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Showing 441 to 460 of 1484 Records
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2025 (3) TMI 1044
Levy of penalty u/s 221(1) - assessee has not paid an outstanding tax demand - assessee submitted that he had no money to make the payment of the entire amount of tax liability - HELD THAT:- AO did not consider the good and sufficient reasons available with the assessee to make the payment of the due tax arrears at the time of filing the return of income and levied a penalty at 100% of the tax in arrears.
We find that as per the Explanation to section 221(1) of the Act, the assessee shall not cease to be liable to any penalty merely by reason of the fact that before the levy of such penalty he has paid the tax. Therefore, in view of the express provisions of section 221(1) of the Act, we do not find any merits in the submissions of AR that till the levy of penalty u/s 221(1), the assessee has made partial payment of tax on various occasions, which were not considered by the AO.
During the hearing, apart from reiterating the submissions made before the lower authorities, AR did not bring any material on record to show that the exercise of discretion by the AO to levy a penalty at 100% of the amount of tax in arrears is not as per the provisions of the Act.
Further, in light of the income declared by the assessee in his return of income for subsequent years as noted in the foregoing paragraphs, we do not find that the assessee has good and sufficient reasons for the default in making the payment of tax in arrears.
CIT(A) has already granted partial relief to the assessee by reducing the penalty by the amount of interest, we do not find any basis for quashing the remaining penalty upheld by the CIT(A) u/s 221(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the learned CIT(A) is upheld and the grounds raised by the assessee are dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1043
Revision u/s 263 - excess deduction @50% has been allowed under section 35CCC leading to under-assessment of income, 1% of the investments capable of fetching exempt dividend income was not disallowed u/s 14A r/w rule 8D and AO has allowed depreciation claimed on the value of land leading to excess allowance of depreciation
Excess deduction @50% has been allowed under section 35CCC - HELD THAT:- From the perusal of the impugned order, we further find that the assessee filed an application under section 154 requesting the AO to rectify the mistake apparent from the record and restrict the deduction u/s 35CCC to the actual expenditure claimed in its return of income. Since the revision proceedings were initiated, the learned PCIT treated the rectification application filed by the assessee as redundant.
During the hearing, assessee, submitted that the excess amount allowed as a deduction by the AO is only INR 8, 03, 76, 735 (i.e., INR 32, 04, 33, 197, claimed in the return of income, minus INR 24, 00, 56, 462, actual expenditure incurred by the assessee). Thus, it was submitted that the disallowance should be restricted to only INR 8, 03, 76, 735 instead of INR 10, 68, 11, 066 directed by the learned PCIT.
Having considered the submissions and perused the material available on record, we are of the considered view that revision proceedings u/s 263 have been correctly initiated in respect of this issue. However, the AO is directed to disallow an amount of INR 8, 03, 76, 735 being the excess amount allowed to the assessee as a deduction under section 35CCC of the Act. Accordingly, to this extent, the impugned order passed under section 263 of the Act is upheld.
Disallowance u/s 14A - From the multiple notices issued by the AO on this issue from time to time during the assessment proceedings, it cannot be concluded that this aspect was not examined by the AO or there was no application of mind.
We find that in Reliance Communication Ltd [2016 (4) TMI 173 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that the fact that the AO did not make any reference in the assessment order cannot make the order erroneous when the issues were indeed looked into.
As regards the non-compliance with the CBDT’s Circular No. 5 of 2014, we find that the said Circular was issued in the backdrop of controversy as to whether disallowance can be made by invoking the provisions of section 14A even in those cases where no income has been earned by the assessee which has been claimed as exempt during the financial year.
Accordingly, the CBDT clarified that Rule 8D r.w.s.14A of the Act provides for disallowance of the expenditure even where a taxpayer in a particular year has not earned any exempt income. However, in the present case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that the assessee received dividend income during the year under consideration, which was claimed as exempt.
Thus, the aforesaid Circular, relied upon by the learned PCIT, has no relevance to the facts of the present case, and therefore, we find no merits in the findings of the PCIT that the assessment order has not been made in accordance with the aforementioned CBDT’s Circular. Thus, we are of the considered view that the provisions of clause (c) of Explanation-2 to section 263 of the Act are not applicable to the present case.
