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Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 236 Records
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1981 (1) TMI 56 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Commuted Pension, Exemptions, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... 980. The circular isissued to all the Commissioners of Income-tax. In para. 3 of the said circular it is stated that the Board has been advised that the decision of the Delhi High Court is to be accepted and thereafter, it is further stated that in that view of the matter instruction No. 819 stands withdrawn with immediate effect. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner s commuted pension is not liable to tax at all and if he is not liable to tax under the Act, then the Accountant-General has no jurisdiction to order deduction of the tax at source. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is liable to succeed and the impugned communication of the 1st respondent, Accountant-General, Karnataka, Bangalore, which is at Annex. G to the petition, is liable to be quashed and it is so quashed as one without the authority of law. Therefore, the rule issued is made absolute and a writ, accordingly, will issue. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 55 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... n that under the Act of 1961, plant is defined under section 43(3) . Plant, in its ordinary sense, includes whatever apparatus is used by a businessman for carrying on his business. In our opinion, the assessee is entitled to the claim of development, rebate on new machinery or plant worth Rs. 16,856. The term plant as defined under s. 43(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, reads Plant includes ships, vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment used for the purposes of the business or profession. Thus, it is clear that the definition of the term plant is comprehensive enough and includes whatever apparatus is used by a businessman for carrying on his business. Thus, we find that the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was entitled to claim development rebate on the value of the new cooling coils. Hence, the answer to question No. 2 is in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The references are accordingly answered with no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 54 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Perquisite, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... eir own yardstick, their own formula, to determine the value of a perquisite once it is held that the premises were given at a concessional rent by the master to the servant. Where there is a relationship of landlord and tenant different considerations may apply. It is unnecessary to rule on that today. In the present case we agree with the ITO and the Tribunal that it is a case of concessional rent to which s. 17 and r. 3 apply. For these reasons, we answer the question referred to us as follows 1. The value of the residential accommodation was correctly determined by the Tribunal under the provisions of s. 17(2) of the I.T. Act, 1961, read with r. 3(a)(ii) of the I.T. Rules, 1962. 2. The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, has no application to the case of the assessee. 3. The Tribunal was justified in disregarding the Rent Act while determining the value of the perquisite under r. 3(b) of the I.T. Rules, 1962. 4. The Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order of the AAC.
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1981 (1) TMI 53 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... who at this stage appears in pursuance of a notice issued on October 30, 1980, that in the proceedings before the IAC the assessee, the petitioners before us, participated and because of the objections raised and arguments urged before the IAC the variation was reduced by rupees seven lakhs and against the final order of assessment an appeal is pending. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to admit this special civil application. The special civil application is, therefore, rejected at the admission stage and notice is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. At this stage, there is an oral application by the learned Advocate-General for certificates under art. 133(1) of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our opinion, there is no substantial question of law of general importance which is needed to be decided by the Supreme Court in this case, since the provisions of s. 144B are very clear. The oral application is, therefore, rejected.
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1981 (1) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Applied To, Exemption For Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... permitted sum for purposes of section 11(1) is correctly arrived at in annexure IV to the order dated June 9, 1975 ? The Tribunal declined to refer the questions to this court. I.T.C. No. 80 of 1979 has been filed by the Commissioner with a prayer to this court to direct the Tribunal to refer the same questions. As stated above, the order in M.P. No. 87 Hyd. 1974-75 was passed by the Tribunal as the issue regarding the inclusion of capital gains was left open at the time of passing the original order. In view of s. 11(1)(a) in conjunction with the clarification issued by the Commissioner, the order of the Tribunal was justified. As the issue was expressly left open, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to pass this order deciding the issue not decided in the original order. Hence I.T.C. No. 80/79 is dismissed. In the result in R.C. No. 142 of 1977, the second question is answered in the affirmative, and question No. 1 need not be answered. I.T.C. No. 80/1979 is dismissed. No costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
In Part, Public Religious And Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... the opinion that the Tribunal was clearly in error in reaching the conclusion that the case of the assessee-trust fell under s. 11(1)(b) and not under s. 11(1)(a) of the said Act. In our opinion, the Tribunal clearly overlooked what has been provided in cl. 2 of the present scheme and the earlier decisions of the District Court in that behalf where it has been clearly held that all the properties, movable and immovable, belonging to this temple were held on trust for the religious and charitable objects. In that view of the matter, therefore, question No. 1 should be answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In view of the above, question No. 3 need not be answered. The result is that this reference is accepted by answering questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 3 does not survive. The Commissioner shall pay costs of this reference to the applicant-assessee.
