|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 664 Records
-
2006 (11) TMI 708
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the appointment of respondent No. 5 as Principal of the Law College.
2. Conflict between the University Act and the Advocates Act.
3. Role of the Bar Council of India in legal education.
4. Harmonious construction of conflicting statutes.
5. Qualifications required for the Principal of a Law College.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Appointment of Respondent No. 5 as Principal of the Law College:
The Bar Council of India challenged the High Court's decision that upheld the appointment of respondent No. 5 as Principal of the Dayanand College of Law. The High Court had ruled that the appointment was valid under the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973, despite respondent No. 5 lacking a qualification in law. The Bar Council of India had withdrawn recognition of the College due to this lack of qualification, leading to the management filing a writ petition questioning the appointment.
2. Conflict Between the University Act and the Advocates Act:
The High Court held that the University Act, being a later State Act with the President's assent, would prevail over the Advocates Act u/s Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The High Court concluded that the Bar Council of India had no control over legal education and that the appointment of respondent No. 5 was consistent with the University Act.
3. Role of the Bar Council of India in Legal Education:
The Supreme Court noted that the Bar Council of India, constituted u/s 4 of the Advocates Act, has functions including promoting legal education and laying down standards for such education (u/s 7(1)(h) and 7(1)(i)). The Bar Council of India also has the power to recognize universities whose degrees qualify for enrolment as advocates and to inspect universities for this purpose.
4. Harmonious Construction of Conflicting Statutes:
The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a harmonious construction of the University Act and the Advocates Act. It held that while the University Act governs the selection process, the appointment of a Principal of a Law College must also comply with the Bar Council of India's rules. The Court stated that a doctorate holder in any branch of law should be appointed as Principal to ensure the students' professional future is not jeopardized.
5. Qualifications Required for the Principal of a Law College:
The Court found that the High Court erred by not reconciling the relevant provisions. It held that the Principal of a Law College must meet the qualifications prescribed by the Bar Council of India, which includes holding a doctorate in law. The Court suggested that the authorities reconsider the amendment to Statute 11.14, which had removed the requirement for the Principal to hold a doctorate in a subject taught in the college.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgments, and ruled that respondent No. 5 could not be appointed as Principal of the Law College. The Court directed the authorities to ensure future appointments comply with both the University Act and the Advocates Act. The Writ Petition filed by the management was allowed, and the Writ Petition filed by respondent No. 5 was dismissed.
-
2006 (11) TMI 707
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the accident occurred during the course of employment and out of employment.
2. Whether the High Court was correct in overturning the findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.
Summary:
Issue 1: Whether the accident occurred during the course of employment and out of employment.
The deceased was working as a Cleaner in Vehicle No. MH 09A 9727 and developed chest pain while performing his duties, leading to his death. The autopsy revealed the cause of death as Cardiac arrest due to Rupture Aortic Aneurysm, with no external injuries. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner did not analyze the evidence on record and proceeded on the basis that the deceased being a workman, it was obligatory on the part of the first Respondent to maintain registers under the Minimum Wages Act. The Commissioner discussed the legal issue regarding the meaning of 'accidents and injury,' noting that internal accidents such as strain causing rupture or heart failure coincide with injury leading to death. However, the High Court found no material evidence to show that the deceased was suffering from a heart ailment or that he was put through a sudden stressful condition in the course of his duties, which brought on a cardiac arrest.
Issue 2: Whether the High Court was correct in overturning the findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.
The High Court allowed the appeal u/s 30 of the Act, stating that the findings of the Workmen's Compensation were perverse and inconsistent with the material on record. The High Court referenced decisions from the Supreme Court, including Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Francis De Costa and Saurashtra Salt Mfg. Co v. Bai Valu Raja, to conclude that the death of the workman was not during the course of his employment. The Supreme Court noted that the term 'accidental injury' is not defined under the Act, and for compensation to be payable, the injury must be caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The Court emphasized that there must be a causal connection between the injury and the accident and the work done in the course of employment. The onus is on the applicant to show that the work and resulting strain contributed to or aggravated the injury. The Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to show that the heart attack was caused while doing any job, and the driver of the vehicle, who was the deceased's brother, did not testify. The Court concluded that the Commissioner did not establish that the job involved any stress or strain and that the death had a causal connection with the employment.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the Commissioner did not go into the jurisdictional facts or arrive at any finding based on legal evidence regarding the causal connection between the employment and the death. The appeal was dismissed, but it was directed that any amount already paid to the Appellant need not be refunded.
