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Showing 41 to 60 of 1457 Records
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2024 (11) TMI 1418
CENVAT Credit - invoices that are addressed to unit I (another unit) of the appellant - procedural discrepancies in the invoicing - contravention of the provisions of Rule 3(1) and Rule 9(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules 2004 - invocation of extended period of limitation.
CENVAT Credit - HELD THAT:- The learned adjudicating authority finds that as per the provisions of Rule 9(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, and as per the decision rendered on the subject issue by various Tribunals, when the substantive issue of receipt of the goods in the factory of the manufacturer and its use in the manufacture of the final product is established beyond doubt, any other procedural lapses such as mistakes in the invoices, should not lead to denial of the substantial benefit like cenvat credit. Having found thus, he proceeds to indicate that the substantive point to be proved for eligibility of cenvat credit are that (a) the goods should have been received in the factory of manufacture and should have been used in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products and (b) the services should have been received by the manufacturer and should have been used in or in relation to the manufacture of the final products.
There are no reason to disbelieve the appellant’s contention of having produced the relevant records for verification, merely because the Divisional Assistant Commissioner who has otherwise conducted the verification of records as instructed has, instead of forwarding all the records and registers, chosen to forward only the screen shots of the GRNs, which documents would readily form a point of reference for the goods details of which were verified - had the learned adjudicating authority harboured any doubt that the Divisional Assistant Commissioner has not carried out the verification report as instructed, it was incumbent upon the learned adjudicating authority to have sought clarification, and if necessary, directed that the verification be done as instructed.
The burden of proof of admissibility of cenvat credit in respect of the goods and services by reflecting the requisite details in the appellant’s records has been initially discharged by the appellant. Under the said circumstances, the onus of proving that the goods have not been received and utilised as alleged in the show cause notice, has then shifted to the Department. Hence, in the absence of any allegation in the show cause notice, or a finding by the learned adjudicating authority, of the said goods having been diverted based on positive evidence of such diversion; and in the absence of any allegation in the show cause notice, or a finding by the learned adjudicating authority, that the goods manufactured and cleared as reflected in the ER1 returns, have been produced utilizing inputs other than those accounted as received in the books of accounts of the appellant, based on positive evidence of such receipt of other necessary inputs, the said onus remains undischarged by the Department.
The appellant is eligible to avail credit on the invoices that are addressed to unit I of the appellant, which substantive benefit cannot be denied for the said procedural lapse and that the verification report submitted by the jurisdictional Divisional Assistant Commissioner sufficiently proves that the goods and services have been received and consumed in the factory of the appellant to the extent verified by him. Hence, the burden to prove the admissibility of the cenvat credit in respect of such goods and services cast on the appellant in terms of Rule 9(5) and Rule 9(6) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, stands sufficiently discharged.
Extended period of limitation - Penalty - HELD THAT:- The allegation relating to wilful mis-statement/suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of duty is not sustainable and consequently extended period is not invocable and mandatory penalty is also not liable to be imposed.
Conclusion - Substantive benefits like CENVAT credit should not be denied due to procedural lapses if the substantive conditions are met. The extended period of limitation requires clear evidence of intent to evade duty.
The demand made in the impugned order in original being untenable, the demand of consequential interest and the penalty imposed also do not sustain - appeal allowed.
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2024 (11) TMI 1417
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy - absence of any jurisdictional challenge - HELD THAT:- Undisputedly and against the final order referable to Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the writ petitioner has a statutory alternative remedy of preferring an appeal. In the absence of any jurisdictional challenge being raised, there are no justification to entertain this writ petition.
Petition dismissed subject to rights of the petitioner being reserved to pursue the statutory alternative remedy.
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2024 (11) TMI 1416
Validity of assumption of jurisdiction for reopening the assessment u/s 147 - reasons to believe - assessee had received some accommodation entries through RTGS and were not disclosed by the assessee in the regular return filed - HELD THAT:- At the time of recording the reasons, AO did not have any information that was received from the Investigation Wing in his possession. Hence, the very basis of formation of belief of income escaping assessment in the case of the assessee was obtained much after recording of reasons and issuance of notice u/s148 - relevant documents were indeed sought for by AO from the Investigation Wing only during the course of reassessment proceedings post issuance of notice under section 148. Hence, since there was absolutely no information available with the AO, which could enable him to form a belief that income of the assessee had escaped assessment, the reopening of assessment deserves to be quashed as void ab initio in view of the fact that there could not be any valid formation of belief by the AO that income of the assessee had indeed escaped assessment for the assessment year 2012-13.
