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• 1982 (12) TMI 231
  
  Issues:
  1. Interpretation of Section 23 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961.
  2. Determination of whether the provisions of Section 23 of the Act were attracted in the case.
  3. Analysis of the clauses of the contracts entered into by the appellant for the purchase of raw wool.
  4. Examination of Rule 29 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market (General) Rules 1962.
  5. Determination of the situs of the sale transaction and its implications on the market fee levy.
  
  Analysis:
  The appellant, a company operating woollen mills in Kanpur and Dhariwal, challenged the demand notice issued by the Market Committee for payment of market fee and penalty on raw wool purchased. The appellant contended that the assessment order was not in accordance with the Act and Rules. The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Market Committee, emphasizing that clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 29(7) applied to the case, as the sale transaction was completed upon delivery of goods to Dhariwal Mills. The Court directed the appellant to satisfy the Market Committee regarding transactions falling outside their judgment's scope (Issue 2, 9).
  
  The dispute centered on whether the provisions of Section 23 of the Act were applicable. Section 23 empowered the Committee to levy fees on agricultural produce bought or sold in the notified market area. The appellant's contracts with suppliers at Kanpur indicated that goods were dispatched directly to Dhariwal Mills after partial payment against documents, with final payment upon receipt and examination at the mills. The terms of the contracts detailed procedures for wool processing and quality control (Issue 3, 5).
  
  Rule 29(7) of the Rules framed under the Act deemed agricultural produce to be bought or sold in the notified market area if the agreement was entered into, the produce was weighed, or delivered within that area. The Division Bench held that both clauses (b) and (c) applied to the case, as the sale was deemed complete upon delivery at Dhariwal Mills. The judgment clarified that delivery and weighment were crucial for a sale transaction, emphasizing the importance of these elements for past and future transactions (Issue 4, 8, 10).
  
  The Court's decision reaffirmed the significance of delivery and weighment in determining the situs of the sale transaction and its implications on market fee levy. The judgment dismissed the appeal, with a directive for parties to bear their own costs, while emphasizing the necessity of delivery and weighment for a valid sale transaction under the Act and Rules (Issue 5).

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• 1982 (12) TMI 230
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Exclusion of police custody period under Section 57 while computing the 90-day period.
  2. Computation method for the 90-day period.
  3. Applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, in computing the 90-day period.
  
  Issue-wise Analysis:
  
  1. Exclusion of Police Custody Period under Section 57:
  
  The court addressed whether the period of custody by the police under Section 57 should be excluded while computing the 90-day period under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant argued that the initial 24 hours of police custody should be excluded from the 90-day calculation. The court held that the words "total period of 60 days or 90 days" in Section 167(2) relate to the custody of the accused authorized by the Magistrate and do not include the initial 24 hours of detention by the police under Section 57. Therefore, the period of police custody under Section 57 is to be excluded while computing the 90-day period.
  
  2. Computation Method for the 90-day Period:
  
  The court examined how the 90-day period should be computed. It was argued that the period should be computed from the date the Magistrate authorizes the detention, excluding the initial 24 hours of police custody. The court agreed with this interpretation, stating that the period of 90 days should be calculated from the date the Magistrate authorizes the detention, not from the date of arrest. The court also referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Haru Das Gupta v. The State of West Bengal, which supported the exclusion of the initial detention period by the police.
  
  3. Applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897:
  
  The court considered whether the provisions of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, apply when the last day of the 90-day period falls on a holiday. The appellant argued that if the 90th day falls on a holiday, the period should be extended to the next working day. The court, however, held that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to the computation of the 90-day period under Section 167(2) of the Code. The court emphasized that the right to be released on bail accrues the moment the 90-day period expires, regardless of whether the last day falls on a holiday or not. The court concluded that the accused's right to be released on bail cannot be defeated by the mere filing of a charge sheet on the next working day after the 90-day period has expired.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court confirmed the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, granting bail to the accused under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held that the period of police custody under Section 57 should be excluded while computing the 90-day period, the computation should be from the date of authorization by the Magistrate, and Section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to extend the 90-day period if the last day falls on a holiday. The criminal writ petition filed by the State was dismissed, and the rule was discharged.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 229
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of remand granted in the absence of the accused.
  2. Validity of an order for production of the accused on the next date as remand.
  3. Effect of previous illegality in granting remand on the present detention of the accused.
  4. Entitlement to bail due to illegality in earlier remand despite a valid current remand order.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of Remand Granted in the Absence of the Accused:
  The court addressed whether remand orders passed without the accused's presence are valid. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in *Sandip Kumar Dey v. Officer-in-charge Sakchi P.S. Jamshedpur* and *Raj Narain v. Supdt. Central Jail, New Delhi*, it was held that remand orders made without producing the accused in court are not invalid. The court emphasized that it may sometimes be necessary to order remand in the absence of the accused. In this case, the accused was in police custody for investigation in other cases, making his personal production before the magistrate impractical. Therefore, the remand orders passed in the absence of the accused were deemed proper and justified.
  
