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Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 1287 Records
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2014 (11) TMI 1111
Income of the trust which loses exemption u/s 11 - investment made by assessee with (GLFL) is not a specified investment and hence assessee is not entitled for exemption u/s 11(5) - Held that:- Tribunal was justified in upholding the order passed by CIT(A) who has very clearly observed that the provisions of Section 11(1)(a) are very clear and provide that the income derived from the property held under trust shall not be included in the income to the extent it is applied for the charitable or religious purposes (expenses incurred during the year) or accumulated/set apart to be applied for that purpose in future out of 75% to which the restriction u/s 11(5) applies. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings adopted by the CIT(A) as well as Tribunal.
In the case of Fr. Mullers Charitable Institutions (2014 (2) TMI 1033 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT) held that a perusal of section 13(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 makes it clear that it is only the income from such investment or deposit which has been made in violation of section 11(5) of the Act that is liable to be taxed and violation under section 13(1)(d) does not result in denial of exemption under section 11 to the total income of the assessee and that where the whole or part of the relevant income is not exempted under section 11 by virtue of violation of section 13(1)(d) of the Act, tax shall be levied on the relevant income or part of the relevant income at the maximum marginal rate. Therefore, we do not see any reason in interfering with the impugned orders. - Decided in favour of assessee
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2014 (11) TMI 1110
Effect of omission of Section 3A - Rule 96 ZQ (ii) of the Central Excise Rules 1944 - SCN issued on 1999, 2000-01 and the same remained to be adjudicated - whether the Adjudicating Authority could have proceeded ahead and confirmed the demands after deletion of the provisions of Section 3A of the central Excise Act 1944 and Rules made there under without saving the clause? - Held that: - the issue is no more res integra and decided in the case of Krishna Processors [2012 (11) TMI 954 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], where it was held that proceedings which are initiated at the time when the provisions were in statute but terminated subsequently after the deletion/omission are not correct and the said proceeding are liable to be dropped.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2014 (11) TMI 1109
TDS u/s 195 - payment made to foreign parties - make available clause - Held that:- We find that CIT(A) while deleting the addition has noted that the services provided by Colardo Engineering was with respect to giving the report of correctness of calibration of assessee's meters. He has further noted that the expertise connected with testing has not been passed on to the Assessee and therefore the aggregate payment of ₹ 52,26,667/- cannot be treated as fee for technical services and is not covered u/s 195 of the Act.
Before us Revenue has not brought any material on record to controvert the findings of CIT(A). Further the case laws relied upon by ld. D.R. are distinguishable on facts and cannot be applied to the facts in present case. We further find that in the case of Veeda Clinical Research (P.) Ltd. (2014 (1) TMI 886 - ITAT AHMEDABAD ) the Co-ordinate Bench after relying on the decision in the case of DIT v. Guy Carpenter & Co. Ltd. [2012 (5) TMI 31 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and CIT v. Debeers India Minerals (P.) Ltd. [2012 (5) TMI 191 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] has held that the condition precedent for invoking the "make available" clause is that the services should enable the person acquiring the services to apply technology contained therein. It further held that unless there is a transfer of technology involved in technical services the "make available" clause is not satisfied. Before us Revenue has not brought any binding contrary decision in its support. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the order of CIT(A) and we therefore dismiss the ground of Revenue. - Decided in favour of assessee
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2014 (11) TMI 1108
Addition u/s 40(a)(ia) - Held that:- We are of the opinion that Section 40(a)(ia) would cover not only to the amounts which are payable as on 31st March of a particular year but also which are payable at any time during the year. Of course, as long as the other requirement of the said provision exist. In that context, in our opinion the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s Merilyn Shipping & Transports vs ACIT (2012 (3) TMI 402 - ITAT VISAKHAPATNAM), does not lay down correct law.
Deduction u/s 80P - assessee has not filed any return of income within the time allowed either u/s 139(1) or 139(4) or within the time allowed by the assessing officer u/s 142(1) - Held that:- This Tribunal, in the case of M/s Kadachira Service Co-operative Bank Ltd & Ors vs ITO (2013 (2) TMI 208 - ITAT COCHIN ) after considering the provisions of section 80A(5) and the judgment of the Apex Court in Prakash Nath Khanna & Another vs CIT (2004 (2) TMI 3 - SUPREME Court ) found that the assessee is not eligible for exemption u/s 80P unless return is filed either u/s 139(1) or 139(4) or within the time provided by the assessee in the notice issued u/s 142(1) of the Act or u/s 148 of the Act and a claim was made for deduction u/s 80P of the Act. In view of the above, this Tribunal do not find any infirmity in the order of the lower authority.
