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Showing 61 to 80 of 317 Records
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1991 (7) TMI 330 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as Compilation of Notifications under section 49 of Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 (Act No. 1 of 1970), Volume I, by Mr. M.C. Padia. It therefore becomes clear that a special treatment was given to the commodity in question, namely water for injection as entry 83 in the abovesaid Notification with effect from April 1, 1976. It appears that the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the Deputy Commissioner was right in not giving the prospective effect to his orders. It is clear that at any rate the changed effect ought to have been given to the commodity from the date of notification that is from April 1, 1976. This question therefore also requires to be replied and answered in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We therefore hereby accordingly answer and reply all the abovesaid three questions in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue, with no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1991 (7) TMI 329 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... respectively. This, however, does not preclude the first respondent from taking appropriate action in the matter including initiation of proceedings for the alleged evasion of tax by the petitioner. 4.. It is, however, submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice dated June 12, 1991, to the petitioner in order to initiate any consequential proceedings under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 or the Rules made thereunder, as the turnover in the instant case admittedly exceeds Rs. 10,00,000. If the petitioner submits explanation to the show cause notice issued to him and raises any such objection as to the jurisdiction of the first respondent, the same shall be considered by the first respondent and appropriate orders be passed. 5.. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Writ petition partly allowed.
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1991 (7) TMI 328 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Act. The writ petitions have been filed by most of the petitioners against the notices only. It is no doubt correct that most of the petitioners had approached this Court against the notices. However, the view of the authorities is apparent from the orders produced by the petitioner in C.W.P. No. 6919 of 1987. In that view of the matter, no useful purpose would have been served by their submitting to the jurisdiction of the departmental authorities. As such, the objections raised on behalf of the respondents cannot be sustained. In view of the above conclusion, I have not considered it necessary to go into the various other submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the limitation, etc. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. The impugned orders at annexures P4 and P5 in C.W.P. No. 6919 of 1987 and the notices in the other cases are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1991 (7) TMI 327 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ver where the turnover exceeds ten lakhs of rupees. The assessing authority in the instant case had levied tax at the same rate and, therefore, no fault can be found with the levy of tax by the assessing authority. So far as the other pleas of the assessee are concerned, we have already negatived them while dealing with Tax Case (Revision) No. 1291 of 1981. Hence, the same reasons impel us to reject the pleas raised on behalf of the assessee in this case also and consequently Tax Case (Revision) No. 1290 of 1981 also fails. 10.. Thus, from what we have said above, we find that the levy of surcharge under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax (Surcharge) Act, 1971 and of the additional tax under the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970 by the assessing authority, as upheld by the appellate authority and the Tribunal, does not call for any interference at our hands. Both the tax revision cases, therefore, fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 326 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... per during the relevant period necessarily has to be considered provided of course, it is a registered dealer. This question also therefore requires to be considered afresh. 14.. The Tribunal in our view has not considered the questions in the right perspective. The order, therefore, is liable to be set aside. The entire matter therefore requires to be considered afresh. We, accordingly, set aside the assessment order and the orders of the appellate authorities and direct the assessing authority to redo the assessment keeping in view the principles stated in the judgment. The assessing authority shall give the assessee an opportunity to produce evidence in support of his various contentions before the matter is finally disposed of. The assessment for 1984-85 requires reconsideration. The order for 1983-84 is confirmed and 1984-85 is remanded for a de novo consideration. The exemptions already granted shall not be reopened. The T.R.Cs are allowed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1991 (7) TMI 325 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quired to be disallowed. In the same way, further the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that when licensed dealer had made the first sale of declared goods to a dealer who was not holding a valid licence then the protection as provided under section 9(4) of the Gujarat Act, 1969 was not available. In the same way it further becomes clear that the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the dealer being the last licensed dealer who had sold the goods to a dealer not holding the licence, was rightly assessed to the tax on such transactions of sales. In view of this position all the questions in the second set also require to be answered and replied in affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. Therefore we hereby accordingly reply and answer all the abovesaid questions referred to this High Court in two sets in affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue with no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1991 (7) TMI 324 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trical goods either in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, we have to necessarily construe it and understand the same in the sense it is used in common parlance . In holding so, the Bench also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh 1967 19 STC 469, where it was observed while interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not to the scientific or the technical meaning of such terms, but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense . Seen in this light, there can be no escape from the