Difference in issue mentioned in the reasons recorded and final re-assessment order framed by AO - AO had formed a belief that the assessee was in receipt of Rs 5 lakhs as accommodation entry which was sought to be treated as undisclosed income of the assessee together with related commission expenditure there on. This was the primary reason for formation of belief to reopen the assessment, but in the final reassessment order u/s 147 no addition has been made by AO on this account. Instead, an addition on account of estimated gross profit was made by the AO finally in the reassessment proceedings.
As relying on Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited [2011 (6) TMI 4 - DELHI HIGH COURT] no hesitation in quashing the re-assessment proceedings of AO for the assessment year 2012-13. Accordingly, we hold that the assumption of jurisdiction u/s 147 is hereby declared invalid and void abinition - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (11) TMI 1415
Rejection of exemption u/s 11 - delay in filing Form 10B - HELD THAT:- We find that in the case of Association of Indian Panelboard Manufacturer [2023 (3) TMI 1374 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] held that although the requirement of furnishing report was mandatory, filing there of is a procedural aspect. Even though the Form 10B was filed at a later stage, when it was part of the record of the AO in course of the processing of the return of income, the AO could not have denied the exemption claimed by the assessee u/s 11(1) and 11(2) on the ground that Form No. 10B has not been filed.
Form 10B was available by the time the order of the ld. CIT(A) was passed who could have considered the factum of filing of FORM 10B. Assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 11 as the Form 10B has been duly filed. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2024 (11) TMI 1414
Demolition of properties of individuals accused of crimes without following the due process of law - Rule of law - doctrine of separation of powers - Doctrine of public trust and public accountability - Presumption of innocence and natural justice - Right to shelter - Permissibility of the collective punishment.
Rule of law - HELD THAT:- The law must be just and fair, and also protect the human rights and dignity of all members of society. At the same time, the essential purpose of the Rule of law is to prevent the abuse of power. The Rule of law is an umbrella concept to protect citizens against the power of the State. It is integral to and necessary for democracy and good governance - the concept of Rule of law needs to be considered broadly. The legal sanctity of practices in the past such as slavery in the United States, apartheid in South Africa, or untouchability in India would have to be considered as antitheses to the Rule of law apart from being a serious affront to human dignity.
The Rule of law has been described as a safeguard against the arbitrary use of the State power. It ensures that the actions of the Government and its authorities are governed by established legal principles, rather than arbitrary discretion. Whenever the citizens in the form of mobs have broken the law to vandalize or to declare threats, the Court has cast an obligation on the State to prevent such threats or assaults. This obligation underscores the State's responsibility to maintain law and order and protect citizens from unlawful actions that undermine the Rule of law itself.
The Rule of law provides a framework and value system to 'rein in the arbitrary exercise of state power and to prevent the abuse of power, to ensure predictability and stability, to make sure that individuals know that their lives, their liberty, their property will not be taken away from them arbitrarily and abusively'.
Separation of powers - HELD THAT:- This Court can issue a direction to the executive and also formulate guidelines for facilitation and in furtherance of fundamental rights and sometimes for the actualization and fructification of statutory rights.
The question arises as to whether when the adjudicatory functions are entrusted to the judiciary, can the officers of the State Government take upon themselves the adjudicatory function and without a person undergoing a trial be inflicted with a punishment of demolition of his properties. In our view, such a situation would be wholly impermissible in our constitutional set up. The executive cannot replace the judiciary in performing its core functions.
Doctrine of public trust and public accountability - HELD THAT:- If the executive in an arbitrary manner demolishes the houses of citizens only on the ground that they are Accused of a crime, then it acts contrary to the principles of 'rule of law'. If the executive acts as a judge and inflicts penalty of demolition on a citizen on the ground that he is an Accused, it violates the principle of 'separation of powers'. In such matters the public officials, who take the law in their hands, should be made accountable for such high-handed actions - certain binding directives need to be formulated. This will ensure that public officials do not act in a high-handed, arbitrary, and discriminatory manner. Further, if they indulge in such acts, accountability must be fastened upon them.
Rights of the accused under the Constitution - HELD THAT:- Firstly, even the Accused or the convicts have certain rights and safeguards in the form of constitutional provisions and criminal law. Secondly, the State and its officials cannot take arbitrary and excessive measures against the Accused or for that matter even against the convicts without following the due process as sanctioned by law. The third principle that would emerge is that when the right of an Accused or a convict is violated on account of illegal or arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its officials or on account of their negligence, inaction, or arbitrary action, there has to be an institutional accountability. One of the measures for redressing the grievance for violation of a right would be to grant compensation. At the same time, if any of the officers of the State has abused his powers or acted in a totally arbitrary or mala fide manner, he cannot be spared for such an illegal, arbitrary, mala fide exercise of power.
