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Showing 501 to 520 of 615 Records
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2003 (3) TMI 115
Summary of the legal judgment:
The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order without giving reasons. The Designated Authority was directed to consider if the closure of Birla Periclase factory was due to dumping by Chinese exporters, assess the justification of continuing anti-dumping duty, and review the levy of duty from February 2, 1999. The Designated Authority was given 3 months to complete the review, with existing import arrangements to continue. If duty is justified, importers must honor bonds, and duties collected will abide by the review result. The Appeals were disposed of with no costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 114
The Supreme Court upheld the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal's decision regarding the application of resin to sand. Sand used for captive consumption is exempt from duty under Notification No. 217/86-C.E. If sand is sold, duty is payable. The appeals against the Tribunal's order were dismissed with no costs awarded.
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2003 (3) TMI 113
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit - Held that:- The reasoning given in support of such order is wholly unsatisfactory. The appellate authority has not at all considered the prima facie merits and has concentrated upon the prima facie balance of convenience in the case. The Appellate Authority should have addressed its mind to the prima facie merits of the appellants' case and upon being satisfied of the same determined the quantum of deposit taking into consideration the financial hardship and other such relevant factors - Matter remitted back - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2003 (3) TMI 112
Issues:
- Entitlement to benefit of Notification No. 75 of 1994 for duty exemption on Ayurvedic preparation sold under specified name.
Analysis:
1. Entitlement to Benefit of Notification:
The appeals in this case were against the orders of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) regarding the entitlement to the benefit of Notification No. 75 of 1994 for duty exemption on Ayurvedic preparations sold under specified names. The central issue was whether the appellants, manufacturing Maha Bhringaraj oil, were entitled to this benefit. The Tribunal had ruled against the appellants, denying them the benefit of the Notification.
2. Compliance with Formula and Name Specification:
The appellants were manufacturing Ayurvedic preparation in compliance with the formula prescribed in authoritative books. However, they were selling the product under the name "Maha Bhringol," which was not the specified name in the books or pharmacopoeia. The appellants argued that using additional words like "Maha Bhringol" should not disqualify them from the Notification's benefit, as it was not a trade or brand name, and they had no proprietary rights over it.
3. Interpretation of Trade Notice:
The appellants relied on a Trade Notice to support their case, which provided examples to clarify the application of the Notification. They contended that their case fell under the situation where the product was sold with additional words, similar to the examples provided in the Trade Notice. However, the Court emphasized that the crucial factor was how the product was sold, irrespective of whether the additional words were a brand or trade name.
4. Product Labeling and Sales Name:
Upon reviewing the product wrappers and classification list, it was evident that the product was being sold as "Maha Bhringol," with "Maha Bhringraj Oil" mentioned in smaller type. Despite the appellants' arguments, the Court emphasized that selling the product under the name "Maha Bhringol" did not align with the names specified in the Ayurvedic books or pharmacopoeias, rendering them ineligible for the Notification's benefit.
5. Judgment and Dismissal of Appeals:
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no fault in the Tribunal's judgments and dismissed the appeals. The Court concluded that as long as the product was sold under the name "Maha Bhringol," deviating from the specified names in the relevant books, the appellants were not entitled to the duty exemption under Notification No. 75 of 1994. The decision was made without any order as to costs, upholding the Tribunal's rulings.
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2003 (3) TMI 111
The Supreme Court set aside the Customs, Excise, and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal's order as it lacked jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed, and no costs were awarded. The Court clarified that the decision did not delve into the case's merits, leaving the respondent free to pursue further legal options if entitled to do so.
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2003 (3) TMI 110
Issues involved:
The issue involves whether excise duty is payable on parts replaced during the warranty period.
Summary:
The appellants, manufacturers of heavy electrical equipment, charge a "complaint reserve" at the time of sale, which is not returned to the customer if parts are not replaced during the warranty period. The Collector and the Tribunal held that excise duty was payable on replaced parts, leading to the appeals.
It was argued that since the part is replaced free of cost during the warranty period, and the sale price includes the price of the part, there should not be a double levy of excise duty. However, the Court found no substance in this argument, stating that the total amount paid by the customer, including the "complaint reserve," is considered the price for the machinery.
