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Showing 501 to 520 of 1182 Records
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2025 (2) TMI 682
Refund claim - input services - whether denial of refund of CENVAT credit on the aforesaid disputed services by holding the same as ineligible ‘input service’ in terms of Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is legally sustainable or not? - Invocation of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994.
HELD THAT:- Plain reading of the definition of ‘input service’ indicate that there are three categories of input services viz., the first category services given under the ‘means’ part; second category, under the ‘inclusion’ part and the third category of services which are given under the ‘exclusion’ part. Therefore, in order to ensure that a particular input service is eligible for availing CENVAT credit, it should be covered either under first or second category and should not be covered under the third category of excluded items.
Hotel & Short term accommodation service - HELD THAT:- The above services are to be considered as eligible for refund as the learned Commissioner (Appeals-II) himself had held so, and that different stand cannot be taken on the admissibility of input services for allowing refund, and that too for the same assessee-appellants again during the same period, in the absence of any substantial changes in the statute.
Event management service - Management Business consultancy service - HELD THAT:- Since these have been used for enhancing the skills of the employees on duty involved in the company’s projects in order to provide desired results in respect of output services, these fall under the category of “means part” as eligible services under the definition of Rule 2(i) ibid. Therefore, the refund of CENVAT benefit on the above services allowed.
Refund of service tax paid on ‘outdoor catering services’/ ‘outdoor services’ and ‘Health Check-up service’ claimed during the period of April, 2015 to December, 2015 - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra in view of the decision of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Wipro Ltd. [2018 (4) TMI 149 - CESTAT BANGALORE - LB], wherein it has been held that the definition of 'input service' has been amended w.e.f. 01.04.2011 providing the exclusion clause, wherein the definition of input service under Rule 2(l) ibid, specifically excludes 'outdoor catering services' and ‘health services’. It has been concluded in the said order that the outdoor catering service is not eligible for input service credit post amendment dated 01.04.2011 vide Notification No. 3/2011-CE (NT) dated 01.03.2011 - the appellants are not eligible to refund of CENVAT credit on such input services.
Invocation of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 in rejection of refunds after providing sufficient opportunity for the appellants to demonstrate that the availment of CENVAT credit is in compliance with the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - HELD THAT:- In such circumstances, it cannot be said that what is clearly excluded from the scope of eligible ‘input service’ in terms of Rule 2(l) ibid, can be treated as eligible, since the appellants have already taken CENVAT credit on the same, on the sole ground that it was not objected to earlier by the department. Therefore, sufficient compliance of requirement of Rule 14 of Cenvat Credit Rules,2004 has been adhered to in this case.
Conclusion - The services explicitly excluded under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, such as Outdoor catering and Health Check-up services, are not eligible for CENVAT credit, stating that "denial of refund of CENVAT credit in respect of 'outdoor catering services'/ 'outdoor services' and 'Health Checkup service' is proper and justified, being not in conformity with the statutory provisions."
Appeal allowed in part.
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2025 (2) TMI 681
Adjustments of excess Service tax against Service Tax liability - interpretation of the term "month" in terms of Rule 6(4A) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 - HELD THAT:- Going by the provisions of Rule 6(4A) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, it appears that such excess amount paid by the Appellant against its Service Tax liability can be adjusted in the succeeding month or quarter but at this juncture it is also required to reproduce section 13 of General Clauses Act 1897, to give meaning to the use of words ‘month or quarter’, as provided in the Service Tax Rules, which is a statutory provision incorporated by the Central Government.
Going by sub-clause 2 of section 13 that is applicable to all Central Government Acts and Regulations, it is crystal clear that words used in singular would also mean its plural and vice-versa and therefore, adjustments of excess Service Tax paid in subsequent months/quarters can be held to be valid otherwise if, after adjustment in a quarter any balance amount would still be available, that was permitted to be adjusted against excess payment, would lapse to the detriment of the assesse. Apart from the statutory provision also, judicial pronouncements even at the Apex Court level are consistent in giving findings that in construing a statutory provisions words in the singular are to include also its plurals.