Presumption of innocence and natural justice - HELD THAT:- The Rule of law, the rights of the citizens guaranteed under the Constitution, and the principles of natural justice would be essential requirements. If a citizen's house is demolished merely because he is an Accused or even for that matter a convict, that too without following the due process as prescribed by law, in our considered view, it will be totally unconstitutional for more than one reason. Firstly, the executive cannot declare a person guilty, as this process is the fundamental aspect of the judicial review. Only on the basis of the accusations, if the executive demolishes the property/properties of such an Accused person without following the due process of law, it would strike at the basic principle of Rule of law and is not permissible. The executive cannot become a judge and decide that a person Accused is guilty and, therefore, punish him by demolishing his residential/commercial property/properties. Such an act of the executive would be transgressing its limits.
It is to be noted that even in the cases consisting of imposition of a death sentence, it is always a discretion available to the courts as to whether to award such an extreme punishment or not. There is even an institutional safeguard in the cases of such punishment to the effect that the decision of the trial court inflicting death penalty cannot be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court. Even in the cases of convicts for the commission of most extreme and heinous offences, the punishment cannot be imposed without following the mandatory requirements under the statute. In that light, can it be said that a person who is only Accused of committing some crime or even convicted can be inflicted the punishment of demolition of his property/properties? The answer is an emphatic 'No'.
Right to shelter - HELD THAT:- The right to shelter is one of the facets of Article 21 of the Constitution. If the persons are to be dishoused, then for taking such steps the concerned authorities must satisfy themselves that such an extreme step of demolition is only available and other options including compounding and demolition of only part of the house property are not available.
Permissibility of the collective punishment - HELD THAT:- Right to life is a fundamental right. As already discussed herein above, with the expanded scope of law, the right to shelter has also been considered as one of the facets of Article 21 of the Constitution. In one structure, various people or maybe even a few families could reside. The question that is required to be considered is, as to whether if only one of the residents of such a structure is an Accused or convicted in a crime, could the authorities be permitted to demolish the entire structure thereby removing the shelter from the heads of the persons who are not directly or indirectly related with the commission of crime.
It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence as recognized in our country that a person is presumed to be innocent till he is held guilty. If demolition of a house is permitted wherein number of persons of a family or a few families reside only on the ground that one person residing in such a house is either an Accused or convicted in the crime, it will amount to inflicting a collective punishment on the entire family or the families residing in such structure. The constitutional scheme and the criminal jurisprudence would never permit the same.
Conclusion - i) No demolition should be carried out without a prior show cause notice returnable either in accordance with the time provided by the local municipal laws or within 15 days' time from the date of service of such notice, whichever is later. ii) The designated authority shall give an opportunity of personal hearing to the person concerned. iii) An opportunity should be given to the owner/occupier to remove the unauthorized construction or demolish the same within a period of 15 days.
Application disposed off.
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2024 (11) TMI 1413
Liability to pay service tax in respect of activities carried out by the petitioner during the period 2008-09 to 2014-15 - HELD THAT:- The petitioner supplied the goods viz. compressors, boosters etc. and other related equipment and necessary manpower to operate and maintain the said equipment for the service receivers. The terms and conditions reveal that the petitioner retained possession and exercised effective control and management over such compressors etc. supplied to their customers - The services rendered by the petitioner therefore fulfil the criteria to be taxable under the category of ‘supply of tangible goods’, since the equipment was supplied by the petitioner to the service receivers while retaining control over the equipment and without handing over the possession to the service receivers.
As is manifest from a reading of clause (ii) of Section 65B(44)(a), a taxable service would include the transfer, delivery or supply of any goods except where such transfer, delivery or supply be liable to be viewed as a deemed sale by virtue of Article 366(29-A) of the Constitution. It is this definition which informs Section 65(105)(zzzzj) and which brings to tax taxable services provided by a person to another and relating to ‘supply of tangible goods’ without transferring a right of possession and effective control of such machinery, equipment and appliances.
While the petitioner would be correct in its submission that a transaction which falls within the ambit of Article 366(29-A) cannot be subjected to a levy of service tax, the said contention itself proceeds and rests on whether a transaction was validly taxed under a sales tax statute on the basis of it being and amounting to a ‘deemed sale’.
