|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 132 Records
-
1978 (12) TMI 195
Issues Involved:
1. Invocation of Section 482 Cr. P.C. for filing a second revision in the High Court under Section 397(3).
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court to suo motu exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(3) when the Sessions Judge has already exercised his revisional jurisdiction.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Invocation of Section 482 Cr. P.C. for Filing a Second Revision in the High Court under Section 397(3):
The Division Bench referred two significant questions to a Full Bench due to conflicting decisions. The first question was whether a party can invoke Section 482 Cr. P.C. when seeking to file a second revision in the High Court under Section 397(3). The Supreme Court in Amarnath v. State of Haryana held that Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court but does not confer new powers. It stated that if an order is expressly barred under Section 397(2), then Section 482 would not apply. However, in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court modulated this view, stating that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 can be exercised even when an interlocutory order is involved if it is necessary to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice.
The judgment clarified that Section 397(3) bars a second revision by the same person who has already approached either the High Court or the Sessions Court. However, it does not limit the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482. The High Court can exercise its inherent powers if there is an abuse of process or a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, a party unsuccessful before the Sessions Judge can bring the matter to the High Court's notice under Section 482, but the High Court must scrutinize and be prima facie satisfied of the abuse of process or miscarriage of justice before entertaining such a petition.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court to Suo Motu Exercise Its Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 397(3):
The second question was whether Section 397(3) takes away the High Court's jurisdiction to suo motu exercise its revisional jurisdiction when the Sessions Judge has already exercised his revisional jurisdiction. The judgment emphasized that Section 397(3) bars a second revision by the same person but does not preclude the High Court from exercising its inherent powers under Section 482. The High Court can suo motu call for and examine any record of any proceeding before an inferior criminal court under Section 397(1) and exercise its powers under Sections 398 and 401 Cr. P.C. The Supreme Court in Nadir Khan v. State and Eknath v. State of Maharashtra held that the High Court's power of revision suo motu is not abolished by the new Criminal Procedure Code.
The judgment concluded that Section 397(3) does not prevent the High Court from exercising its inherent powers to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The High Court's power to act suo motu is not barred by Section 397(3) and can be exercised in appropriate cases to prevent abuse of process or to secure justice.
Conclusion:
The High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. even when a second revision by the same party is barred under Section 397(3). The High Court can also suo motu exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice, and Section 397(3) does not limit this power. The matters in question were directed to be posted before the regular court to decide their fitness for being entertained under Section 482 Cr. P.C., ensuring that the High Court's interference is necessary in the interests of justice.
-
1978 (12) TMI 194
Issues:
Conviction under Section 135(b) of the Customs Act, Burden of proof under Section 123 of the Customs Act, Seizure of goods by the proper officer, Definition of smuggling under Section 2(39) of the Customs Act, Knowledge of the nature of goods by the accused, Sentencing considerations.
Conviction under Section 135(b) of the Customs Act:
The judgment involves four revision applications against the conviction of the revisionists under Section 135(b) of the Customs Act. The prosecution case detailed the events leading to the arrest of the revisionists with smuggled goods in a motor truck. The revisionists were found guilty and sentenced to one year's R.I., a decision upheld on appeal. The revisionists did not contest the recovery of the goods, leading to the application of relevant provisions of the Customs Act.
Burden of proof under Section 123 of the Customs Act:
The defense argued that the goods were seized by a police officer and not the proper officer under the Customs Act, hence Section 123 did not apply. However, the court held that when the goods were handed over to Customs authorities, they were deemed seized by the proper officer, triggering the burden of proof on the revisionists. The court cited a precedent where goods seized by police and later handed to Customs were considered properly seized, emphasizing the revisionists' failure to prove the goods were not smuggled.
Seizure of goods by the proper officer:
The judgment delved into the definitions of 'proper officer' under the Customs Act and the procedures for search and seizure. The court clarified that the goods were effectively seized by the proper officer when handed over to Customs authorities, rejecting the argument that police seizure invalidated the application of Section 123 and emphasizing the importance of compliance with Customs Act procedures.
Definition of smuggling under Section 2(39) of the Customs Act:
The court analyzed the definition of smuggling under the Customs Act, emphasizing that goods with foreign markings, lacking evidence of legal import, and concealed for evasion of duties are deemed smuggled. The revisionists' failure to provide evidence of legal import or payment of duties led to the presumption that the goods were smuggled, justifying their confiscation under Section 111(i) of the Act.
Knowledge of the nature of goods by the accused:
The judgment considered the revisionists' claim of innocence regarding their knowledge of the smuggled goods. Citing precedents, the court highlighted circumstantial evidence indicating the revisionists' awareness of the nature of the goods, such as evasive actions during police interception and conflicting statements during the unloading process. The court concluded that the revisionists had knowledge of the illicit nature of the goods.
Sentencing considerations:
Regarding sentencing, the court noted the time elapsed since the seizure of goods and the revisionists' partial incarceration. The court opted for a reduced sentence of the period already served and imposed fines on each revisionist to serve the ends of justice, allowing for payment within a specified period. The judgment balanced the severity of the offense with the circumstances of the case to reach a fair sentencing decision.
-
1978 (12) TMI 193
Issues Involved:
1. Specific performance of contract for sale of agricultural land.
2. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to decide whether the plaintiff is an agriculturist.
3. Validity of certificate issued by Mamlatdar.
4. Application of Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.
5. Reference of issues to Mamlatdar under Sections 70, 85, and 85A of the Tenancy Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Specific Performance of Contract for Sale of Agricultural Land:
The appellant filed a suit for specific performance of a contract dated 15th December 1965, for the sale of land. The contract was extended by a supplementary agreement dated 26th April 1966. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the High Court upheld this dismissal, primarily because the plaintiff was not an agriculturist, which is a requirement under Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.
2. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to Decide Whether the Plaintiff is an Agriculturist:
The Civil Court initially held that it had the jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiff was an agriculturist, considering it an incidental issue in a suit for specific performance. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction to decide whether a person is an agriculturist lies exclusively with the Mamlatdar as per Section 70(a) of the Tenancy Act. This jurisdiction is not shared with Civil Courts due to the explicit ouster of jurisdiction under Section 85 of the Tenancy Act.
3. Validity of Certificate Issued by Mamlatdar:
The plaintiff produced a certificate (Ext. 78) issued by the Mamlatdar, certifying that he was an agricultural laborer. Both the trial court and the High Court found this certificate to have no evidentiary value and invalid. The Supreme Court did not address the validity of this certificate as the appellant did not contest this issue before it.
4. Application of Section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948:
Section 63 prohibits the sale of agricultural land to non-agriculturists. The Supreme Court emphasized that if the plaintiff is not an agriculturist, the contract for the sale of agricultural land cannot be enforced as it would be contrary to the statutory prohibition and public policy.
5. Reference of Issues to Mamlatdar under Sections 70, 85, and 85A of the Tenancy Act:
The Supreme Court explained that if an issue arises in a civil suit that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under the Tenancy Act, the Civil Court must refer the issue to the Mamlatdar as per Section 85A. This ensures that the competent authority under the Tenancy Act decides the issue, and the Civil Court then disposes of the suit based on the Mamlatdar's decision. The legislative intent is to avoid conflicting decisions and ensure that issues under the Tenancy Act are decided by the designated authority.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decrees of the trial court and the High Court, and remanded the suit to the trial court. The trial court was directed to refer the issue of whether the plaintiff is an agriculturist to the Mamlatdar and proceed according to the Mamlatdar's decision. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for expeditious handling of the case due to its age.
-
1978 (12) TMI 192
Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to concessions (deductions) in the minimum price of sugarcane.
2. Classification of sugarcane as "bonded" or "unbonded."
3. Interpretation of sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause 3 of the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954.
4. Legality of the Recovery Certificate issued against the appellant.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement to Concessions (Deductions) in the Minimum Price of Sugarcane:
The primary issue in this appeal was whether the appellant was entitled to certain concessions (deductions) in the minimum price of sugarcane as notified by the Cane Commissioner on June 1, 1955. The appellant argued that they were entitled to these concessions for the sugarcane supplied by respondent No. 4, as it was "unbonded sugarcane." The appellant relied on the Cane Commissioner's Notification, which allowed deductions for "unbonded cane" but not for "bonded cane."
2. Classification of Sugarcane as "Bonded" or "Unbonded":
The appellant contended that the two lac maunds of sugarcane supplied by respondent No. 4 should be classified as "unbonded sugarcane" because the offer and acceptance did not comply with the time limits prescribed in sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause 3 of the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954. The court, however, clarified that the terms "bonded sugarcane" and "unbonded sugarcane" were not defined in the statute or the Order, and their ordinary dictionary meanings should be considered. "Bonded sugarcane" was interpreted as sugarcane secured by a bond or agreement. Since the supply of two lac maunds was secured by an agreement executed on May 4, 1955, it was classified as "bonded sugarcane," making the appellant ineligible for the concessions.
3. Interpretation of Sub-clauses (2) and (3) of Clause 3 of the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954:
The court examined the provisions of sub-clauses (2) and (3) of clause 3. Sub-clause (2) allowed a cane-grower or Cane-growers' Cooperative Society to offer to supply cane within 14 days of the issuance of a reserving order, while sub-clause (3) mandated the factory to accept the offer within 14 days of receipt. The court noted that sub-clause (2) used the term "may," indicating that the 14-day period was not mandatory, especially since sub-clause (4) allowed the Cane Commissioner to extend this period. However, sub-clause (3) used "shall," making it obligatory for the factory to accept the offer within 14 days of receipt. The court concluded that even if the offer was made beyond the prescribed period, the factory could still accept it, creating a binding agreement and classifying the sugarcane as "bonded."
4. Legality of the Recovery Certificate Issued Against the Appellant:
The appellant challenged the Recovery Certificate issued under sections 17 and 18 of the Uttar Pradesh Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, arguing that they had the right to make deductions based on the Cane Commissioner's Notification. The court upheld the decisions of the District Cane Officer, the Divisional Commissioner, and the Allahabad High Court, which had all concluded that the appellant had wrongly made deductions for "bonded sugarcane." The court found that the appellant's conduct in referring the dispute to arbitration and appealing the arbitrator's award indicated that the parties treated the agreement as one under the Act and the Order.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the additional supply of two lac maunds of sugarcane by respondent No. 4 was "bonded sugarcane," and thus, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the Cane Commissioner's Notification dated June 1, 1955. The court affirmed the legality of the Recovery Certificate issued against the appellant. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
-
1978 (12) TMI 191
Issues:
Challenge to the imposition of cess under the Madhya Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1958. Validity of the Validation Act, 1961. Assessment and collection of cess under the State Act. Interpretation of Section 23 of the State Act.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Challenge to the imposition of cess under the Madhya Pradesh Sugarcane Act, 1958
The appellant, a sugar manufacturing company, challenged the imposition of a cess under the Madhya Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1958. The State Government imposed a cess on the entry of sugarcane into specific areas, leading to a legal dispute. The High Court initially held the imposition illegal, but Parliament enacted the Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961, to validate such impositions. The Supreme Court clarified that the Validation Act aimed to make a law concerning the cess and provide retrospective operation, thereby upholding the imposition of the cess.