Conclusion - Such adjustment of service tax made by the Appellant in different months after such excess payment come to its knowledge, is appropriate and in conformity to Rule-6(4A) of the Service Tax Rules.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 680
Relevant date for calculation of interest on refund claim - Interest on the refund amount has not been granted from the date of the application for refund - seeking grant of interest for the remaining period from 11.11.2016 to 13.06.2022 - HELD THAT:- Reference made to the earlier two orders of the Commissionerate, Jaipur and Gautam Budh Nagar has interpreted the order of the Tribunal transferring the refund claims to the concerned jurisdictional Commissionerate to mean that the date of filing of the original refund application shall be the date of transfer of refund and, therefore, the interest has to be calculated from the said date. The application for refund has now been considered on being transferred to the Jurisdictional Commissionerate. Accordingly, the appellant has been granted interest on the refund amount from the date of the original filing of the refund claim, after a period of three months.
In view of the above two orders, which seems to have been accepted by the Revenue, it is felt that they have rightly interpreted the order of the Tribunal as referred above. The Revenue cannot pick and choose to grant relief in one case and deny the same in the other case. Once the original date of filing of the application has to be considered, the necessary implication is that the grant of interest shall also relate back to the said date after the expiry of three months.
Reference made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Union of India [2011 (10) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT], wherein it has been held that 'interest under Section 11BB of the Act becomes payable, if on an expiry of a period of three months from the date of receipt of the application for refund, the amount claimed is still not refunded.'
Conclusion - The appellant is entitled to interest after the expiry of three months from the date of original filing of the refund application i.e. 11.11.2016 till the date of payment of refund amount i.e. on 13.06.2022.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 679
Levy of Special Additional Excise Duty (SAED) and Additional Duty of Excise (AED) - goods cleared from the SEZ can be considered as goods manufactured within India for the purpose of tax and duties or not - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal committed no error in holding that the charge under the Principal Act, i.e., Section 3(1) of the Act, 1944 does not extend to goods manufactured in SEZ & consequently the Additional duties, i.e., SAED (Surcharge) & AED (Cess) also cannot extend to goods manufactured in SEZ.
The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 678
Levy of penalty u/r 26(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 - Clandestine removal - sale invoices supplied by the appellants without actual despatch/receipt of goods - HELD THAT:- The adjudged demands against the duty evasion having been confirmed against the main noticee SPPL, the issue in respect of duty evasion and consequent confirmation of demands in this case has become final. In this context, it is found that legal provisions under Rule 26(2) of Central Excise Rules, 2002 clearly provide that any person, who issues an excise duty invoice without delivery of the goods, on the basis of which the main noticee SPPL had taken ineligible CENVAT credit, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding the amount of such benefit or five thousand rupees, whichever is greater. On careful reading of the documents on record, it is noticed that the appellants have admitted that they had issued the documents extending CENVAT credit to the manufacturer without supply of inputs, in a few cases.
Considering the overall duty evasion involved in the present case, the penalty imposed on the appellants in the present case is in accordance with the provisions of the Rule 26(2) ibid. The gravity of the offence involved in issue of such invoice or abetting, does not gets diluted as the adjudged demands against duty evasion has become final.
Conclusion - The penalty imposed on the appellants for issuing excise duty invoices without delivering goods was justified based on their admission and the gravity of the offense.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 677
Rejection of appeal as being time barred, ignoring the date of filing of the cross objections by the appellant in computing the limitation - whether the date of filing the cross objections (which is not the correct Form) has to be taken into account while considering the issue of limitation, in preferring the appeal before the Commissioner? - HELD THAT:- There is absolutely no difference in the prayers made either in the cross objections or in the appeal filed. Considering the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, the principle laid down is that it is only a procedural error, which can be rectified and does not warrant dismissal of the appeal. Secondly, in such cases, the limitation would relate back to the date when the original memorandum (though not in the correct form) was filed before the Commissioner (Appeals). The decision of the Single Member in CCE Vs. Nisha Chemicals, Bombay [1986 (4) TMI 172 - CEGAT, BOMBAY] has dealt with the appeal in Form-C.A.-3, which was not the valid form as it was meant for an appeal under Section 129A(1), whereas the appeal was filed under Section 129A(2) and it was observed that the forms are meant for helping the authorities in the disposal of the appeals and the applications and they cannot be interpreted to act as a hindrance to such disposals. In other words, the use of a non-prescribed form will not make the appeal invalid.