-
2006 (11) TMI 706
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 to rice mills in Andhra Pradesh.
2. Compliance with principles of natural justice in issuing the notice.
3. Requirement for inspectors to disclose details of employees and wages under Regulation 10B.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 to Rice Mills in Andhra Pradesh:
The primary issue was whether the rice mills in Andhra Pradesh fall under the purview of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The Act was made applicable to these mills from 1st August 2000. Inspections conducted before this date found that more than 10 employees were employed in these mills. The rice mills were considered factories under Section 2(12) of the Act, which defines a factory as any premises where ten or more persons are employed for wages and where a manufacturing process is carried out with the aid of power.
The court noted that the applicability of the Act is a jurisdictional question. It must be determined whether the establishments are covered under the Act based on the definitions of "employees" and "wages." The scheme of the Act indicates that only employees drawing wages as defined in Section 2(22) would be covered.
2. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice in Issuing the Notice:
The appellants contended that the principles of natural justice were not followed, as they were not given an opportunity to explain their non-compliance before being issued a notice proposing criminal action. The court observed that Section 44 of the Act, which mandates employers to furnish returns and maintain registers, embraces principles of natural justice. A notice should have been issued to the appellants to comply with the Act's provisions before proposing criminal action.
The court found that the notice dated 20th October 2000 did not direct the appellants to comply with the Act but instead asked why criminal cases should not be instituted against them. The court emphasized that the authorities must determine the jurisdictional fact before enforcing the Act, and the appellants should be given an opportunity to show that the Act does not apply to them.
3. Requirement for Inspectors to Disclose Details of Employees and Wages under Regulation 10B:
The appellants argued that the inspectors did not disclose the details of employees and wages as required under Regulation 10B of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950. The court noted that while it is the employers' statutory obligation to furnish such details, the authorities are not bound to disclose the same while issuing a notice. However, discrepancies between the information furnished by the employer and the inspector's report may necessitate the disclosure of such details.
The court concluded that the inspection conducted before the Act came into force was ultra vires Section 45(2) of the Act. Consequently, any action taken based on this inspection, including the imposition of penalties, was invalid.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the appeals to the extent that the impugned judgment was set aside. The appellants were given an opportunity to file their returns and other documents before the authorities within six weeks. The authorities were directed to determine whether the provisions of the Act applied to the respective employers after giving them an opportunity of hearing. If it was found that the Act applied, the authorities could proceed as permissible by law.
-
2006 (11) TMI 705
Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of FIR No. 62/2004 u/s 406/120B IPC on the grounds of compromise/settlement.
2. Quashing of FIR on merits.
3. Jurisdiction of High Court u/s 482 CrPC to quash non-compoundable offences.
Summary:
1. Quashing of FIR on Grounds of Compromise/Settlement:
The petitioners sought quashing of FIR No. 62/2004 u/s 406/120B IPC registered at police station Kapashera, citing a compromise/settlement with the complainant bank (ICICI Bank Ltd). The complainant bank confirmed no grievance remained, and its counsel did not oppose the quashing of the FIR.
2. Quashing of FIR on Merits:
The State opposed the quashing, arguing that the charge-sheet u/s 406/120B IPC had been filed and the offence was non-compoundable as per Section 320 of the Code. The petitioners' counsel contended that no offence u/s 406 IPC was made out, as hypothecation does not involve entrustment, referencing the Supreme Court decision in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and Ors. The counsel argued that at best, it could be a case of cheating u/s 415 IPC, punishable u/s 420 IPC, which is compoundable.
