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Showing 81 to 93 of 93 Records
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1977 (2) TMI 13
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of action u/s 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for reassessment of the assessee for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59.
Summary:
Issue 1: Validity of action u/s 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
The primary question referred to the court was whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the action u/s 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for reassessment of the assessee for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 was valid.
The assessee, engaged in business, maintained books of accounts closed on July 31 each year. For the years ending July 31, 1956, and July 31, 1957, the books included entries for loans allegedly borrowed from Multani bankers on hundis, with interest on these loans claimed as deductions. The original assessments for 1957-58 and 1958-59 were completed without questioning the genuineness of these loans. However, the assessments were reopened by notices issued u/s 148, served on March 18, 1966, and February 6, 1967, respectively. The Income-tax Officer (ITO) initiated action u/s 147(a) after securing the Commissioner's sanction, concluding that certain hundi loans were not genuine and adding these amounts as income from undisclosed sources.
The assessee appealed against the reassessments, contending that the reopening was invalid. The Tribunal upheld the reassessments, stating that the assessee had not fully and truly disclosed all material facts necessary for the assessments. The Tribunal's decision was challenged, leading to the present reference.
The court examined whether the ITO had reason to believe that income had escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The court noted that the assessee consistently challenged only the validity of the reassessment proceedings, not the merits. The court found that the mere filing of certain statements did not amount to full disclosure, which is a factual finding.
The assessee's counsel cited Supreme Court decisions in Lakhmani Mewal Das and Chhugamal Rajbal, arguing that the ITO lacked sufficient reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. However, the court distinguished these cases, noting that in the present case, the ITO had prima facie concluded that the loans were not genuine based on information about the bankers' involvement in hawala business.
The court also referred to a previous decision involving the same assessee, where similar reassessment proceedings were upheld. Based on these findings, the court concluded that the reassessments were valid and answered the question in the affirmative, against the assessee. The revenue was awarded costs of Rs. 500.
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1977 (2) TMI 12
Issues:
1. Whether the penalty under section 271(1)(c) was leviable in the case.
2. Whether there was a clear case of concealment when the additions on account of cash credits were fully deleted.
Analysis:
The case involved the assessment years 1955-56 and 1956-57 of a registered firm. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner found suspicious cash credits and discrepancies, leading to an enhancement notice. The assessee admitted to suppressed income, claiming it was derived from suppressed profits. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted part of the claim but rejected the rest due to lack of evidence. The Income-tax Officer reopened assessments for both years, adding cash credits and interest, initiating penalty proceedings for concealment.
The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner imposed penalties after the assessee admitted the cash credits represented income. The Tribunal, in a common judgment, deleted the additions of cash credits for both years, finding them to be covered by suppressed trading profits. The Tribunal then considered the penalty appeals, questioning if penalties could be levied after the deletions. The Tribunal found the penalties were based on the deleted cash credits, thus unsustainable after deletion.
The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner's penalty orders focused solely on the cash credit amounts, making the penalties unsustainable once those amounts were deleted. The Tribunal concluded that penalties could not be sustained based on the deleted cash credits, even though interest on non-genuine loans remained. The Tribunal held that concealment for penalty under section 271(1)(c) requires the concealed income to remain in the final assessment order, which was not the case after the deletions.
Therefore, the Tribunal held that the penalty under section 271(1)(c) was not leviable due to the deletion of cash credits. It also determined that there was no clear case of concealment as the additions were fully deleted. The judgment was in favor of the assessee, disposing of the reference without costs. Both judges concurred with the decision.
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1977 (2) TMI 11
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of assessment orders on the receiver.