Apart from the decisions of the Tribunal, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in Planet POP Foods Pvt. Ltd. Vs. AC, Customs [2017 (2) TMI 422 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and the issue considered was whether to treat the representation made by the petitioner seeking withdrawal of the order-in-original as an appeal to assail the order-in-original. In the said case, the appellant was informed vide letter dated 21.04.2016 that an appeal could be preferred before the Commissioner of Customs and, therefore, the appellant preferred the appeal in the appropriate format on 15.12.2016, however, the appeal was dismissed, as being time barred. In the circumstances, the Court considered, whether the party aggrieved by the order-in-original has lodged its grievance before the appropriate forum within the prescribed time limit. The Court considering the representations sent by the petitioner found that they had sought withdrawal of the order i.e. the order-in-original and, therefore, the representation dated 27.04.2016 was within time, though not in the manner prescribed under the Rules. The Court categorically noted that this was more than an error which pertained to the form than the substance of the matter.
Conclusion - The cross objections filed by the appellant, though initially incorrect, were within the limitation period, and the rectified form related back to the original filing date. Therefore, the appeal was not time-barred.
Matter remanded back to the Commissioner (Appeals), to consider the appeal on merits in accordance with law. The appeal is, therefore, allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (2) TMI 676
Clandestine manufacture and removal - input-output ratio - demand alleging that for production of LABSA, the ratio is to be 1:1.475 whereas the appellant has shown 1:1.45 - suppression of facts or not.
Allegation made out on the basis of theoretical method - HELD THAT:- The allegation has been made out on the basis of theoretical method as stated by Shri K.S. Parasuram, but no chemical examination was done to know how much LAB is required to manufacture LABSA - In that circumstances, the said demand is not sustainable as held by this Tribunal in the case of Shree Durga Cables Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Bhubaneswar-I, [2020 (1) TMI 542 - CESTAT KOLKATA], wherein the Tribunal has held 'In any case, since we have already noted hereinabove, that the whole basis of allegation of clandestine removal is the production pattern of other assessees, which has no legal or scientific basis, the impugned duty demand cannot be sustained.' - Demand not sustained.
Demand of Rs.19,36,934/- was sought to be confirmed against the appellant on the basis of suppression of batch charges for production - HELD THAT:- The mixed quantity required further operation for separation and temporarily stored in the dedicated storage tank and subsequently processing take place, the re-processed batch again placed in a separator like normal batches recovered LABSA and Spent Acid as per norms. The explanation given by the appellant has not been verified or has not been taken up at the time of investigation, same had to be done to know how the batch charge has taken placed then it will be clear. Without any concrete evidence the charge of clandestine removal on the basis of batch charges cannot be confirmed held by this Tribunal in the case of Commr. of Cus., C.E. & S.T., Ghaziabad vs. Auto Gollon Industries P.Ltd. [2018 (1) TMI 307 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] - The adjudicating authority sought to allege clandestine removal on arithmetical calculation of the number of batches charges which is not sustainable under law. Accordingly, the demand of Rs.19,36,934/- is dropped.
Demand of Rs.14,03,998/- sought to be confirmed alleging suppression of production and clandestine removal as evidenced from computer print outs - HELD THAT:- The data in the computer print outs are nothing but movement chart of the respective hired tanker. On the basis of this, the Revenue sought to allege that there is clandestine removal of goods. The computer print outs as explained by the appellant have not been verified by the adjudicating authority from M/s. A.R. Stenchem (P) Ltd. also and it is only on the basis of these print outs, it is alleged that there is a clandestine manufacture and removal of goods. But the said computer print outs are not admissible evidence without following the provisions of Section 36B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, therefore, the said computer print outs cannot be relied upon - the demand of Rs.14,03,998/- is not sustainable, hence dropped.
Demand of Rs.1,93,90,293/- was sought to be confirmed on the basis of diary notes recovered from a diary seized during the course of investigation - HELD THAT:- As Revenue has failed to produce any corroborative evidence to allege clandestine removal of goods and same has been alleged only on the basis of diary notes made by their employee Shri Debasis Ghosh, therefore, the said demand is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Demand of Rs.2,27,850.62 has been confirmed on account of clandestine removal of Spent Acid - HELD THAT:- The said allegation is made on the basis that Spent Acid is generated during the course of production of LABSA, therefore, appellant has suppressed the clearance of Spent Acid. The reply made by the appellant is that the said clearance of Spent Acid depends on production of LABSA and there is no evidence in the show cause notice to support the said allegation and there is no evidence in respect of disproportionate procurement of LAB/Sulphuric Acid illegally by the appellant and no corroborative evidence has been produced - As no such effort has been made by the Revenue and brought in any evidence in support of their allegation and the demand is raised on assumption and presumption only, therefore, demand of Rs.2,27,850.62 is not sustainable. Accordingly the same is set aside.