  2. Validity of an Order for Production of the Accused on the Next Date as Remand:
  The court examined whether an order for production of the accused on the next date could be considered a valid remand. The remand orders, recorded on document 'X', were addressed to the jailor and extended periodically. The court file showed that reasons were recorded, and remand orders were passed from time to time. It was concluded that if the endorsements on documents 'X' and 'Y' are read in conjunction with the order-sheets, there is no illegality. The court noted that while remand orders should not be passed mechanically and the accused's presence is generally desirable, the necessity of physical presence depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, an order for production of the accused on the next date is not invalid if the prosecutor's request for further remand is unopposed and no bail application is filed.
  
  3. Effect of Previous Illegality in Granting Remand on the Present Detention of the Accused:
  The court considered whether any previous illegality in granting remand could render the current detention illegal. It distinguished between habeas corpus cases and bail applications. In habeas corpus cases, the legality of detention is assessed on the day of the court's order. However, in bail applications, the validity of earlier remand orders is relevant. The court cited *Rati Ram v. State of Rajasthan* and *Narayan v. State of Rajasthan*, holding that once an order of remand expires and a fresh order is not passed, the detention becomes illegal. A subsequent valid remand order cannot cure the illegality of a prior invalid detention. Hence, the court affirmed that previous illegal remand orders cannot be validated by subsequent orders, and this principle applies to bail considerations.
  
  4. Entitlement to Bail Due to Illegality in Earlier Remand Despite a Valid Current Remand Order:
  The court noted that this issue is covered by the analysis of the third issue. It reiterated that the previous illegality in remand cannot be cured by a subsequent valid order, impacting the accused's entitlement to bail.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court concluded that there was no illegality in the remand orders passed in this case, and thus the bail application filed by the accused-petitioner was dismissed.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 228
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the detention of the applicant after commitment.
  2. Validity of the remand warrant issued for an indefinite period.
  3. Applicability of Sections 167 and 309 of the Cr.P.C. regarding detention periods.
  4. Interpretation of Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. regarding commitment and remand of the accused.
  5. Comparison with the precedent set in Rajendra Gosain v. Supdt, District Jail, Gonda.
  6. Consideration of bail on the grounds of co-accused being granted bail.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality of the Detention of the Applicant After Commitment:
  The applicant, Sunder Lal, contended that his detention in jail post-commitment was illegal due to the indefinite period mentioned in the warrant. The Court examined the commitment order and found no illegality in it. The applicant was committed to the Sessions Judge for trial under Sections 147/148/302/307 of the IPC, and the custody was handed over to the Superintendent, District Jail, till the disposal of the case. The Court concluded that the detention was lawful as it was in compliance with the commitment order.
  
  2. Validity of the Remand Warrant Issued for an Indefinite Period:
  The applicant argued that the remand warrant for an indefinite period was not contemplated by law. The Court analyzed the warrant, which directed the custody of the applicant "during and till the disposal of the case" before the Sessions Judge. The Court held that the period of judicial custody was not indefinite or arbitrary as it lasted from the commencement to the conclusion of the trial, subject to the provisions relating to bail.
  
  3. Applicability of Sections 167 and 309 of the Cr.P.C. Regarding Detention Periods:
  The applicant's counsel relied on Sections 167 and 309 of the Cr.P.C., which provide for detention for a definite period. The Court noted that Section 167 allows for detention up to 90 or 60 days, after which the accused can be released on bail if not furnished. Section 309 deals with the postponement or adjournment of trials and remand of the accused. The Court found that these sections did not render the applicant's detention illegal, as Section 209, Cr.P.C., specifically governed the commitment and remand process.
  