3. Jurisdiction of High Court u/s 482 CrPC to Quash Non-Compoundable Offences:
The petitioners' counsel cited several decisions supporting the High Court's power to quash criminal proceedings even for non-compoundable offences if a settlement is reached. The State's counsel referenced decisions like Union Carbide v. Union of India and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors., arguing against quashing non-compoundable offences. However, the court noted that these decisions did not preclude the High Court's inherent power u/s 482 CrPC to quash such proceedings.
Conclusion:
The court recognized its inherent power u/s 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings even for non-compoundable offences, emphasizing the need for caution in exercising this power. Given the settlement between the parties and the lack of evidence supporting an offence u/s 406 IPC, the court quashed the FIR and all proceedings pursuant thereto.
-
2006 (11) TMI 704
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the Special Leave Petition without interference with the High Court's order, allowing the petitioners to approach the appropriate forum. (Citation: 2006 (11) TMI 704 - SC)
-
2006 (11) TMI 703
Issues involved: Appeal against order excluding advertisement expenses from assessable value of goods.
Summary:
The department appealed against the Commissioner (Appeals) order excluding advertisement expenses from the assessable value of goods. The Tribunal found that the issue of including advertisement charges in assessable value was already settled by Supreme Court judgments in cases like Philips India Ltd. v. CCE Pune and Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. v. CCE. The Revenue sought to distinguish the present case from Philips India Ltd. by arguing there was no agreement for advertisement reimbursement, but the Tribunal noted there was an arrangement for cost sharing between the assessee and dealers. It was established that the dealers would bear the advertisement cost initially and then issue debit notes to the assessee for reimbursement of 50% of the cost. Similar understanding was found in Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. case, where it was held that advertisement cost should be mandatorily incurred to be included in assessable value. Since the Revenue failed to prove this compulsion, and it was mutually beneficial for both parties, the Tribunal upheld the lower authority's decision to exclude advertisement cost from assessable value.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the operative part of the order was pronounced on 13.11.06.
-
2006 (11) TMI 702
Sanction for prosecution - Offence punishable u/s 147/148/149/302/436/ 324/326 of the Indian Penal Code - Interpretation and application of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 as amended by the State of Assam by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Assam Amendment) Act, 1983 and the Criminal Procedure Code (Assam Repealing) Act, 1986 - HELD THAT:- The Certificate in question, as noticed hereinbefore, was addressed to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Golaghat. It appears that the same was sent under registered cover with acknowledgment due. However, there is no evidence on record to show that it was actually handed over to the postal authorities. Be that as it may, it is evident from the order dated 5.12.1985 passed by the High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 386 of 1985 that a communication of the said order was directed to be made. We may, therefore, presume that the State of Assam did send the said communication. In any event the High Court communicated the said order to the Court of learned Magistrate where the matter was pending. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Golaghat was bound to act accordingly.
The complainant was aware that a certificate had been granted. She could have preferred an appeal there against within a period of 60 days from the date of communication of the said order. She did not choose to do so. Her right to appeal as against the correctness or otherwise of the order granting certificate is, thus, also lost. The High Court furthermore committed a manifest error in opining that by reason of Section 3 of the Assam Repealing Act the right of the appellant was taken away.
Furthermore, by reason of Section 3 of the Assam Repealing Act, the right of the accused accrued to him is not taken away. Section 3 deals with transfer of cases. Although, the marginal note of a statutory provision may not ordinarily be taken recourse to for interpretation thereof; in case of ambiguity, reference thereto would not be irrelevant. As Section 3 has been enacted only for the transfer of cases from the court of Executive Magistrate to a competent Court, the same, in our opinion, is a clear pointer to show that the State in enacting the Repealing Act, 1986 did not have any intention to deprive a person of his accrued or vested right.
Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
-
2006 (11) TMI 701
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition after condoning the delay. Justices Ashok Bhan and Dalveer Bhandari presided over the case.
-
2006 (11) TMI 700
Issues involved:
The issues involved in the judgment are the legality of appointments made by the State of U.P, the regularization of employees, compliance with constitutional and statutory provisions, and the authority of the High Court to issue orders in such matters.