Issue 2: Validity of the Validation Act, 1961
The appellant argued that the Validation Act was ultra vires the Constitution, contending that the State Act fell within the State's legislative competence. However, the Supreme Court held that the Validation Act validated the imposition and collection of cesses under State Acts, making them validly imposed in accordance with the law. The Court emphasized that the Validation Act's provisions superseded any previous judgments or orders, thus upholding the legality of the cess imposition.
Issue 3: Assessment and collection of cess under the State Act
The appellant disputed the assessment and collection of the cess, claiming that no formal order of assessment was made. However, the Court clarified that the State Act and Rules did not necessitate a formal assessment order. The Rules specified the authority empowered to assess and collect the cess, with the Collector responsible for verifying the amount deposited by the factory occupier. The Court highlighted that the purpose of assessment was to compute the cess payable, and in this case, the Collector had issued an order for recovery based on the admitted amount, rendering the appellant's argument invalid.
Issue 4: Interpretation of Section 23 of the State Act
The appellant contended that the expression "an area" in Section 23 of the State Act should be construed as "a local area." However, the Court rejected this argument, citing precedents that clarified the meaning of "local area" in legislative contexts. The Court emphasized that the State Act empowered the State Government to impose the cess on the entry of sugarcane into any specified area, not limited to a "local area." Therefore, the appellant's interpretation was deemed futile, and the imposition of the cess was upheld.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the imposition of the cess under the Madhya Pradesh Sugarcane Act and affirming the validity of the Validation Act, 1961.
-
1978 (12) TMI 190
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Magistrate acts as a court when passing orders for bail and discharge based on police reports.
2. Whether the offence under Section 211 IPC can be considered as committed in relation to proceedings in any court.
3. Application of Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the Magistrate acts as a court when passing orders for bail and discharge based on police reports:
The Supreme Court examined whether the Magistrate acts as a court when passing orders for bail and discharge based on police reports. The relevant sections of the CrPC, including Sections 6, 496, and 497, were analyzed. It was established that Magistrates are specifically labeled as courts by Section 6, and thus, when they act judicially, they must be regarded as courts. The Court noted that the Code does not differentiate between functions performed by a Magistrate before or after taking cognizance under Section 190. Sections 496 and 497, which deal with bail matters, describe a Magistrate as a court, indicating that a Magistrate acts as a court at all stages of a case, including during the investigation.
The Court referred to Halsbury's Laws of England and the opinion of Lord Sankey in Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, which distinguishes between courts and quasi-judicial tribunals. The Court concluded that a Magistrate, when performing judicial functions such as granting bail or discharging an accused, acts as a court.
2. Whether the offence under Section 211 IPC can be considered as committed in relation to proceedings in any court:
The Court analyzed whether the offence under Section 211 IPC, which involves instituting false criminal proceedings, can be considered as committed in relation to proceedings in any court. The Court examined the stages of investigation and the role of the Magistrate in accepting police reports under Sections 169 and 173 of the CrPC. It was noted that when a Magistrate agrees with a police report and discharges an accused, he is performing a judicial act, thereby acting as a court.
The Court also considered the implications of bail and remand proceedings, which are judicial in nature and form part of the court's function. Therefore, the offence under Section 211 IPC, when related to such proceedings, is considered as committed in relation to proceedings in a court.
3. Application of Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC):
Section 195(1)(b) of the CrPC bars courts from taking cognizance of certain offences, including Section 211 IPC, unless there is a complaint in writing by the court in relation to which the offence was committed. The Court examined whether the proceedings before the Magistrate, including the acceptance of the police report and the grant of bail, constituted proceedings in relation to a court.
The Court held that the orders passed by the Magistrate for bail and discharge are judicial acts and thus constitute proceedings in a court. Consequently, the offence under Section 211 IPC, being in relation to these proceedings, falls within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC. Therefore, the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence without a complaint in writing by the court.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the Magistrate acts as a court when passing orders for bail and discharge based on police reports. The offence under Section 211 IPC can be considered as committed in relation to proceedings in a court. Consequently, the bar under Section 195(1)(b) CrPC applies, requiring a complaint in writing by the court for the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. The appeal was allowed, the order of the High Court was set aside, and the proceedings against the appellant were quashed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 189
Issues:
Interpretation of the term "consumable stores" under section 16 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 in relation to purchases of timber sizes against form 19 for packing machinery.
Analysis:
The case involved a manufacturer of heavy machinery, air-compressors, and vacuum pumps who purchased timber sizes for packing machinery against declarations in form 19. The Sales Tax Officer imposed purchase tax under section 16 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, alleging a breach of declarations. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax upheld the decision, leading to an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, citing a previous decision, held that timber sizes used for packing cannot be considered consumable stores. The applicant then sought a reference to the High Court.
The High Court referred to a previous judgment where it disagreed with the Tribunal's view on the interpretation of "in the manufacture of goods." It emphasized that consumable stores need not be limited to raw materials or processing materials and can include items integral to the manufacturing process. The Court highlighted the importance of activities essential for the commercial viability of manufacturing. It noted that not all items facilitating manufacturing would qualify as consumable goods for tax exemption.
The crucial question was whether the crates used for packing machinery were necessary for activities integrally connected with manufacturing as per customer specifications. The Court stressed that this determination relied on factual evidence. It acknowledged that while theoretically machinery could be manufactured without crates, the commercial viability and precision required by customers necessitated packing in crates. The Court declined to answer the question, directing the Tribunal to assess the evidence provided by both parties and apply the commercial expediency test outlined by the Supreme Court.