  4. Interpretation of Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. Regarding Commitment and Remand of the Accused:
  Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. was introduced to provide for the commitment of cases triable exclusively by a Court of Session. It allows the Magistrate to remand the accused to custody "during and until the conclusion of the trial," subject to bail provisions. The Court emphasized that this section is a self-contained code, ensuring that the accused is detained lawfully until the trial's conclusion, unless bailed out. The Court concluded that the commitment and remand order was in accordance with Section 209, Cr.P.C.
  
  5. Comparison with the Precedent Set in Rajendra Gosain v. Supdt, District Jail, Gonda:
  The applicant's counsel initially relied on the precedent set in Rajendra Gosain's case. However, during the proceedings, it was conceded that this precedent was not applicable to the present case. Consequently, the Court did not find it necessary to examine the questions raised in the referring order by the learned single Judge.
  
  6. Consideration of Bail on the Grounds of Co-Accused Being Granted Bail:
  The applicant's counsel argued for bail on the grounds that other co-accused had been granted bail. The Court found this argument insufficient, especially since the applicant was involved in a triple murder case. The application for bail was primarily pressed on legal grounds rather than merits, and the Court rejected the bail application, finding no legal infirmity in the applicant's detention.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court concluded that the detention of the applicant did not suffer from any legal infirmity. The remand warrant, although for an indefinite period, was lawful under Section 209, Cr.P.C., and the applicant's custody was valid until the trial's conclusion. The application for bail was accordingly rejected.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 227
  
  Issues:
  Conviction under Section 395 of the Penal Code, Identification of the respondents, Recovery of stolen property, Escape in the Ambassador car
  
  Analysis:
  1. The respondents were initially convicted under Section 395 of the Penal Code but were later acquitted by the High Court of Rajasthan. The State of Rajasthan filed an appeal against this judgment.
  
  2. The incident involved the looting of a bank branch by armed individuals. The police were able to intercept the suspects in an Ambassador car after a chase, leading to their arrest. The stolen money and incriminating items were allegedly recovered from the suspects.
  
  3. The High Court rejected the evidence of identification by bank employees and others, citing inconsistencies in their statements. It also dismissed the recovery of stolen property as unreliable and questioned the escape in the Ambassador car due to missing details in the First Information Report (FIR).
  
  4. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, finding the evidence against the respondents compelling. The Court highlighted the circumstances of the arrest, recovery of stolen money, and the presence of incriminating items in the car as crucial factors in establishing guilt.
  
  5. The Court emphasized that the respondents were caught red-handed near the crime scene, attempting to flee. The recovery of the black box containing stolen money from the car, along with other bank-related documents, further supported the prosecution's case.
  
  6. Despite the High Court's doubts regarding the FIR details, the Supreme Court considered the overall evidence strong enough to uphold the conviction. The Court criticized the High Court's approach as overly skeptical and reinstated the original conviction against the respondents.
  
  7. Considering the time elapsed since the initial judgment, the Supreme Court modified the sentence, taking into account the respondents' personal circumstances. Each respondent was sentenced to the time already served in prison but was fined an amount to be paid within a specified period.
  
  8. The Supreme Court's decision overturned the High Court's acquittal, reinstating the conviction and imposing a modified sentence on the respondents. The judgment highlighted the importance of strong evidence and the continuity of events in establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 226
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Applicability of the principle of lis pendens to the transfer of a larger interest in immovable property.
  2. Validity of the charge created by a money decree.
  3. Adverse possession and its impact on the rights of the mortgagor.
  4. Applicability of the principle of lis pendens to court sales and involuntary alienations.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Applicability of the Principle of Lis Pendens to the Transfer of a Larger Interest in Immovable Property:
  The court examined whether a transfer of a larger interest in immovable property than possessed by the transferor would be affected by the principle of lis pendens. It was determined that Sohanlal, who purchased the mortgagee rights during the pendency of the suit, was a purchaser pendente lite. The court held that the transfer was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, as the suit for redemption of mortgage was filed on May 31, 1941, and the oral sale to Sohanlal occurred on November 19, 1945, with a sale-deed registered on April 6, 1950. Consequently, Sohanlal, and his successors, including Hiralal and Sayar Bai, were bound by the decree for redemption passed in the suit.
  
  2. Validity of the Charge Created by a Money Decree:
  The appellant argued that an order by the Mahendra Sabha in 1936 created a charge on the property, which was a pre-existing right unaffected by the subsequent suit for redemption. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Mahendra Sabha's judgment only directed the money decree to be satisfied from Moolchand's property without creating a specific charge. The court further noted that any supposed charge was satisfied when the mortgagee rights were sold at a public auction in 1943. Therefore, no pre-existing rights were created by the decree that could affect the doctrine of lis pendens.
  