Another submission was that the value of replaced parts should be considered zero, hence no excise duty should be payable. The Court rejected this argument, explaining that offering warranties or incentives does not exempt excisable goods from duty, as manufacturers bear the cost of such replacements.
Ultimately, the Court upheld the Tribunal's judgment, finding no infirmity, and dismissed the appeals without costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 109
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Revenue against a consent order passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. The appeal was based on an issue covered in favor of the assessee by a previous tribunal judgment. The Court refused to accept the Revenue's argument that the concession made before the Tribunal was not binding. An amicus curiae assisted the court as the assessee was unrepresented.
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2003 (3) TMI 108
The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's interpretation of Notification No. 65 of 1987, stating that duty must be paid on terry-towelling fabric under Heading "5802.12". Respondents will be given adjustment for duty paid on towels, with a refund allowed if excess duty was paid. The order applies only for the period of the notification. Appeal stands disposed of.
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2003 (3) TMI 107
Whether the respondent is entitled to the benefit of exemption under the notification dated March 1, 1986, with effect from March 31, 1988, the date on which registration was granted?
Held that:- Remit the matter to the Tribunal to hear the parties and record a clear finding as to whether the first application made on 3rd December, 1986 was an application for registration whether provisional or permanent, and whether the second application made sometime in February/March, 1988 was an application which was supplemental in nature or in continuation of the first application made on 3rd December, 1986. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the application made on the 3rd of December, 1986 was rejected, then the benefit, of exemption should be extended to the respondent only with effect from the date of the second application made sometime in February, 1988. However, if the Tribunal comes to the finding that the first application made on 3rd December, 1986 remained pending and the second application made sometime in February/March, 1988 was merely a continuation of the first application, being supplemental in nature, then the respondent would be entitled to the benefit of exemption with effect, from the date of the first application i.e. from 3rd December, 1986. The Tribunal will dispose of the appeal accordingly.
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2003 (3) TMI 106
Whether the goods could be said to be regenerated second grade MMM?
Held that:- The burden of proof was on taxing authority to show that imported goods were not regenerated second grade MMM. Mere assertion by the department was of no avail as heavy burden was on the department to lay evidence that the test reports which were given by the Government Institutions were incorrect or erroneous. No such attempt was made and the test carried out before the Commissioner (Appeals) by IIT Expert revealed that the contention of the appellant was justified.
An important fact overlooked by the Tribunal is that because of an earlier report of the CRCL with respect to the Delhi consignment to the effect that it was unable to test the samples for regenerated second grade MMM, the department had sent samples from the Delhi consignment to the IIT, Delhi and the IIT, Delhi vide its report dated 18-7-1996 had opined that the goods were of regenerated second grade quality. This report had been placed on record. The CEGAT accepted the fact that the goods forming part of the Delhi consignment were identical to the goods in question that is goods of the Ludhiana consignment. This IIT report left no scope to sustain the stand of the department. In our view the report obtained at the instance of the department itself had great force and it should not have been ignored.
It is important to note that the report of the CRCL, New Delhi relied upon by the department does not unequivocally state that the goods were not regenerated second grade MMM. The report is carefully worded and gives an impression that something is sought to be concealed rather than truth being revealed. The onus is on the department to establish that it is a case of mis-declaration of goods. The department has miserably failed to discharge that onus in the present case. Therefore, we are unable to sustain the stand of the department. The impugned judgment of the CEGAT cannot be upheld. The same is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The order of the Commissioner of Customs, Amritsar, is restored.
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2003 (3) TMI 105
Whether there was an error apparent on the face of the record of the judgment dated 15-6-1998 as argued by the led coarneunsel for the appellant?
Whether the Tribunal has erred in holding that the 'Taspa' yarn is classifiable and assessable to duty of excise under Heading No. 56.06?
Held that:- The yarn manufactured by the appellant is only 'Taspa' yarn/fancy yarn and is classifiable and chargeable to duty under Chapter Heading No. 56.06 of the Central Excise Tariff and, therefore, the appellant is liable to pay duty in contravention of Rule 174 read with Section 6 etc. of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.
No error of law or any perversity in the reasoning adopted by the Commissioner or by the Tribunal on the facts of these cases. On the contrary, in our view, the decision of the Commissioner and the Tribunal are well sustained on the evidence on record and calls for no interference in these appeals moved by the appellant. The orders passed by the Commissioner as confirmed by the Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal confirmed and reject these appeals.
