant is that the assessee had not paid any consideration for the acquisition of any asset or any benefit of an enduring nature. Understood in that light, we do not find that there is any error committed by the Tribunal in holding that the expenditure was of a revenue nature. The result is that the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 10 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... ed on the basis of the regular assessment. We would only like to add that, even assuming that there is a possibility of some doubt in regard to the above construction and even if it is taken to be a case of legislative ambiguity, the assessee should be entitled to the benefit of doubt particularly in a provision which attempts to penalise the assessee. This is a well-settled principle of construction of taxing statutes Vide the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. 1973 88 ITR 192, and other cases cited in foot note (7) at p. 2 of Kanga and Palkhivala (Vol. 17th Edn.). However, we should like to make it clear that these observations of ours should not be understood to reflect any misgiving or doubt on our part as to the construction of the provisions outlined earlier in our judgment. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. But, in the circumstances , we make no order as to costs.
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1981 (10) TMI 9 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Advance Tax ... ... ... ... ..... t, the ITO was vested with the power to levy penalty in cases where the assessed income was below a particular amount. This court held that the law in force at the time when the return was filed would be applicable and that the authority who could levy penalty was the one envisaged in the provision then in force. In the same case, the question of limitation has also been described as a procedural one. We are not here concerned with the levy of penalty by an authority who could not have levied the penalty as on the date of (filing) the return. This is not a matter of jurisdiction, so that the law in force when the return was filed could alone apply. We do not, therefore, find it possible to extend the principle laid down in the said decision dealing with jurisdiction, in the present case, along with procedure. The result is, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The Revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1981 (10) TMI 8 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Mistake Apparent From Record, Question Of Law, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... g drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may be conceivably two opinions. A decision on a debatable point of law is not mistake apparent from the record. In the instant case it is obvious that a new question of fact was raised before the Tribunal after the order was passed dismissing the assessee s appeal against the AAC s order. This fact was disputed by the Department and, therefore, in the garb of an application for rectification the assessee sought a fresh finding on a question of fact which was not raised at any time before the Tribunal. Thus, it is clear that the Tribunal was right in holding that there was no error apparent from the record which needed rectification. No question of law thus arises out of the Tribunal s order dated September 7, 1976, disposing of the assessee-applicant s miscellaneous petition under s. 254(2) of the IT. Act. The application under s. 256(2) of the Act is, therefore, dismissed. Costs on the applicant. Advocate s fee Rs. 100.
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