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2014 (11) TMI 1107
Title: Supreme Court dismisses case with delay condoned
Court: Supreme Court
Citation: 2014 (11) TMI 1107 - SC
Judges: Mr. H.L. Dattu and Mr. A.K. Sikri
Decision: Delay condoned, case dismissed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1106
The Supreme Court in the case of 2014 (11) TMI 1106 - SC, with judges Mr. H.L. Dattu and Mr. A.K. Sikri, condoned the delay and dismissed the case.
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2014 (11) TMI 1105
Bail application - offence of Money Laundering - Held that:- In this case, not only that the applicant is in custody for a period more than 3 years, but there is absolutely no possibility of the trial of this case commencing within a reasonable time. This is not disputed by the learned Public Prosecutor who submitted that steps for bringing the cases in respect of the scheduled offences allegedly committed by the applicant are before the Special Court under the PMLA Act, are being taken.
As aforesaid, the properties belonging to the applicant and his Companies have already been attached, and the process of attachment is still being undertaken. Considering the volume of evidence that would be required to be adduced before the Special Court, it can be easily said that the trial would take several years for getting completed, after it commences; and presently even the commencement thereof is nowhere in sight. The applicant would be required to give sureties/securities not only in the present case if released on bail, but also in all the other cases of scheduled offences, though they would form a part of the present case only. As such, it would not be easy for him to abscond. In any case, appropriate conditions can be imposed upon the applicant to ensure that he would not abscond. Detaining the applicant further in custody without granting bail, in the circumstances, would be unfair, unreasonable and would violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Thus we are inclined to release the applicant on bail, subject to certain conditions.
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2014 (11) TMI 1104
Legality and validity of the order of issue of warrant passed by the Designated Judge under P.M.L. Act 2002 - Held that:- On a plain reading of the provisions of law it appears prima facie that if the offence is heinous, the Court may be justified in issuing nonbailable warrants simultaneously with the order of process, but it appears on a plain reading of Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that at the same time the Court concerned is also obliged to satisfy itself by recording reasons that the accused persons are likely to evade the process of law or have already absconded. Issuance of non bailable warrant should be avoided except in case of heinous crime or it is feared that accused is likely to tamper or destroy the evidences or is likely to evade the process of law.
We do not find any such findings recorded by the designated judge in her order dated 29th October, 2014 while issuing warrant. Thus it is of the view that the petitioners have been able to make out a strong prima facie case to have an interim order to the limited extent that, the order passed by the Designated Judge for issue of warrant shall remain stayed from its operation, till the next date of hearing.
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2014 (11) TMI 1103
Validity of order passed by Settlement Commission - CHA - undervaluation and misdeclaration - import of Base Oil classifiable under CTH 2710 19 60 - the petitioner/Company and its Managing Partner, claim immunity from penalty and fine solely relying upon the earlier order passed by the Settlement Commission, dated 24-8-2012 - Held that: - there was no evidence to show that the co-applicants derived pecuniary advantage, though they had assisted in documentation, etc., the Settlement Commission was inclined to take a lenient view and absolved them from imposition of penalty. Accordingly, the Commission passed the order imposing penalty only on the main applicant, namely, M/s. Lubecon Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. and granted full immunity from penalty in respect of co-applicants, which included Mr. Zahroorul Huq
This Court is inclined to make such an observation in the light of the fact that all allegations against the petitioner emanated, on account of the action, said to have been done by Mr. Zahroorul Huq. Once full immunity from penalty has been granted to the said Mr. Zahroorul Huq, it necessarily follows, that the benefit should also flow to the petitioner/company - the Commission ought to have taken into consideration the earlier order, dated 24-8-2012, as it emanates from the same cause of action and granted full immunity from penalty to the petitioner.
The petitioner’s Customs House Agent Licence having already been revoked and as against the said order, the petitioner has filed an appeal before the CESTAT, which shall be independently agitated by the petitioners and this order shall have no effect on those proceedings. - petitioner/company is granted full immunity from penalty - petition allowed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1102
Imposition of fine and penalty - Section 127B of the Customs Act - Held that: - there is no error on the part of the Commission to impose redemption fine in the light of the fact that there is admission by the co-applicants before DRI that the value admitted was less than actual value under import. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioners cannot be heard to state that the market survey should be conducted in the light of the candid admission of applicants.