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1981 (1) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he holdings are by one and the same person, there is no warrant for clubbing the holdings for the purposes of assessment under the Act. In Mariam Aysha v. Commr. of Agrl. LT. 1976 104 ITR 381 (Mad), Ramaprasada Rao J., as he then was, has clearly pointed out that the lands held by an individual in his capacity as a normal person would be severed from the lands held by him in his other capacity and would be dealt with accordingly and the authority under the Act normally have no jurisdiction to club holdings of persons who have a different status in the eye of law and who fill in different legal personalities in any one individual. In the present case, the petitioner-school is found to be a different and separate entity from the trustee, who holds the residual extent under the deed of 1959. Hence, the clubbing is without jurisdiction, and in this view, I am obliged to interfere in writ proceedings. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 49 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Deemed Dividend, Dividends ... ... ... ... ..... company to registered shareholder and the other conditions set out in s. 2(6A)(e) are satisfied that the amount of the loan would be liable to be regarded as deemed dividend within the meaning of s. 2(6A)(e). The amount of the loan would not fall within the mischief of this section if it is granted to beneficial owner of the shares who is not the registered shareholder. The decision in CIT v. C. P. Sarathy Mudaliar 1972 83 ITR 170 (SC) does, in our opinion, lay down the correct interpretation of s. 2(6A)(e). In view of the above authoritative decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, our answer to question No. 2 is in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and we hold that s. 2(6A)(e) of the Act of 1922 is not applicable to the loans advanced by the above-noted accounts to the HUF. In view of this answer to question No. 2, it is not necessary to consider the other grounds as the main controversy between the parties stands disposed of by the above-noted answer.
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1981 (1) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... thin the prescribed time without reasonable cause because he acted under the advice and guidance of the chartered accountant employed by him for that specific purpose. To my mind, the answer must be in the negative. To this extent the approach of the Commissioner is contrary to law and goes to the root of the matter, necessitating interference. In the result, the petition is allowed in terms of prayers (a) and (b). In respect of the assessment year 1970-71, after calculating the penalty under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act for four months, namely, from 1st January, 1971, to 30th April, 1971, and deducting the same from the amount of Rs. 21,091 paid by the petitioner to the department, the department shall refund the balance to the petitioner within six weeks from today. In respect of the assessment year 1971-72, the department shall refund to the petitioner the sum of Rs. 2,537 in toto within two weeks from today. Rule is made absolute accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 47 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Partial Partition In HUF ... ... ... ... ..... he land in favour of Shri Bedi and within a very short time thereafter, Shri Bedi also agreed to sell the land to two other companies. The close proximity of time among the several transactions also throws a light on the intention with which the land was purchased by the company and Mr. Bedi together. Finally, it may be pointed out that though the assessee had not yet executed a sale deed in favour of Shri Bedi, it was able to realise the entire sum of Rs. 1,03,625. This amount was also treated as a profit of the company and distributed as dividend to its shareholders. Considering all these circumstances cumulatively, we are in agreement with the conclusion of the Tribunal that the amount of Rs. 37,037 was taxable income under the I.T. Act. This question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Since the company is already in liquidation we see no purpose in mulcting it with costs. There will, therefore, be no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 46 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Deemed Dividend, Dividends ... ... ... ... ..... ld be liable to be regarded as deemed dividend within the meaning of s. 2(6A)(e). The amount of the loan would not fall within the mischief of this section if it is granted to a beneficial owner of the shares who is not the registered shareholder. The decision in CIT v. C. P. Sarathy Mudaliar 1972 83 ITR 170 (SC) does, in our opinion, lay down the correct interpretation of s. 2(6A)(e). The language of s. 2(6A)(e) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, and of s. 2(22)(e) of the I.T. Act, 1961, are in pari materia. In view of the abovenoted authoritative pronouncement made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, our answer to question No. 1 is in the negative, i. e., in favour of the assessee. We hold that s. 2(22)(e) of the I.T. Act, 1961, is not applicable to the loan advanced by the abovenoted firms to the HUF. In view of our answer to question No. 1, it is not necessary to consider and answer question No. 2, as the matter stands finally disposed of by our answer to question No. 1.
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1981 (1) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Limitation, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... there is unreasonable delay and, therefore, the power to impose penalty could not be exercised. Neither the order of the assessing authority, Ex. P-5, nor the order of the revisional authority, Ex. P-7, has offered any explanation for the delay and it is not as if the proceedings were taken after this long period because of any circumstance which prevented the assessing authority from taking such proceedings earlier. In these circumstances, we hold that the penalty could not have been imposed by the assessing authority as it has done. Exhibit P-5, as confirmed by Ex. P-7, is quashed. Parties are directed to suffer costs in the circumstances of the case. Learned Government counsel on behalf of the respondents made an oral application for certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under art. 134A of the Constitution. We do not see any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arising in this case. Leave refused.