2. Jurisdiction and legality of recovery proceedings.
3. Compliance with procedural requirements under the Revenue Recovery Act.
4. Bar of suit under Section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
5. Limitation period for recovery proceedings.
6. Validity of the auction sale of the properties.
7. Impact of the compromise in S.A. No. 1373 of 1967 on the tax liability.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Assessment Orders on the Receiver:
The plaintiff contended that the assessment orders on the receiver were illegal, ultra vires, and without jurisdiction, as assessments post the death of S. M. Sheriff should have been made on the legal representatives, not the receiver. The trial court found the assessments valid, but the lower appellate court disagreed, holding that the receiver was not a legal representative and thus the assessments were null and void.
2. Jurisdiction and Legality of Recovery Proceedings:
The plaintiff argued that she could not be considered an assessee in default, and thus recovery proceedings were invalid. The lower appellate court agreed, stating that without valid assessments, the plaintiff could not be an assessee in default, rendering Section 46(2) inapplicable. The trial court, however, had found the recovery proceedings valid.
3. Compliance with Procedural Requirements under the Revenue Recovery Act:
The plaintiff questioned the sale's validity due to non-compliance with Sections 25, 27, and 36 of the Revenue Recovery Act. The lower appellate court found significant procedural lapses, including lack of proper notice and publication, invalidating the sale. The trial court had dismissed these claims, finding the sale valid.
4. Bar of Suit under Section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922:
The main defense was that Section 67 barred the suit. The lower appellate court held that since the assessments were void, the plaintiff was not an assessee, and thus Section 67 did not apply. The trial court had not found the suit barred.
5. Limitation Period for Recovery Proceedings:
The lower appellate court found that the certificates under Section 46(2) were issued beyond the prescribed period, thus barring the recovery proceedings. The trial court had not found any issue with the timing of the certificates.
6. Validity of the Auction Sale of the Properties:
The lower appellate court invalidated the sale due to procedural non-compliance and the invalidity of the recovery proceedings. The trial court had upheld the sale's validity.
7. Impact of the Compromise in S.A. No. 1373 of 1967 on the Tax Liability:
The plaintiff argued that a compromise in another case should be deemed to have wiped out the tax liability. The lower appellate court overruled this, noting the compromise only relinquished the department's right to proceed against specific properties, not the entire debt.
Conclusion:
The second appeal was dismissed, upholding the lower appellate court's findings. The court concluded that the sale was invalid due to procedural lapses and the invalidity of the recovery proceedings. However, the court did not provide a declaration on the validity of the assessment orders, only granting an injunction against confirming the sale. The plaintiff's remedies regarding the auction money deposited with the Collector were left to be pursued separately. No costs were awarded.
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1977 (2) TMI 10
Issues involved:
Petition to quash order of Income-tax Officer refusing registration of petitioner-firm for assessment year 1971-72 and order of Commissioner of Income-tax dismissing revision petition.
Judgment Details:
The petitioner, a firm, had been granted registration for assessment year 1961-62 under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, with registration continued annually. For assessment year 1971-72, petitioner filed return of income on March 10, 1972, along with declaration in Form No. 12 for continuation of firm's registration u/s 184(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Income-tax Officer refused registration continuation, citing belated filing beyond time allowed by proviso clause. Appeal to Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed as not maintainable, and revision petition to Commissioner of Income-tax also rejected.
Petitioner alleged delay due to difficulty with accountant, applied for extension till August 15, 1971, granted by Income-tax Officer. Another application on August 16, 1971, for extension till March 31, 1972, not communicated by Income-tax Officer. Return filed on March 10, 1972, with registration declaration.
Counter-affidavit disputed petitioner's extension applications, but acknowledged receipt on August 16, 1971. Income-tax Officer deceased by hearing date.
Petitioner argued bona fide belief of granted extension, filing within time limit. Provisions of section 184(7) discussed, pre and post-April 1, 1971 amendments. Commissioner's reasoning on lack of proof for extension application and delay questioned by petitioner.
Comparison made to another case where Commissioner allowed registration delay of two months due to new law oversight. Commissioner's order found erroneous in present case with delay of about 7 1/2 months.