conclusion that electric fans and electric presses are clearly electrical goods within the meaning of entry 17 of Schedule A of the Act. The reference is thus answered in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1991 (7) TMI 323 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hotographic camera inasmuch as it enlarges the copies. If one reads entry 75 carefully, it is evident that the entry covers photographic and other cameras. It is not meant to cover the copying machine like xerox machines. Simply because one additional function of the xerox machine is to contract or enlarge the original writing, it cannot be said that xerox machine is a photographic camera or any other cameras falling in entry 75. So also even if the basic principle on which the xerox machine works is the principle of photography and surface electrification, it does not become photographic camera or other camera. We see no infirmity in the reasons given and conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal when it decided that xerox machine is covered by entry 79 of Schedule II, Part A to the Act. 10.. In the result, the reference is answered as indicated in para 2 of this judgment. Reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1991 (7) TMI 322 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... silent of any discussion about the levy of penalty. No finding has been recorded about the existence of grounds for the imposition of penalty. The order of the Tribunal upholding the levy of penalty without dealing with the submission and the pleas of the assessee against such levy, cannot be sustained. We, therefore, while upholding the order of the Tribunal in so far as it relates to the order of assessment, set aside the order of the Tribunal where it confirmed the levy of penalty without any discussion whatsoever. We remand the cases to the Tribunal to decide afresh about the question of penalty under section 12(3) of the Act by making a proper judicial determination with regard thereto. The Tribunal shall pass fresh orders on the question of penalty after hearing the parties. 8.. The tax revision cases, therefore, partly, succeed to the extent indicated above, and in that view of the matter, there shall be no order as to costs in both the cases. Petition partly allowed.
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1991 (7) TMI 321 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g the buyer. The decision relied on by the petitioner in State of Tamil Nadu v. Anandam Viswanathan 1989 73 STC 1 (SC), dealt with a totally different set of facts. In that case, the contract of the University was for the printing of question papers. It was found on the facts of the case that printing of question papers was an extremely confidential matter and such printing could not be entrusted to any and every press. The value paid for such printing includes the paper, technical and professional work as well as the confidence and faith reposed on the assessee. In our view that decision does not help the petitioner in this case. For what we have stated above it is clear that the concurrent findings of the assessing authority, the appellate authority and the Tribunal that the transaction in question amounts to a sale of goods, cannot be called into question. The revision fails and it is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 320 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ss the dealer but the general order appointing Shri Minocha as the assessing authority in respect of the whole of the Union Territory of Delhi gave him the jurisdiction to assess the dealer. No specific order in this regard was necessary or called for specially when Shri Gupta had taken no effective steps to assess the dealer. For the aforesaid reasons, question No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the Commissioner of Sales Tax. As regards question No. 2, we are firmly of the opinion that the Financial Commissioner was not justified in quashing the assessment order. This is more so because the Punjab High Court in Kishan Chand s case 1965 16 STC 521 has clearly held that the assessment orders do not become invalid merely because of such procedural irregularities. Be that as it may, in view of our answer to question No. 1 being in favour of the Commissioner, the said question which has been referred to us, has become academic. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (7) TMI 319 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trative convenience and another to augment the revenue of the State. In fairness to the learned counsel appearing for the State, it must be stated that as far as the first object is concerned, he has put forth his argument to the effect that different treatment is given to specified sales for the purpose of administrative convenience. Be that as it may. The fact remains that there is intelligible classification and it has nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 28.. In above view of the matter, the argument that on account of the different treatment given to specified sales and the turnover thereof and by depriving the claim of set-off and/or reduction in case of resale, there is hostile discrimination in case of transactions of transfer of right to use in specified goods has no merits and the same is hereby rejected. 29.. No other contention is raised. 30.. In the result, the petitions fail and all the three petitions are rejected. Rule discharged. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 318 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... etable oil contained only the groundnut and cotton seed oil as ingredients, then the lot which contained this ingredient alone has not been kept separate. It is neither kept separately nor it is indicated accordingly in the account books. Similarly on the tin containing vegetable oil, it is not indicated as to what are the ingredients of the vegetable oil. If the dealer wanted to get relieved of the obligation undertaken by him he ought to have produced positive and unimpeachable evidence showing the use of different ingredients in different lots of the end-product. As observed by the Bombay High Court, this may be impossible in a given case. But by saying so, the dealer cannot get relieved of the obligation. The dealer is never called upon to do something which is impossible. The dealer can adopt the other course, i.e., pay the tax. 23.. No other contention is raised. 24.. The reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative