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2003 (3) TMI 104
Benefit of Notification No. 175/1986-C.E., dated 1st March, 1986 denied - Held that:- Where inputs which are specified goods, are used within the factory of production for further manufacture of finished goods which are also specified goods, the clearance of such inputs for such use shall not be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the aggregate value of clearances under this notification. There appears to be a rationale behind this Explanation; firstly, when the value of the finished goods, which are exempted under different notifications, is to be excluded, having regard to the wording of Explanation II, on the same analogy, the value of inputs which are being used for manufacture of finished goods are also excluded as both are specified goods, subject, of course, to the limit of the notification. Secondly, the notification provides relief to small scale industries; when the inputs which enjoys the exemption under the notification have already been dealt with, there is no reason why the value of the same inputs again be added for the purposes of aggregate value. It follows that the assessee would be entitled to the benefit of Explanation III while computing the aggregate value for the purposes of availing exemption under the notification.
No illegality in the order of the Tribunal. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed
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2003 (3) TMI 103
Whether the differential discount between stockists discount and sub-stockists discount passed on to the stockists by the assessee, is deductible in assessing the excisable value of the goods sold to the sub-stockists?
Held that:- From the contentions raised before the Tribunal it appears to have been urged for the assessees that the differential between the higher discount to their stockists and the lower discount to the sub-stockists was passed on to the stockists as commission. If that be the plea, even otherwise, the differential discount cannot be accepted for the purpose of sub-clause (ii) as a permissible deduction. [See : Seshasayee Paper and Boards Limited v. Collector of Central Excise [1990 (2) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA].
For the aforementioned reason, the differential discount has rightly been disallowed as deduction by the Tribunal in computing the excisable value of the tractors sold by the assessees to the sub-stockists. The appeals fail
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2003 (3) TMI 102
Whether the product in question can be classified as a cosmetics and toilet preparation falling under Tariff Item 33.04 or as patent or proprietary medicine under Tariff Item No. 30.03 ?
Held that:- After verification of the entire evidence and the certificates produced on record as well as the report of the Chemical Analyser, the Tribunal rightly arrived at the conclusion that the product in question is oil used for massage and would be covered by heading 33.04.
The oil is not used for cure of skin but is oil for massage and it takes care of the skin. Against assessee.
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2003 (3) TMI 101
Claim of exemption under Notification No. 217/86
Held that:- The assessee is a SSI unit and is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 175/86. It is not clear from the record as to whether the same inputs in regard to which exemption under Notification No. 217/86 was claimed by the assessee had gone into the manufacture of final products which are said to have been cleared up to a limit of Rs. 20 lakhs. It will suffice to observe that we leave it open to the Excise authorities to verify the said fact. If the claim of exemption under Notification No. 217/86 is in regard to inputs which have gone into manufacture of the final products which were cleared under Notification No. 175/86, there can be no further demand of excise duty, even though the assessee claimed exemption under Notification No. 217/86. But, if under Notification No. 175/86 the clearance value of the inputs was already excluded in arriving at the aggregate value of Rs. 20 lakhs and claim for exemption of inputs under Notification No. 217/86 relates to different final products which are exempt under a different notification, then the assessee will be liable to pay the duty in demand. We confirm the order of the Tribunal and dismiss these appeals.
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2003 (3) TMI 100
Issues Involved: Appeal against the Final Order of Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal to determine if the Tribunal was correct in reversing the order of the Assistant Collector as confirmed by the Collector.
Summary:
In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the controversy surrounding the valuation of excisable goods for charging excise duty under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Act specifies that the duty of excise is chargeable based on the normal price at which goods are sold in wholesale trade, provided certain conditions are met. The respondent-assessee sold refrigeration machinery parts in wholesale trade at a price approved by the Excise authorities. The show cause notice alleged that the cost of production exceeded the wholesale price, leading to a demand for differential duty. However, the notice did not raise concerns about the genuineness of the sale price or any flowback of money from the buyer to the assessee. The Court held that in the absence of such factors, the normal price was ascertainable, and the goods were sold at the correct price as per Section 4(1)(a) of the Act.