In conclusion, the High Court declined to answer the reference question, emphasizing the need for factual evidence to determine the necessity of crates in the manufacturing process. The decision highlighted the importance of activities integral to manufacturing for determining the classification of items as consumable stores under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969.
-
1978 (12) TMI 188
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the repeal and reintroduction of Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
2. Constitutionality of retrospective application of Section 5(3) under Article 14 and 20(1) of the Constitution.
3. Effect of the repeal of Section 5(3) on ongoing legal proceedings.
Summary:
1. Validity of the repeal and reintroduction of Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947:
The appellant was charged u/s 120-B IPC for criminal conspiracy and specific offences u/s 161 IPC read with Section 5(2) and Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Special Judge acquitted the appellant, noting that Section 5(3) had been repealed on 18th December 1964, and specific instances of bribery could not be proved. However, the assets of the appellant were found disproportionate to his known sources of income. The High Court later upheld the validity of Act No. 16 of 1967, which reintroduced Section 5(3) retrospectively, and remanded the case for trial from the stage it was pending on 18th December 1964.
2. Constitutionality of retrospective application of Section 5(3) under Article 14 and 20(1) of the Constitution:
The appellant contended that the retrospective application of Section 5(3) by Act No. 16 of 1967 was void and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 and 20(1) of the Constitution. The Court held that Section 5(3) merely prescribed a rule of evidence and did not create a new offence. The retrospective application of the rule of evidence did not violate Article 20(1) as it did not create a new offence or impose a new penalty but revived the procedure that was in force when the offence was committed.
3. Effect of the repeal of Section 5(3) on ongoing legal proceedings:
The Court noted that the repeal of Section 5(3) by Act 40 of 1964 did not obliterate its previous operation. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act preserved the legal proceedings and consequences of such proceedings as if the repealing Act had not been passed. Therefore, the rule of evidence under Section 5(3) was available for offences committed before its repeal. The Court dismissed the appellant's contention that the retrospective application of Section 5(3) created a new offence, affirming that the old procedure was merely revived.
Conclusion:
The appeals were dismissed, upholding the validity of the retrospective application of Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and the remand of the case for trial from the stage it was pending on 18th December 1964. The Court found no violation of Articles 14 and 20(1) of the Constitution.
-
1978 (12) TMI 187
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Rule 6(2)(iii) of the U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules, 1966.
2. Violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
3. Legal fiction of final absorption under Rule 6(2)(iii).
4. Opportunity of hearing before termination of services.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Rule 6(2)(iii) of the U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules, 1966
The appellants challenged the validity of Rule 6(2)(iii) on the grounds that it was ultra vires the State Government as it led to the extinction of the employer-employee relationship between them and the erstwhile Municipal Boards. The Supreme Court noted that this objection was not pressed before them due to the language of Entry 5, List II of the Seventh Schedule. The Court upheld the validity of the amendments made to Rule 6(2), emphasizing that the legislature had expressly conferred powers on the State Government to make retrospective rules.
2. Violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
The appellants argued that the orders were violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution because the State Government's classification of officers and servants into two categories, based on their salary, was without any rational basis. The Supreme Court dismissed this contention, stating that their view of the various circulars issued by the State Government did not support the claim of violation of Articles 14 and 16.
3. Legal Fiction of Final Absorption under Rule 6(2)(iii)
The appellants contended that due to the legal fiction contained in Rule 6(2)(iii), their services stood finally absorbed on March 31, 1967, as the State Government failed to pass the necessary orders before that date. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the subsequent amendment made on June 26, 1967, which introduced a new clause (iii) with retrospective effect from July 9, 1966, was effective. This amendment shifted the date for passing the order of final absorption to August 31, 1967, thereby nullifying the earlier fictional date of March 31, 1967.
4. Opportunity of Hearing before Termination of Services
The appellants argued that the orders of termination were vitiated due to the State Government's failure to provide them an opportunity of hearing. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of natural justice, stating that the State Government had a duty to act in a quasi-judicial manner and provide a fair hearing to the officers and servants concerned. The Court found that Ashfaq Hussain was given an opportunity of hearing by the Divisional Committee, which was sufficient. However, in the case of Mohd. Rashid Ahmad, the Court found that no such opportunity was provided before the termination of his services. Consequently, the order of termination in his case was deemed invalid.
Conclusion:
- Civil Appeal No. 1724 of 1969 (Mohd. Rashid Ahmad): The appeal was allowed, and the termination order was set aside due to the lack of a fair hearing.
- Civil Appeal No. 1732 of 1971 (Ashfaq Hussain): The appeal was dismissed as the termination order was found to be valid, given that he was afforded an opportunity of hearing.
There was no order as to costs in either case.
-
1978 (12) TMI 186
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the patent involved any inventive step or novelty.
2. Whether the method of holding an article by the pressure of a pointed tailstock constituted the novelty of the invention.
3. Whether the invention was a manner of new manufacture or improvement.
4. Whether the failure to examine the alleged inventor, Purshottam Dass, adversely affected the plaintiff's case.
5. Whether the concurrent findings of utility by the lower courts should sustain the patent.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the patent involved any inventive step or novelty:
The trial court found that the patent did not involve any inventive step, as the method of manufacturing utensils using a lathe with a headstock, adapter, and tailstock had been known and used in the commercial world for decades before the plaintiff's patent. The court concluded that the changes introduced by the patentee were minor and did not involve any novelty. The appellate bench, however, concluded that the method of mounting patented by the appellant did involve an inventive step and was a manner of new manufacture and improvement. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence, sided with the trial court, finding that the patented machine was merely an application of an old invention with a slight change in the mode of application, which did not qualify as an inventive step.