Depreciation claimed on the value of land leading to excess allowance of depreciation - Assessee made specific reference to the findings in the assessment orders for the earlier years, and the AO was completely apprised of the litigation history as well as the relevant facts pertaining to this issue. Thus, once the AO after considering the submissions filed by the assessee has allowed the claim of depreciation, it cannot be said that the assessment order was passed without proper enquiry and application of mind rendering the same to be erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Therefore, this issue was duly examined by the AO during the scrutiny assessment proceedings.
Appeal by the assessee is partly allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1042
Addition u/s 56(2)(viib) - whether the valuation of shares at a premium of Rs. 90/- per share is representative of the fair market value? - HELD THAT:- DCF method could be applied for valuation purposes for the assessments pending at that time. Besides, the Circular stated that Rule would apply from the date of its publication. This assessment was pending on that date. The benefit of the DCF method of valuation was thus even otherwise available to the Assessee as per the Circular.
Rule 11UA(2)(b) provides for the acceptance of the valuation made by Chartered Accountant as an acceptable mode for determining the fair market value of shares. Assessee has filed a report of CA, Sh. V.P. Tyagi which certifies the fair market value, higher than Rs. 100/- at Rs. 106/- per share.
We notice that the attempt of the AO to locate and establish discrepancies or errors in that report of the Chartered Accountant is not based on any acceptable principle or approved standards. The discrepancies as pointed out by the AO are not relevant in the context of capital restructuring in the case of group companies.
Valuation by itself is a specialized exercise which can be disputed only on the basis of the findings of another expert as recognized in law for that purpose. The valuation as proposed by the DCF method cannot, therefore, be faulted. There is no over valuation of shares over the fair market value. Accordingly the invocation of the provisions of Sec.56(2)(viib) of the Act by the AO being erroneous cannot be upheld.
Addition u/s 68 - addition of share capital amount as collected by way of premium from the Subscribing Companies - We are of the view that the proviso provides for the scrutiny and assessment of the funds of the immediate subscribing Company. The proviso does not extend that power to scrutinise the financial capacity of the secondary source which has provided funds to the Subscribing Companies.
Also the fact that the investments as made by the Subscribing Companies were out of funds which they possessed at the beginning of the year and no fresh infusion of funds by the Subscribing Companies during the assessment year under consideration and the source of funds are all proceeds of investments made in earlier years in the course of business and have been recalled/encashed was corroborated by the Subscribing Companies, in his statement recorded on oath. Therefore with these facts remaining uncontroverted no addition could have been even otherwise validly made u/s 68 of the Act by the AO. invocation of the proviso to Sec.68 of the Act by the AO was, therefore, erroneous and not justified. The basic ingredients of Sec.68 of the Act of identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions are, in the circumstances of the case, apparently beyond doubt.
Disallowance made u/s. 14A r/w rule 8D - HELD THAT:- It is the finding of the Assessing Officer that the Assessee has made fresh investment during the year under consideration. It is also the finding that the assessee sold shares out of the opening investments. Therefore the AO held that the assessee might have incurred expenditure for earning dividend income. These findings were not rebutted with evidences by the Assessee before us and only asserted that no expenditure was incurred to earn dividend income. No good reason to reverse the findings of the authorities below. Hence, the disallowance made by the AO U/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D2(iii).
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2025 (3) TMI 1041
Validity of Reassessment u/s 147 - whether no addition can be made to other issues for which reasons were not recorded while issuing notice u/s 148 of the Act if no addition has been made on the issues for which reasons were recorded for re-opening of the assessment ? - HELD THAT:- The issue in appeal has already been settled in case of Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.[2011 (6) TMI 4 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and again reiterated the said position of law in its recent judgement in M/s Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd [2024 (9) TMI 1711 - DELHI HIGH COURT] to hold that reassessment shall stand confined to items which had been mentioned or taken note of by the AO while forming the opinion that income had escaped assessment. Ranbaxy had principally held that unless additions are made on that score, no further additions would be sustained.- Decided in favour of assessee.
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2025 (3) TMI 1040
Denial of exemption u/s 11 and/or section 10(23C)(iiiad) - delayed filing of Form 10B - HELD THAT:- We note that this ground was not pressed by the assessee before the Ld. Addl./JCIT(A).
