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Showing 201 to 220 of 317 Records
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1991 (7) TMI 119
Issues:
1. Deduction under section 54 of the Income Tax Act allowed or not.
2. Fair market value of the old property on 1st Jan., 1964 for computation of capital gains.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The appeal by the Department challenges the allowance of a deduction of Rs. 69,999 under section 54 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee sold a residential house and invested the sale proceeds in a new property. The Department contended that since the registered sale deed for the new property was executed after the prescribed one-year limit under section 54, the deduction should not be allowed. The Dy. CIT(A) accepted the assessee's submission that the full purchase price was paid within the time limit, and possession was obtained promptly. The Department argued that legal ownership only passes upon execution of the registered sale deed. However, the Tribunal interpreted section 54 liberally, focusing on the actual purchase and possession rather than legal title acquisition. The delay in executing the sale deed due to external factors did not negate the purchase. The Tribunal cited a relevant case and noted that the assessee had control and dominion over the property, justifying the deduction under section 54.
Issue 2:
The cross objection raised by the assessee concerned the fair market value of the old property on 1st Jan., 1964, for capital gains computation. The assessee failed to provide evidence of the property's value, leading the ITO to estimate it at Rs. 37,000. The Dy. CIT(A) found this estimation reasonable, and the assessee did not present any new evidence before the Tribunal. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the valuation, and no interference was deemed necessary.
In conclusion, both the Department's appeal and the assessee's cross objection were dismissed by the Tribunal, affirming the allowance of the deduction under section 54 and the valuation of the old property for capital gains computation.
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1991 (7) TMI 118
Issues:
1. Whether interest under section 214 should have been granted to the assessee in conformity with the decision of the Gujarat High Court.
2. Whether the mistake in not granting interest under section 214 was apparent from the record.
3. Whether the decision of the jurisdictional High Court binds the Income Tax Officer (ITO) in granting interest.
Analysis:
Issue 1:
The Income Tax Officer (ITO) did not grant interest under section 214 to the assessee, despite a refund being payable, as per the order of CIT (Appeals) and the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Bardolia Textile Mills case. The ITO cited a conflicting decision from the Kerala High Court in CIT v. G.B. Transports. The Appellate Authority Commission (AAC) held that the ITO should have followed the Gujarat High Court decision and granted interest. The Department appealed to the Tribunal, arguing that the point was debatable due to conflicting High Court decisions.
Issue 2:
The Tribunal considered whether the mistake in not granting interest under section 214 was apparent from the record. The Tribunal noted that the ITO was bound by the decision of the Gujarat High Court at the time of passing the order. The ITO's failure to grant interest in accordance with the binding decision constituted a mistake apparent on record. The Tribunal relied on the principle that the ITO must follow the decision of the jurisdictional High Court.
Issue 3:
The Tribunal discussed the relevance of subsequent decisions and the hierarchy of legal interpretations. It highlighted that the Supreme Court's decisions have retrospective effect from the inception of the statutory provision. Referring to a Departmental Circular, the Tribunal emphasized that a mistake arising from a subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court constitutes a mistake apparent from the record. The Tribunal rejected the Department's argument that the point was debatable due to conflicting decisions, emphasizing the necessity for the ITO to follow the binding decision of the jurisdictional High Court.
In conclusion, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the ITO should have granted interest under section 214 in conformity with the decision of the Gujarat High Court. The Tribunal held that the mistake in not following the binding decision constituted a mistake apparent from the record, justifying rectificatory action under section 154 of the Income-tax Act.
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1991 (7) TMI 117
Issues:
1. Whether the interest income earned from gifted amounts should be assessed in the hands of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) or the individual.
2. Whether the fact that there is only one male member in the HUF affects the assessment of income.
3. Application of legal principles regarding the ownership of gifted property in an HUF.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The case involved the assessment of interest income earned by a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) from gifted amounts. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) initially assessed the income as that of the individual, not the HUF, due to the absence of a second male member and ancestral property in the family. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) directed the ITO to assess the income in the hands of the HUF, considering that the gifts were made to the HUF. The issue was whether the income should be assessed in the individual's capacity or that of the HUF.