Court found Commissioner's order legally flawed, quashed it, allowing fresh consideration of petitioner's revision petition. Each party to bear own costs.
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1977 (2) TMI 9
Issues:
1. Whether the Tribunal was right in canceling the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1968-69?
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a case where the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Gauhati Bench, referred a question of law regarding the cancellation of a penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee, a firm engaged in the business of biris and other articles, initially filed a return showing an income of Rs. 38,200 for the assessment year 1968-69. Subsequently, it filed a revised return with an enhanced income of Rs. 46,992, along with explanations for the discrepancies in the account books. The Income-tax Officer made several additions to the income, leading to a total income of Rs. 77,590 and initiated penalty proceedings due to alleged concealment of income.
The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000 under section 271(1)(c) of the Act, citing substantial concealment of income. The assessee appealed to the Tribunal, which overturned the penalty order. The Tribunal considered the additions made by the Income-tax Officer and assessed whether the penalty was sustainable under the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Act, which places the burden on the assessee to prove the absence of fraud or negligence in reporting income.
Regarding specific additions made by the Income-tax Officer, the Tribunal found that the omission of Rs. 10,000 in the biri account was a clerical error, not deliberate concealment. Similarly, the enhancement of income by Rs. 14,000 in the biri account was considered a case of under-valuation of closing stock, not concealment of sales. The Tribunal concluded that the penalty was not justified as the assessee had not acted with gross negligence or willful intent to conceal income.
Ultimately, the Tribunal held that the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) was not applicable in this case, shifting the burden to the department to prove deliberate concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income, which it failed to do. Consequently, the Tribunal's decision to cancel the penalty was upheld by the High Court, ruling in favor of the assessee for the assessment year 1968-69.
The judgment highlights the importance of proving fraudulent intent or gross negligence in imposing penalties under tax laws and underscores the burden on the department to establish deliberate concealment of income. In this case, the Tribunal's meticulous examination of the facts led to the cancellation of the penalty, emphasizing the need for concrete evidence to support allegations of tax evasion or concealment.
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1977 (2) TMI 8
Issues involved: Interpretation of section 80-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding deduction calculation for fees received by an Indian company from foreign companies.
Summary:
The case involved an Indian private limited company claiming deduction u/s 80-O for fees received from foreign companies. The Income-tax Officer disallowed certain expenditure claimed by the company and calculated the taxable profit. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal both considered the definition of "any income" in section 80-O and disagreed on whether the deduction should be based on gross fees received or net income after deducting expenses. The Tribunal held that the deduction should be applied to the gross fees received by the company. The Additional Commissioner challenged this conclusion, leading to a reference to the High Court.
The High Court analyzed section 80-O and emphasized that the deduction should be calculated based on the amount actually received by the assessee, not the net income after deducting expenses. The Court clarified that the definition of "gross total income" in section 80B(5) does not impact the calculation of the deduction under section 80-O. It was held that a harmonious construction of the sections mandates considering the actual income received by the assessee for calculating the deduction.
Ultimately, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, ruling in favor of the assessee and affirming that the deduction should be applied to the gross fees received by the company. The question referred to the court was answered in the affirmative, in favor of the assessee. The assessee was awarded costs for the reference.
This judgment clarifies the correct method for calculating deductions u/s 80-O for fees received by Indian companies from foreign entities, emphasizing that the deduction should be based on the gross amount received, not the net income after deducting expenses.
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1977 (2) TMI 7
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this legal judgment include the imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act of 1961, the availability of alternate remedies for the assessee, the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to impose the penalty, and the application of relevant legal provisions.
Imposition of Penalty:
The petitioner, an assessee under the Income-tax Act, was assessed for the year 1967-68 with cash credits in the names of individuals. The Income-tax Officer added these amounts as income from other sources and initiated penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner levied a penalty of Rs. 16,250 after considering the petitioner's explanation. The petitioner did not opt for an appeal but sought revision before the Commissioner of Income-tax, who upheld the penalty imposition. The petitioner then filed for a writ of certiorari against the penalty.