The impugned issue is covered by the favourable order of the Co-ordinate Bench of Pune Tribunal in the case of Dr. Sukumar J. Magdum Foundation [2023 (8) TMI 1627 - ITAT PUNE] wherein the Tribunal under the similar set of facts had set aside the matter to the file of the Ld. AO holding that the total income needs to be computed in accordance with the regular provisions of the Act in case the benefit of exemption u/s 11 is not available.
We set aside the impugned order of the Ld. Addl./JCIT(A) and restore the matter back to the file of the Ld. jurisdictional AO with a direction to verify whether the assessee is eligible for claim of exemption u/s 10/23(C)(iiiad)/11 of the Act and grant relief to the assessee as per the provisions of law as a result of such verification thereof.
In case the assessee is found to be not eligible for claim of exemption u/s 10/23(C)(iiiad) jurisdictional AO is hereby directed to examine/verify the claim of expenditure made by the assessee trust against the gross receipts for the relevant AY and modify the assessment accordingly as a result of such examination/verification as per the fact and law after giving adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee. Appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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2025 (3) TMI 1039
Rejection of the petitioner's application for compounding of the offence under Section 137 of the Customs Act, 1962 - failure to follow the instructions and guidelines issued by the respondents themselves - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, after the applicant had submitted his application, the application was first got scrutinized by the compounding officer within the Department and thereafter the petitioner was called for personal hearing. The petitioner had availed the opportunity of personal hearing, appeared before the compounding officer, accepted his guilt and offence and prayed for allowing the compounding application and also expressed his willingness to pay the compounding fees.
There is no need for another show-cause notice to be issued to the petitioner or the applicant seeking compounding of an offence. Secondly, what also weighs more in the minds of this Bench is the fact that, every application for compounding of offence need not be accepted as a matter of routine. There has to be an element of scrutiny to be done and in addition there has also to be the subjective satisfaction of the compounding officer for reaching to the conclusion that the contents of the compounding application is full and true disclosure of the relevant facts. It would be difficult to accept the situation where the petitioner at the first instance takes a different stand both in his statement under Section 108 and also in the statement at the time of preparation of Panchnama and later to take a somersault and take an entirely different version while applying for compounding of the offence.
In the instant case, admittedly there is a vast variance in the contents in the statement under Section 108 that which is recorded in the Panchnama when compared to the contents made in the application for compounding of the offence - Surprisingly, there has been no statement available on record to show that the petitioner had retracted from the statement that he had given under Section 108 as also in the Panchnama.
If the compounding officer found substantial variance in the statements so made by the petitioner, the rejection of the compounding application cannot be held to be bad in law or being contrary to the circulars governing the field of determining the compounding application.
Conclusion - The rejection of the compounding application was justified due to the petitioner's failure to make a full and true disclosure of facts. It is held that every application for compounding of offence need not be accepted as a matter of routine.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1038
Seeking grant of regular bail during the pendency of the trial - smuggling of Gold - bailable or non-bailable under Section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962, in view of value of gold - admissibility and relevance of the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 - applicant argued that the complaint is confined only to the alleged recovery of 2000 gms of gold and the recovery effected from the house of Ankit Jindal being in the nature of ornaments is not the subject matter or case property for his prosecution for violation of the provisions of Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- This Court finds that the officials of the DRI had intercepted a roadways bus wherein accused persons Anil Kumar Sharma and Sudhir Kumar were travelling and from them 1 kg gold each was recovered. Of course, the value of the recovered gold individually is below 1 Crore whereas collectively, it is more than 1 crore, but while deciding the prayer for bail, this Court is not inclined to make any comment on the nature of offence whether it is bailable or non-bailable.
No doubt, in the case of Mohd. Tufial [2023 (3) TMI 1293 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], this Court has observed that the recovery effected from each accused is to be considered to determine the nature of the offence, but this Court is not inclined to comment upon the nature of the alleged offence, if, it would fall under section 104(6) or 104(7) Customs Act, 1962 as the charges against the accused have also not been framed so far. Otherwise also, this issue can be effectively decided by the trial court on the strength of the evidence of the parties.
The admissibility of the statements of the accused recorded under section 108 Customs Act, 1962 would also be tested during trial. However, considering the stand of the accused, who claim that the recovered material was acquired by them in legitimate manner, this Court is of the opinion that further detention of the applicants may not be necessary for any useful purpose. Concededly the investigation in the matter is complete and after filing of the complaint/ charge-sheet even the charges have not been framed against the accused, therefore, it is clear that the trial is yet to start.
