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2024 (12) TMI 1554
TP Adjustment - Advertisement, Marketing and Promotion AMP expenses - constitute an international transaction or not? - adoption of the bright line test method for making the protective adjustment by the AO - HELD THAT:- Issues forming subject matter of consideration in these appeals have already been considered and disposed of by this Court in the case of the respondent-assessee itself in Casio India Company [2019 (9) TMI 1744 - DELHI HIGH COURT] wherein as perusal of the impugned order shows that the same proceeds on the basis of the decision of this Court in Sony Ericson Mobile Communication India Pvt. Ltd [2015 (3) TMI 580 - DELHI HIGH COURT] wherein this Court rejected the adoption of the bright line test method for making the protective adjustment by the Assessing Officer. In the present case as well, the AO had adopted the bright line test method and the Tribunal by following the decision of this Court in Sony Ericson Mobile Communication India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has rejected the said method. In view of the fact that this Court has already rendered its decision on the same issue, we dismiss this appeal. No substantial questions of law.
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2024 (12) TMI 1553
Assessment u/s 153A - validity of the approval accorded in terms of Section 153D - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered view that an approval of superior officer cannot be a mechanical exercise and this has been emphasised in several decision. A reference can be made in the context of Section 142(2A) of the Act which empowers the AO to direct a special audit. The obtaining of the prior approval was held to be mandatory when the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar [2006 (11) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT] as held an order of approval is also not to be mechanically granted. The same should be done having regard to the materials on record. The explanation given by the assessee, if any, would be a relevant factor. The approving authority was required to go through it.
Thus, where the approval is granted mechanically, it would vitiate the assessment order itself.
Considering the approval granted by the competent authority we have no hesitation in holding that the approval granted by the Addl. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Range-4, Mumbai, is not only mechanical but against the ratio laid down in M/s. MDLR Hotels Pvt. Ltd. [2024 (8) TMI 1138 - DELHI HIGH COURT]. Therefore, the resultant assessment orders deserve to be quashed. Assessee appeal allowed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1552
Penalty proceedings u/sec. 270A - non mention of specific mention of the limb under which the penalty was initiated - allegation of defective notice - addition to the income determined u/sec. 143(1)(a) by making addition of the difference between the profit estimated @ 10% and the profit declared by the assessee @ 7.37% of the total turnover - HELD THAT:- We find in the case of Schneider Electric South East Asia (HQ) PTE Ltd. [2022 (3) TMI 1295 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has held that when there is not even a whisper as to which limb of sec. 270A is attracted and how the ingredient of sub-sec.(9) of sec. 270A is satisfied, the action of the Assessing Officer is contrary to the legislative intent.
Thus where neither in the assessment order nor in the notice issued u/sec. 274 r.w.s. 270A the Assessing Officer has specified as to under which limb of provisions of sec. 270A(2) or 270A(9) the case of the assessee falls, then in that case, no penalty u/sec. 270A is leviable. We, therefore, uphold the order of the Ld. CIT (A) and the grounds raised by the Revenue are dismissed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1551
Suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession - decreeing the suit in favor of the Plaintiffs despite the Defendants seeking protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act - HELD THAT:- No error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment and order.
Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was inserted partly to set at rest the conflict of views in this country, but principally for the protection of ignorant transferees who take possession or spend money in improvements relying on documents which are ineffective as transfers or on contracts which cannot be proved for want of registration. The effect of this section, is to relax the strict provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act in favour of transferees in order to allow the defence of part performance to be established - Section 53-A is an exception to the provisions which require a contract to be in writing and registered and which bar proof of such contract by any other evidence. Consequently, the exception must be strictly construed.
Conclusion - Section 53A requires strict compliance with its conditions for protection to be granted. The absence of a proven contract and lawful possession by the Defendants meant they could not invoke this protection.