The Court referenced a previous judgment and concluded that the nearest ascertainable equivalent of the normal price under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 would not apply in this case. It upheld the Tribunal's decision to accept the wholesale price as the correct price, dismissing the appeal and finding no illegality in setting aside the Collector's order. The appeal was ultimately dismissed with no costs incurred.
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2003 (3) TMI 99
Whether denial of opportunity to the GTC to cross-examine Shri Sailo, Lalchunganga and Liangtilinga was nothing short of denial of reasonable opportunity to the Writ Petitioner to defend and establish its version?
Held that:- An adverse finding could not have been recorded against the GTC by relying upon the oral submissions made by a co-noticee at the hearing without any supporting material on record, providing due opportunity to GTC to meet the same. This appeal is accepted in part and directions issued by the High Court to the Collector to summon Shri Sailo, Liantilinga and Lalchungunga for necessary examination and to afford an opportunity to the GTC to cross-examine them are set aside. But the order of the High Court setting aside the order of the Collector is sustained on the ground that the Collector had erred in placing reliance on the submissions of Shri Sailo. The direction issued by the High Court that the proceedings shall be taken by the officer other than the one who had made the adjudication order shall also stand set aside. Otherwise also this direction has become infructuous with the passage of time. The incumbent Collector is directed to decide the matter afresh on the basis of any other material obtained and also placed on record for the purpose duly granting reasonable opportunity to GTC to produce evidence in rebuttal.
The Collector is directed to dispose of the matter within four months from the date of appearance of the parties before it. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Collector of Customs, Shillong on 5th May, 2003. No costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 98
Whether show cause notice dated March 6, 1998 issued by the Deputy Collector, Central Excise, Jaipur, invoking proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is valid in law?
Held that:- The contention that the impugned notice be treated as valid in regard to shorter period of six months is devoid of merit. Once the notice is issued under the proviso for the larger period, it cannot be treated as notice under main Section 11A for shorter period of six months. To enable this Court to ascertain the content of the impugned notice issued to find out whether it is severable as contended by the learned Counsel, time was granted to the Revenue to produce a copy thereof. In spite of the fact that a period of about eleven months has elapsed from the last date of hearing, a copy of the notice has not been produced. A perusal of the order of the Collector shows that he recorded the finding of suppression of fact. Even for shorter period notice based on the grounds contained in the proviso could be issued only by the Collector, therefore, the contention to treat the show cause notice for shorter period of six months cannot be accepted. Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 97
Whether the car air-conditioning kit is classifiable under item No. 3 or under Item No. 8 of the table to the said Notification No. 166/86-C.E., dated March 1, 1986?
Held that:- For purposes of the Notification, the term "car air-conditioner kit" or "car air-conditioning kit" shall exclude the kit or assembly of parts which contains automotive gas compressor with or without magnetic clutch. In our view, the Explanation has the effect of taking away the automotive gas compressor (with or without magnetic clutch) from out of the car air-conditioning kit. The car air-conditioning kit which comprises of parts of car air-conditioner remains as part of Item No. 8 of the notification. The Explanation cannot be so construed as to remove the term "car air-conditioner kit" or "air-conditioning kit" itself from Item No. 8 of the Notification. What follows is that 'car air-conditioning kit minus automotive gas compressor with or without magnetic clutch' will remain in the description of goods against Item No. 8 of the Notification and that the excluded part of the kit, namely, automotive gas compressor with or without magnetic clutch, will cease to be part of Item No. 8 and will be liable to duty separately. Appeal allowed.
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2003 (3) TMI 96
Whether the regular assessment orders were barred by time?
Whether use of the word "return", instead of "refund", does not make any difference to the right?
Held that:- Section 50 of the 1922 Act, as modified by rule 4A, is a provision of the statute which was required to be applied by the High Court at the time of considering the relief, if any, to be granted in the writ petition. The claim being barred by time, the writ petition could not have been allowed nor could any relief be granted. The first contention, therefore, fails.
The money which was paid as provisional tax became returnable on the date on which the right of the Revenue authorities to make a regular assessment under section 12 came to an end. Assuming that there was a right in the respondent-assessee to reclaim this money, such a right ought to have been exercised within a period of three years under the residuary article 137 of the Limitation Act, after which even such a right must be held to be barred. There is no doubt that by the time the assessee asserted his so called right, even this period had expired in respect of the assessment years in question. The contention based on article 265 of the Constitution also must, therefore, fail.
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