Penalty imposed on company as well as co-applicant - Held that: - This would require reconsideration in the light of the fact that already redemption fine has been imposed. Hence, to that extent, the impugned order calls for interference. Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed and the findings of the settlement commission insofar as it relates to penalty in Paragraph 15.1(d), (e) and (f) are set aside and the matter is remanded to the Settlement Commission for fresh consideration, to consider as to whether there is need for imposition of penalty on the company as well as the Directors of the Company.
The petitioner has fully cooperated before the Officer as well as the Settlement Commission and paid the demand raised and the confirmation of redemption fine levied, such reconsideration shall be made by the Commission - first respondent, in accordance with law.
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2014 (11) TMI 1100
Validity of order passed by the Customs and Central Excise Settlement Commission - additional higher duty liability admitted by the petitioner - Held that:- The petitioner, having appeared and agreed initially to additional duty liability of ₹ 10,79,898/- and the commission, having passed an order directing them to pay the amount and the same having been complied with, on 13-6-2005, and subsequently, the petitioner, having been appeared twice before the Commission and having not appeared for only one occasion, ought not to have been penalized by passing the impugned order.
Three adjournments were granted by the Commission, for the reasons not attributable to the writ petitioner. One adjournment was granted on the ground that the departmental representative did not appear and two adjournments were granted for administrative reasons. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the commission should have granted one more opportunity to the petitioner, in the light of the fact that additional duty liability had been remitted and the petitioner also admitted the future additional duty liability. Writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Commission for fresh consideration.
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2014 (11) TMI 1099
Penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) - no return of income had been filed by the assessee - Held that:- The penalties were upheld as it was only estimated value on which estimates of income tax was made and the books of accounts were rejected. There was no scope to levy the penalty under Section 271(1)(c), the appellant had been assessed by the Income Tax. The Tribunal has very rightly considered that both the additions are on an estimated basis. Therefore, just because estimates are made, penalty cannot be levied under Section 271(c).
We are unable to persuade ourselves to take a different view than that taken by the Tribunal as well as CIT (Appeals)
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2014 (11) TMI 1098
Denial to refund of deposited amount - legality of refund order passed by lower authorities - Tribunal’s order of refund has not been accepted by Revenue and appeal stand filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is pending - Held that: - The Assistant Commissioner as also the Commissioner (Appeals) has allowed the refund of deposited amount by following the Tribunal’s order. It is also not the Revenue’s case that the Tribunal’s order has been stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. As such, it cannot be said that the impugned orders of the authorities below suffer from illegality or impropriety - no merits in the Revenue’s appeal - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2014 (11) TMI 1097
Maintainability of appeal - Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 - issue relates to rate of duty of customs, which would include question of levy of duty on re-import - Held that: - the decision in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax v. Ernst and Young Private Limited [2014 (2) TMI 1133 - DELHI HIGH COURT] relied upon where it was held that the question of levy of duty would be included and also relate to rate of duty. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the Revenue that the present appeals would be maintainable because the issue relates to levy of duty and not rate of duty. Section 130 of the Act in clear terms stipulates that an appeal would lie before the High Court when it does not relate to an order relating, among other things, to determination of any question having a relation to rate of duty of Customs or value of the goods for the purpose of assessment.
The issue raised in the present appeals relates to levy of customs duty on re-import of goods, which had earlier been exported - appeal not maintainable under Section 130 of the Act and are accordingly directed to be returned - appellant may file an appeal under Section 130E of the Act.
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2014 (11) TMI 1096
Deemed dividend u/s 2(22)(e) - Held that:- We find that the department’s appeal against similar order of the Tribunal in deleting the addition made on account of deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) passed in earlier assessment years relating to the same assessee was not admitted by us following the judgement in CIT, Kolkata-III, Kolkata vs. M/s.Baljit Securities Pvt.Ltd. (2013 (6) TMI 793 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT).
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2014 (11) TMI 1095
Levy of purchase tax - legality of the Circular No.137, dated 29-30.03.2007 issued by the Commissioner of Trade Tax - validity of re-assessment proceedings initiated under Section 21 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 - Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - manufacture of rice from paddy - declared goods - tax at the point of first purchase under the notification issued under Section 3-D(i) of the Act - period of limitation - permission for re-assessment - whether the High Court was justified in quashing the re-assessment proceedings initiated under Section 21(2) of the Act on grounds that it was merely based on change of opinion and therefore, bad in law? - Held that: - the import of the words "reason to believe" has also been examined by this Court in cases arising out of proceedings under Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 which also has the same phraseology. It deals with income escaping assessment and confers jurisdiction on the income tax officer to make assessment or re-assessment.