Cenvat credit of Rs.1,38,040/- was denied on irregular availment of credit on the goods on the basis of some invoices which were not received in their factory - HELD THAT:- The contention of the Ld.Counsel for the appellant is that the appellant has received the goods containing those invoices which has been used in the manufacture of the final product which ultimately suffered the duty. The said fact has not been denied by the Revenue, in that circumstances, the demand of Rs.1,38,040/- is also not sustainable for denial of Cenvat credit and dropped.
Demand on account of shortage of Acid Slurry of Rs.79,675.20 found on 22.11.2001 - HELD THAT:- The measurement of the said Acid Slurry was done only on eye estimation basis. No actual stock taking was taken, in that circumstances, the shortage cannot be alleged against the appellant on the basis of eye estimation, therefore, the said demand of Rs.79,675.20 is also not sustainable hence dropped.
Demand of Rs.3,27,046/- has been alleged as short payment of Central excise on account of sale through consignment agent, on the value at which the goods were sold from the consignment agent’s place - HELD THAT:- To find out how much is short payment on account of Central Excise duty on account of sale through consignment agent is required to be verified. For that purpose we remand the matter back to the adjudicating authority only to verify how much duty is payable by the appellant on account of sale through consignment agent. If the appellant has paid duty correctly of Rs.40,707/-, no demand is sustainable against the appellant - the case made against the appellant by the Revenue is only on the basis of assumption and presumption, therefore, in such cases without bringing any evidence on record of procurement of raw material from other sources demands are not sustainable.
Penalties - HELD THAT:- In the facts and circumstances of the case no penalty is imposable on the appellants. Accordingly, penalties imposed on the appellant and co-appellants are set aside.
Conclusion - i) Demands based on theoretical calculations without corroborative evidence are unsustainable. ii) Admissibility of evidence such as computer printouts requires compliance with statutory provisions. iii) Extended periods of limitation require evidence of deliberate withholding of information. iv) Penalties cannot be imposed without substantiated demands.
Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (2) TMI 675
Interpretation of statute - New conditions for allowing ITC - Whether Rule 21(8) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (Punjab VAT Rules) could have been introduced during the period between 25.01.2014 to 01.04.2014 when there was no enabling provision in the parent statute i.e. the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (Punjab VAT Act)? - HELD THAT:- Punjab VAT Act was amended the second time by the Punjab Value Added Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 2013 (Punjab Act No. 38 of 2013). Though as per Section 1(2) of the Second Amendment Act, the same was to come into force at once, the proviso thereto mentioned that amendment of sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall come into force on and with effect from the first day of April, 2014 i.e. from 01.04.2014. Section 5 of the Second Amendment Act deals with amendment to Section 13 of the Punjab VAT Act.
A taxable person who had stock in trade as on 25.01.2014 or as on 01.02.2014 had already paid the tax while making the purchase of such goods. In this case, the purchase was made by paying higher rate of tax on iron and steel goods to be used as input for the purpose of manufacture etc. of taxable goods. The taxable person who is otherwise entitled to avail input tax credit on the goods already purchased and lying in stock would suffer serious prejudice and loss if his entitlement to input tax credit are reduced by virtue of lowering of the rate of tax on such goods on a subsequent date. High Court has noted that the enabling provision in the statute came into effect on and from 01.04.2014 and, therefore, Rule 21(8) of the Punjab VAT Rules which permits application of the reduced rate of tax cannot be given effect to transactions which already stood concluded prior thereto. It could only be applied to transactions on and from 01.04.2014.