Availability of Alternate Remedies:
The standing counsel for the revenue raised a preliminary objection regarding the abatement of the application under article 226(3) of the Constitution due to the availability of an alternate remedy through an appeal. However, as the petitioner had waived the right of appeal and moved the Commissioner under section 264(1) of the Act, the objection was dismissed. The court found no other remedy against the revisional order of the Commissioner, allowing the writ petition to proceed.
Jurisdiction of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner:
The case involved a change in the relevant legal provision regarding the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for imposing penalties. The amendment to section 274(2) of the Act in 1971 affected the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The court referred to a previous case to establish that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had lost jurisdiction to impose the penalty after the amendment came into effect. The court held that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Commissioner was a nullity due to the lack of legal force.
Application of Legal Provisions:
The court analyzed the effect of the amendment to section 274(2) of the Act and rejected the standing counsel's contentions regarding the applicability of the General Clauses Act. The court concluded that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to impose the penalty, as established in a previous case. Consequently, the imposition of penalty by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, as upheld in revision, was quashed by the court.
This judgment highlights the importance of jurisdictional issues, the availability of alternate remedies, and the application of relevant legal provisions in matters concerning the imposition of penalties under the Income-tax Act of 1961.
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1977 (2) TMI 6
Issues:
1. Interpretation of section 18(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act of 1957 regarding the levy of penalty.
2. Determining the applicable law for penalty proceedings - date of default or date of penalty imposition.
3. Calculation of penalty based on the tax remaining unpaid on the date of penalty imposition.
Analysis:
The judgment addressed three main issues arising under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act of 1957. The primary dispute revolved around the interpretation of section 18(1)(a) concerning the calculation of penalties. The central question was whether the law to be applied for penalty proceedings should be the one in force on the date of default or the date of penalty imposition.
The court noted that the Tribunal had correctly held that the law applicable is the one in force on the date of the default. This interpretation was supported by previous decisions, including one by the Allahabad High Court, emphasizing that the law at the time of default governs penalty proceedings. Consequently, the court answered affirmatively to the questions raised in the references, supporting the Tribunal's view.
Regarding the calculation of penalty based on the tax remaining unpaid on the date of penalty imposition, the Tribunal's decision was initially in line with the judgment of the Calcutta High Court. However, a subsequent retrospective amendment under Section 23 of the Direct Taxes (Amendment) Act, 1974 altered this position. The amendment clarified that the tax mentioned in section 18(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act refers to the wealth-tax chargeable under the Act. As a result, the court answered the third question in Tax Case No. 259/74 negatively, overturning the Tribunal's decision due to the statutory amendment.
In conclusion, the judgment reaffirmed the principle that the law applicable in penalty proceedings is that in force at the time of default. It also highlighted the impact of statutory amendments on the calculation of penalties based on the tax remaining unpaid. The court's decision provided clarity on these issues, settling the disputes raised in the references before it.
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1977 (2) TMI 5
Issues Involved:
1. Inclusion of the provision for taxation in computing capital for super profits tax.
2. Classification of amounts advanced by a bank against bills drawn by the assessee as "moneys borrowed" for the computation of capital under the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Inclusion of the Provision for Taxation in Computing Capital for Super Profits Tax:
The first issue pertains to whether the sum of Rs. 15,50,168, being the provision for taxation as on April 1, 1962, should be included in computing the capital for the assessment year 1963-64 for the purposes of levying super profits tax. The court noted that this question was common to I.T.R.C. Nos. 15, 16, and 17 of 1974. Both parties agreed that this issue was already settled by the court's decision in Mysore Electrical Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Super Profits Tax (I.T.R.C. No. 11 of 1967). Consequently, the court answered this question in favor of the revenue and against the assessee.