2. For the assessment year 1983-84, a similar situation arose where the ITO treated the interest income as that of the individual, not the HUF. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) directed the ITO to treat the income as that of the HUF, following the decision for the previous assessment year.
3. The Department appealed to the Tribunal, arguing that the income from gifted funds should be assessed in the individual's capacity due to the HUF having only one male member. The Tribunal considered the facts and legal precedents, including the Surjit Lal Chhabda case, which established that income from gifted property would be assessed in the individual's capacity until the birth of a son. The Tribunal concluded that as the HUF had only one male member at the time of the gifts, the income should be assessed in the individual's hands. The Tribunal set aside the Deputy Commissioner's order and restored the ITO's decision to assess the interest income in the hands of the individual.
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeals, ruling that the interest income earned from the gifted amounts should be assessed in the individual's capacity rather than that of the HUF, considering the absence of a second male member in the family at the time of the gifts.
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1991 (7) TMI 116
Issues Involved:
The issue involves the grant of interest under section 214 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 based on conflicting decisions of different High Courts.
Comprehensive Details:
Issue 1:
For the assessment year 1978-79, the Income-tax Officer (ITO) did not grant interest under section 214 despite a refund being payable to the assessee as per the order of CIT(Appeals). The ITO cited conflicting decisions of different High Courts as the reason for not granting interest. The AAC held that the ITO should have granted interest as per the Gujarat High Court decision. The Department appealed to the Tribunal.
Issue 2:
The Departmental Representative argued that the mistake in not granting interest was not apparent from the record due to conflicting High Court decisions. Citing various cases, it was contended that relief under section 154 could not be granted in a debatable scenario.
Issue 3:
The counsel for the assessee argued that the ITO's omission to grant interest as per the Gujarat High Court decision constituted a mistake apparent from the record. Referring to relevant case law, it was asserted that the ITO was bound by the jurisdictional High Court's decision.
Judgment:
The Tribunal considered the submissions and facts, noting that the ITO was obligated to follow the Gujarat High Court decision at the time of giving effect to the CIT(A) order. The failure to grant interest was deemed a mistake apparent on record. The Tribunal highlighted that subsequent Supreme Court decisions do not erase prior conflicts of opinions. Referring to a Departmental Circular, it was established that mistakes arising from later legal interpretations could be rectified under section 154. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of following the jurisdictional High Court's decisions. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s direction to grant interest in line with the Gujarat High Court decision, dismissing the Department's appeal.
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1991 (7) TMI 115
Issues:
1. Imposition of penalty for short-landing of goods.
2. Interpretation of Section 116 of the Customs Act, 1962 regarding penalty calculation.
3. Consideration of financial condition of the carrier in penalty determination.
4. Impact of duty exemption on penalty calculation.
5. Relevance of explanations and factors in determining penalty under Section 116.
6. Review of orders-in-appeal and restoration of original adjudicating authority's decision.
Analysis:
The judgment involves a review proposal filed against an order-in-appeal regarding the imposition of a penalty on a company for short-landing goods. The original adjudicating authority imposed a penalty equal to the standard rate of duty applicable to the short-landed goods. The Collector (Customs) reduced the penalty considering the financial difficulties faced by the shipping lines. The review proposal questioned the interpretation of Section 116 of the Customs Act, 1962, stating that the penalty should not exceed twice the duty amount involved. The respondents argued that the quantum of penalty falls under the Collector (Appeals) jurisdiction and raised concerns about the lack of access to the review application filed by the Collector. A hearing was conducted where the respondents' representatives highlighted the importance of considering factors like the financial condition of the company in determining the penalty.
The Government emphasized that the liability for short-landing goods under Section 116 is penal in nature, and a satisfactory explanation can exempt the party from penalty. Factors such as the circumstances of short-landing, handling of goods, and natural causes are relevant in determining penalty. The judgment referenced a previous case to support the rational imposition of penalties. It was clarified that the health of the carrier is not a relevant factor in penalty determination. The Government also addressed the impact of duty exemptions on penalty calculation, stating that penalties should be based on the standard rate of duty, not the exemption rate. The judgment rejected the respondents' arguments and restored the original adjudicating authority's decision, emphasizing the lack of a satisfactory explanation for the short-landing. Additionally, a revision application filed by the company against the impugned order-in-appeal was rejected based on the discussions in the judgment.
