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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 200 Records
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1981 (3) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
`Import' and `Export' - Connotation of - Baggage - Smuggling ... ... ... ... ..... t he desired to keep his baggage in bond for the purpose of taking the same for his further onward journey to Kathmandu. If the statement dated May 13, 1969 or the Baggage Declaration Form are not forthcoming or are not being produced by the respondents, then the adverse inference against the respondents is fully justified. On this material on the record and in the absence of the material with the respondents, no prima facie case has been made out against the petitioner that there was any intention of smuggling the seized goods into this country. 10. With the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned show cause notice as well as the prosecution is quashed. The seized goods will be handed over to the petitioner for purpose of exporting out of this country across the customs barrier as and when desired by the petitioner which he may claim after giving a notice of a fortnight to the respondents. 11. On facts and circumstances of the case, I make no orders as to costs.
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1981 (3) TMI 80 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Refund - Duty paid under protest - Levy of export duty not void - Applicability of time limit
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1981 (3) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reduction gear - Liability to duty ... ... ... ... ..... is permissible under sub-Clause (a) of Clause 2. What was imported were components of a gear. Therefore, sub-Clause (b) Clause 2 of Section XVI would get attracted and the components would have to be classified under the heading of the main machine, namely, the gear. It may be possible to contend that when the gear is imported as part and parcel of the plant imported as such, duty would be chargeable on the plant at 40 per cent and thus duty on the gear or its components would also be 40 per cent ad valorem, but when components of gears are imported to correlate or connect them with the plant as a whole it would be rather far-fetched. In our view, this approach of the Central Government could not be regarded as untenable and is certainly a view which can be taken of on a reading of the relevant provisions, adverted to earlier. We, therefore, find no force in this petition. The Rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1981 (3) TMI 78 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Adapter ball bearings ... ... ... ... ..... as added that due to the high expenditure involved in manufacturing a tapered journal, it has been invariably found that the use of this bearing together with the sleeve is much more economical and therefore, these bearings are commonly used in conjunction with the sleeves as an assembly . 6. From the manufacturer s literature and the above opinions of S/Shri Seth and Keswani, Government conclude that the use of the sleeves with the impugned goods was in the nature of an accessory since sleeves of different types were used with these bearings. Further, from way these goods are cataloged and marketed, Government agree with the importers that the goods have an independent entity and could not be considered incomplete when imported without sleeves. Admittedly the bore of the bearing exceeds 60 mm and there is no warrant for taking the bore after fitting the sleeves. Accordingly Government consider this as a fit case to uphold the order-in-appeal and drop the review proceedings.
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1981 (3) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
Classification of goods - Syringes - Clinical syringes - Interpretation of Statutes - Terms and Expressions - Canons of interpretation
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1981 (3) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
`Imported into India' ... ... ... ... ..... ention of the Legislature to enact a redundant section. Mr. Hossain also accepted the position that in the event the Customs Duty was enhanced before the goods were cleared, the petitioners would have to pay the enhanced duty in spite of the fact that the goods had entered the territorial waters of India long before. 12. The Supreme Court had also in the case of M/s. Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. B. Sen and Ors. reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 675 held the requirements of section 15(1)(b) of the Act to be mandatory and further held that the requirements of the said section cannot be ignored on the ground that the goods were imported before the said section came into force. 13. For the reasons stated above, all these applications succeed and the Rules are made absolute. I direct the Customs Authorities to give the petitioners the benefit of the two Notifications dated 4th of January, 1979 copies being annexures A and B to the petitions. 14. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the partner of a firm is also liable to be convicted for an offence committed by the firm if he was in charge of, and was responsible to, the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm?
Held that:- The evidence in the present case shows that it was respondent No. 1 and not respondent No. 2 who was in overall control of the day to day business of the firm. The second respondent is not liable to be convicted merely because he had the right to participate in the business of the firm under the terms of the partnership deed.
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1981 (3) TMI 74 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... ition applicable for claiming set-off of unabsorbed losses. Further, carrying forward of losses is not permitted beyond eight years in view of s. 72(4) of the Act. All these conditions are not incorporated in, or made applicable to, the carry forward and set off of depreciation allowance specially provided for in sub-s. (2) of s. 32 of the Act. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the benefit allowable under sub-s. (2) of s. 32 of the Act is not, subject to the condition that the business must have been carried on by the assessee during the relevant accounting year. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in accepting the claim of the, assessee and confirming the order of the AAC, applying the ratio of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Rampur Timber and Turnery Co. s case 1973 89 ITR 150, with which we respectfully agree. For the reasons aforesaid, we make the following order We answer the question referred in the affirmative, i. e., against the department.