Legality of Appointments:
The judgment addressed the legality of appointments made by the State of U.P, emphasizing that appointments made in violation of the constitutional scheme of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India are illegal and void ab initio. The Court highlighted that no regularization rules could be made by the State in derogation of the statutory or constitutional scheme. It was noted that the State must have rules in place, as per the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, for recruitment, which have statutory force. The Court differentiated between irregularity and illegality in appointments, stating that irregularity presupposes substantial compliance with rules, while illegality renders appointments illegal.
Regularization of Employees:
The judgment discussed the regularization of employees who had been irregularly appointed and had worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned vacant posts. The Court referred to previous decisions and emphasized that regularization does not connote permanence but is meant to cure procedural irregularities. It was clarified that the process of regularization should be initiated within six months for such cases. The Court highlighted that employees must be duly qualified and appointments should not bypass constitutional requirements.
Compliance with Constitutional and Statutory Provisions:
The judgment underscored the importance of compliance with constitutional and statutory provisions in appointments and regularization of employees. It was noted that the appointments in question were illegal as they were not made in accordance with recruitment rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The Court stated that any policy decision adopted by the State for regularization of employees is impermissible in law.
Authority of the High Court:
The judgment critiqued the High Court's handling of the case, pointing out legal errors in the orders passed. The Court set aside the impugned orders and allowed the appeal, emphasizing that the respondents should be compensated due to the delay in the appeal process. The State was granted the authority to recover the compensation amount from responsible officers. The judgment concluded by setting aside the impugned orders and allowing the appeal without costs.
-
2006 (11) TMI 699
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of the respondent as a permanent employee.
2. Entitlement to back wages.
3. Delay in filing the Special Leave Petition.
4. Distinction between 'irregular appointment' and 'illegal appointment'.
Summary:
1. Classification of the respondent as a permanent employee:
The respondent was appointed on daily wages without adherence to statutory rules and without an offer of appointment. He sought classification as a permanent employee from the Labour Court, which ruled in his favor based on continuous service of more than six months, invoking Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court directed his classification as a permanent clerk retroactively from 11th November 1991. The High Court upheld this decision. However, the Supreme Court noted that the respondent was not appointed against a clear vacancy, was not on probation, and was not given a permanent employee ticket. The Court referenced Mahendra L. Jain & Ors. vs. Indore Development Authority & Ors. [(2005) 1 SCC 639] and other cases, concluding that the respondent's appointment did not comply with statutory rules and thus could not be regularized.
2. Entitlement to back wages:
The appellants contended that the respondent should not have been awarded back wages from 1992. The Supreme Court did not specifically address the back wages issue separately but implied that since the respondent's classification as a permanent employee was invalid, the entitlement to back wages would also be affected.
3. Delay in filing the Special Leave Petition:
The respondent argued that the Special Leave Petition was barred by limitation and the delay should not be condoned. The Supreme Court acknowledged the delay but decided to condone it, directing that any benefits already given to the respondent should not be recovered. Instead, the respondent was awarded Rs. 1,50,000 towards compensation and costs.
4. Distinction between 'irregular appointment' and 'illegal appointment':
The Court distinguished between 'irregular appointment' and 'illegal appointment', stating that an appointment made in total disregard of the constitutional scheme and recruitment rules is illegal, whereas substantial compliance with some procedural lapses constitutes an irregular appointment. The Court referenced National Fertilizers Ltd. vs. Somvir Singh [(2006) 5 SCC 493] and other cases, concluding that the respondent's appointment was illegal and thus he had no legal right to continue in service.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgments, stating that the respondent's appointment was illegal and could not be regularized. However, it directed that any benefits already given should not be recovered and awarded the respondent Rs. 1,50,000 as compensation and costs. The appeal was allowed with no costs.
-
2006 (11) TMI 697
Issues involved:
Promotion to Indian Forest Service cadre based on assessment by Selection Committee u/s I.F.S. (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1966. Allegations of irregularities in grading eligible officers leading to challenges and directions for review by Tribunal and High Court.
