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Showing 121 to 140 of 183 Records
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1978 (2) TMI 63 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Export Incentive Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... ied on and acted upon, we should direct the Tribunal to take into consideration the subsequent report and decide the case afresh. We are afraid, we are unable to accept this submission. So far as the evidence on record it appears that there was evidence and material for the purpose of the Tribunal to reject the claim, as the Tribunal did. There is no question as to whether the Tribunal s rejection of fresh material was justified or not nor was there any question as to whether the Tribunal s finding was perverse or not. In that view of the matter, it would not be possible at this stage to admit additional evidence on this count or to direct the Tribunal to take any additional evidence. This, however, will not prevent the assessee from taking any other step open to it under the law for revising the assessment. The second question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will get the costs of this reference. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (2) TMI 62 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
AAC And Tribunal, Delay In Filing, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... assessment year 1966-67, merely because the matter was taken in appeal, it does not change the complexion and it would be impossible to come to the conclusion that because he has done that there was no sufficient cause. Under these circumstance, it must be held that the discretion vested in him has not been exercised in a judicial manner and the result is that a substantial injury has been caused to the petitioner-company so far as the consideration of the question regarding the revenue expenditure of Rs. 3,00,600 is concerned. Under these circumstances, this special civil application is allowed and the order of the Commissioner dated March 29, 1975, exhibit E to the petition, is quashed and set aside. The Commissioner in the light of his own reasoning is directed to proceed on the footing that there was sufficient cause and that the delay must be condoned. He must now proceed to dispose of the revision application on merits. The rule is made absolute accordingly with costs.
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1978 (2) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... and recorded any finding whether the assessee had in fact established a contributory provident fund in accordance with s. 63. There is no finding whether the contributory provident fund was not used in the business of the society and did not form part of the assets of the society. Further, there is no finding whether the interest was credited as required by r.203, and whether the provident fund was invested in accordance with r. 204. Unless the assessee satisfies these statutory requirements it will be difficult to hold that the deduction claimed by it was in discharge of its statutory liability. The ITO found that the assessee was earning income on the investment of the reserve fund, to which the provident fund account had also been credited. This creates some doubt whether the statutory requirements have, in fact, been fulfilled. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to draw up a supplementary statement of the case, giving its findings on the various aspects mentioned above.
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1978 (2) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Loss, Trading Loss ... ... ... ... ..... assessee, as a film distributor, advanced moneys to the producers and when he found that the distribution rights given to him under the agreement did not fetch sufficient moneys even to cover the advances given by him, he entered into a settlement with the producers, accepted a portion of the balance due to him and wrote off the remaining as irrecoverable. It is, therefore, a trading loss occasioned in the course of film distribution business and is incidental thereto. It is an accepted commercial practice between the distributors and the producers to enter into such agreements. We, therefore, hold that the loss sustained was one in the course of business and incidental thereto and is, therefore, a trading. loss. Mr. Anjaneyulu, however, conceded before us that he is not putting his case under s. 36(2) of the Act. We, therefore, answer the first part of the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1978 (2) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... so clauses in the memorandum of association, which could not be construed to be objects of general public utility coming within the scope of s. 2(15) of the Act. It was also pointed out that the promotion and encouragement of mere entertainment, which was one of the objects, could not be called a charitable purpose. That decision cannot have any scope for application to the case before us. The decision in Madras Hotels Association v. CIT 1978 111 ITR 241 (Mad), proceeded on a construction of the objects clauses in that case and lays down no different principle. As indicated earlier, the activity of this association is such as to enure for the benefit of the public in the sense that it promotes the development of trade and commerce and industry in a part of this country. Taking into account the facts relating to this association, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1978 (2) TMI 58 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Jurisdiction Of Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... xcept possibly the power of enhancement) which are conferred upon the AAC by s. 31 of the Act. That was, of course, a case where the Tribunal had directed the AAC or the ITO to hold a further enquiry and dispose of the case on the basis of such enquiry. No doubt, it was not a case where any claim for exemption was made under any provisions of law. We are of the opinion that when there is sufficient evidence on record to support a claim, neither the AAC nor the Tribunal is barred from entertaining a claim on the basis of the evidence on record which is sufficient to support the claim. The decision of the Supreme Court in Addl. CIT v. Gurjargravures P. Ltd. 1978 111 ITR 1, therefore, is no bar to the entertaining of the claim by the AAC or the Tribunal, in view of the fact that all the necessary material for allowing a claim under s. 80J(1) was before the ITO. In the result, the reference is answered in the affirmative and against the revenue with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1978 (2) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Hindu Law ... ... ... ... ..... ent, it has been ruled that a custom applicable to the family has been established in order to change the normal rule of inheritance or to change the normal law that is applicable to the parties governed by a particular religion and make applicable a different law altogether. In the light of the above principles, we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal that there was no material produced by the assessee to prove that the parties who entered into the document dated March 31, 1966, were governed by the principles of Hindu law and the properties divided belong to a joint Hindu family, the parties having an interest in the properties before the partition deed was entered into, thus resulting merely in the transformation of joint properties into a separate property, resulting in no gift to attract gift-tax. In the light of the view, we answer the two questions referred to us in the affirmative, that is in favour of the revenue and against the assessees. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1978 (2) TMI 56 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act ... ... ... ... ..... he mother, and that, therefore, the family was not entitled to a higher limit of exemption from tax provided in the limit clause to the proviso of Part I(A) of Sch. I to the Finance Act, 1951 . All that the learned judges said in that case was that the expression lineal descendant has to be interpreted in its natural meaning. There, the learned judges extended the meaning even to the female line. When sons and grandsons in the female line could be held to be lineal descendants, we see no reason for excluding an adopted son from the meaning of lineal descendant . Our attention is not invited to any decision of the Supreme Court departing from the view expressed by the Privy Council in Nagindas Bhugwandas v. Bachoo Hurkissondas 1916 32 IC 403 AIR 1915 PC 41. We, therefore, hold that the expression lineal descendant takes in adopted son . Question No. 1 referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the accountable person. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1978 (2) TMI 55 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Enduring Benefit, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... id to be an expenditure for the creation of a new asset and that too of an enduring nature so as to disentitle the assessee from claiming deduction. The decision of this court in Guntur Merchants Cotton Press Co. Ltd. v. ITO 1977 108 ITR 620 (AP) covers the question raised by the revenue. This question, therefore, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. So far as the fourth question is concerned, Mr. Swamy, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, concedes the case of the revenue in so far as the two assessment years in question are concerned. He also makes it clear that the concession made by him is only in respect of this case and the two assessment years involved in this reference. The question, therefore, is answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. In the result, questions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are answered in favour of the assessee and question No. 4, against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1978 (2) TMI 54 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Individual Partner, Registered Firm, Share Income, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... of s. 184 is not that the registration would continue as such but that the registration would continue provided the conditions are fulfilled, namely, an application is made in the prescribed form. There is no warrant for the ITO to presume that that condition would be fulfilled in the instant case when he made the assessment. In the above view of the matter we must hold that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the ITO was justified in taxing the income in the hands of the assessee, an unregistered firm, for the relevant assessment years. We may here observe that the Tribunal in its order has directed the ITO to give effect to the provisions of s. 86(iii) of the 1961 Act. If the assessments are bad then this direction would be of no avail. In the premises, the question referred to this court is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of this case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (2) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... roperty and it could not take effect as an enlargement of an existing estate. It was intended to be and was a transfer of ownership. A deed called a deed of release can, by using words of sufficient amplitude, transfer title to one having no title before the transfer. Admittedly, the assessee had no title in respect of 3/4ths share of the house at Madanapalle. His right was only limited to 1/4th share in that property. The three brothers had agreed to transfer each one s interest in that property, which was valued at Rs. 30,000 to be relinquished in favour of their elder brother, the assessee. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the release deeds in this case, as rightly found by the Tribunal, transfer the title or interest of the three divided brothers to the other divided brother, the assessee, who had no title in respect of the 3/4ths of the property. In the result, the reference is answered in the affirmative and against the revenue with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1978 (2) TMI 52 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Of Company, Computation Of Capital ... ... ... ... ..... important even if one considers the question of reserve in contradistinction to. provision in the accountancy principle. On the point that such a kind of estimate of an obligation cannot be considered to be a contingent liability meriting exclusion from reserve, reliance may be placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Standard Mills Co. Ltd. v. CWT 1967 63 ITR 470 and also on the decision in the case of Metal Box Co. of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1969 73 ITR 53. The view we are taking is in consonance with the view of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Forbes Forbes Campbell and Co. Ltd. 1977 107 ITR 38, though being a decision under the C.P.S.T. Act, 1964, their Lordships of the Bombay High Court did not refer to the change introduced by the Explanation by the 1964 Act. In the premises, the question referred to this court is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (2) TMI 51 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
A Partner, Clubbing Of Income, Minor Child, Partnership Firm ... ... ... ... ..... d be included in her income. The Supreme Court again endorsed its view in Muthiah Chettiar v. CIT 1969 74 ITR 183. The Madras High Court in CIT v. Smt. Shajathi alias Jainabi 1977 110 ITR 738, on somewhat similar facts, opined that, if the minors were admitted to the benefits of partnership, then it would be proper to assess the income referable to the minors in the hands of the firm and also to club the income with that of the widow. We, therefore, hold that, when once it is admitted that the minors were admitted to the benefits of partnership, there is no escape from the operation of the provisions of s. 64(ii) of the Act. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each. Mr. Anjaneyulu made an oral application under s. 261 of the Act for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We are unable to certify that these are fit cases for appeal to the Supreme Court. Oral application is rejected.
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1978 (2) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
HUF Partner In Firm, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... l. 5 as suggesting that though the capital investment had been divided between the members of the joint family, the profits arising from them should exclusively belong to the assessee. We are of the view that cl. 5 does not in any way affect the legal right of the sons to the profits arising from the partnership firms and other investments. Accordingly, we hold that the share of future profits from the firms was held by the assessee and his two divided sons and was not vested in the assessee wholly and exclusively and cl. 5 of the partition deed did not in any way affect this right. Accordingly, the profits attributable to the interest of the assessee s two minor sons in the various partnership firms have to be treated as their wealth and consequently they have to be excluded in computing the net wealth of the assessee. Accordingly, we answer the three questions in the foregoing terms and against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1978 (2) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Higher Rate, Income Returned ... ... ... ... ..... rit in this submission. It is not correct that the Tribunal held that the penalty is not imposable in a case where the assessment is a best judgment assessment. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal, after examining the evidence, came to the conclusion that in view of the explanation of the assessee that since it was not maintaining vouchers for purchases, that was not the case (sic) for not submitting the correct return for the entire income. It may be remembered that the petitioner is a sweetmeat seller and, in these circumstances, the Tribunal was fully justified in accepting the explanation offered by the assessee-firm and in concluding that, as the explanation was reasonable, the assessee was not guilty of fraud or gross or wilful neglect within the meaning of s. 271(1)(c). In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Since no one appears to oppose this reference, we make no order as to costs.