2. Whether the method of holding an article by the pressure of a pointed tailstock constituted the novelty of the invention:
The appellate bench held that the novelty and invention of the patent lay in the method of holding an article by the pressure of a pointed tailstock, which was neither used nor known. However, the Supreme Court found this conclusion inconsistent with the appellate bench's own findings that lathes with headstocks and tailstocks had been well known for a long time. The Supreme Court noted that the specification and claims of the patent did not assert novelty for the pointed tailstock, and the patentee's representative admitted that such tailstocks were already in use.
3. Whether the invention was a manner of new manufacture or improvement:
The trial court found that the patented machine was not a manner of new manufacture or improvement, as it did not involve any novelty or inventive step. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the patented machine was a normal development of an existing manner of manufacture and did not produce a new or improved result. The court emphasized that the combination of old known integers must produce a new result or a better or cheaper article to qualify for a patent, which was not the case here.
4. Whether the failure to examine the alleged inventor, Purshottam Dass, adversely affected the plaintiff's case:
The trial court noted that Purshottam Dass, the alleged inventor, did not appear in the witness-box to explain the novelty or inventive step of the patented method. The court inferred that his absence adversely affected the plaintiff's case. The Supreme Court concurred, stating that the failure to examine Purshottam Dass, who was a partner of the patentee firm and the best-informed person about the invention, gave rise to an inference adverse to the plaintiff.
5. Whether the concurrent findings of utility by the lower courts should sustain the patent:
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the concurrent findings of utility by the lower courts should sustain the patent. The court emphasized that the crucial test of the validity of a patent is whether it involves novelty and an inventive step, not just utility. Since the patent failed the test of novelty and inventive step, it was invalid and liable to be revoked.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the appellate bench, and restored the trial court's judgment, which dismissed the plaintiff's suit and revoked the patent. The court held that the patented machine was neither a manner of new manufacture nor a novel improvement and did not involve any inventive step. The parties were left to bear their own costs throughout.
-
1978 (12) TMI 185
Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the trust property.
2. Locus standi of the plaintiffs.
3. Removal of the defendant from Mahantship.
4. Rendition of accounts by the defendant.
5. Appointment of a new Mahant.
6. Delivery of possession of the trust property.
7. Settlement of a scheme for administration of the trust.
Summary:
1. Nature of the Trust Property:
The primary issue was whether the entire estate of village Bahawalpura is the property of a public religious trust dedicated to the Temple Idol of Shri Thakurji Maharaj or the secular and absolute property of the appellant. The Court found ample evidence in the settlement records from 1864 onwards, showing that the property was a religious endowment dedicated to Thakurji Maharaj. The Wajibularz from 1864 indicated that the Mahant was not the real owner, and the real ownership vested in the Trust. The admissions by Mahant Raghubir Das in various documents and applications further confirmed that the property was dedicated to Thakurji Maharaj. The Court concluded that the Math and the Temple were public religious trusts.
2. Locus Standi of the Plaintiffs:
The District Judge found that the plaintiffs had sufficient interest in the suit and thus had the locus standi to maintain the suit. This finding was upheld by the High Court.
3. Removal of the Defendant from Mahantship:
The District Judge held that the defendant was liable to be removed from the office of the Mahant due to various allegations, including mismanagement and immoral conduct. The High Court upheld this finding and directed the election of a new Mahant within four months.
4. Rendition of Accounts by the Defendant:
The District Judge directed the defendant to render accounts for three years preceding the suit. However, the High Court partly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit regarding the relief for rendition of accounts.
5. Appointment of a New Mahant:
The District Judge ordered the appointment of a new Mahant in accordance with the custom and usage of the Math. The High Court upheld this order and directed that a new Mahant be elected by the Mandleshwaras.
6. Delivery of Possession of the Trust Property:
The District Judge directed the defendant to deliver possession of the endowed property to the person duly appointed as Mahant. The High Court upheld this direction.
7. Settlement of a Scheme for Administration of the Trust:
The District Judge held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief of settlement of a scheme for the administration of the trust. The High Court affirmed this finding.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the High Court, dismissing the appeal and confirming that the property in question was a public religious trust dedicated to Thakurji Maharaj. The Court declined to entertain a new plea regarding Bhumidhari rights raised by the appellant at a belated stage. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
1978 (12) TMI 184
Issues Involved:
1. Legislative competence of Parliament to enact the Special Courts Bill.
2. Validity of the classification under Clause 4(1) of the Bill.
3. Procedural fairness and compliance with Article 21.
4. Independence of the judiciary and the appointment of judges to Special Courts.
5. Maintainability of the reference under Article 143(1).
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legislative Competence of Parliament to Enact the Special Courts Bill:
The Supreme Court examined whether Parliament had the legislative competence to enact the Special Courts Bill, specifically focusing on Clauses 2, 6, and 10(1). Clause 2 provides for the creation of Special Courts, Clause 6 for the transfer of pending appeals and revisions to the Supreme Court, and Clause 10(1) for appeals from Special Courts to the Supreme Court.
The Court held that the Parliament has the competence to enact these provisions under Entry 11A of the Concurrent List, which relates to the "Administration of justice; Constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Court." The Court also found that Entry 77 of List I, which covers the "Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court," supports the legislative competence to enact Clauses 6 and 10(1). Therefore, Clauses 2, 6, and 10(1) were within the legislative competence of Parliament.
2. Validity of the Classification under Clause 4(1) of the Bill:
The classification under Clause 4(1) was scrutinized to determine if it violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The classification in question involved the trial of offences committed during the Emergency period by persons holding high public or political offices.