  3. Adverse Possession and Its Impact on the Rights of the Mortgagor:
  The appellant contended that Hiralal, having purchased the entire property, became the full owner by adverse possession, as the mortgagor was aware of the sale. The court dismissed this argument, referencing the pending suit for redemption filed in 1941, which precluded the possibility of adverse possession beginning after Hiralal's purchase in 1957. The court emphasized that adverse possession could not be claimed as the suit for redemption was already in progress, thereby preventing the acquisition of rights by adverse possession against the mortgagor.
  
  4. Applicability of the Principle of Lis Pendens to Court Sales and Involuntary Alienations:
  The court affirmed that the principle of lis pendens applies not only to private transfers but also to court sales and involuntary alienations. This was supported by precedents from the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, which held that any acquirer of property pendente lite is bound by the decree obtained in the pending proceedings. The court cited cases such as Radhamadhub Holdar v. Manohur Mookerji and Kedarnath Lal v. Sheonarain, reinforcing that the principle of lis pendens places a complete embargo on the transfer of immovable property involved in litigation, ensuring that any decree or order passed by the court is not circumvented by private dealings.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was dismissed, with the court ruling that the principle of lis pendens bound all parties involved, including the appellant, to the decree for redemption. The court also clarified that no pre-existing charge was created by the money decree, and adverse possession could not be claimed due to the pending suit for redemption. The principle of lis pendens was affirmed to apply to both private transfers and court sales, ensuring the integrity of the judicial process. The parties were left to bear their own costs of the appeal.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 225
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the initial takeover order dated 12th Aug. 1977.
  2. Requirement for a reasoned order by the Central Government.
  3. Validity of the extension order dated 11th Aug. 1982 without prior hearing.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Initial Takeover Order Dated 12th Aug. 1977
  The petitioners challenged the initial takeover order on the grounds that the direction of the High Court in the earlier writ petition was not followed, as the person who passed the order affirming the takeover did not hear the petitioner company, and the hearing was given by a different person. The Court examined this contention by referring to the principles of administrative law. It was noted that the usual practice in government departments is that the Minister in charge takes assistance from subordinate officials. The Court cited several precedents, including Local Government Board v. Arlidge and Pradyut Kumar v. C. J. of Calcutta, to support the view that the hearing can be conducted by an official, and the final decision can be taken by the Minister after considering the report and evidence collected by the official. The Court concluded that there was no breach of natural justice as the Minister had honestly applied his mind to the relevant material and the decision reached was his own.
  
  2. Requirement for a Reasoned Order by the Central Government
  The petitioners contended that the Central Government did not pass a reasoned order after hearing the petitioner, and it is not open to the Court to gather the reasons from the notings in the file. The Court assumed that a reasoned order is necessary under Section 18AA after hearing the objections. Initially, no reasoned order was communicated, but upon the Court's direction, a reasoned order was passed and communicated to the petitioner company. The Court noted that the reasons in the final order were the same as those in the file notings, which formed the basis of the Minister's decision. Thus, the contention that no reasoned order was passed did not survive.
  
  3. Validity of the Extension Order Dated 11th Aug. 1982 Without Prior Hearing
  The petitioners argued that the extension order for a further period of six months was invalid as no prior hearing was given. The Court held that no prior hearing is necessary before passing an order of extension under Section 18AA(2) read with Section 18A(2). The Court reasoned that the owner of the undertaking had already been heard at the time of the initial takeover and had the opportunity to apply for cancellation of the takeover under Section 18F. Therefore, there was no implied duty on the Central Government to hear the owner again for the extension of the takeover period.
  
  Conclusion
  The petition was dismissed on all counts. The Court found that the initial takeover was valid, the Central Government had complied with the requirement for a reasoned order, and no prior hearing was necessary for the extension of the takeover period. The security amount was ordered to be refunded to the petitioners.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 224
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Eligibility of Specialist Grade II for appointment or promotion as Professor or Associate Professor.
  2. Interpretation of Sub-rules (2) and (2A) of Rule 8 and paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Annexure I to the Second Schedule of the Central Health Service (Amendment) Rules, 1966.
  3. Consideration of teaching experience gained in an ex-officio capacity.
  4. Denial of equal opportunity in matters of employment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Eligibility of Specialist Grade II for Appointment or Promotion as Professor or Associate Professor:
  The appeal questions whether a Specialist Grade II in a teaching hospital within the Central Health Service is eligible for appointment or promotion as a Professor or Associate Professor. The court analyzed the structure and rules of the Central Health Service, noting that Specialist Grade II officers can be promoted to Specialist Grade I and Supertime Grade II. The court emphasized that the recruitment rules do not explicitly prevent Specialist Grade II officers from being promoted to teaching positions if they meet the necessary qualifications and experience.
  