SLP dismissed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1550
Release of consignment of the writ petitioner comprising inter alia, ‘frames’ and ‘slides’ of handguns, which had been seized by the respondents - it was held by High Court that 'The ex post facto issuance of the aforesaid Form X amounts to a clear admission on the part of the appellants that as long as an importer held an import license for ‘frames’ and ‘slides’, the importer was not required to apply for a separate license under Rule 88 (2), nor did it require a permission under Rule 57 (4) of the 2016 Rules.'
HELD THAT:- There are no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court.
SLP dismissed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1549
Disallowing the deduction u/s 80P vide intimation u/s. 143(1) - belated filling of return - HELD THAT:- Here in this case, due to date of filing of return was 30th September 2013 and 30th September 2014, whereas the CPC has made the adjustment on the ground that return itself has been filed belatedly treating the due date as 31st July. First of all, once it is a co-operative society, then it is required to file the audit report for which different time limit has been provided for filing the return of income under the Act, i.e., 30th September.
Thus, this cannot be the ground for disallowing the claim of deduction. In any case, as held by the Tribunal in the aforesaid case prior to A.Y. 2021-22, no such adjustment could have been made within the scope of Section 143(1). Accordingly, the adjustment made by the CPC is deleted for both the years. Appeals of the assessee are allowed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1548
Challenge to penalty imposed - seeking a declaration that the Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 2018 (MDG) on the basis of which penalty was imposed, is not having any force of law and as beyond the purview of the agreements entered into with the respondent Corporation.
Is the respondent Corporation entitled to impose monetary penalty with reference to the provisions of MDG? - HELD THAT:- By a judgment INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS VERSUS ALL INDIA PETROLEUM DEALERS ASSOCIATION REGISTERED AND OTHERS; ALL HARYANA PETROLEUM DEALERS ASSOCIATION REGISTERED AND OTHERS; BIHAR PETROLEUM DEALERS ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER [2022 (1) TMI 1484 - DELHI HIGH COURT], a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has found that such monetary penalty can be imposed under the MDG, and hence the judgment of the learned Single Judge was set aside. In the light of the afore, the respondent Corporation is entitled to impose monetary penalty with reference to the provisions of the MDG, on the petitioners herein.
Is the time limit prescribed under Clause 4.2(viii), mandatory in nature? - HELD THAT:- A detailed procedure is prescribed under the MDG, for initiation of appropriate actions against the distributers. The initiating authority has to prima facie satisfy himself as to the requirement for taking steps under the relevant chapter of the MDG - the provisions of Clause 4.2 cannot be taken to be mandatory in nature, since for arriving at a decision to proceed in accordance with Clause 4.2(viii), the procedure prescribed thereunder has to be complied with. Therefore, the stipulation of the period of 30 days for initiation of the notice can only be reckoned as “directory” in nature. Furthermore, it is noticed that the Delhi High Court, in the judgment referred to earlier, had found that the MDG has legal backing, especially when the intention behind the introduction of the MDG was laudable. Therefore, the provisions of Clause 4.2(viii) can only be directory in nature.
Are the impugned orders in tune with the provisions of Clause 4.2(x) of MDG? - HELD THAT:- The allegations raised in the show cause notices are essentially with reference to the violation of the TDT norms under Chapter IV. When the MDG provides the dealer an opportunity to show cause against proposed action, it is imperative on the part of the officer concerned to consider the contentions raised/explanations offered and then arrive at a considered decision. As already found, by virtue of the judgment by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, the respondent Corporation is having every power and authority to act under the provisions of MDG. When that be so, it goes without saying that the directives in the MDG that a speaking order is required to be issued is also an essential pre-requisite for imposing a monetary penalty.
In the case at hand, it is seen that Ext.P2 series [W.P(C) No.9331 of 2020) are the orders imposing the monetary penalty. A perusal of these orders would show that apart from the name of the distributor, the quarter concerned, the figures with respect to the alleged violation/commission/penalty, all other portions are one and the same. In other words, Ext.P2 series are stereotyped orders wherein, there are no reasons given for imposing the penalty.
The impugned orders, to the extent of not following the mandate under Clause 4.2(x), need to be set aside.