Keeping in view the nature of the crime as well as the period undergone by the applicants and the punishment provided for the alleged offences, this Court deems it proper to extend the concession of regular bail to them, as the conclusion of trial is likely to consume considerable time. Further, the material witnesses are the officials of DRI and at present there does not seem to be any possibility of their being won over.
Conclusion - Thus, without meaning any expression of opinion on the merits of the case, the bail application is allowed and it is ordered that the applicants Ankit Jindal, Anil Kumar Sharma and Sudhir Kumar be released on regular bail, subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed.
Bail application allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1037
Guilty of the offence u/s 6(4), 6(5) 8(1), 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(f)(i) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 - fine imposed - Court [2014 (9) TMI 1085 - DELHI HIGH COURT] is of the view that the AO dated 24th March, 2004, and the impugned order of the AT to the extent they hold the appellant liable for contravention of Section 8(1) of FERA, cannot be sustained in law - HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court; hence, the special leave petition is dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1036
Money Laundering - seeking grant of interim bail due to the alleged medical conditions of his family members and the inability of his wife to care for them adequately - HELD THAT:- It is admitted that the applicant was arrested by the police on 29.05.2024, when he had returned to India on 25.04.2024. He was abroad for many years prior to that. It is stated that the age of the father of the applicant is 80 years and the age of the mother is 70 years. They both are old patients. The wife of the applicant is looking after them. She has soft tissue issue. She is walking around.
Conclusion - Having considered, this Court is of the view that there is no ground to enlarge the applicant on interim bail. Accordingly, the interim bail application deserves to be rejected.
The interim bail application is rejected.
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2025 (3) TMI 1035
Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - Challenge to provisional attachment order - prayer for appropriate writ/direction for redrafting of the definition of ''value'' as provided under Section 2(1)(zb) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- As per Section 2(u) of the PMLA Act defines the 'Proceeds of Crime', if any property is derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property comes under the proceeds of crime.
Therefore, the definition of 'value' as defined under Section 2(1)(zb) cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the definition of 'property' and 'proceeds of crime' in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the PMLA Act. If all three definitions are read conjointly, there would be no need to redraft the definition of 'value', as prayed by the petitioner by way of this petition. A definition is not to be read in isolation.
Conclusion - The definition of 'value' as defined under Section 2(1)(zb) cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the definition of 'property' and 'proceeds of crime' in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the PMLA Act.
The petition challenging the provisional attachment order and the constitutional validity of the definition of "value" under Section 2(1)(zb) was dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1034
Rejection of the SVLDRS declaration filed by the petitioner - initiation of an investigation after the statutory cut-off date - violation of of principle of natural justice - HELD THAT:- In the present case, admittedly, the investigation was initiated by a issuance of a summon only on 18.09.2019 and thus the rejection/withdrawal of the SVLDRS declaration dated 29.10.2020, is unsustainable.
Conclusion - The impugned order dated 29.10.2020 rejecting the declaration/application under the Scheme is set aside.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1033
Invocation of extended period of limitation - Recovery of service tax with interest and penalty - suppression of value - Repair and Maintenance Service - HELD THAT:- No explanation is coming forth for not declaring the said value, appellant also do not dispute with regards to levibility of tax on merits. In the absence of any such explanation with regards to the differential taxable value, intention to evade payment of service tax is quite clear and visible by suppressing the provisions of Section 73 (1) for invoking the provisions of extended period have been invoked for demanding this service tax. The fact that appellant was filing ST-3 return do not leave him from the responsibility to declare the correct value of taxable services provided. The mis-declaration has come to the knowledge only on the basis of information provided from Income Tax authorities for comparison with ST-3 returns.
Conclusion - There are no merits in the submission made in the appeal that extended period should not have been invoked. The demand for service tax by invoking extended period is upheld.