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1981 (3) TMI 73 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... lies in limited circumstances. Sub-section (1) of s. 56 applies to a case where the executor of the deceased wants a representation certificate. Then alone he is required to file an account of the properties of the deceased to the Controller. Under sub-s. (2), the accountable person is required to produce a certificate from the Controller that the requisite estate duty has been paid in respect of the property for which a succession certificate is applied for. Proceedings under S. 56 commence when some one desires to have a representation certificate or a succession certificate, not otherwise. In the present case, none of the two situations have occurred. We are, therefore, clear that the assessment proceedings were invalid and were rightly quashed by The Tribunal. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the accountable person and against the department. The accountable person shall be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1981 (3) TMI 72 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... for estate duty purposes when the property is common. There is some force in the submission of Mr. Pasayat. Counsel for the assessee as also for the revenue agreed before us that now that we have answered the main question against the assessee, this aspect of the matter could be left to the Tribunal to be decided after hearing the parties while proceeding to give effect to the opinion on the first question. Accordingly, without expressing any definite view on the second question, we leave it open to the Tribunal to look into the matter again in the light of the assessee s submission and what we have indicated above. To reiterate, the first question is answered against the assessee by saying On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the inclusion of the value of the house property was legal. So far as the second question is concerned, we do not propose to answer the same. There will be no order for costs. B. N. MISRA J.-I agree.
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1981 (3) TMI 71 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Non-resident, Shipping Business ... ... ... ... ..... sponding to s. 44C of the 1922 Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the intention of the Legislature was to treat the payment under s. 172 as payment of advance tax. Sub-s. (7) of s. 172 permits only an adjustment of the payment made under the section as payment in advance of the tax leviable for the assessment year . This is not a deeming provision treating the payment as payment of advance tax within the meaning of the Act. In view of the fact, that a payment under s. 172 is on actual assessment, and also, in view of the history of the legislation, it is not possible to say that s. 172(7) is capable of two interpretations, so that the one in favour of the assessees should be preferred. The result is, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessees. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1981 (3) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Property To Prevent Evasion Of Tax, Proceeding ... ... ... ... ..... not of the said society. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion, that the competent authority issued the impugned notices illegally and without jurisdiction and the learned judge was perfectly justified in quashing the same. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the learned judge is affirmed and this appeal is dismissed. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. Mr. Ajit Sengupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue, prays for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under art. 134A of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, in view of the fact that the LIC was the transferor, there could not be any question of untrue statement about the agreed consideration in the instrument of transfer on the basis of which the impugned notices were issued and, accordingly, we are not inclined to grant the certificate for appeal as prayed for. The oral prayer for a certificate is disallowed. A. K. SARKAR J.-I agree.
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1981 (3) TMI 69 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Carry Forward And Set Off, Firm, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... ring the period when it was unregistered against the profit of the firm in the subsequent year when it was assessed as a registered firm was permissible. The wording of sub-s. (1) of s. 77 of the Act being similar, the same interpretation, with which we respectfully agree, holds good to the said provision also. From the view that carry forward of loss incurred by a firm during the period when it was unregistered against the income earned by it after it got registered is permitted by s. 77(1) of the Act, it follows that carry forward has to be permitted whether the firm incurs loss or profit in the subsequent year, subject, however, to s. 78(1) in the case of change in the constitution of the firm and sub-s. (3) of s. 72 of the Act which prescribes that no carry forward shall be permitted beyond eight years. In the result, we hold that the view taken by the Tribunal is correct. For the reasons stated, our answer to the first question, as confined by us, is in the affirmative.
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1981 (3) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Earned Income ... ... ... ... ..... ncome contemplated is that which arises as a result of a declaration of dividend by the company whose shares the assessee holds. It is only after the dividend is properly declared that the amount so received by the assessee can be said to be dividend income. It may be that at the time of purchasing or selling of the shares, the assessee may be making an estimate of the expected dividend income while determining either the purchase or the sale price. But, at that stage, no income arises in the form of dividend and, therefore, the argument that dividend income results from personal exertion put in at the time of either acquisition or sale of shares and must, therefore, qualify for being described as earned income cannot be accepted. In view of the decision referred to above, the question referred must be answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee to pay the costs of Reference No. 123 of 1971. There will be no order as to costs in Reference No. 124 of 1971.