Is the imposition of penalty under Clause 4.2, with reference to average commission, illegal? - HELD THAT:- Clause 4.2 (Ext.P8 of W.P(C) No.30986 of 2023) only requires the imposition of a fine of 20% with respect to 20% of AMDC and that only visualizes the right of the petroleum company to levy a fine of 20% of the commission received for the “poor” rating in a quarter. Merely because the commission paid is for the performed part (not attracting penalty) and non-performance (poor performance attracting penalty), it cannot be said that there is any irrationality. Apart from the above, the vires of the MDG have already been upheld by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court IOCL, and therefore, the afore contention raised cannot be accepted.
Is there any ambiguity with reference to the rating prescribed under Clause 4.1 of MDG? - HELD THAT:- It may be noticed that the rating of “excellent” is provided in a situation where “more than 85%” delivery is effected within two days. The 1-star “poor” rating is provided in cases where the delivery in excess of 8 days period is “over 15%” of total deliveries. Clause 4.1(iii) provides “1 Star = 15% delivery in > 8 days ‘poor’”. Therefore, no case can fall under both “excellent” and “poor” category. In such circumstances, the afore contention raised is also to be rejected.
Conclusion - i) It is declared that the respondent Corporation is entitled to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the MDG. ii) The time limit prescribed under Clause 4.2(viii) is only directory in nature. iii) The impugned orders are not in tune with the provisions of the MDG, since they are non-speaking orders. iv) The imposition of penalty under Clause 4.2 with reference to average commission cannot be said to be illegal. v) There is no ambiguity with reference to the rating prescribed under Clause 4.1 of the MDG.
The impugned orders are set aside - Petition disposed off.
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2024 (12) TMI 1547
Stay of demand - refund amount due to the petitioner was adjusted against an outstanding demand - HELD THAT:-Concededly, the issue is covered by the earlier decision of this court in Lease Plan India & Another [2012 (12) TMI 904 - DELHI HIGH COURT] held that in this case that the actions of the Revenue were violative of the stay order of this Court; they were also contrary to the provisions of Section 245. The term “recovery” includes adjustment of the refund due to the assessee. Thus, the High Court order which directed that the assessment proceedings “would not be given effect to without the leave of the court” translated to a bar on adjustments as well.
Section 245 is clear in its mandate regarding the requirement of prior intimation in writing to the assessee whose refunds are being adjusted against amounts payable to the Revenue; the assessee has to be given notice, and heard. Revenue clearly did not follow the provision, and give any notice or hearing before making adjustments, impugned in this case.
The present petition is allowed and the Revenue is directed to refund the amount along with applicable interest, which has been adjusted contrary to the stay granted by the ITAT.
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2024 (12) TMI 1546
Levy of service tax - services rendered by the appellant be considered as export services or they acted as an intermediary - HELD THAT:- The basic requirement to be an intermediary is that there should be at least three parties; an intermediary is someone who arranges or facilitates the supply of goods or services or securities between two or more persons. In other words, there is main supply and the role of the intermediary is to arrange or facilitate another supply between two or more other persons and, does not himself provide the main supply.
Conclusion - The services rendered by the appellant do not satisfy the definition of ‘intermediary’ and hence, falls under the scope of ‘export service’.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1545
Recovery of service tax with interest and penalty - Intellectual Property Service - royalty payments made by the appellant for receiving the technical know-how to their parent-company at USA - HELD THAT:- The issue to be decided is whether the royalty payments made by the appellant for receiving the technical know-how to their parent-company at USA, and consideration received from the domestic customers towards transfer of technical know-how are liable to service tax under the category of intellectual property service as defined under Section 65(55a) of the Finance Act, 1994.
This Tribunal recently in the case of GE BE PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & SERVICE TAX, BANGALORE-I [2011 (8) TMI 1119 - CESTAT BANGALORE] in a similar set of facts, had set aside the demand of service tax in relation to technical know-how.