In Eicher Motors Limited Vs. Union of India [1999 (1) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT], a three- Judge Bench of this Court examined the challenge to the validity and application of the scheme as modified by way of introduction to Rule 57(F) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 under which credit which was lying unutilised as on 16.03.1995 with the manufacturers stood lapsed in the manner set out therein. While examining the above issue, this Court held that if on the inputs, the assessee had already paid the taxes on the basis that when the goods are utilised in the manufacture of further products as inputs thereto then the tax on these goods gets adjusted which are sold subsequently. Thus, a right accrued to the assessee on the date when he paid the tax on the raw material or the input would continue until the facility available thereto gets worked out or until those goods existed. The impugned rule cannot be applied to the goods manufactured prior to the date it came into force i.e. 16.03.1995 on which duty had been paid and credit facility thereto has been availed of for the purpose of manufacture of further goods.
The respondent had earned input tax credit on purchase of iron and steel goods which it kept as its stock in trade to be used as inputs or raw materials in the manufacture etc. of taxable goods. State lowered the rate of tax with effect from 01.02.2014 on those goods. The related amendments in the rules i.e. Rule 21(8) of the Punjab VAT Rules were notified on 25.01.2014 to come into effect from 01.02.2014. There was however no corresponding provision in the parent statute i.e. Punjab VAT Act which permitted availing of input tax credit at the lower rate of tax on the existing stock in trade though the purchase of such input was already made at a higher rate of tax thereby reducing the quantum of credit. The enabling provision in the statute i.e. first proviso to Section 13(1) of the Punjab VAT Act came into force with effect from 01.04.2014.
Under sub-section (9) of section 13, a person is under a mandate to reverse input tax credit availed by him on goods which could not be used for the purposes specified in subsection (1) of Section 13 of the Punjab VAT Act or which remained in stock at the time of closure of business. If the interpretation sought to be given to Rule 21(8) of the Punjab VAT Rules by the State is accepted, the natural corollary would be that reversal of input tax credit would be at the lower rate of tax on the goods in question when those goods could not be used for the purposes specified in Section 13(1) or which remained as part of the stock in trade at the time of closure of business. Such an interpretation besides being fallacious, would also lead to revenue loss for the State exchequer.
Conclusion - The interpretation given by the High Court to the applicability of Rule 21(8) of the Punjab VAT Rules read with the amended first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Punjab VAT Act is legally sound and warrants no interference.
There are no merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 674
Dishonour of Cheque - vicarious liability of non-executive director - case of appellant is that Appellant had resigned from the company well before the offence occurred - Section 141 of the NI Act - HELD THAT:- This Court has consistently held that a mere designation as a director does not conclusively establish liability under section 138 read with section 141 of the NI Act. Liability is contingent upon specific allegations demonstrating the director’s active involvement in the company’s affairs at the relevant time.
In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Another, [2005 (9) TMI 304 - SUPREME COURT], this Court laid down that mere designation as a director is not sufficient; specific role and responsibility must be established in the complaint.
Upon perusal of the record and submissions of the parties, it is evident that the Appellant was neither a signatory to the dishonoured cheques nor was he actively involved in the financial decision-making of the company. Moreover, he resigned from the post of independent non-executive director on 03.05.2017, duly notified through Form DIR-11 and DIR-12 to the Registrar of Companies - Petitioner’s role in the accused company was limited to that of an independent non-executive director, with no financial responsibilities or involvement in the day-to-day operations of the company. Furthermore, he was not responsible for the conduct of its business.
Conclusion - The Appellant cannot be held vicariously liable under section 141 of the NI Act. The complaints do not meet the mandatory legal requirements to implicate him.
The Impugned Judgment and Order dated 06.08.2019 of the High Court is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 673
Dishonour of Cheque - nullification of conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by High Court based on a compromise reached between the parties after the appellate court has confirmed the conviction - HELD THAT:- It is well settled that inherent power of the Court can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigants and nor a specific remedy as provided by the statute. It is also well settled that if an effective, alternative remedy is available, the High Court will not exercise its inherent power, especially when the Revision Petitioner may not have availed of that remedy. The power can be exercised by the High Court to secure the ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of any court and to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or Act, depending upon the facts of the given case. This Court can always take note of any miscarriage of justice and prevent the same by exercising its power. These powers are neither limited, nor curtailed by any other provision of the Code or Act. However, such inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
In the instant case, it is true that the appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentence was upheld by the appellate court, but it cannot be lost sight of the fact that this Court has power to intervene in exercise of its power only with a view to do the substantial justice or to avoid a miscarriage and the spirit of compromise arrived at between the parties. This is perfectly justified and legal too.