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1991 (7) TMI 114
Issues: Classification of glass fabrics impregnated with alkyd resin under Central Excise Tariff - Whether under 22B or 22F.
Analysis:
1. The main issue in this judgment is the classification of glass fabrics impregnated with alkyd resin under the Central Excise Tariff, specifically whether they should be classified under 22B or 22F.
2. The appellant argued that previous Tribunal decisions supported the classification under Item 22F, citing cases like CCE v. Abeline Engineers and Excel Glass Fibre Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE. They contended that if mineral fiber predominates, classification under 22F is appropriate.
3. The respondent, on the other hand, relied on the decision in Albeline Engineers, where it was held that impregnated glass fabric should be classified under Item 22B. They argued that the specific nature of Item 22B makes it more suitable for such products.
4. The Tribunal analyzed various decisions, including General Electro Mechanical Industries v. CCE and Bakelite Hylam Limited v. CCE, which supported classification under Item 22F based on the predominance of mineral fibers. The Tribunal also considered Notification 87/76, exempting glass fabric under Item 22F, as indicative of legislative intent.
5. The Tribunal further examined Notification 88/76, which supported the classification under Item 22F and emphasized the predominance test. The test report on the glass fabric sample confirmed the predominance of glass fabric, further supporting classification under Item 22F.
6. Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the classification of glass fabrics treated with resin under Tariff Item 22F, CET, was more appropriate based on the predominance of mineral fibers and the legislative intent reflected in the notifications.
7. Therefore, the judgment favored the classification of glass fabrics impregnated with alkyd resin under Central Excise Tariff Item 22F, emphasizing the importance of the predominance test and legislative intent in determining the appropriate classification.
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1991 (7) TMI 113
Issues: Classification of cement under Central Excise Tariff; Validity of show cause notice under Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act; Allegations of suppression of facts by the petitioner.
Classification of Cement under Central Excise Tariff:
The petitioner, a cement manufacturer, challenged a show cause notice demanding payment under Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, for allegedly selling Grey Portland High Strength Cement below production cost. The petitioner argued that the cement should be classified under sub-heading 2502.20, not 2502.90. The Assistant Collector had previously classified the cement under sub-heading 2502.20. The respondents contended that the petitioner failed to disclose separate pricing for consumers with authorization certificates, leading to duty evasion. The court held that the show cause notice was not without jurisdiction, allowing the authorities to investigate potential duty evasion. The petitioner was given the opportunity to respond to the notice and present objections, including reliance on the Assistant Collector's order and a CBEC circular.
Validity of Show Cause Notice under Section 11-A:
The show cause notice issued to the petitioner was based on allegations of selling cement below production cost, triggering demand under Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act. The respondents claimed that the petitioner suppressed relevant facts necessary for determining the correct assessable value, justifying duty demand under the Act. The court found that the notice was not invalid, as it aimed to ascertain any factual suppression by the petitioner during price list submission. The petitioner was granted the chance to address the allegations and present contentions within three weeks, with a commitment from the authorities to decide on the matter within eight weeks of receiving the response.
Allegations of Suppression of Facts:
The respondents accused the petitioner of concealing pricing details for consumers with authorization certificates, leading to duty evasion. The petitioner argued that the Department had accepted the classification of the cement under sub-heading 2502.20. The court noted that the show cause notice was not premature, allowing the authorities to investigate the alleged suppression of facts. The petitioner was directed to respond to the notice within three weeks, raising all objections and contentions, including reliance on the Assistant Collector's order and a CBEC circular. The authorities were instructed to decide on the matter within eight weeks of receiving the petitioner's response.
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1991 (7) TMI 112
The High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore ruled that notices served beyond 6 months from the date of seizure under the Gold (Control) Act were illegal. The court dismissed the writ petitions and upheld the decision that no adjudication was possible under Section 79 of the Act. The appeals were dismissed with no costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 111
Issues:
1. Interpretation of import license conditions regarding the timeline for crossing the Hungarian border.
2. Validity of the Cross Border Certificate provided by the importer.
3. Burden of proof on the Department to establish non-compliance with license conditions.
4. Imposition of penalty for breach of license terms.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The case involved a dispute where the petitioners imported goods under a license condition that required the goods to cross the Hungarian border by a specified date. The goods arrived in Bombay after the deadline, leading to proceedings for confiscation and penalties by the Collector of Customs for violating the license conditions.