The Court upheld the classification to the extent that it covered offences committed during the Emergency period, finding that it was based on an intelligible differentia and had a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, which was the speedy trial of such offences. However, the Court found the classification invalid to the extent that it included offences committed between February 27, 1975, and June 25, 1975, as this period did not share the same characteristics as the Emergency period.
3. Procedural Fairness and Compliance with Article 21:
The Court examined whether the procedure prescribed by the Bill was "just, fair, and reasonable" as required by Article 21, which protects the right to life and personal liberty. The Court identified three procedural infirmities:
(a) The provision in Clause 7 allowing retired High Court judges to preside over Special Courts.
(b) The provision in Clause 7 allowing the Central Government to appoint judges to Special Courts in consultation with, but not with the concurrence of, the Chief Justice of India.
(c) The absence of a provision for the transfer of cases from one Special Court to another.
The Court found these provisions to be unjust and unfair, thus violating Article 21. The Government's subsequent acceptance of the Court's suggestions to amend these provisions was noted, but the Court emphasized that the Bill, as it stood, was procedurally unjust.
4. Independence of the Judiciary and the Appointment of Judges to Special Courts:
The Court addressed concerns about the independence of the judiciary, particularly regarding the appointment of judges to Special Courts. Clause 7 of the Bill allowed for the appointment of retired High Court judges and required only consultation with the Chief Justice of India for appointing sitting judges.
The Court found this provision problematic as it undermined judicial independence, especially since retired judges would serve at the pleasure of the Government, which could compromise their impartiality. The Court suggested that only sitting judges should be appointed to Special Courts and that such appointments should be made with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India to ensure judicial independence.
5. Maintainability of the Reference under Article 143(1):
The maintainability of the reference itself was challenged on several grounds, including that it was hypothetical, vague, and involved political questions. The Court held that the reference was maintainable, emphasizing that Article 143(1) allows the President to seek the Court's opinion on questions of law or fact that are of public importance. The Court found that the question posed was neither hypothetical nor speculative and that it was within its jurisdiction to answer it.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that:
1. Parliament has the legislative competence to enact the Special Courts Bill, including Clauses 2, 6, and 10(1).
2. The classification under Clause 4(1) is valid for offences committed during the Emergency but invalid for offences committed between February 27, 1975, and June 25, 1975.
3. The procedure prescribed by the Bill is unjust and unfair in certain respects, violating Article 21.
4. Provisions undermining judicial independence, particularly those concerning the appointment of judges, are problematic.
5. The reference is maintainable under Article 143(1).
-
1978 (12) TMI 183
Issues: Interpretation of Public Notice No. 78/77 regarding importation against a letter of credit extended after the notice, consideration of firm commitments, and the impact of abnormal circumstances on contractual obligations.
Analysis:
1. Interpretation of Public Notice No. 78/77: The case involved the importation of Tetracycline Hydrochloride against a letter of credit extended after the issuance of Public Notice No. 78/77. The notice specified that imports could only be made against a license issued for drugs and drug intermediates. The appellants argued that the notice did not explicitly prohibit imports against a letter of credit opened before the notice and extended later. They relied on past handbooks and a clarification by CCI & E to support their contention that the extension of a letter of credit did not constitute a fresh commitment barring import clearance.
2. Consideration of Firm Commitments: The Department contended that the benefit of the notice could not be extended to the case as the letter of credit was altered post-notice. However, the appellants maintained that there was a firm order and acceptance before the notice, and the extension of the letter of credit was necessitated by abnormal circumstances beyond their control, such as a damaged reactor at the supplier's factory.
3. Impact of Abnormal Circumstances on Contractual Obligations: The Board acknowledged the existence of a firm commitment with a valid letter of credit before the notice was issued. It noted that the extension of the shipment period, the only amendment to the original terms of the letter of credit, was due to abnormal circumstances and did not fundamentally alter the contractual obligations. Therefore, the Board deemed it unreasonable to consider the extension as a fresh contract or to invalidate the importation based on the extension post-notice. Consequently, the Board allowed the appeal, accepted the ITC license for the import, and remitted the fine imposed on the appellants in full.
-
1978 (12) TMI 182
Detention orders - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. If the detenu wanted any more particulars such as the name of the intelligence officer or other information, he could have well asked for the particulars before making his representation. That he never did. It was not as if any privilege had been claimed by the Government in respect of the intelligence reports. In fact, we find that the intelligence reports were produced before the learned Judges of the High Court at the hearing of the Writ Petition there. There was no complaint before us that the detenu or his Counsel wanted to peruse the reports and were denied the opportunity of doing so. We do not think that the detenu could be said to have been denied a reasonable opportunity of making a representation merely because particulars which he neyer desired in respect of a ground which was not vague were not furnished to him. We are unable to see any force in any of the submissions advanced on behalf of the detenu.
-
1978 (12) TMI 181
Issues Involved:
1. Liability to pay purchase tax under Section 16 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969.
2. Liability to penalty under Section 45(1) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969.
3. Admissibility of set-off under Rule 42 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970.
4. Calculation of set-off under the proviso to Rule 42 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Liability to Pay Purchase Tax Under Section 16 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969:
This issue was not pressed by the assessee during the hearing and thus was not considered by the court.
2. Liability to Penalty Under Section 45(1) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969:
This issue was also not pressed by the assessee during the hearing and thus was not considered by the court.
3. Admissibility of Set-off Under Rule 42 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970:
The court examined whether the assessee was entitled to set-off under Rule 42 even when a portion of the manufactured goods was sold on a consignment basis outside the state. Rule 42 provides for a deduction from the aggregate of amounts calculated before a drawback, set-off, or refund of tax is granted. The court emphasized that the rule must be read in its entirety, considering the context and the legislative intent behind it.