Conclusion - Since in the present case, the authorities administering the service tax legislation have come to the firm conclusion that there was no transfer of ‘right to use’, and which conclusion clearly does not merit any interference, the mere fact that the petitioner had discharged a purported liability arising under a sales tax legislation or based upon a misinterpretation of the contractual covenants by the fifth respondent would not absolve it of the liability which attaches in terms of Section 65(105)(zzzzj).
There are no merit in the challenge raised to the SCNs as well as the impugned order dated 28 November 2016 - petition dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 1412
Rejection of Section 9 application filed by the Appellant - exclusion of certain invoices under Section 10A of IBC - existence of a running account - applicability of interest under the MSME Act - HELD THAT:- The Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order has noticed the details of all invoices and has come to conclusion that the invoices of 10A period are to be excluded from the claim amount and if the invoices falling under 10A period are excluded, balance amount will be Rs. 92,09,732/-. The submission of the Appellant is that since there was running account, the amount which was at the foot of the account has to be treated as balance amount due towards the Corporate Debtor and 10 A period may not be considered.
Even if, the argument of the Appellant is accepted for the time being that there was running account, the invoices which fall within the 10A period has to be excluded. The acknowledgment of debt for invoices during 10A period cannot permit the Operational Creditor to maintain the application and for invoices which are under 10A period has to be excluded since Section 10A clearly bars recovery of amount for default occurred during 10A period which is statutory scheme for a purpose and object. The statutory scheme which is reflected in Section 10A cannot be allowed to be defeated, even by claim of Appellant that amount claimed being running account or any action of the Corporate Debtor of confirmation of debt.
Neither there was any interest paid nor there was any agreement for interest at any point of time, hence, the Adjudicating Authority has rightly excluded the interest. In so far as interest under MSME Act is concerned, said interest can be looked into in proceeding which are initiated under the said act and that interest cannot be treated as operational debt in facts of the present case.
Conclusion - i) Invoices under Section 10A are excluded from the claim amount. ii) The running account and acknowledgment of debt do not override the statutory bar of Section 10A. iii) Interest under the MSME Act is not included in the claim amount due to lack of agreement.
Appeal dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 1411
Rejection of the Section 9 application - Operational Creditor is entitled to claim interest at the rate of 24% per annum on the outstanding amount from the Corporate Debtor or not - HELD THAT:- The Clause 9 cannot be read as any obligation for payment of interest by the Corporate Debtor. It is true that the Operational Creditor did not accept the offer for settlement but entire Principal Amount being already paid, as claimed in Part IV, nothing survives to be decided in Section 9 application.
The invoices which have been sent by the Operational Creditor containing the term of interest cannot be operated against the Corporate Debtor unless there is an agreement for interest or any other document showing that the Corporate Debtor has accepted the obligation for interest.
There is nothing to substantiate that the Corporate Debtor has accepted the obligation to pay the interest @24% per month, as claimed by the Operational Creditor. The entire Principal Amount having been paid, the Adjudicating Authority did not commit any error in rejecting the Section 9 Application filed by the Operational Creditor.
Conclusion - There was no merit in the claim for interest without an agreement, and the Principal Amount had been paid, negating the grounds for a Section 9 application.
Appeal dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 1410
CENVAT Credit - whether a banking company would be entitled to avail CENVAT credit of service tax paid to Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation for insuring deposits? - HELD THAT:- It needs to be noted that after the Larger Bench of the Tribunal answered the reference, a Division Bench of the Tribunal in M/S. SOUTH INDIAN BANK, BANK OF BARODA, CANARA BANK, CORPORATION BANK, KARNATAKA BANK, SYNDICATE BANK, CATHOLIC SYRIAN BANK LTD. VERSUS C.C.,C.E. & S. T-CALICUT, C.C.E & ST, MANGALORE, C.C. CE & S.T, TRIVANDRUM, STATE BANK OF MYSORE [2020 (11) TMI 120 - CESTAT BANGALORE] and against the decision of the Division Bench of the Tribunal, the department filed an appeal before the Kerala High Court.
The reference made to the Larger Bench has, therefore, to be answered in the same terms as was answered by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in M/S. SOUTH INDIAN BANK VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX-CALICUT [2020 (6) TMI 278 - CESTAT BANGALORE - LB]. It was held in the reference that 'The insurance service provided by the Deposit Insurance Corporation to the banks is an “input service” and CENVAT credit of service tax paid for this service received by the banks from the Deposit Insurance Corporation can be availed by the banks for rendering “output services.'