While the approval under Section 21(2) of the Act could be granted on the subjective change of opinion, no proceeding under Section 21(1) of the Act can be initiated on the ground of change in opinion of the assessing Authority dehors any material on record which justifies such change requiring re-assessment. The requirement of "reason to believe" in Section 21(1) qualifies the phrase "change in opinion" as contained in Section 21(2).
Subsequent change in law according to which the assessment proceedings were conducted, cannot constitute "change in opinion" of the assessing Authority so as to initiate re-assessment proceedings. In fact, the same is impermissible if the Act does not specify the operation of law as retrospective. Reliance placed in the decision of the case S.C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas [1962 (12) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT] held that if after change in law, the period of time prescribed for action by the tax authorities has already expired, then subsequent change in the law does not make it so retrospective in its effect as to revive the power of the tax authority to take action under the new law.
The material in existence remains the same during both, the assessment and the reassessment proceedings and no additional material or facts have been referred to explaining such "reason to believe" as per the mandate of Section 21(1) of the Act before initiating reassessment proceedings. In fact, the assessing Authority has not indicated any material at all that has given rise to such reason and thus, on the basis of mere "change of opinion" concluded that exemption on purchase tax has wrongly been allowed - action of High Court justified - purchase tax rightly levied - appeal rejected - decided against appellant.
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2014 (11) TMI 1094
Deemed Export Benefits (DEB) - Bill of Entry in the name of the project authority - Permission for withdrawal of special leave petition with liberty to file review petition before High Court against the order [2014 (9) TMI 380 - DELHI HIGH COURT] - Held that: - The special leave petition is disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to file review petition before the High Court within thirty days. If such a petition is filed, the High Court is requested to consider the same in accordance with law. If for any reason, petitioner fails, the petitioner will be at liberty to question not only the main order but also the order passed in the review petition - permission granted - petition disposed off - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2014 (11) TMI 1093
Seeking exemption from the requirement of making any further deposit of the amount confirmed - Demand alongwith interest and penalties - appellants were distributor/marketing agency of M/s Forever Living India Pvt. Ltd. - Business Auxiliary service - service tax not paid on commission received - Held that:- the impugned demand is based on the amount of commission received by them under multilevel marketing scheme. So their plea that they were selling their own goods is obviously untenable and also devoid of any basis and also this plea was never put forth by them earlier. Indeed the issue is squarely covered against them vide CESTAT order in the case of Shri Surendra Singh Rathore & Others Vs. CCE, Jaipur-I [2013 (8) TMI 149 - CESTAT NEW DELHI]. Therefore, in view of the same , the requirement of pre-deposit is waived of. - Decided against the appellant
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2014 (11) TMI 1092
Unexplained purchases - Held that:- As during the course of assessment, the assessee produced before AO all the details of opening stock, purchase and sales made by it etc. and the same were neither disputed nor any discrepancy was found, therein. Apart from that the AO did not produce any material to show that the assessee had made purchases out of undisclosed income. It is not the case of the revenue or for that matter AO that the Bank had physically verified the stock lying with the assessee. On the contrary, from a perusal of the assessment order, it transpires that the assessee had shown more stock in books than in the statement submitted to the Bank. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal committed no error in passing the impugned order.
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2014 (11) TMI 1091
Invokation of extended period of limitation - Cenvat credit - transportation & distribution of food material, supply of tea & snacks, manpower services, (doctor, pharmacist & nurses), caretaking jobs at auditorium etc. - inclusion of cost of subsidy towards subsidized food as also several other fringe benefits in the cost of production - Held that:- in respect of several of the services, there are already decisions taking a view that the CENVAT credit is admissible and we find the decisions relied upon by the appellants are appropriate and applicable to the facts of this case. Further we also take note of the fact that appellants themselves have admitted that certain portion of the credit are not admissible after the amendment of provisions in the CCR and in our opinion, the appellants should deposit the interest on this amount paid by them for hearing the appeal. Accordingly, the appellants are directed to pay interest amount within eight weeks and report compliance. - Stay granted
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