The assessee argued that the deduction should only apply to the portion of the set-off related to the tax paid on goods used in the manufacture of products sold on consignment basis. The revenue contended that the deduction should be made from the total set-off, including the tax paid on goods used in the manufacture of products sold locally.
The court concluded that the deduction should be confined to the set-off related to the tax paid on goods used in the manufacture of products sold on consignment basis. The court emphasized that the legislative intent was to avoid multi-point taxation and to ensure that the cost of manufactured goods does not become unduly excessive due to multiple tax levies.
4. Calculation of Set-off Under the Proviso to Rule 42 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970:
The court examined the correct interpretation of the proviso to Rule 42, which requires a deduction of 3% of the sale price of goods sold on consignment basis from the aggregate set-off amount. The assessee contended that the deduction should only apply to the set-off related to the tax paid on goods used in the manufacture of products sold on consignment basis, and any excess deduction should not affect the set-off related to goods sold locally.
The court agreed with the assessee's interpretation, stating that the proviso should be read in conjunction with the rule's overall purpose. The court emphasized that the deduction should not extend beyond the set-off related to consignment sales, as this would result in an unjust and unreasonable burden on the assessee.
The court referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jai Hind Oil Mills Co., which supported the view that the deduction should be confined to the set-off related to consignment sales.
Conclusion:
The court answered the remaining questions in favor of the assessee, stating that the deduction under the proviso to Rule 42 should be limited to the set-off related to the tax paid on goods used in the manufacture of products sold on consignment basis. The court held that any excess deduction should not affect the set-off related to goods sold locally. The State of Gujarat was ordered to pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
-
1978 (12) TMI 180
Issues: Assessment of sales tax on leather cases as radio accessories, Jurisdiction of Deputy Commissioner to revise assessment, Limitation period for reopening assessment.
Assessment of sales tax on leather cases as radio accessories: The assessee, a dealer in radios and radio parts, claimed to pay sales tax at 3% on leather cases, considering them as "general goods." However, the Deputy Commissioner revised the tax rate to 10% treating the leather cases as "radio accessories." The Tribunal upheld the revision, stating that the leather cases were indeed accessories to radios. The court agreed with this view, citing precedents that accessories are determined by their predominant use, and since the leather cases were specifically made to fit and suit different varieties of radios, they qualified as accessories. The court also noted a legislative amendment introducing taxation on leather goods other than footwear at 6% from 1974, applicable to the assessment years in question.
Jurisdiction of Deputy Commissioner to revise assessment: The assessee contended that the Deputy Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to revise the assessment under section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act as there was no dispute before the assessing authority regarding the classification of leather cases. However, the court held that the Deputy Commissioner's revision was valid under section 14(4) read with section 14(4-C) since the assessing officer had accepted the assessee's claim of 3% tax rate on leather cases, even though no reasons were provided for such acceptance. The court emphasized that the Deputy Commissioner had the same powers as the assessing authority under section 14(4-C), ensuring no lack of jurisdiction.
Limitation period for reopening assessment: The Tribunal attempted to justify the reopening of the assessment for the year 1971-72 beyond the four-year limitation period by invoking section 14(4)(a), which allows a six-year period if there is a failure to disclose turnover or particulars correctly. However, the court found no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose information regarding the nature of the leather cases, as the assessment order clearly indicated the sales of leather cases. Consequently, the extended period of limitation was deemed unwarranted, and the court held that the reopening of the assessment for 1971-72 was barred by limitation, while the same did not apply to the subsequent year 1972-73.
In conclusion, Tax Revision Case No. 80 of 1977 was allowed, while Tax Revision Case No. 81 of 1977 was dismissed. Each party was directed to bear their own costs, with an advocate's fee specified for each case.
-
1978 (12) TMI 179
Issues:
Interpretation of items 102 and 83 of the First Schedule to the A.P. General Sales Tax Act regarding taxation of water-meters.
Detailed Analysis:
The primary issue in this tax revision case before the Andhra Pradesh High Court was the classification of water-meters for tax purposes under the A.P. General Sales Tax Act. The specific question raised was whether water-meters fall under item 102 or item 83 of the First Schedule to the Act. The respondent, a dealer in sanitary goods, contended that water-meters should be considered as "machinery" under item 83, while the revenue authorities treated them as "water supply fittings" under item 102, which had different tax rates.
The assessing authority initially classified water-meters as "water supply fittings" under item 102, attracting a 6% sales tax rate. However, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal disagreed with this classification. The Tribunal held that water-meters should be treated as either "machinery" or "general goods," subject to a lower tax rate of 4%. The Tribunal's decision was based on the understanding that water-meters, which measure water consumption, do not qualify as "water supply fittings" as per the Act.
The High Court analyzed the definitions and scope of "water supply fittings" and "machinery" under the relevant items of the First Schedule. It emphasized that not everything related to water supply could be considered a "water supply fitting." Drawing an analogy with a motor used for water supply, the Court clarified that items like water-meters, which measure consumption but do not directly supply water, do not fit the definition of "water supply fittings."
Furthermore, the Court referred to a precedent from the Allahabad High Court, which classified water-meters as machinery due to their operation based on the transmission of energy from water movement. Even if water-meters were not considered machinery outright, the Court concluded that since they did not qualify as "water supply fittings," they could be categorized as "general goods" for taxation purposes, attracting a 4% tax rate.