  2. Interpretation of Sub-rules (2) and (2A) of Rule 8 and Paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Annexure I to the Second Schedule:
  The court examined the Central Health Service Rules, particularly Sub-rules (2) and (2A) of Rule 8 and paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Annexure I to the Second Schedule. Rule 8(2) mandates that vacancies in the Specialists' Grade be filled by direct recruitment through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). However, Rule 8(2A) provides an exception for Associate Professors and Assistant Professors, allowing their appointment through a Departmental Promotion Committee. The court interpreted the word "as" in these provisions to mean "in the capacity of," indicating that teaching experience gained in any capacity should be considered.
  
  3. Consideration of Teaching Experience Gained in an Ex-officio Capacity:
  The appellant had substantial teaching experience as a Radiologist-cum-Associate Professor of Radiology (ex-officio) in the Irwin Hospital. The court found that the teaching experience gained in this capacity should count towards the requisite teaching experience for promotion. The court noted that the Central Health Service rules do not stipulate that teaching experience must be gained through a regular appointment, thus the appellant's ex-officio teaching experience should be valid.
  
  4. Denial of Equal Opportunity in Matters of Employment Under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution:
  The appellant argued that the Government of India's decision to disregard his teaching experience was a denial of equal opportunity in employment, violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The court found merit in this argument, stating that the Ministry of Health's interpretation of the rules was incorrect and discriminatory. The court emphasized that the appellant had the requisite qualifications and teaching experience, and thus was eligible for consideration for the post of Associate Professor.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the Government of India's order and declaring that the appellant had the requisite teaching experience as per the relevant rules. The court directed the Union Public Service Commission to re-advertise the post of Professor of Radiology and consider the appellant for the position. The judgment ensures that Specialist Grade II officers with valid teaching experience are not unjustly excluded from promotion opportunities in teaching positions.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 223
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Jurisdiction of the Court
  2. Alternative remedy and maintainability of the writ petition
  3. Fixation of retention and sale prices
  4. Alleged imposition of tax without legislative sanction
  5. Discrimination and violation of Article 14
  6. Violation of natural justice
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of the Court:
  The appellants argued that the Court had no jurisdiction as the impugned orders were passed in New Delhi and the aluminium plant of HINDALCO was situated in Uttar Pradesh. However, the Court ruled that a part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta as HINDALCO's principal office and substantial business operations were located there, thereby conferring jurisdiction on the Court.
  
  2. Alternative Remedy and Maintainability of the Writ Petition:
  The appellants contended that the writ petition was not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative remedy by way of an appeal under Clause 11 of the Control Order. The Court held that the provision for appeal to the Central Government was not an adequate alternative remedy as the Central Government itself had passed the impugned orders. Additionally, the appellate authority could not decide on the vires of Clauses 4A and 4B of the Control Order.
  
  3. Fixation of Retention and Sale Prices:
  HINDALCO argued that the retention prices were not fixed in accordance with Clause 4A of the Control Order, as the cost of production and increases in the cost of inputs were not fully considered. The Court found that the Government had taken into account the increase in the cost of production, including power rates, and that the retention prices reflected these increases. The Court also held that the Government was not obliged to ensure the cost of production in the retention price but only to consider it.
  
  4. Alleged Imposition of Tax Without Legislative Sanction:
  HINDALCO contended that the payment to the Aluminium Regulation Account was tantamount to an imposition of tax without legislative sanction. The Court ruled that the payment was not a tax as it did not constitute a compulsory exaction of money for public purposes. The money paid into the Aluminium Regulation Account did not belong to HINDALCO but was part of a regulatory mechanism to ensure equitable distribution and availability of aluminium at fair prices.
  
  5. Discrimination and Violation of Article 14:
  HINDALCO argued that it was discriminated against as the Government did not fully consider the increase in the cost of power supplied by Renusagar. The Court found that the Government had considered the increase in power costs and that HINDALCO had not suffered any loss as it had withheld payments to the Aluminium Regulation Account and earned interest on the withheld amount.
  