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1991 (7) TMI 317 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ture also. Merely because the furniture sold to the match factory was put to a particular use, shall not detract from its characteristic of being furniture . It would be a misnomer if the specially designed furniture is treated as an equipment for the match factory. The Tribunal fell in error in holding otherwise. The Tribunal appears to have been influenced by the use of the word equipment for the dental chair in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Associated Dental and Medical Supply Co. 1976 37 STC 336. That is an entirely different case. The dental chair is undoubtedly a specially designed equipment for dental clinic. The Tribunal therefore was in error in holding that the furniture sold by the assessee like tables, trays, racks, etc., did not fall under entry 121 of the First Schedule. We, consequently, accept this revision and set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We, however, make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (7) TMI 316 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ason that soap is excluded from entry 17. As noted by the Appellate Tribunal the said entry does not mention any particular type of soap. Therefore, all types of soaps, whether washing soap or bathing or any other type of soap, would be excluded from entry No. 17. A hair remover may be in the form of cream or it may be in the form of a liquid or in the form of a soap. When it takes the form of soap, as in the present case then it would be excluded from the operation of entry 17. The word soap in entry 17 is not qualified by any other word. We see no reason as to why hair removing soap should not be regarded as soap mentioned in entry No. 17 of the First Schedule of the said Act. This being so, entry No. 17 thereof has no application and the item in question would be liable to be taxed at the rate of 5 per cent. For the aforesaid reason the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the dealer. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1991 (7) TMI 315 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en if it was to be assumed though there is no warrant for doing so, that the sale was in favour of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, nevertheless as ultimately the purchaser was the Ministry of Defence, rule 29(iii) has to be so construed to give a full effect and that is to consider the sale to be to the Ministry of Defence itself. In other words, applying the principle of a purchase being made for a disclosed principal, by an agent, in the instant case, the sale has been effected by the dealer in favour of the Ministry of Defence. Even if this was not so, nevertheless, on a correct interpretation of rule 29(iii), the sale in question must be regarded as a sale to the Ministry of Defence. In our opinion, therefore, the provisions of rule 29(iii) were clearly applicable to the present case. For the aforesaid reasons, the questions of law are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the dealer. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1991 (7) TMI 314 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at the assessee carried on any trade or commercial activity in the sale of cement manufactured during the research activities. The judgment of this Court in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. South India Textile Research Association 1978 41 STC 197 is fully applicable to the facts of this case and we are in agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench in that case. Considered in the totality of the circumstances and on the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal did not commit any error of law in coming to the conclusion that the assessee was not a dealer and, therefore, was neither exigible to the levy of sales tax nor the purchase tax under section 7-A. The appeals filed by the assessee were rightly allowed by the Tribunal and the enhancement petition was also rightly dismissed. We therefore do not find any cause to interfere. All the three revisions therefore fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (7) TMI 313 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t requires to be pointed out that as stated by the Supreme Court the words, used in the provision imposing tax or granting exemption, should be understood in the same way in which the same are understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law is in force or by people who ordinarily deal with them. As made clear by us earlier the word mori basudi is being used by the people including the manufacturer for a sweet known as mori basudi and never for the milk. Viewing this case in this respect also it becomes clear that the abovesaid commodity would not fall within the tax-free entry as urged by the assessee. It therefore becomes clear that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the commodity in question would be falling within entry 50 of Schedule II of the Act. We therefore answer the abovesaid question in affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, with no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1991 (7) TMI 312 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be a consumable stores. The contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the provision which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was altogether different. Therein the Supreme Court was required to consider as to whether an article can be said to have been consumed in the manufacture of other goods. The question before the Supreme Court was as to whether cashew shells which were used in kiln, while manufacturing tiles and other goods can be said to have been consumed in manufacturing of tiles and other goods. In that context, the Supreme Court has made the aforesaid observations. These observations cannot be applied to the provisions of section 13(1)(B) wherein the expression consumable store occurs. 18.. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our answer to the aforesaid question is as indicated hereinabove in para 6 in the column against the question. The reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1991 (7) TMI 311 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inference drawn on the basis of the facts existing on the record. In this view of the matter, the question referred to the High Court is a question of fact. Hence it is not required to be answered by this Court. Learned counsel appearing for the parties have not been able to point out as to how this question can be said to be a question of law. 5.. So far as the second question is concerned, once it is held that the first question is a question of fact and no question of law is involved, the second question also is not required to be answered. 6.. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our answer to the first question is that it is a question of fact and no question of law is involved therein. Hence it is not required to be answered. Similarly as far as the second question is concerned, in view of our answer to the first question, this question is also not required to be answered. The reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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