2. The importer claimed that the goods were dispatched on time but mistakenly went to a different port due to an error. The Collector rejected this claim, citing the dubious nature of the Cross Border Certificate provided as evidence. The appellate authority also upheld this decision, leading to the petition challenging these findings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. The petitioner's counsel argued that the authorities did not give due weight to the Cross Border Certificate and failed to prove non-compliance with the license conditions. However, the court disagreed, stating that the burden of proof was on the importer to establish compliance. The court found no merit in the argument and upheld the authorities' decision to disregard the certificate due to lack of corroborative evidence.
4. The court also dismissed the claim that the breach of license terms was unintentional, pointing out that the importer and foreign supplier appeared to collude in claiming compliance. The court concluded that the penalty imposed was justified given the lack of evidence supporting the claim of timely border crossing. Ultimately, the petition was deemed without merit and dismissed with costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 110
The High Court directed the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal to expedite the appeal process and waived the pre-deposit condition of Rs. 7,89,000 until final disposal of the appeal. The petitioners were instructed to appear before the Tribunal on 15-7-1991, with the appeal expected to be resolved within a month from that date.
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1991 (7) TMI 109
Whether assessable value of the article is different from the consideration received by the appellants to claim benefit under Notification 120/75 as held by Tribunal?
Held that:- the Tribunal fell into an error in its understanding of the notification. The Notification posits and predicates the possibility that the "invoice-value" could be lesser than the "assessable-value" and, taking into account the need to mitigate the hardship on the manufacturer of being called upon to pay duty on the value in excess of the invoice value, seeks to exempt the manufacturer from payment of duty "in excess of the duty" calculated on the basis of the "invoice price".
Allow these appeals; set aside the order of the authorities as well as the affirming order of the authorities as well as the affirming order of the Tribunal under appeal and hold that the appellant was entitled under the said Notification No. 120/75-C.E. to exemption from that part of the duty as was in excess of the invoice-price which, we hold, was not required to include the value of the "wheel-sets".
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1991 (7) TMI 108
The High Court of Bombay allowed the petition of transferees of REP Licence to import goods, despite Customs Authorities initially denying clearance due to a Show Cause Notice served to the transferor of the licence. The Court ruled that the transfer of the licence is legal and granted relief by discharging the bond furnished by the petitioners. No costs were awarded. (Case Citation: 1991 (7) TMI 108 - High Court of Judicature at Bombay)
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1991 (7) TMI 107
The petitioner sought a mandamus for seizure report and relevant documents. The court directed the authorities to provide the petitioner with a copy of the seizure report, connected documents, and evidence. An application for interim release of seized tobacco was filed and should be considered within four weeks. The writ petition was disposed of with no costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 105
The High Court of Bombay dismissed a bunch of writ petitions regarding customs duty exemption for polyester staple fiber, ruling that it falls under the category of "polyester fiber." The petitioners were ordered to pay the amounts due with interest at 12% per annum, and the bank guarantees given by them could be encashed. No costs were awarded. (Citation: 1991 (7) TMI 105 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY)
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1991 (7) TMI 103
Issues Involved:
1. Challenge to the levy of additional duties of excise.
2. Constitutional validity of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957.
3. Notifications issued under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
4. Distribution of additional duties among States.
5. Doctrine of colourable legislation and legislative competence.
6. Interim orders and their impact on public revenue.
Summary:
1. Challenge to the Levy of Additional Duties of Excise:
The petitioners, job processors of cotton/man-made fabrics, challenged the levy of additional duties of excise u/s the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957. They argued that this levy was ultra vires Article 366 (29A) read with Articles 246 and 274 of the Constitution, claiming it was in lieu of sales tax, a State subject under Entry 54 of List II.