Conclusion - The insurance services necessary for statutory compliance in banking operations qualify as "input services" under the CENVAT credit rules.
The appeal may now be placed before the Division Bench of the Tribunal for deciding the appeal on merits.
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2024 (11) TMI 1409
Denial of benefit of concessional tax rate u/s 115BAC - assessee had failed to file form no.10IE electronically before the due date of filing of return of income - assessee’s main contention is that the failure to file form no.10IE, was mere inadvertent lapse and did not result any revenue loss - HELD THAT:- As assessee failed to file form no.10IE within the prescribed due date. However, it is also noted that the assessee has otherwise complied with other conditions u/s 115BAC of the Act.
There has been no loss to the Revenue due to this procedural lapse. As various judicial precedent have been held that substantial justice should not be denied due to technical lapse - the failure to file form no.10IE within the due date is a procedural requirement which does not affect the eligibility of the assessee to claim concessional tax rate benefit, provided that other conditions of this Section 115BAC are satisfied.
We condone the delay in filing form no.10IE and direct the AO to grant the benefit of concessional tax rate u/s 115BAC of the Act, subject to verification of compliance with other conditions under the said section. Appeals of the assessee are allowed for statistical purpose.
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2024 (11) TMI 1408
Condonation of delay of more than 534 days in filing the appeal - HELD THAT:- It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if assumed for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.
Conclusion - There are no error not to speak of any error of law in the impugned judgment of the High Court warranting interference in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 1407
Extension of time limitation - delay in filing GSTR 3B for the financial year 2019-20 by the petitioner - HELD THAT:- Amendment has been effected to Finance Act, 2024 more particularly Section 118, wherein, time for filing the returns and claim input tax credit has been extended and the petitioner would be satisfied if the impugned orders are set aside and petitioner is given an opportunity to reply to show cause notice issued.
Parties are remitted to the stage of show cause notice dated 21.05.2024 issued by respondent No.1 (Annexure-A to the writ petition) and dated 07.08.2024 issued by respondent No.2 (Annexure-D to the writ petition) and the respondents are directed to give effect to and implement the amended provisions contained in Section 118 of the Finance Act, 2024 relating to insertion of Section 16(5) to the CGST/KGST Act, 2017 by providing sufficient and reasonable opportunity and hear the petitioner and proceed further in accordance with law within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
Petition disposed off by way of remand.
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2024 (11) TMI 1406
Cancellation of the GST registration without providing opportunity to be heard - violation of principles of natural justice - appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected on the ground of being filed after expiry of Limitation period as envisaged under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- It appears that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner (Annexure-2) which indicates that the reason for issuing show cause notice is that the petitioner failed to furnish the return for a continuous period of six months which is mandatory as per the CGST Act - The petitioner during course of argument had submitted that in the order of cancellation, it has been mentioned that the undersigned has examined the reply but fact remains that no reply was filed by the petitioner within the stipulated period and as such principles of natural justice has been denied to him.
It is true that no reply of the petitioner was on record as informed by the CGST counsel; however, the fact remains that the petitioner failed to furnish return for a continuous period of six months. It further transpires that the appeal of the petitioner was also rejected on the ground of limitation as the same was filed after a lapse of more than 1 year and 20 days; whereas the normal period for filing appeal is three months as prescribed under section 107 (1) of CGST Act 2017.
There are no hesitation in holding that the petitioner firm is not entitled for any relief on the ground of being lethargic in approach, inasmuch as, on the one hand, the petitioner did not file return for a continuous period of six months and on the other hand the petitioner filed appeal before the appellate forum after a delay of 1 year and 20 days which is admittedly beyond the period of three months for filing appeal as prescribed under the Act.
Thus, neither there is any perversity in the order of cancellation of GST registration; nor is there any necessity for interference with the appellate order, inasmuch as, the same is filed beyond the statutory period of limitation - Accordingly, the instant writ application stands dismissed.
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2024 (11) TMI 1405
Constitutionality of Section 16 (2) (c) of CGST/SGST Acts - violation of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India - non-application of mind - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- From a bare perusal of the order dated 08.12.2023 it is clear that the 1st respondent has not applied its mind and the said order has been passed in a mechanical manner.
Order bearing No. CTO/LGSTO-510/2023- 24/8814 dated 08.12.2023 by the 1st respondent (Annexure-D) is quashed - writ petition is allowed in part.