Conclusion - The royalty payments and considerations did not constitute a taxable service under the Intellectual Property Service category.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1544
Undisclosed income u/s 69A - credits in the bank accounts were not satisfactorily explained - primary reason why CIT(Appeals) confirmed the additions was on the foundation that cash withdrawn in the previous several years could not have been kept unused for such a long period of time
HELD THAT:- The assessee clarified that the amount deposited into the bank account represented the repayment of previous loans given to relatives, which were returned to the assessee during demonetization period. A detailed tabular chart giving details of relatives from whom cash was received was also furnished before Ld. CIT(Appeals), during the course of appellate proceedings.
In the case of Ajit Bapu Satam [2022 (9) TMI 103 - ITAT MUMBAI] ITAT held that where Assessee contended that cash which was withdrawn by assessee from bank was deposited in very same bank account and he provided details of cash withdrawal from bank account and cash so withdrawn was lying with him and was not used anywhere else, since both cash withdrawal and deposit were duly substantiated from bank statement of very same branch of bank and there was no findings by lower authorities that cash available with assessee was invested or utilised for any other purpose, cash so deposited could not be treated as unexplained money under section 69A.
In the case of Smt. Krishna Agarwal [2021 (9) TMI 625 - ITAT JODHPUR] held that mere time gap between withdrawals and deposits cannot be the reason for alleging undisclosed income. In the case of ITO v. Deepali Sehgal [2014 (9) TMI 1073 - ITAT DELHI] it was held that merely because there was a time gap between withdrawal of cash and its further deposit to the bank account, the amount can not be treated as income from undisclosed sources u/s 69 of the Act in the hands of the assessee.
Accordingly, looking into the instant facts and the explanation provided by the assessee, along-with supporting evidences/ Affivavits etc. we are of the considered view that no addition is called for the instant facts. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (12) TMI 1543
Penalty order u/s. 271(1)(c) - involvement of organized tax evasion by way of accommodation entries - ITAT allowing the appeal of the assessee in respect of penalty order - HELD THAT:- The legal position is very clear that the penalty proceedings are independent of the assessment proceedings and merely because the assessee has accepted the assessment order, cannot be a ground to affirm the proposal of the AO to impose penalty. Thus, factually the learned Tribunal found that the AO’s conclusion was erroneous. Decided against revenue.
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2024 (12) TMI 1542
Allowance of only 1/10th u/s 35E as against the claim u/s 37 -entitlement to deduction of expenses claimed wrongly described as "Prospecting Expenses" - whether Tribunal is right in holding that the appellant is entitled to get relief only under Section 35E of the Act in respect of expenditure in question - Appellant entitlement to relief u/s 80IA in respect of 650 TPD Kiln? - Tribunal held that the appellant is not entitled to get relief u/s 80IA even though the new kiln is independent and a viable unit
HELD THAT:- The aforesaid questions would have to be answered against the assessee as the same issues had arisen from the order of the Tribunal for AY.1996-97 and the assessee/appellant has accepted the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. In view of the aforesaid position, the assessee does not seriously pursue these appeals.
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2024 (12) TMI 1541
Money Laundering - illegally obtaining the tender after bribing the concerned officials - twin conditions of section 45 of PMLA - HELD THAT:- The IRCON has categorically mentioned that to procure the tender under the Jal Jeevan Mission, the petitioner must have a valid certificate issued by the IRCON. In Mukesh Pathak's statement under Section 50 of the PMLA, it has been categorically mentioned that he forged the certificates and received money from the petitioner and other co-accused. The record also shows that the petitioner has received Rs.136.14 Crores from the State Government on the pretext of having valid certificates. The law itself is no longer res-integra, and for granting bail under Section 45 of the PMLA, twin conditions enshrined under Section 45 of the PMLA are to be satisfied.