2. Constitutional Validity of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957:
The respondents contended that the Act was relatable to Entries 84 and 97 of the Union List (List I) and had been upheld by the Supreme Court in M/s. Ujagar Prints v. Union of India. The court held that the additional duties of excise under the Act fell within the scope of Article 272 of the Constitution and were valid Union duties of excise.
3. Notifications Issued Under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944:
The petitioners initially challenged notifications issued under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, but later focused solely on the constitutional validity of the Additional Duties Act itself. The court noted that under Article 255, an Act of Parliament is not invalid solely because the President's recommendation was not obtained if the President later assented to the Act.
4. Distribution of Additional Duties Among States:
The court examined the distribution mechanism of additional duties among States as per the Second Schedule of the Act, noting that States levying sales tax on the commodities covered by the Act would not receive a share of the additional duties unless directed otherwise by the Central Government. This principle was found to be in accordance with Article 272 of the Constitution.
5. Doctrine of Colourable Legislation and Legislative Competence:
The petitioners argued that the Act was a colourable piece of legislation, essentially imposing a sales tax under the guise of excise duty. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Act's plain language clearly imposed a Union duty of excise, not a sales tax, and was within the legislative competence of Parliament under Entries 84 and 97 of the Union List.
6. Interim Orders and Their Impact on Public Revenue:
The court criticized the interim orders that allowed petitioners to pay only half the duty and furnish bank guarantees for the rest, resulting in significant revenue loss. The court ordered the encashment of bank guarantees and payment of interest at 17.5% per annum on the due amounts, emphasizing the need to restore public revenue and prevent petitioners from profiting at the public's expense.
Conclusion:
The writ petitions were dismissed with costs, and the court upheld the constitutional validity of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, as a valid Union duty of excise. The interim orders were vacated, and the petitioners were ordered to pay the due amounts with interest.
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1991 (7) TMI 102
Whether the excise duty under Sections 3 and 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 is to be charged on the invoice-value of the wagon or on the value of completed wagon including that of the "free supply items"?
Held that:- It is not disputed that the appellants are manufacturers of wagons. What comes down from the assembly-line of the appellant's factory is a complete wagon and as such the appellant being manufacturer of wagons, is liable to pay duty of excise on the value of a complete wagon. The "free supply items" like wheel-sets, etc., in the process of manufacturing become part of the complete wagon and lose their identify. It hardly matters how and in what manner the components of the wagon are procured by the manufacturer, so long as the appellant is manufacturing and producing the goods called "wagons" it is liable to pay duty of excise on the normal value of the wagon.
The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted that the value of the "free supply items" should not be included in the assessable value of the wagons manufactured by the appellant. No infirmity in the reasoning and the findings reached by the Division Bench of the High Court. Appeal dismissed
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1991 (7) TMI 101
Issues Involved:
1. Legality and validity of the order passed by the Collector of Customs & Central Excise.
2. Delay in initiating proceedings for confiscation of goods.
3. Burden of proof regarding smuggled goods.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality and Validity of the Order Passed by the Collector of Customs & Central Excise:
The petitioner challenged the order dated 31st January 1981 by the Central Board of Excise & Customs, which upheld the order dated 30th September 1980 by the Collector of Customs & Central Excise, Ahmedabad, confiscating 30 gold bars under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. The gold bars were seized on 8th February 1956, and the petitioner admitted to possessing them but claimed they were purchased legally from Bombay without any documentation. The Collector concluded that the gold bars were smuggled based on several factors, including the foreign markings on the bars, the petitioner's inconsistent statements, and the lack of purchase documentation. The court held that the Collector's findings were reasonable and supported by evidence, affirming the order of confiscation.
2. Delay in Initiating Proceedings for Confiscation of Goods:
The petitioner argued that the proceedings initiated in 1980 were beyond a reasonable time from the date of the original judgment in 1971. The court noted that the show cause notice was initially issued on 24th April 1956, and the confiscation order was passed on 7th September 1956. Although the trial court decreed in favor of the petitioner in 1960, the appellate court in 1971 allowed the Customs Authority to adjudge afresh. The court found no unreasonable delay as the proceedings were continuous and pending before the competent authority. The court also referenced the petitioner's own actions, including filing a Miscellaneous Civil Application in 1980, which indicated acknowledgment of ongoing proceedings.