In the case of Krishan Vs. Krishnaveni, [1997 (1) TMI 529 - SUPREME COURT], Hon'ble the Apex Court has held that though the inherent power of the High Court is very wide, yet the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously particularly in a case where the applicant is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may in its discretion prevent the abuse of process or miscarriage of justice by exercising its power.
Merely because the litigation has reached to a revisional stage or that even beyond that stage, the nature and character of the offence would not change automatically and it would be wrong to hold that at revisional stage, the nature of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act should be treated as if the same is falling under table-II of Section 320 IPC.
In the instant case, the problem herein is with the tendency of litigants to belatedly choose compounding as a means to resolve their dispute, furthermore, the arguments on behalf of the Govt. Advocate (crl.side) on the fact that unlike Section 320 Cr.P.C., Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides no explicit guidance as to what stage compounding can or cannot be done and whether compounding can be done at the instance of the complainant or with the leave of the court.
Conclusion - Taking into account the fact that the parties have settled the dispute amicably by way of compromise, this Court is of the view that the compounding of the offence as required to be permitted.
The present Criminal Revision Case is disposed of in terms of Memorandum of Compromise arrived at between the parties to this litigation out of Court.
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2025 (2) TMI 672
The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta, condoned the delay in refiling, issued notice on the application for condonation of delay in filing and on the Special Leave Petition, stayed the operation of the impugned order, and scheduled a post along with Diary No. 28069 of 2024. The Respondent did not appear.
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2025 (2) TMI 671
Challenge to ex parte impugned order and N/N. 56/2023-Central Tax dated 28th December, 2023 and Notification No. 56/2023-State Tax dated 11th July, 2024 - one ground that is pressed by the Petitioner is that the impugned SCN as also the impugned order are both unsigned - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the impugned SCN and the impugned order would show that there are no digital signatures or scanned signatures on the same. Clearly, the present case would be covered by the decision of the Coordinate Bench in Marg Erp Ltd. through its Authorised Representative Mr. Mehender Singh v. Commissioner of DGST Delhi & Anr. [2023 (2) TMI 395 - DELHI HIGH COURT] wherein the Court has clearly held that an unsigned notice or order would not be sustainable in law.
The impugned order is set aside - Petition disposed off.
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2025 (2) TMI 670
Violation of natural justice - appellant was not given an opportunity of being heard while passing the impugned order - HELD THAT:- On a consideration of the matter, however, it is found that in response to Ext.P2 notice, the appellant had submitted Ext.P4 reply and in the said reply, he had also requested for a period of 15 days to file clarifications to one of the issues raised in the show cause notice. In Ext.P3 summary of show cause notice that was sent along with the show cause notice, the date by which the reply had to be submitted was indicated as 27.12.2024, and the personal hearing was fixed at 12.10 p.m. on 06.01.2025.
There are no reason to take a different view from that taken by the learned Single Judge to find that Ext.P6 order was not passed in violation of the rules of natural justice.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 669
Seeking the direction to upload an Order-in-Original on an online portal under the GSTIN - pre-deposit of 10% as mandated u/s 107 of Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 already made - HELD THAT:- The Writ Petition is disposed of.
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2025 (2) TMI 668
Seeking grant of regular bail - applicant is ready and willing to repay the amount of Input Tax Credit, which was wrongfully availed by the present applicant, as alleged in the FIR - HELD THAT:- From the record it appears that apart from the present F.I.R., several other F.I.R. appears to have been lodged against the present applicant.
The applicant has sought to rely upon the order passed by this Court dated 09.01.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.22792 of 2024 wherein this Court had exercised discretion in favour of the present applicant in the F.I.R. which was pertaining to similar offence registered against the applicant. However, in the said case, the applicant was arrested on 08.10.2024 and had undergone imprisonment for a period of three months. The said F.I.R. was registered on 07.10.2024 and investigation in the said case was virtually over. In the present case, the F.I.R. has been lodged on 27.11.2024. The investigation of the present offence is still in progress. Moreover, after registration of the F.I.R., wherein the applicant has been considered for grant of bail by this Court, several other offence of similar nature have been registered against him.