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1981 (3) TMI 67 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... bserved is that the only difference is that the straw-board machine runs at a slow speed on account of the thickness of the end product whereas the paper machines are fast running. The manufactured paper is ordinarily thin and fine whereas the straw-board is thick and rough. In view of the decision in Straw-Board Mfg. Co. Ltd. s, case 1975 98 ITR 78 (P and H), with which we respectfully agree, we do not find it necessary to go further on this question, and would answer the question as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the business of the manufacture of straw-board is a priority industry under item No. 16 of the Vth Schedule to the I.T. Act, 1961, and, hence, the assessee is entitled to the necessary rebates as admissible under the Act to the priority industry in respect of the assessment years 1965-66/66-67. There shall be no order as to the costs which shall be borne by the parties as incurred.
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1981 (3) TMI 66 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income From Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... s shown to have won. But such contention is not, however, corroborated by the record of the Royal Calcutta Turf Club. Be that as it may, we are fully in agreement with Mr. Sen that the assessee had miserably failed to establish that the earnings by races were made on those particular dates as claimed by the assessee. As mentioned earlier, this he could have proved only by the relevant papers and books of the bookmaker Shri Chakraborty. All the authorities below not only discarded that evidence but could not place any reliance whatsoever on those books of account. In view of the foregoing findings we are of opinion that the Tribunal was justified in confirming the order passed by the AAC. Question No. (i) is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue and question No. (iii) is answered in the negative and also in favour of the revenue. Question No. (iii) is not pressed by the applicant, There will, however, be no order as to costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (3) TMI 65 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... respondent-Commissioner was bound to entertain the revision application of the petitioner, notwithstanding the decision of the Kerala High Court on the subject as he was not bound by it. Thus, there is failure on the part of the respondent to exercise jurisdiction vested in him in passing the impugned order and, therefore, that order is liable to be set aside. I may further observe that on the date the revision petition was dismissed, i. e., on December 22, 1978, the AAC s order appealed against by the department before the Tribunal was not the subject of an appeal before the Tribunal as the same had been dismissed on March 28, 1978, nearly 9 months before. In the result, the rule is made absolute. The impugned order is set aside and the matter remitted to the respondent with a direction to entertain the revision application of the petitioner pertaining to the assessment year 1970-71 and dispose of the same on merits in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (3) TMI 64 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... year 1967-68 and not in the accounting year. The deduction qua this amount, therefore, could be claimed by the assessee in the year in which the liability to pay it actually accrued and the fact that the authorities entitled to enforce the liability issued notice for its payment in the accounting year would be of no consequence. The reasons given in Nathmal Tolaram s case 1973 88 ITR 234 (Gauhati) that there is no provision under the law which disentitles the assessee to debit such amount later when an enforceable demand is made by the appropriate authority is, therefore, not sustainable because the bar, if not expressly, is impliedly contained in the said provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 145 which makes it imperative that the chargeable income shall be computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. For the foregoing reasons, the question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1981 (3) TMI 63 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er levying interest in the grounds of appeal before the Tribunal. The question which has been referred to the High Court is not an abstract question of law and the question has been raised on the facts and in the circumstances of the case before us. If the facts and the circumstances of the case of the assessee are considered, the grounds raised by the assessee do not fall even within the ratio of the three decisions relied upon. Since this view is sufficient to dispose of this reference, we have not thought it fit or necessary to go into the question whether we should take the same view as the three decisions on the construction of s. 246(c) in the context of an order of levy of interest where, admittedly, the return was not filed within the stipulated time. In the view which we have taken, the question referred has to be answered in the negative. Accordingly, the question is answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee to pay the costs of this reference.
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1981 (3) TMI 62 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Income, Perquisite ... ... ... ... ..... wance was salary or benefit or amenity or perquisite and whether their disallowance by the ITO was proper. The High Court took the view that in order to term a payment as a perquisite it had to be a payment other than a cash payment in pursuance of a contract of service. As the payment in that case was cash payment, the same did not constitute perquisite and hence could not be disallowed under s. 40(c)(iii) or s. 40(a)(v) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the amount paid by way of bonus and commission to the employees was not covered by the provisions of sub-cl. (iii) of cl. (c) of s. 40 of the Act and, therefore, the same could not have been disallowed as revenue expenditure by the ITO is correct and proper. In the circumstances, we answer the question as follows That the said amount would be deductible since it is not covered by the provisions of s. 40(c)(iii) of the Act. The assessee to get the costs from the revenue.
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