  6. Violation of Natural Justice:
  HINDALCO claimed that it was not given an opportunity to be heard before the impugned orders were passed. The Court held that HINDALCO had made representations to the Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices (BICP), which were considered by the Government. Therefore, there was no violation of the rules of natural justice as HINDALCO's grievances were considered through written representations.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the validity of the impugned orders. The cross-objection filed by HINDALCO was also dismissed. The Court granted HINDALCO six weeks to pay the amounts due to the Aluminium Regulation Account. The prayer for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court was disallowed.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 222
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Scope and nature of the power under Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
  2. Competence of Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha to apply for withdrawal from prosecution.
  3. Justification and legality of the withdrawal from prosecution of Respondents Nos. 2, 3, and 4.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Scope and Nature of the Power under Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973:
  
  The court discussed the true scope and nature of the power under Section 321 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. The section allows a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution with the consent of the court before the judgment is pronounced. The section does not provide specific guidelines on the circumstances or grounds for withdrawal, necessitating reliance on judicial decisions for clarity.
  
  The court reviewed several precedents, including State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra, Balwant Singh v. State of Bihar, and R.K. Jain v. The State. These cases emphasize the functional dichotomy between the Public Prosecutor (executive function) and the court (supervisory judicial function). The Public Prosecutor must exercise discretion independently, considering public justice, public order, and peace. The court's role is to ensure that the Public Prosecutor's discretion is not improperly exercised or influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations.
  
  The court concluded that the withdrawal from prosecution could be justified on grounds beyond the paucity of evidence, including broader public justice, public order, and peace, which may include social, economic, and political purposes. The court emphasized that the Public Prosecutor's decision must be based on relevant considerations and not influenced by extraneous factors.
  
  2. Competence of Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha to Apply for Withdrawal from Prosecution:
  
  The appellant argued that Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha was not competent to apply for withdrawal as he was not the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case. The court examined the facts and concluded that although Shri A.K. Dutt was initially appointed as the Special Public Prosecutor, he had not appeared in the case at any stage. Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha, appointed later, was in charge of the case and had appeared on multiple occasions before the Special Judge, making him the proper officer to apply for withdrawal.
  
  The court also addressed the argument that Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha acted at the behest of the State Government. It found that the State Government had suggested withdrawal but had asked Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha to consider the matter independently. The court found no material to doubt that Shri Lalan Prasad Sinha had considered the relevant materials and made his own decision.
  
  3. Justification and Legality of the Withdrawal from Prosecution of Respondents Nos. 2, 3, and 4:
  
  The court examined whether the withdrawal from prosecution was unwarranted and unjustified on facts and in law. The Public Prosecutor had cited four grounds for withdrawal: lack of prospect of successful prosecution, implication due to political and personal vendetta, inexpediency of prosecution for reasons of State and public policy, and adverse effects on public interest.
  
  The court found that grounds (b), (c), and (d) were irrelevant and extraneous to the issue of withdrawal in this case, as the offences were common law crimes of bribery and forgery, not political offences or committed during any explosive situation involving emotive issues. The court emphasized that the public interest of administering criminal justice could not be sacrificed in such cases, especially when a highly placed person was allegedly involved.
  
  Regarding ground (a), the court examined the documentary evidence and found that a prima facie case of criminal misconduct and forgery was made out against Respondent No. 2. The court concluded that the Public Prosecutor's decision to withdraw on the ground of lack of prospect of successful prosecution was not valid, as the available material was sufficient to make out a prima facie case.
  
  The court also noted a legal infirmity in the application for withdrawal, as it mentioned an offence under Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which was not the charge against Respondent No. 2. This indicated non-application of mind by both the Public Prosecutor and the Special Judge, leading to the quashing of the withdrawal from prosecution.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court allowed the appeal, set aside the withdrawal order, and directed that Vigilance P.S. Case No. 9(2)78 be proceeded with and disposed of in accordance with law.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 221
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether a debt arises for a prized subscriber in a chitty upon receiving the prize amount and executing a security bond for future subscriptions.
  2. Validity of a sale deed executed by a Hindu father in respect of ancestral property for discharging antecedent debts.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Whether a debt arises for a prized subscriber in a chitty upon receiving the prize amount and executing a security bond for future subscriptions:
  
  The court examined whether a prized subscriber who receives the prize amount and executes a security bond for future subscriptions becomes a debtor to the foreman. Historically, different views were expressed by various courts. The Travancore High Court in Sundaram Pillai Easwaramoorthiya Pillai v. Vallithavi Narayana Vadivu (1926) held that the debt arises only when the instalment falls due, not at the execution of the security bond. This view was supported by subsequent decisions, including Varkey Thomas v. Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. (1962) and Narayana Prabhu v. Janardhana Mallan (AIR 1974 Ker 108).
  