3. Burden of Proof Regarding Smuggled Goods:
The court referred to the principles established in the case of Collector of Customs v. D. Bhoormull, emphasizing that the burden of proof in smuggling cases does not require mathematical precision. The Department must provide prima facie evidence of the goods being smuggled, and the burden shifts to the person concerned to explain the possession of such goods. The court found that the petitioner failed to provide a credible explanation for possessing the gold bars with foreign markings and noted the petitioner's false statements and lack of purchase documentation. The court concluded that the Collector of Customs & Central Excise had provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the finding that the gold bars were smuggled.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition, upholding the confiscation order and rejecting the arguments regarding the legality of the order and the alleged delay in proceedings. The court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, stating that it would not interfere unless the order was illegal, perverse, or devoid of commonsense. The court found that the evidence and circumstances considered by the Collector were sufficient to justify the confiscation of the gold bars as smuggled goods.
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1991 (7) TMI 100
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of "millboard" under Exemption Notification Nos. 44/83 and 45/83.
2. Jurisdiction and validity of the show cause notice issued by the Collector of Central Excise.
3. Limitation period for issuing the show cause notice under Section 11A of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944.
Summary:
Issue 1: Interpretation of "millboard" under Exemption Notification Nos. 44/83 and 45/83
The petitioner manufactures millboard from waste paper and board cuttings, which is excisable under Item 17 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944. The dispute revolves around the interpretation of "millboard" under Exemption Notification Nos. 44/83 and 45/83. Notification No. 44/83-C.E. issued u/r 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, provided for exemption of diverse items of paper and paperboard. The explanation in the notification defined "millboard" as "any unbleached homogeneous board having a thickness exceeding 0.50 millimeter and made out of waste papers with or without screening and mechanical pulp but without any colouring material being added thereto." Notification No. 45/83 also granted further concession with an identical definition of millboard. The petitioner claimed concession under these notifications, and the classification lists were approved by the respondents.
Issue 2: Jurisdiction and validity of the show cause notice issued by the Collector of Central Excise
On 22nd December 1986, the Collector of Central Excise issued a show cause notice to the petitioner for the recovery of differential Central Excise Duty of Rs. 38,34,536.94, alleging that the goods were not eligible for the concession as mechanical pulp was not used. The petitioner challenged the notice on the grounds that it was not necessary for millboard to contain mechanical pulp for obtaining the concession. The petitioner relied on previous decisions and interpretations by the Government of India, the Central Board of Excise & Customs, and this Court, which indicated that the presence of mechanical pulp was optional. The respondents argued that the show cause notice was valid and that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under the Act. The Court held that a show cause notice could be challenged under Article 226 in appropriate circumstances, such as when it is without jurisdiction, suffers from an incurable infirmity, or is contrary to judicial decisions.
Issue 3: Limitation period for issuing the show cause notice under Section 11A of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944
The Court found that the impugned show cause notice was issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed u/s 11A of the Act. The monthly returns for the period in question were filed between 1-4-1983 and 31-10-1985, but the notice was issued on 22-12-1986. The petitioner had explicitly described the raw material used, which did not include mechanical pulp, and the respondents had approved the classification lists and tested the millboard. There was no question of fraud, collusion, or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. The Court concluded that the petitioner was acting on a possible interpretation of the notifications, supported by opinions from the Government and the Central Board of Excise & Customs. Therefore, the provisions of Section 11A would not be attracted, and the show cause notice was liable to be quashed on this ground as well.
Conclusion:
The application was allowed, and the Rule Nisi was made absolute. The impugned show cause notice and all proceedings thereunder were quashed. There was no order as to costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 99
The writ petition was filed by tobacco growers seeking remission of duty on tobacco deemed unfit for human consumption. The court ruled against the petitioners, stating that duty was assessed and recoverable as per Rule 9A(1) of the Central Excise Rules. The petition was dismissed with no costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 98
The High Court allowed the writ petition of a chewing tobacco manufacturer, directing the return of sale deed and Fixed Deposit Receipts deposited as security. Another writ petition regarding a refund application was directed to be considered along with a show cause notice issued to the petitioner.
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