2. Classification of Amounts Advanced by a Bank Against Bills Drawn by the Assessee:
The second issue involves whether the sum of Rs. 4,91,761 advanced by National & Grindlays Bank Ltd. against bills drawn by the assessee should be considered "moneys borrowed" for the computation of capital under the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963. This issue also appeared in I.T.R.C. Nos. 7, 8, 9, 16, and 17 of 1974 under analogous provisions of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964.
The court examined the nature of the transactions between the assessee and the bank. The Income-tax Officer initially held that the amount represented a contingent liability rather than moneys borrowed. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, after further investigation, upheld this view, stating that the transactions were purchases of bills by the bank, not loans.
The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal also supported this view, noting that the bank purchased the bills and credited the assessee's account with the value of the consideration, not as loans. The Tribunal emphasized that the bank's right of recourse to the assessee if the drawees defaulted did not alter the nature of the transaction.
However, the court found that the transactions were essentially financial arrangements between the bank and the assessee, where the bank credited the full value of the bills to the assessee's account and charged interest until the bills were realized. The court determined that these transactions did not constitute a discount of the bills but were instead a form of short-term advance.
The court referenced several legal sources and precedents, including Corpus Juris Secundus and American Jurisprudence, to clarify the distinction between discounting bills and advancing money against bills. It concluded that the amounts advanced by the bank were indeed "moneys borrowed" and should be included in the computation of the assessee's capital.
Conclusion:
The court answered the first question in I.T.R.C. Nos. 15, 16, and 17 of 1974 in favor of the revenue, concluding that the provision for taxation should not be included in computing the capital for super profits tax. The second question in I.T.R.C. Nos. 15, 7, 8, 9, 16, and 17 of 1974 was answered in favor of the assessee, determining that the amounts advanced by the bank against bills drawn by the assessee were "moneys borrowed" and should be included in the computation of capital. The assessee was entitled to its costs, with an advocate's fee of Rs. 250 for one set.
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1977 (2) TMI 4
Issues:
1. Inclusion of replanting, building, machinery reserve, tax contingency reserve, and pension reserve in the computation of capital under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964.
Analysis:
The High Court of Madras was presented with a question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the inclusion of various reserves in the computation of capital under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. The assessee, a non-resident foreign company engaged in tea manufacturing in India, claimed that replanting, building, machinery reserve, tax contingency reserve, and pension reserve should be considered as part of its capital. The assessing officer initially rejected this claim, but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) upheld it, stating that these reserves constituted free reserves and should be included in the capital computation. The Tribunal, following an earlier order, also held in favor of the assessee, leading to the current challenge in the High Court.
In examining the reserves, the AAC provided detailed insights into each reserve. Regarding the replanting, building, machinery reserve, the AAC noted that the reserve had been consistently added to over the years and ultimately transferred to the general reserve account, indicating its nature as a free reserve. Similarly, the tax contingency reserve was found to be created to meet future contingencies in taxation, not for immediate tax liabilities, thus qualifying as a free reserve. The pension reserve, earmarked for a specific liability, was considered a free reserve as it was not used to meet any ascertainable future contingency but was transferred to the general reserve account for dividends.
The High Court referenced a previous case involving the same assessee where a similar reserve was deemed includible in the computation of capital under a different tax act, supporting the Tribunal's decision in the current case. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's assessment of the reserves, affirming that the replanting, building, machinery reserve, tax contingency reserve, and pension reserve should be included in the capital computation under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. The judgment favored the assessee, granting them costs and counsel fees.
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1977 (2) TMI 3
Issues involved: Application for extension of time for filing return, imposition of penalty u/s 271(1)(a), justification of penalty cancellation by Tribunal, interpretation of mens rea in penalty proceedings.