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1981 (1) TMI 44 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Best Judgment Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... 2, learned counsel for the assessee contended that there was no basis for the Tribunal for holding that the yield of cotton, in the circumstances of the case, would be 34.75 per cent., and that the decision of the Tribunal was arbitrary. The Tribunal, however, has referred to the material on record which disclosed that in the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 the yield of cotton in the case of the assessee was 34.77 and 35 , respectively. In a best judgment assessment, there has necessarily to be some guess work. All that is necessary is that it should be an honest guess work and should not be capricious. In the instant case, the finding of the Tribunal cannot be held to be capricious. For all these reasons, we decline to answer the first question as it does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal, and our answer to the second question is in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1981 (1) TMI 43 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xempted by cl. (29) of s. 10 of the Act. Therefore, to claim exemption, it must be proved that the income derived by an authority constituted for the marketing of commodities is income which is derived from the letting of godowns or warehouses for the purposes specified in s. 10(29), which are storage, processing or facilitating the marketing of commodities. If the letting of godowns or warehouses is for any other purpose, or if income is derived from any other source, then such income is not exempt under that clause. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was justified in holding that the income derived by the assessee from the handling of goods or from the banks by way of interest was not covered by s. 10(29) of the Act. For all these reasons, our answers to the first question reframed by us and to the second question referred to us by the Tribunal are in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1981 (1) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... is the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 363 (SC) was not brought to the notice of the Bench deciding this case. Further, the exemption was claimed only for the excess amount quantified and not for the whole amount. In fact the case of CIT v. Banwari Lal Madan Mohan 1978 110 ITR 868 (All) was distinguished on that basis in the two Bench decisions of the court, viz., Banwari Lai Madan Mohan v. CIT 1978 113 ITR 562 (All), CIT v. Brijmohan Das Laxman Das 1979 117 ITR 121 (All). Needless to say that the present case is not a case relating to the payment of the excess amount of the sales tax. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that the claim for Rs. 1,91,887 was not an allowable expenditure for the assessment year 1968-69. In the result, both the questions referred to us are answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. In the circumstances of the case, we, however, make no order as to costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Alternate Remedy, HUF, Reassessment, Wealth Tax, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... on the basis of the civil court s decision, in the land acquisition proceedings for the reasons, I have stated earlier, no reasonable conclusion could be drawn about the market value of the properties in the forest lands in respect of the relevant assessment year concerned. Moreover, it might be noticed here that the petitioner has stoutly denied that he is the karta or manager of the family which was not in existence. In the counter-affidavit filed, the respondent has not stated that the petitioner is the karta of the family, He has only stated that because he was the second party in the land acquisition proceedings notice had been sent to him. In the light of the above discussions, hold that Ex. P-1 notice and the proceedings for an attachment consequent on the same are illegal and without jurisdiction. I quash the same. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Carbon copy of the judgment would be given to the parties on payment of requisite charges.
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1981 (1) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Diversion By Overriding Title, Income ... ... ... ... ..... ceived must be wholly treated as share income for the purposes of assessment. This appears to be the view which was taken by the Tribunal, when it observed that the assessee received interest for and on behalf of the other members of the erstwhile HUF. On that finding, which does not appear to us to be, in any way, erroneous in law, the only inference that can follow is that there was an overriding title in respect of the amount which was received by the assessee not on his own behalf but for and on behalf of the separated members of the erstwhile HUF as their separate income by way of interest on the amounts lying with the partnership firm. If this is the correct view of the nature of the liability, which is brought about by cl. 3 of the agreement of partition, then the view taken by the Tribunal appears to us to be correct in law. Consequently, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. The revenue to pay the costs of this reference.
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1981 (1) TMI 39 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... or reduction of the amount of deduction on time basis, with reference to the working of the industrial undertaking.. The provisions of s. 80J of the Act which are intended to encourage the setting up of a new industrial enterprise have to be construed liberally. Even if a new undertaking has functioned for only a part of an accounting year, the deduction has to be allowed to the full extent and the percentage cannot be reduced in proportion to the part of the year during which the undertaking was in productive operation. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was, therefore, justified in holding that for the purpose of allowing deduction under section 80J of the Act the deduction at 6 per cent. per annum was admissible for the full year even though the undertaking of the assessee has actually worked during the year for less than twelve months. For all these reasons, this reference is answered in the affirmative and against the department. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1981 (1) TMI 38 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Hundi Loans, Income, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... overall figure for all such loans and borrowings in all aspects, the question of penalty could never arise and, in any event, if certain items are disallowed by the ITO, it cannot be said that the provisions of penalty under s. 271(1)(c) can be brought into play., That the position in law is very well settled to levy penalty on the assessee in respect of the different items pertaining to loans and borrowings in assessment years 1962-63, 1963-64 and 1964-65. In the light of the above discussion, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. 1-In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 2-In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 3-In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 4-In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1981 (1) TMI 37 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Association Of Individuals, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ociation of individuals by them to some amongst themselves or to others is an essential sine qua non to determine whether persons constituting such an association are indeed an association of individuals within the meaning of the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1955. The tests laid down in the above decisions do not stand satisfied in the instant case. Further, one of the sons has been assessed in his individual capacity. An assessment having been made individually on one of the members of the erstwhile family, it is no longer possible to treat the members of the family as a single unit and pass an assessment order on the basis of association of individuals . A similar view has been expressed in CIT v. Dandayutham 1978 113 ITR 602 (Mad). If the ratio of the above decisions are applied to the facts of this case, I do not find that the orders passed by the respondents I and 2 can be upheld. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed, bat there will be no order as to costs.
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