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2024 (11) TMI 1404
Challenge to order of assessment and the DRC-07 notice and the order passed in the rectification application - order of assessment made without giving opportunity to the petitioner based upon which the notice of DRC-07 was issued - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Considering the fact that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned except to make the statement that no satisfactorily reasons attached to the annexure had been made out, the first respondent had not given any reasons. Section 161 of the TNGST Act indicates that when such an application is made and if no error on the face of record had been made out to the applications for rejection are to be rejected.
In the present case, the petitioner has pointed out an error in his return, which he seeks to rectify for passing the revised order of assessment. The said reasons had not been considered by the first respondent and therefore, the impugned order dated 04.06.2024 rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for rectification alone is hereby set aside and remitted back to the first respondent for passing a fresh order after considering the reasons and pass appropriate orders. If the authorities decide not to entertain the said request, he shall give detailed reasons as to why the said order is being made. Further proceedings, pursuant to DRC- O7 notice dated 02.01.2024 shall be kept in abeyance.
This writ petition stands disposed of.
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2024 (11) TMI 1403
Availability of Input Tax Credit in respect of demo vehicles - issuance of Circular No. 231/25/2024-GST (F.NO.CBIC-20001/6/2024-GST], dated 10.09.2024 - HELD THAT:- The clarification has been also taken note of by the Haryana Government, and they have issued similar clarification vide Circular No. 231/25-HGST/2024/GST-II (CBIC Circular No.231/25/2024- GST, dated 11.09.2024), dated 13th September 2024 - Said circular discussed the availability of Input Tax Credit on demo vehicles, which are motor vehicles for transportation of passengers having approved seating capacity of not more than 13 persons in terms of clause(a) of section 17(5) of Haryana Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017.
Further, it deals with the availability of the Input Tax Credit on demo vehicles in cases where such vehicles are capitalized in the books of account by the authorized dealers.
The observations of not giving benefit of Input Tax Credit to vehicles, which have been initially used as demo vehicles, is accordingly, set-aside in view of the extension of grant of availability of Input Tax Credit with respect to the demo vehicles, as clarified by the aforesaid circulars.
The petitioner is entitled to the benefit of ITC.
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2024 (11) TMI 1402
Challenge to order passed by the respondent on the premise that the same was made in violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The impugned order dated 10.04.2024 is set aside and the petitioner shall deposit 10% of the disputed tax within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On complying with the above condition, the impugned order of assessment shall be treated as show cause notice and the petitioner shall submit its objections within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order along with supporting documents/material. If any such objections are filed, the same shall be considered by the respondent and orders shall be passed in accordance with law after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
The Writ Petition stands disposed of.
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2024 (11) TMI 1401
Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned order has been made on a gross non-application of mind to the objections filed by the petitioner - rejection of petitioner's claim for ITC - HELD THAT:- This Court finds that there is some merits in the submission of the petitioner inasmuch as the impugned order does not even make a reference to the documents that have been filed in the form of E-way bill, Tax invoices, etc., while rejecting the petitioner's claim of entitlement to Input Tax Credit. Further more, in this matter the petitioner is also in possession of lorry receipts, weighbridges, etc. In the circumstances, this Court is of the view that the petitioner may be granted one final opportunity to produce all the related documents.
The impugned order is thus set aside and the petitioner is granted liberty to submit objections, if any along with the relevant documentary evidence within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. If such reply or documents are produced within the stipulated period i.e., two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order, order would be passed afresh, after considering the reply or document and after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity therein.
This writ petition is disposed of.
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2024 (11) TMI 1400
Challenge to final order framed under Section 73 (9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - personal hearing on the scheduled date not availed - principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- All that the competent authority has chosen to observe is that the reply has not been found to be satisfactory. Since the order impugned is bereft of any reasoning, it is rendered unsustainable.
The impugned order dated 20 August 2024 is quashed - petition allowed.
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2024 (11) TMI 1399
Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned order came to be passed, without affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the only issue raised by the petitioner is that before issuing the impugned order, no opportunity of personal hearing was provided to the petitioner, but the first respondent passed the impugned order after affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. However, considering the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, the petitioner is willing to deposit 10% of the disputed tax amount, this Court is inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 31.05.2024.
The impugned order dated 31.05.2024 is set aside and the matter remanded back to the respondents on condition that the petitioner shall deposit 10% of the disputed tax demand of the impugned assessment year, within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and thereafter, the petitioner is directed to file a reply within a period of two (2) weeks.
Petition disposed off by way of remand.
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9911796707