Details of the Judgment:
Issue 1: Assessment and Promotion Criteria
The Selection Committee, as per Regulations, assesses State Forest Service Officers for promotion based on Annual Confidential Reports and overall service records. The Committee categorizes officers as "outstanding", "very good", "good", or "unfit" and prepares a Select List accordingly. The methodology for grading officers was strictly followed by the Committee.
Issue 2: Challenges and Review Process
Challenges arose when officers, like Shri L.P. Tiwari and Shri D.P. Dwivedi, contested their grading and placement in the Select List. The Tribunal found irregularities in the Selection Committee's process for the year 2001 and directed a review. The High Court upheld this decision, leading to appeals by the Union Public Service Commission.
Issue 3: Judicial Review and Expertise
The Court emphasized that expert committee evaluations should not be easily interfered with by courts lacking necessary expertise. No allegations of mala fides were raised against the Selection Committee. The Tribunal's reliance on past Annual Confidential Reports was deemed erroneous, as it widened the scope of selection beyond the Regulations.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the Tribunal and High Court. It was concluded that the Selection Committee had adhered to the prescribed methodology for grading officers, warranting no interference. The High Court's decision was overturned, and no costs were awarded in the matter.
-
2006 (11) TMI 696
Claim for fixation of pay in the higher promotional revised pay scale - Ambiguity in the matter of applicability of scale of pay - Revised Pay Rules Or Rules known as Haryana Civil Services (Assured Career Progression) Rules, 1998 ("the ACP Rules") - Appointment as veterinary surgeon in the cadre of Haryana Veterinary Service (Grade-I) - promoted to the post of Assistant Director - cum - Sub-Divisional Officer - HELD THAT:- We, as at present advised, do not intend to go into the question as to whether the Revised Pay Rules or the ACP Rules will apply in the case of Respondent.
The dispute between the parties has to be decided in accordance with law. What, however, cannot be denied or disputed that a dispute between the parties once adjudicated must reach its logical conclusion. If a specific question which was not raised and which had not been decided by the High Court the same would not debar a party to agitate the same at an appropriate stage, subject, of course, to the applicability of principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata. It is also trite that if a subsequent cause of action had arisen in the matter of implementation of a judgment a fresh writ petition may be filed, as a fresh cause of action has arisen.
A review petition filed by Appellants herein was not maintainable. There was no error apparent on the face of the record. The effect of a judgment may have to be considered afresh in a separate proceeding having regard to the subsequent cause of action which might have arisen but the same by itself may not be a ground for filing an application for review.
If the ACP Rules were applicable in the case of Respondent, it was the duty of Appellants to bring it to the notice of the High Court and ask for adjudication on the said question. But the effective order passed as against it could not have been sought to be nullified by raising a question which had not been raised in the writ petition. There might not have been an adjudication on a question which was relevant for determination of the issue directly or indirectly but in a case of this nature such a contention could not have been entertained in a review proceeding which would have the effect of taking away the benefit granted by a court upon adjudication. It may not also be open to a party to the lis to ask for a clarification contrary to or inconsistent with its stand taken by it in the writ proceedings.
Therein a review proceeding was entertained as the court accepted its own mistake in understanding the nature and purport of the undertaking given by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Board. It was in that context opined that the subsequent event may be taken into consideration by the court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake. Subsequent event may have some relevance but the same must have a direct nexus with the judgment sought to be reviewed. It has been noticed hereinbefore that before us an endeavour has been made to urge that the review application was in effect and substance an application for clarification.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that this appeal has no merit and, thus, must be dismissed accordingly. However, the question as regards applicability of one or the other Rules if arises in future, the same has to be determined on its own merit in accordance with law and having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. Thus, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2006 (11) TMI 694
Issues involved:
The judgment deals with the disqualification of a member of a Panchayat under the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, based on encroachment on government land. The key issues include the interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions, the authority to determine disqualification, and the process for challenging an election result.
Constitutional Mandate and Disqualification:
The Constitution of India, specifically Part IX, mandates the composition and disqualifications for membership in Panchayats. Article 243F outlines disqualifications, while Article 243O bars court interference in electoral matters. The Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, aligns with these constitutional provisions by providing for disqualifications of office bearers, including encroachment on government land.