The demand by invoking the extended period upheld, penalty imposed under Section 78 is also upheld - appeal dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1032
Seeking grant of regular bail - availing ineligible Input Tax Credit (ITC) on the basis of fake invoices received from non-operational firms - HELD THAT:- This Court finds that the entire case of the prosecution is founded upon the documentary material and as far as the alleged ineligible availment of Input Tax Credit of Rs. 31.18 crores is concerned, the same is part of the tax returns filed by the applicant/firm M/s Shreeji Metals. Further, during the course of hearing, it is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the Union of India that the account of M/s Shreeji Metals was attached vide order dated 07.10.2024, but subsequently, it was liberated vide order dated 08.11.2024, Annexure-2 appended with the supplementary affidavit dated 22.01.2025.
Admittedly, the alleged offences are triable by Magistrate and provide for a maximum punishment of five years imprisonment, and trial is likely to consume considerable time to conclude, therefore, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the further detention of the applicant behind the bars would not serve any useful purpose, who is confined in judicial custody. Further, the prosecution witnesses are official witnesses and presently there does not appear to be any possibility of their being won over, therefore, considering the nature of the trial as well as period of six months undergone by the applicant as an undertrial, this Court deems it appropriate to extend the concession of regular bail to the applicant, subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed.
Conclusion - This Court has no hesitation in holding that the further detention of the applicant behind the bars would not serve any useful purpose, who is confined in judicial custody.
Bail application allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1031
Authority of Kanpur Nagar Nigam to levy and collect advertisement tax or fees after the legislative changes brought by the U.P. Goods and Services Tax (GST) Act, 2017 and the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016 - HELD THAT:- Insofar as in the penultimate paragraph of the order (of which clarification is sought), it has been clearly provided that the demand impugned in the writ petition to the extent such demands fall in the teeth of Section 173 of U.P. G.S.T. Act read with the 101st Constitutional Amendment is quashed and further to the extent it has been provided by that co-ordinate bench that any amount of "Advertisement Tax" deposited by the petitioners for the period beyond 01.04.2017 may be refunded to the petitioners and no further or other direction was issued, that order is crystal clear as to its reasoning and as to the effect it causes. It admits of no doubt as to what has been provided and what has not been decided.
Conclusion - The Kanpur Nagar Nigam's demands for advertisement tax post-July 1, 2017, are illegal.
To the extent, the order is itself speaking and admits of no doubt, the present application fails and is liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1030
Extension of time limit for issuing Show Cause Notice (SCN) - Challenge to N/N. 9/2023-Central Tax dated 31st March, 2023 & N/N. 56/2023 – Central Tax dated 28th December, 2023 issued by Respondent No. 6 (Union of India) and N/N. 9/2023 – State Tax dated 24th May, 2023 & N/N. 56/2023 dated 16th January, 2024 issued by Respondent No. 1 (State of Maharashtra) exercising powers u/s 168A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) - HELD THAT:- The issue involved in the Writ Petition is identical to the issue involved in EVIE REAL ESTATE PRIVATE LTD. VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [2025 (3) TMI 173 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] where it was held that a strong prima facie case is made out for granting interim relief to the Petitioner.
As the issue is identical, similar order is required to be passed in the present Petition also - A strong prima facie case is made out for granting interim relief to the Petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1029
Seeking to quash SCN, issued without jurisdiction - SCN did not contain proper reasons - violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy, barred by res judicata - principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Upon a perusal of the show cause notice, it is clear that ingredients of Section 74 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') have not been adhered to, as there is no allegation of fraud or any willful-mis-statement and/or suppression of material facts in the said show cause notice. Subsequent to issuance of said show cause notice, this writ petition has been filed. However, in the meantime, order under Section 74 of the Act has also been passed by the authorities. The order is also bereft of any reasons for issuing the notice Section 74 of the Act and does not comply the ingredients thereof.
Conclusion - The SCN did not adhere to the requirements of Section 74 of the UPGST Act, as it lacked allegations of fraud or willful misstatement. Consequently, the impugned SCN and the subsequent order were quashed and set aside.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1028
Seeking grant of bail - fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit - contravention of the conditions of eligibility stipulated in Section 16(2)(b) of the CGST Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the case diary, it reveals that the petitioner is the proprietor of the alleged company M/s P.S. Enterprise against whom the allegations was made evading payment of total GST amounting to crores of rupees. Learned counsel for the petitioner prayed to release the accused on bail on the ground of length of detention i.e. 54 days in judicial custody wherein the mandatory period is 60 days. It is not in dispute that the alleged offences are punishable with imprisonment up to a maximum period of 5 (five) years and compoundable in nature. It transpires that the object and the purpose of CGST Act is not penal in nature but it is for the purpose of legislation being to recover any amount that may be due to the Government Exchequer.