  The court reviewed the evolution of chitty laws, noting that the chitty institution has undergone significant changes and is now regulated by statutes such as the Kerala Chitties Act 23 of 1975. These statutes define the rights and obligations of the foreman and subscribers, emphasizing the contractual nature of the relationship.
  
  The court concluded that the obligation to pay future subscriptions arises from the original contract and not from the execution of the security bond. The prized subscriber does not become a debtor upon receiving the prize amount. The debt arises only when an instalment is defaulted. The court thus answered the referred question in the negative, stating that "no debt due to the foreman arises by reason of the receipt of the prize amount or of the execution of the security bond for securing future subscriptions."
  
  2. Validity of a sale deed executed by a Hindu father in respect of ancestral property for discharging antecedent debts:
  
  The plaintiffs challenged the sale deed executed by their father, arguing that it was not supported by consideration and necessity, and the debts recited were not antecedent debts. The trial court found that the sale deed was executed for the discharge of antecedent debts to the extent of Rs. 5,750, while the appellate court concurred, though it did not categorically find family necessity.
  
  The court reiterated that a Hindu father's right to alienate ancestral property to discharge his debts is recognized, provided the debts are antecedent and not tainted. If an alienee, after due inquiry, advances funds to discharge these debts, the sale can be upheld even if the entire consideration is not shown to be for antecedent debts.
  
  However, in this case, only half of the consideration was proved to be for antecedent debts. The court emphasized that an alienation cannot be sustained if a substantial part of the consideration is not for antecedent debts. The court found that the sale deed could not be upheld solely on the ground of discharging antecedent debts.
  
  The court also noted the necessity to consider whether the sale deed could be upheld for family necessity. The trial and appellate courts did not provide a clear finding on this issue. The court remitted the case back to the trial court to determine whether the sale deed was supported by family necessity, considering various factors such as the family's financial position and obligations.
  
  The court directed the trial court to decide the matter afresh in accordance with the law, focusing on the question of family necessity. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in the appeal, and the court fee paid on the memorandum of Second Appeal was ordered to be refunded to the appellants. The case was posted for further proceedings on 17-2-1983.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 220
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Nationalisation of Coke Oven Plants
  2. Interpretation of the term "Material Resources of the Community"
  3. Applicability of Article 31C of the Constitution
  4. Alleged Discrimination and Violation of Article 14
  5. Identity of the Coke Oven Plant
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Nationalisation of Coke Oven Plants:
  The primary issue revolves around the nationalisation of the Coke Oven Plants owned by the petitioners under the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. The Act aimed to acquire and transfer the right, title, and interest of the owners of coking coal mines and coke oven plants to the Central Government. The legislation was intended to reorganize and reconstruct such mines and plants for protecting, conserving, and promoting the scientific development of coking coal resources needed for the iron and steel industry.
  
  The Court clarified that the management of all coking coal mines and coke oven plants vested in the Central Government from the appointed day under the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971. The Act defined 'mine' broadly enough to include 'coke oven plants' within its scope. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 further specified that the right, title, and interest of the owners in relation to the coking coal mines and certain identified coke oven plants vested in the Central Government.
  
  2. Interpretation of the term "Material Resources of the Community":
  The Court addressed the interpretation of the term "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) of the Constitution. It was argued that private-owned resources could not be considered "material resources of the community" until they were acquired by the State. The Court rejected this narrow interpretation, stating that the term includes all resources, whether public or private-owned, capable of producing wealth for the community. The Court emphasized that the goal of socialism and the Directive Principles of State Policy support this broader interpretation.
  
  3. Applicability of Article 31C of the Constitution:
  The Court examined whether the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was entitled to the protection of Article 31C of the Constitution, which immunizes laws giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Article 39(b) or (c) from being challenged on the grounds of inconsistency with Articles 14, 19, or 31. The Court upheld the constitutionality of Article 31C as introduced by the Constitution Twenty-fifth Amendment Act, 1971, and stated that the nationalisation of coking coal mines and coke oven plants was directed towards securing the principle of distributing material resources to best subserve the common good.
  