The High Court of Rajasthan considered an application under sub-s. (2) of s. 256 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, regarding the cancellation of a penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(a). The respondent-assessee, M/s. Rawat Singh and Sons, Jodhpur, filed their return of income for the assessment year 1965-66 after the due date, leading to penalty proceedings. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) imposed a penalty of Rs. 6,090 for the delay in submission of the return. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) quashed the penalty, citing a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the return. The Tribunal upheld the AAC's decision, stating that there was no deliberate defiance of law or contumacious conduct by the assessee. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) sought a reference to the Tribunal, which was rejected on the grounds that no question of law arose from the Tribunal's order. The High Court analyzed the conflicting opinions of various High Courts on the burden of proof in penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(a) and referred to Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the quasi-criminal nature of penalty proceedings and the requirement to establish deliberate defiance of law or contumacious conduct. The High Court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was in line with Supreme Court precedents and dismissed the application for reference.
In conclusion, the High Court of Rajasthan upheld the Tribunal's decision to cancel the penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(a) on the assessee, emphasizing the need to establish deliberate defiance of law or contumacious conduct in penalty proceedings. The Court highlighted the quasi-criminal nature of penalty proceedings and the burden of proof on the department to demonstrate the absence of a reasonable cause for non-compliance. The judgment underscored the importance of adhering to Supreme Court precedents in interpreting penalty provisions under the Income Tax Act, 1961.
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1977 (2) TMI 2
Issues:
Interpretation of "company in which the public are substantially interested" under s. 2(18) of the I.T. Act, 1961 for assessment years 1963-64 and 1964-65.
Analysis:
The case involved a reference under s. 256(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961, arising from proceedings under s. 104 for the assessment years 1963-64 and 1964-65. The main issue revolved around determining whether the assessee company qualified as a "company in which the public are substantially interested" as defined under s. 2(18) of the Act. Section 107 dealt with super-tax on undistributed income, while s. 108 excluded certain companies from the application of s. 104. The critical aspect was the ownership structure of the company's shares, specifically whether they were beneficially held by the public to the extent required by law.
The Assessing Officer (AO) had levied additional super-tax based on the interpretation that the trusts holding shares in the company should not be considered part of the public. However, the Appellate Authority Commission (AAC) disagreed, stating that trusts could be considered as members of the public, thus affecting the substantial interest determination. The Tribunal further delved into the issue, considering whether the shares held by trusts could be deemed as those held by the public. Ultimately, the Tribunal held that the trust-held shares did not qualify as public-held shares, leading to the conclusion that the company was not substantially interested by the public.
The High Court analyzed the contentions put forth by both parties, emphasizing the importance of fulfilling the conditions laid down in s. 2(18)(b)(i) for a company to be considered substantially interested by the public. The Court agreed with the Department's interpretation that both conditions of unconditional allotment/acquisition and beneficial holding by the public must be met for such classification. The Court also addressed the argument regarding the control of trustees over the shares, highlighting the necessity for legal and beneficial ownership to align without external influence for the provisions to apply.
In its judgment, the High Court found the evidence presented insufficient to conclusively determine the status of the company as substantially interested by the public. Due to the lack of evidence regarding the control of trustees and beneficial ownership by the public, the Court was unable to provide a definitive answer to the legal question posed. Consequently, the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for further evidentiary proceedings and a decision in accordance with the law.
In conclusion, the case highlighted the intricate interpretation of statutory provisions governing the substantial interest of the public in a company, emphasizing the need for concrete evidence to support such determinations and the alignment of legal and beneficial ownership for classification purposes. The judgment underscored the importance of fulfilling statutory conditions and providing substantial evidence in tax assessments involving complex ownership structures.
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1977 (2) TMI 1
Whether loss in hedging transactions of banned items can be set off against profits of same year and whether such loss can be carried forward for set off in subsequent years - loss in hedging transaction of banned items could not be set off against profits of the same previous year under s. 24(1) - such a loss also could not be carried forward for set off against profits in the later years - Questions are answered in the negative and in favour of the department
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