In the case of Sanjay Kumar Bhuwalka Vs. Union of India [2018 (7) TMI 589 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT], wherein the benefit of bail was granted to the accused person on deposit of certain portion of disputed liabilities/dues. While deciding a bail application in the case of similar nature, the Court observed 'Revenue is the monetary payment due to the Government and non-payment, whatever be the means applied for such non-payment confers right on the Government, both central and the State, to realize the revenue whereas penal provision of arrest and detention is only when there is violation of the provision under the statute which is not the intention of the legislature to achieve the fiscal object regardless of the existence of a provision for the arrest of the offender in the Act.'
Conclusion - Situated thus, as it appears that the petitioner has been languishing in judicial custody for last 54 days, the GST officials has got sufficient opportunity to interrogate the petitioner. Under such backdrop, this Court is inclined to grant bail to the petitioner - the petitioner is granted bail subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed.
Bail application allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1027
Extension of time limit for issuing Show Cause Notice (SCN) - Challenge to N/N. 9/2023-Central Tax dated 31st March, 2023 & N/N. 56/2023 – Central Tax dated 28th December, 2023 issued by Respondent No. 6 (Union of India) and N/N. 9/2023 – State Tax dated 24th May, 2023 & N/N. 56/2023 dated 16th January, 2024 issued by Respondent No. 1 (State of Maharashtra) exercising powers u/s 168A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) - HELD THAT:- The issue involved in the Writ Petition is identical to the issue involved in Evie Real Estate Private Limited v/s. State of Maharashtra & Others [2025 (3) TMI 173 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'a strong prima facie case is made out for granting interim relief to the Petitioner'.
As the issue is identical, similar order is required to be passed in the present Petition also - A strong prima facie case is made out for granting interim relief to the Petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1026
Extension of time limit for issuing Show Cause Notice (SCN) - Challenge to N/N. 9/2023-Central Tax dated 31st March, 2023 & N/N. 56/2023 – Central Tax dated 28th December, 2023 issued by Respondent No. 6 (Union of India) and N/N. 9/2023 – State Tax dated 24th May, 2023 & N/N. 56/2023 dated 16th January, 2024 issued by Respondent No. 1 (State of Maharashtra) exercising powers u/s 168A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) - point raised in this Petition is that these Notifications issued under Section 168A have to be on the recommendation of the GST Council - HELD THAT:- A strong prima facie case is made out for granting of ad-interim relief. This is for two reasons. Firstly the challenge to the aforesaid Notifications is already in issue in several other Writ Petitions before this Court, and in which ad-interim relief is already granted. On the same parity, ad-interim relief would have to be granted in the present Writ Petition also.
Secondly, prima facie, it is found that the Show Cause Notice itself ought to have been issued before 31st May, 2024. This is because, the Show Cause Notice has to be issued atleast three months prior to the time limit specified under Section 73 (10) of the Act. In the present case, the Show Cause Notice has not been issued prior to three months as stipulated in Section 73 (2) of the Act.
The above matter placed on board on 22nd April,, 2025 under the caption “for ad-interim reliefs”.
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2025 (3) TMI 1025
Cancellation of registration of the Petitioner under the CGST Act, 2017/MGST Act, 2017 - failure to file returns for more than six months - Petitioner is willing to pay all dues together with interest - HELD THAT:- Considering the peculiar facts of this case, and the fair concession made by the learned Addl. GP, we direct the Respondents to compute, within a period of two weeks, the dues if any, payable by the Petitioner. The amount so determined must be communicated to the Petitioner within a period of one week thereafter, and upon the Petitioner paying the said amount, the Petitioner’s registration be restored. It is needless to clarify that the registration should be restored to facilitate the payment of the dues calculated by the Respondents, and within 48 hours of restoration of the registration, the Petitioner must pay the demanded dues. If this is not done, then the registration can be cancelled without the necessity of any notice to the Petitioner. In addition to what is stated herein above, the Petitioner shall pay Rs. 40, 000/- as costs to “The High Court Employees Medical Welfare Fund at Mumbai” within a period of one week from today.
Petition disposed off.
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