Election Petition and Jurisdiction:
The Act specifies the grounds for filing an election petition, including disqualification under Section 175. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into election petitions is provided under Section 174. The judgment discusses the process of filing an election petition within a specified timeframe and the grounds for setting aside an election result.
Authority to Determine Disqualification:
The judgment clarifies the authority responsible for determining disqualification under the Act. It distinguishes between cases where disqualification arises before or after the election process, assigning the Authorised Officer and Deputy Commissioner, respectively, to make such determinations. The interpretation of Section 122 and Section 175 of the Act is crucial in deciding the appropriate authority for addressing disqualification issues.
Interpretation and Application of Legal Principles:
The judgment emphasizes the need for a strict construction of the Act in line with constitutional mandates. It highlights the principle of avoiding anomalies or absurdities in statutory interpretation and advocates for a purposive construction approach. The importance of harmoniously interpreting constitutional provisions and statutes is underscored to ensure consistency and coherence in legal interpretation.
Conclusion:
The judgment affirms the decision of the High Court regarding the disqualification of a member of Zilla Parishad based on encroachment on government land. It upholds the jurisdiction of the Authorised Officer in determining disqualifications before elections and the Deputy Commissioner after the election process. The dismissal of the appeals and the imposition of costs are in line with the legal reasoning provided in the judgment.
-
2006 (11) TMI 693
The High Court of Gujarat admitted an appeal based on the substantial question of law regarding research activities and deduction of expenditure under Section 35(1) of the Income Tax Act. The appeal was listed for final hearing after three months.
-
2006 (11) TMI 692
The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition (WP(C) 6313-15/06 and CM 5184/06) as there was no ground to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Revenue claimed an estimated tax liability of approximately Rs. 10 crores against the frozen amount of around Rs. 86 lacs.
-
2006 (11) TMI 691
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal in ITA 1521/2006 as no substantial question of law arises. Citation: 2006 (11) TMI 691 - DELHI HIGH COURT.
-
2006 (11) TMI 690
Murder - Application for bail rejected - 4th term Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha) - Guilty of the charges of offence u/s 302/34/120B IPC r/w Section 27 of the Arms Act - no prima facie evidence - HELD THAT:- We are of the opinion that while it is true that Article 21 is of great importance because it enshrines the fundamental right to individual liberty, but at the same time a balance has to be struck between the right to individual liberty and the interest of society. No right can be absolute, and reasonable restrictions can be placed on them. While it is true that one of the considerations in deciding whether to grant bail to an accused or not is whether he has been in jail for a long time, the Court has also to take into consideration other facts and circumstances, such as the interest of the society.
It has been stated that the appellant has been a Member of Parliament on four occasions. In our opinion, this is wholly irrelevant. The law is no respecter of persons, and is the same for every one.
A perusal of the FIR itself shows that it is a triple murder case, and the incident was committed in broad day light with sophisticated weapons. It is true that the appellant was not named in the FIR, but it has come in the statement before the Magistrate u/s 164 CrPC of one Ranjan Tiwari that he and other assailants had been hired by the appellant to commit this ghastly crime.
We are not inclined to comment on the veracity or otherwise of the statement of Ranjan Tiwari and other witnesses as it may influence the trial, but looking at the allegations against the appellant both in the statement of Ranjan Tiwari and other witnesses, we are of the opinion on the facts and circumstances of the case, that this is certainly not a case for grant of bail to the appellant, particularly since the prosecution witnesses have been examined and now the defence witnesses alone have to be examined. It would, in our opinion, be wholly inappropriate to grant bail when not only the investigation is over but even the trial is partly over, and the allegations against the appellant are serious.
The conduct of the appellant as noted in the decision in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav & anr.[2005 (2) TMI 883 - SUPREME COURT], is also such that we are not inclined to exercise our discretion under Article 136 for granting bail to the appellant.
Thus, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. We, however, make it clear that no further application for bail will be considered in this case by any Court, as already a large number of bail applications have been rejected earlier, both by the High Court and this Court.