This Court is not satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not involved in such an offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. In the case of Daulat Singh @ Gatu Versus State of Rajasthan, [2014 (4) TMI 1333 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] the Division Bench of this Court, after interpreting the provisions enshrined under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, categorically held that provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are mandatory. The Apex Court may grant release of bail under Article 142 of the Constitution without getting itself satisfied with the requirement of Section 37 of the Act, if that is necessary for doing complete justice; such Authority is not available to the High Court or trial court. The accused's bail cannot be granted until the Court prima facie held that no material indicates the accused's involvement in the alleged crime.
The bail order passed in the case of Manish Sisodia [2024 (8) TMI 614 - SUPREME COURT] pertains to the power of the Hon’ble Apex Court enumerated under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The same power cannot be exercised by the High Court as the provisions of Section 45 of the PMLA are mandatory, as held in the case of Madan Lal Choudhary Vs. Union of India, [2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT (LB)]].
Conclusion - i) There was enough material against the petitioner to substantiate the allegations, and he did not meet the conditions for bail under Section 45 of the PMLA. ii) Petitioner was not entitled to release on bail based on the evidence and legal interpretations provided.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1540
Validity of reopening of assessment - scope of new law - applicability of the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 - HELD THAT:- As decided in Supreme Court in Union of India and Others vs. Rajeev Bansal [2024 (10) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] The first provisio to section 149 does not expressly bar the application of Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, Section 3 of the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 applies to the entire Income-tax Act, including sections 149 and 151 of the new regime. Once the first proviso to section 149(1)(b) is read with Taxation and other Laws (Relxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, then all the notices issued between April 1, 2021 and June 30, 2021 pertaining to the assessment years 2013-2014, 2014-2015, 2015-2016, 2016-2017, and 2017-2018 will be within the period of limitation.
In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order issued u/s 148(A)(d) as well as the notice issued u/s 148 in respect of AY 2015-16 are liable to be set aside. It is so directed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1539
Validity of reassessment proceedings u/s 147 beyond period of limitation - scope of new regime/law for reopening - HELD THAT:- Test for checking the validity of notices issued u/s 148 under new regime for AYs 2021-22 or prior years is whether the period of six years has expired at the time of issue of such notice and in that case the notice u/s 148 becomes invalid.
These observations also makes it clear that the time limit of ten years as per the amended provisions of section 149(1)(b) can be applied only prospectively. In assessee's case when we apply this test for AY 2015-16, the period of six years has expired on 31.03.2022 and therefore the notice dated 29.07.2022 u/s 148 of the Act for AY 2015-16 is invalid since it is barred by limitation. Accordingly the assessment completed u/s 147 of the Act is liable to be quashed.
Reassessment without obtaining approval of the appropriate authority for the purpose of issuing u/s 148 - AY 2016-17 - In assessee's case for AY 2016-17 pursuant to the directions in the case of Ashish Agrawal [2022 (5) TMI 240 - SUPREME COURT], the AO passed an order under section 148(d) of the Act and issued a notice u/s 148 on 30.07.2022. From the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is clear that the though the prior approval u/s 148A(b) and 148(d) were waived in terms of the decision of Ashish Agarwal (supra), for issue of notice under section 148A(a) and u/s 148 on or after 1 April 2021, the prior approval should be obtained from the appropriate authorities specified u/s 151 of the new regime.
Thus the approval should have been obtained under the amended provisions of section 151(ii) of the Act i.e. the approval should have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner whereas the approval has been obtained from CIT as stated in the notice under section 148 itself. Therefore we see merit in the contention of the assessee that the notice u/s 148 for AY 2016-17 is issued without obtaining the prior approval from the appropriate authority. Accordingly we hold that the notice u/s 148 is invalid and the consequent assessment u/s 147 is liable to be quashed. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (12) TMI 1538
Reversal of Cenvat credit on provisions made for slow-moving/non-moving inventory of stores and spares - Rule 3(5B) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - HELD THAT:- The issue came up before this Tribunal in the appellant’s own case [2024 (10) TMI 1336 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], wherein it was held that 'it is clear that provisions of rule 3 (5B) CCR are applicable only when the value of asset and or inventory is written off fully or partially, or wherein any specific provision to write-off fully or partially has been made in the books of accounts.'