In the final judgment, the High Court upheld the decision of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, ruling that water-meters do not fall under the definition of "water supply fittings" in item 102. Therefore, regardless of whether they are classified as machinery or general goods, they are subject to a 4% tax rate. The Court dismissed the tax revision case brought by the revenue and directed each party to bear its own costs, citing the absence of a prior ruling on this specific issue in the Court.
-
1978 (12) TMI 178
Issues:
Claim for refund of State tax, levy of Central sales tax on groundnuts, revocation of exemption notification, demand for payment of Central tax, adjustment of tax amounts.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a dispute regarding the levy of Central sales tax on groundnuts and the subsequent claim for refund of State tax. The State Government initially exempted declared goods, including groundnuts, from Central sales tax under a notification issued in 1964. However, this exemption was revoked in 1970. Despite the revocation, some sales tax authorities continued to collect only State tax and the difference between State tax and Central tax. In the case of the petitioner for the year 1974-75, a demand was made for payment of Central tax after the petitioner had already paid the State tax and the difference amount. The petitioner requested an adjustment of the already paid amount towards the Central tax due for the same year to avoid the cumbersome process of paying and claiming a refund.
The court acknowledged that as per the relevant laws, both State and Central taxes should be paid, followed by a refund claim for the State tax. However, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case where the authorities had collected taxes in a specific manner even after the revocation of the exemption notification, the court deemed it unreasonable to insist on the petitioner to pay the amount again and then claim a refund. The court recognized the legal position but exercised its discretion to grant the petitioner's request for adjustment of the already paid amount towards the Central tax due for the assessment year 1974-75.
Therefore, the court allowed the writ petition, directing the respondent to adjust the amount already paid by the petitioner towards the Central sales tax demand for the specified year. The court further instructed that no additional amount should be collected in this regard. The petitioner's request for adjustment was granted based on the specific circumstances of the case, despite the general legal requirement of paying both taxes and claiming a refund. The judgment concluded with the allowance of the petition without any order as to costs, and the advocate's fee was fixed at Rs. 150.
-
1978 (12) TMI 177
Issues:
Challenge against retrospective amendment of entry No. 34 of Schedule B of Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 - Taxability of agricultural implements - Validity of retrospective operation of the amendment.
Analysis:
The case involves a challenge against the retrospective amendment of entry No. 34 of Schedule B of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, as applicable to Haryana. The amendment substituted entry No. 34 to exclude certain items from the definition of agricultural implements. The retrospective effect of the amendment, dating back to 1949, is the primary issue in question.
The petitioner, a registered dealer of agricultural implements, contested the retrospective taxation of discs and harrow-frames under the amended entry. The argument focused on the unreasonableness and arbitrariness of such long retrospectivity, invoking violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. However, the petitioner's contention was refuted based on established legal principles and precedents.
The court examined the legality of retrospective taxation in light of previous judgments and legal principles. It was established that a legislature competent to levy tax prospectively could also do so retrospectively. The court cited relevant Supreme Court decisions to support this position, emphasizing the legislative competence to enact retrospective tax laws.
Another argument raised by the petitioner was the undue hardship caused by the retrospective taxation of previously untaxed goods. The court reiterated that the power to tax retrospectively, though resulting in unexpected liabilities, was a valid exercise of legislative authority. The court dismissed the petitioner's contentions on this ground as well.
The court also addressed the argument regarding the constitutionality of long periods of retrospectivity in tax laws. Citing previous judgments, the court concluded that the duration of retrospectivity alone did not render a tax statute unconstitutional. Precedents upholding retrospective tax laws for extended periods were cited to support this conclusion.
Ultimately, the court found no merit in the writ petition and dismissed it, with each party bearing its own costs. The judgment was delivered unanimously by the judges, affirming the dismissal of the petition challenging the retrospective amendment of the tax law.
-
1978 (12) TMI 176
Issues:
Challenge to the validity of section 9(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 on grounds of excessive delegation of legislative functions and abdication of essential legislative function by the Parliament.
Analysis:
The petitioner challenged the validity of section 9(2A) of the Act, claiming that the Parliament delegated its essential legislative functions to the State Legislature by allowing penalties under the Act to be the same as fixed under State law. The petitioner, a registered dealer, faced a penalty for underreporting turnover. The Assessing Authority imposed a penalty of Rs. 2,25,000 under section 9(2) of the Act. The petitioner relied on a Supreme Court decision stating that penalties must be clearly enacted. The Parliament later added subsection (2A) to section 9, aligning penalties under the Act with State laws. The petitioner argued that since the penalty amount is not fixed by Parliament and can vary, it amounts to abdication of legislative functions.
The respondents cited a Supreme Court case where adopting State tax rates was deemed valid. The court held that the Parliament's amendment to section 9(2) by adding sub-clause (2A) showed a considered decision to align penalties with State laws. The court noted that the tax collected under the Act aims to augment State revenues, and the delegation of power to set penalty limits was made responsibly. The court found no excessive delegation or abdication of legislative powers in section 9(2A).
The petitioner contended that the amendment's application to past transactions violated constitutional guarantees. The court rejected this argument, stating that article 20 prohibits ex post facto laws in criminal prosecutions, not penalties for tax non-payment. The petitioner also argued that the penalty was excessive for a minor error in reporting. The court advised seeking redress through statutory remedies, as the matter could have been raised before appellate authorities. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the challenges to section 9(2A) of the Act.
In conclusion, the court upheld the validity of section 9(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, rejecting the petitioner's claims of excessive delegation and abdication of legislative functions by the Parliament. The court emphasized that penalties under the Act aligning with State laws serve the purpose of revenue augmentation, and the delegation of power to set penalty limits was within permissible limits. The court dismissed the petition and disposed of related cases.
........
|
9911796707