This Court is not inclined to exercise its judicial discretion in favour of the applicant at this stage. The application is dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 667
Seeking to quash the impugned orders passed by the second respondent under Section 73 of CGST Act - respondents submitted that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal before the Appellate Commissioner under Section 107 of the TNGST Act, 2017 against the impugned order - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is directed to first exhaust the statutory remedy available under law before approaching this Court. The petitioner shall prefer an appeal together with necessary pre-deposit within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Upon filing of the appeal together with necessary pre-deposit, the Appellate Commissioner shall entertain the appeal without reference to the period of limitation and dispose of the same on merits and in accordance with law, within a period of two months thereafter.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (2) TMI 666
Violation of principles of natural justice - Challenge to SCN on the ground of denial of opportunity to cross examine witnesses - alleged suppression of turnover during the financial years 2017-18 to 2023-24 - HELD THAT:- It is clear from the said statutory provisions that the power of the proper officer under Section 74 (1) is to determine whether any of the factors leading to tax evasion exist in relation to an assessee during any financial/assessment year and initiate proceedings under the said Section within the time frame contemplated under Section 74 (1) of the CGST Act. The said exercise is to be conducted in relation to each of the years in which such pre-conditions exist for the invocation of the power under Section 74 (1). While there may be cases where the data available with the proper officer is such that it suggests the existence of pre-conditions for more than one financial/assessment years, the proper officer should ideally issue separate show cause notices to cover the different financial/assessment years since the period available to the Department for adjudication of the show cause notices varies depending upon the due date for furnishing of annual return for that year.
The proximate expiry of the limitation period under Section 74 (10) is only in relation to one of the six financial/assessment years, the contentions of the assessee and the opportunity available to an assessee for adducing evidence in relation to the other years cannot be rendered illusory by forcing upon the assessee the period of limitation prescribed under Section 74 (1) for passing the final order in relation to the earliest financial/assessment year [2017-18]. The statutory period available for an assessee to put forth its contentions against the show cause notice in an effective manner cannot be curtailed by an unnecessary act on the part of the Department in issuing a consolidated show cause notice that includes therein a financial/assessment year in relation to which the period for passing a final order expires earlier.
There is yet another aspect of the matter. If a consolidated notice for various financial/assessment years is issued, the total amount of tax, penalty etc. determined as payable by the assessee may increase exponentially depending upon the number of financial/assessment years included in the consolidated notice. The determination of tax, penalty etc. would be in respect of all the financial/assessment years put together. That would go against the provisions of sub-sections (9) and (10) of Section 74 which specifically refer to the “financial year to which the tax not paid or short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised relates” while stipulating the last date for passing the adjudication order. A consolidated notice would also result in a consolidated adjudication order covering several financial/assessment years and in the event of it being adverse to the assessee, the fee/pre-deposit required to be paid by an assessee for preferring a statutory appeal would also be higher.
Conclusion - The power of the proper officer is to determine tax evasion for each year separately, issuing show cause notices accordingly. Issuing a consolidated notice could prejudice the assessee's rights and lead to increased tax liabilities across multiple years, contrary to the principles of fairness in taxation.
There are no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge - appeal dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 665
Invocation of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution - petitioner argued that the appeal was filed within the prescribed time limit despite receiving the order after the date mentioned on it - HELD THAT:- The Additional Commissioner has clearly taken an extremely narrow and pedantic view since the condonable period of an additional 30 days was one which was clearly applicable and could have been invoked for the purposes of entertaining the appeal and trying the challenge on merits.
The Order-in-Appeal of the Additional Commissioner dated 29 December 2023 is quashed - petition allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 664
Challenge to impugned order and also the order passed on the rectification petition under Section 161 of the GST Act - order has been passed without assigning any reason while rejecting the petitioner's objection - violation of principles of natural justice - The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that they would redo the assessment after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner - HELD THAT:- The impugned orders are set aside. The respondent shall pass a speaking order after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, taking into account the reply and any document that may be filed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of.
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2025 (2) TMI 663
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy - cancellation of petitioner's GST registration - HELD THAT:- A reading of the impugned order indicates that there is no discussion to the reply dated 17.12.2021 filed by the petitioner in response to show cause notice in Form GST-REG-17/31 dated 16.12.2021. Considering the same, this writ petition is disposed by remitting the case to the respondent to pass a fresh order on merits within a period of two months. Pending such exercise, the registration of the petitioner shall continue to stand suspended. Revival of the GST registration will be subject to final order to be passed by the respondent. Such order shall be passed within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Petition disposed off.
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