On going through the decision in the appellant’s own case, it is found that the facts are not in dispute that the appellant has made provisions in books of accounts for partial writing down the value in respect of the slow moving and non-moving of inventories and spares whereas the provision of Rule 3(5B) of Cenvat Credit Rules are applicable when the provision in the books of accounts, the stock/inventories have been written off which is not the case in hand.
Therefore, relying on the appellant’s own case, it is held that the provision of Rule 3(5B) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 are not applicable to the facts of the present case, therefore, no demand is sustainable against the appellant. As no demand is sustainable against the appellant, no penalty is also imposable against the appellant.
Conclusion - The provisions made for slow-moving/non-moving inventory did not amount to a write-off under Rule 3(5B) of the Credit Rules, and thus, no demand for the reversal of Cenvat credit was justified.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2024 (12) TMI 1537
Seeking restoration of cancellation of GST registration due to the petitioner's failure to apply for revocation or file an appeal within the statutory limitation period - HELD THAT:- The issue decided in order dated 20.11.2024 [2024 (11) TMI 1432 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'Though learned counsel for the petitioner seeks indulgence of this Court by submitting that there are certain petitions which have been entertained, we are not inclined to exercise our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter where a party has remained indolent for the last one year in not only failing to take statutory remedy available under the law but also in approaching this Court.'
The writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to apply fresh registration before the competent authority.
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2024 (12) TMI 1536
Addition on account of unexplained receipts of share application money u/s 68 - assessee failed to prove the identity of the alleged shareholders, their creditworthiness and also the genuineness of the whole transactions - ITAT deleted addition affirming the order passed by the CIT(A) - HELD THAT:- CIT (A) while examining the correctness of the transaction had taken into consideration the parameters which have been laid down in various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as to how a matter should be examined when the assessing officer proposes to invoke this power under Section 68 of the Act. The broad principles which were laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in so far as the credits of the share capital/premium are that the assessee under a legal obligation to prove the genuineness of the transactions, the identity of the creditors and creditworthiness of the investors who should have financial capacity to make the investment in question to the satisfaction of the assessing officer, so as to discharge the primary onus. The second aspect is with regard to the duty of the assessing officer, wherein it was held that the assessing officer is duty bound to investigate the creditworthiness of the creditors/subscribers, verify the identity of the subscribers and ascertain whether the transaction is genuine or there are bogus increase of name lenders. If the enquiry and investigation reveal that the identity of the creditors to be dubious or doubtful or lack of creditworthiness then the genuineness of the transaction would not be established.
Not stopping with that, the learned Tribunal took note of various decisions of the High Courts and has recorded that the assessing officer has not pointed out that the identity of the share applicants is not proved and/or the subscription made by them to the share capital of the assessee was not genuine and/or the source of investment was not fully explained to the satisfaction of the assessing officer. The correctness of the factual finding rendered by the CIT (A) was re-examined by the Tribunal and the learned Tribunal also found that the assessing officer has not pointed out as to what enquiry he has made and as to how in his opinion the transactions were held to be not genuine. The only aspect which borne in the mind of the assessing officer was that the directors of the erstwhile subscribers company, though were issued summons, did not personally appear. However, it is not in dispute that the documents were all placed before the assessing officer and no independent enquiry was conducted by the assessing officer to re-examine those documents which were produced. - Decided against revenue.
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2024 (12) TMI 1535
Validity of SCN - Seeking issuance of an appropriate writ commanding the respondents to return his seized electronic devices - HELD THAT:- As is manifest from the disclosures which are made, it is found that these allegations have been addressed to the competent authorities of the respondents and are being duly inquired into. Similar details are set forth in paragraph 40 of the writ petition.
The question of whether the credentials of the petitioner were misused and is a case of identity theft clearly gives rise to disputed questions of fact and would be liable to be duly inquired into by the competent authorities and which investigation cannot be undertaken by this Court.
Petition disposed off.
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