-
2006 (11) TMI 689
Issues Involved:
1. Rejection of the highest bid by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).
2. Comparison of auction prices with other plots.
3. Procedural fairness and arbitrariness in the decision-making process.
4. Impact of non-acceptance of the highest bid on public confidence and development projects.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Rejection of the Highest Bid by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA):
The petitioner challenged the rejection of its highest bid for Hotel Plot No. 01 in Central Business District (East), Shahdara, Delhi. The bid was rejected by the Vice-Chairman of DDA without providing any reason. The petitioner had bid Rs. 170.001 crores, which was above the reserve price of Rs. 167.40 crores and had deposited 25% of the bid amount, i.e., Rs. 42.5 crores.
2. Comparison of Auction Prices with Other Plots:
The DDA's Finance Member recommended re-auction of the plot, citing that the bid price of Rs. 37,778 per sq. meter was lower compared to the auction prices of Rs. 75,960 to Rs. 126,068 per sq. meter for some shopping/office plots in Kondli Gharoli (East Delhi). This comparison was deemed inappropriate by the court as the hotel plot in question was significantly larger (20,000 sq. meters) and for different usage (hotel) compared to the smaller shopping/office plots.
3. Procedural Fairness and Arbitrariness in the Decision-Making Process:
The court scrutinized the decision-making process of the DDA and found it to be arbitrary and lacking in application of mind. The decision to reject the bid was based on an inappropriate comparison and did not consider the unique characteristics of the hotel plot. The court emphasized that every state action must be free from arbitrariness, bias, or mala fides and must satisfy the test of reasonableness as understood in Wednesbury's case.
4. Impact of Non-Acceptance of the Highest Bid on Public Confidence and Development Projects:
The court noted that the non-acceptance of the highest bid and the decision to re-auction the plot without proper reasoning undermined public confidence in the open bid system. It also caused avoidable delays in completing development projects, which could negatively impact the planning and growth of the city, especially considering the upcoming Commonwealth Games of 2010.
Conclusion:
The court found the DDA's decision to reject the highest bid to be irrational, arbitrary, and lacking in credibility. The comparison of the hotel plot with smaller commercial plots was deemed inappropriate. The court quashed the DDA's decision and directed the acceptance of the petitioner's bid. The writ petition was allowed, and the rule was made absolute.
-
2006 (11) TMI 688
The Supreme Court issued an order for notice returnable within two weeks in a civil appeal and for condonation of delay. Dasti is permitted. Stay of operation of the impugned final orders of the Customs, Excise, and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal is granted.
-
2006 (11) TMI 687
Issues Involved:
The judgment involves the issue of criminal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act based on the dishonour of a cheque, the validity of an undated cheque filled after a significant period, and the legal maintainability of a complaint under Section 138.
Issue 1: Criminal Liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
The respondent/complainant alleged that the revision petitioner/accused failed to pay the due amount of &8377; 1,14,471/- and issued a cheque which was dishonoured. The respondent lodged a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. The trial court and the appellate court convicted the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner contended that the undated cheque was issued as collateral security in 1998 and was misused by the respondent in 2000, making the complaint legally unsustainable.
Issue 2: Validity of Undated Cheque
The revision petitioner argued that the undated cheque handed over in 1998 was filled with a date in 2000 by the respondent, which was beyond the statutory period of six months for presenting a cheque. The courts below confirmed the conviction without considering the legal aspect under the Act. The revision petitioner cited legal precedents to support the argument that filling up an undated cheque after a significant period would not create criminal liability.
Issue 3: Legal Maintainability of Complaint under Section 138
The revision petitioner contended that the dishonoured cheque amount was higher than the actual balance due, as per the bills issued by the respondent. Citing legal precedents, the revision petitioner argued that a cheque issued for a higher amount than the due would not create a cause of action under Section 138. The respondent relied on the presumption of liability under the Act and the need for consideration.
The judgment analyzed the evidence, legal precedents, and the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It concluded that the undated cheque filled after one and a half years was not legally maintainable, and the dishonour did not create criminal liability. The criminal revision petition was allowed, setting aside the conviction and ordering the refund of the deposited amount to the revision petitioner.
........
|
9911796707