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1978 (2) TMI 48 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hammedan law. It was thus clear that distribution of 80 of the income was determinate and not fluctuating. The Tribunal was justified in taking that view. It was hence correct in holding that s. 21(1), and not s. 21(4), was applicable. This view has been upheld in CWT v. Trustees of H.E.H. Nizam s Family (Remainder Wealth) Trust 1977 108 ITR 555, 598 (SC). In respect of the second question, the position is that sacrifice of goat in the name of a prophet was undoubtedly of a charitable nature because the subject-matter of sacrifice was meant for the benefit of the members of the public. Similarly, the purpose of sacrificing another goat was to bestow peace on the soul of the waqf and the meat of this sacrifice was also to be distributed to the public. It was an object of charitable nature. We, therefore, have no hesitation in answering both the questions in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (2) TMI 47 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Bad Debt, Partnership Deed, Same Business ... ... ... ... ..... ording to s. 36(1)(vii) read with s. 36(2), only such bad debt could be allowed which had been taken into account in computing the income of the assessee of that previous year or of an earlier previous year, and the assessee of the previous year cannot be held to be the same assessee for the relevant assessment year 1967-68, in the case of a firm which was dissolved and a new one was created. This contention has also no substance, as the expression assessee in s. 36(2)(i)(a) has to be interpreted keeping in view the interpretation of s. 187 regarding reconstituted firm or the succeeding firm, as the case may be. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the assessee-firm for the assessment year 1967-68, was only a reconstituted firm of the first firm and as such, the decision of the Tribunal was correct in law in allowing a sum of Rs. 10,799 as a bad debt. Consequently, our answer to the question referred to this court is in the affirmative. S. S. SANDHAWALIA J.-I agree.
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1978 (2) TMI 46 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... slature by the use of the expression contract ... settled in defining a speculative transaction in Expln. 2 to s. 24(1) of the Act. Payment of compensation on account of a breach of contract has not been held to be a speculative transaction in CIT. v. Pioneer Trading Co. P. Ltd. 1968 70 ITR 347 (Cal), Daulatram Rawatmull v. CIT 1970 78 ITR 503 (Cal), Bhandari Rajmal Kushalraj v. CIT 1974 96 ITR 401 (Mys), CIT v. Ramjeewan Sarawgee and Sons 1977 107 ITR 845 (Cal) and CIT v. Arun General Industries Ltd. 1977 110 ITR 286 (Cal). I respectfully agree with the conclusions arrived at in these decisions. Thus, agreeing with the opinion of Oza J., my answer to the question of law referred to this court for its opinion is that, upon the facts and in the circumstances of the case, payment of Rs. 30,000 to M/s. Pitty Brothers, Bombay, is not a speculative loss by virtue of Expln. 2 to s. 24(1) of the I.T. Act, 1922, corresponding to s. 43(5) of the 1961 Act, but is a normal trading loss.
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1978 (2) TMI 45 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Contingency Reserve, Priority Industry, Tax Concession ... ... ... ... ..... ny lawful right in favour of the assessee to receive the amount claimed. Even the entries in the books of the assessee were tentative. It is on record that the dispute between the parties have continued and appeal from the writ proceedings are still pending. For the reasons stated above it appears to us that no part of the said sum of Rs. 1,47,090 can be held to have accrued as the income of the assessee. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows Income-tax Reference No. 10 of 1971 Question No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Question No. 3 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Income-tax Reference No. 19 of 1971 By reason of the answers to questions raised in the Income-tax Reference No. 10 of 1971, these two questions do not call for any answer. The references are disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1978 (2) TMI 44 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Held By Assessee, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... er s. 5(1A), the proviso enacts that where the net wealth includes items under (xv) and (xvi) of s. 5(1A), above the ceiling limit, held prior to March 1, 1970, the ceiling shall be raised by the amount of such excess. On the plain language of the proviso, in the contingency provided, the exemption limit shall be raised to the extent of such excess, and no more. We are not prepared, as the Tribunal was, to whittle down the plain meaning deduced from the language of these provisions by any presumed or assumed intention of the legislature as gathered from the speech of the Finance Minister introducing the Finance Act of 1970. In the light of our conclusion, we would answer the questions referred in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. We make no order as to costs. A copy of our judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of this court will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
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