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Showing 41 to 46 of 46 Records
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1959 (3) TMI 7
Whether the respondent's admitted income under certain heads is chargeable to income-tax under the provisions of section 10(6) of the Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922)?
Held that:- As to the nature of the service which the association performed in respect of the assistants, the payment of the fee was definitely related to that service. It is, therefore, plain that the case fell within section 10(6) of the Act. It must, therefore, be held that the question referred to the High Court should have been answered in the affirmative, and that the High Court was in error in giving its opinion to the contrary. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (3) TMI 5
Whether the sum of ₹ 2,19,343 received by the assessee in the year of account relevant for the assessment year 1951-52 was a revenue receipt or a capital receipt?
Held that:- The Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the High Court were thus justified in the conclusion to which they came, viz., that the sum of ₹ 2,19,343 received by the assessee from the company, was a capital receipt. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 4
Whether on the above facts and circumstances of this case the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of ₹ 2,31,009 was income of the assessee during the assessment year under consideration and was liable to be assessed under the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The amount received as repayment of excess profits tax must be deemed to be " income " for the purposes of the Indian Income-tax Act and for assessment it must be treated as income of the previous year. The answer to question given by the Calcutta High Court was thus correct. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 3
Whether the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, could make the assessment in the appellant's case?
Held that:- In the view of the matter the question as to the place of assessment does not arise out of the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and, therefore, no question of law could be referred nor could the High Court make such order under section 66(2). In our opinion, the High Court rightly dismissed the appellant's application for directing the case to be stated under section 66(2) of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (3) TMI 2
Whether the circumstances reasonably supported the Income-tax Officer's presumption that the appellant had converted his secret profits into jewellery, gold and sovereigns, with a view to camouflage his transactions and brought such profits in his accounts by re-sale of such jewellery etc., and remittances through bank drafts?
Whether in the circumstances of the case, Yamnabai could have in her possession jewellery, etc., to the tune of ₹ 1,60,000.
Held that:- The whole of the inference drawn by the Appellate Tribunal in this behalf was allegedly based on no material whatever and was submitted to be at best a suspicion or a conjecture which warped the reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal.
The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is a fact finding Tribunal and if it arrives at its own conclusions of fact after due consideration of the evidence before it this court will not interfere. The conclusions reached by the Tribunal should not be coloured by any irrelevant considerations or matters of prejudice and if there are any circumstances which required to be explained by the assessee, the assessee should be given an opportunity of doing so. On no account whatever should the Tribunal base its findings on suspicions, conjectures or surmises nor should it act on no evidence at all or on improper rejection of material and relevant evidence or partly on evidence and partly on suspicions, conjectures or surmises and if it does anything of the sort, its findings, even though on questions of fact, will be liable to be set aside by this court.
Set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and remand the matter back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras "A" Bench, to reconsider the same in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made above. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1959 (3) TMI 1
Issues: 1. Violation of rules of natural justice in the proceedings. 2. Lack of opportunity for the petitioners to defend their case. 3. Dispute regarding inspection of documents seized by Customs Authorities. 4. Delay in communication of ex parte orders passed by the Authorities. 5. Setting aside and quashing of impugned orders by a writ of certiorari and mandamus. 6. Future conduct of the proceedings, including timelines for inspection and filing of objections.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addresses the issue of violation of rules of natural justice in the proceedings. The judge notes that the petitioners were not given a sufficient opportunity to defend their case. The Customs Authorities had seized a large number of documents, and the petitioners were only allowed inspection of documents deemed relevant by the Authorities. The judge emphasizes that the petitioners were entitled to inspection of all relevant documents and copies thereof. The judge suggests that the Authorities should give the petitioners a proper opportunity to be heard, and the Authorities agree to do so.
2. The judgment highlights the lack of opportunity for the petitioners to defend their case adequately. The judge points out that the petitioners were charged with offenses under the Sea Customs Act and related statutes but were not given adequate time and access to the seized documents to prepare their defense. The judge emphasizes the importance of providing the petitioners with a reasonable opportunity to review all relevant documents and files.
3. The judgment discusses the dispute regarding inspection of the seized documents by the Customs Authorities. The judge notes that there was a disagreement between the parties regarding the scope of the inspection allowed by the Authorities. The judge points out that the Authorities initially restricted the inspection to documents they deemed relevant, causing further delays in the proceedings. The judge emphasizes the need for a fair and comprehensive inspection process for all relevant documents.
4. The judgment addresses the delay in communication of ex parte orders passed by the Authorities. The judge notes that the orders were made in August 1956 but were not communicated to the parties until March 1957. This delay in communication raised concerns about the transparency and procedural fairness of the proceedings. The judge emphasizes the importance of timely communication of orders to all parties involved.
5. The judgment orders the setting aside and quashing of the impugned orders by a writ of certiorari and mandamus. The judge directs the Authorities not to give effect to the orders and outlines the future conduct of the proceedings. The judge sets specific timelines for inspection of documents, filing of objections, and continuation of the proceedings after providing the petitioners with a proper opportunity to be heard.
6. The judgment outlines the future conduct of the proceedings, including specific timelines and procedures to ensure a fair and transparent process. The judge specifies deadlines for inspection of seized documents, filing of objections to show cause notices, and scheduling of hearings. The judge emphasizes the need for all parties to adhere to the prescribed timelines and procedures to prevent further delays and ensure a timely resolution of the case.
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