  4. Alleged Discrimination and Violation of Article 14:
  The petitioners argued that the nationalisation of their coke oven plants was discriminatory, as other similar plants were left out. The Court found no merit in this argument, stating that the nationalisation process could be achieved in stages and that the exclusion of some units in the earlier stages did not constitute a violation of Article 14. The Court also noted that the inclusion of the petitioners' plants in the Second Schedule was justified based on their proximity to nationalised coking coal mines and the need to reorganize and reconstruct the industry.
  
  5. Identity of the Coke Oven Plant:
  A specific issue was raised regarding the identity of the coke oven plant listed in Item 9 of the Second Schedule to the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act. The petitioners claimed that the plant did not belong to them and that there was a mix-up in the names. The Court found no doubt about the identity of the plant, as the petitioners themselves had acknowledged its inclusion in the Second Schedule in their affidavits.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was a valid legislation aimed at securing the distribution of material resources for the common good and was protected under Article 31C of the Constitution. The Court also found no merit in the allegations of discrimination and confirmed the identity of the coke oven plant in question. The petitions were dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000 in each case.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 219
  
  Issues involved: Quashing of proceedings under sections 7/16/17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act based on complaint disclosure of offense.
  
  The Supreme Court heard an appeal challenging the Delhi High Court's decision to quash proceedings by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi against respondent Nos. 1 to 11. The case involved the purchase of adulterated milk toffees by a Food Inspector, leading to a complaint under sections 7/16/17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The High Court quashed the proceedings, similar to another case, but the Supreme Court found that the complaint in this case provided clear details of the roles and liabilities of the accused, unlike the previous case where a presumption was drawn without averment. The Court emphasized that at the stage of quashing proceedings, only the allegations in the complaint should be considered, and further evidence would be presented during the trial. The Court concluded that a prima facie case for summoning the accused was established, and the High Court erred in deeming the allegations vague. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the accused were to be summoned for trial.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 218
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the proceedings against the respondents under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
  2. The scope and application of inherent powers of the High Court u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
  3. The vicarious liability of the Manager and Directors of the company for the offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Quashing of Proceedings by the High Court
  The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in quashing the proceedings against the respondents. The High Court had quashed the proceedings on the ground that the complaint did not disclose any offence against the respondents. The Supreme Court noted that the complaint contained allegations regarding the visit of the Food Inspector to the shop, the sampling of toffees, and the subsequent finding of adulteration by the Public Analyst. However, the Court found that there was no clear averment that the Directors were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business, leading to the quashing of proceedings against them.
  
  Issue 2: Inherent Powers of the High Court u/s 482
  The Court discussed the scope of inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, emphasizing that these powers are to be exercised sparingly and only when no other remedy is available. The Court referred to previous judgments, including Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra and Raj Kapoor and Ors. v. State and Ors., to highlight that inherent powers should not be used to circumvent specific provisions of the Code. The Court reiterated that proceedings could be quashed if the complaint does not disclose any offence or if the allegations are patently absurd and inherently improbable.
  
  Issue 3: Vicarious Liability of Manager and Directors
  The Supreme Court differentiated between the vicarious liability of the Manager and the Directors. It held that the Manager, by virtue of his duties, could be presumed to be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business, making him vicariously liable for the offence. However, for the Directors, there was no evidence or specific allegation to suggest their involvement in the offence. The Court agreed with the High Court's decision to quash the proceedings against the Directors but set aside the quashing of proceedings against the Manager.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal was partly allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing the proceedings against the Manager (respondent No. 1) and restored the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate. The appeal was dismissed concerning the other respondents (Directors), and the High Court's order quashing the proceedings against them was upheld. The Court also highlighted the provisions u/s 319 of the Code, allowing the Court to take cognizance and add any person as an accused if sufficient evidence is produced during the trial.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 217
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Fairness in implementing the Import Policy.
  2. Compliance with the procedure for import of Capital Goods.
  3. Validity of the Government's decision to grant import licenses.
  4. Allegations of suppression of facts and unfair competition.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Fairness in implementing the Import Policy:
  
  The primary issue was whether Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 acted fairly in implementing the Import Policy as outlined in the Hand Book of Import-Export Procedures, 1980-81. The court noted that the petitioners argued that the policy was framed to encourage indigenous manufacturers and prevent the drain on foreign exchange. The petitioners contended that the Government overlooked their claim and granted the import license to Respondent No. 3 unfairly. However, the court found that the Government acted fairly, considering the technical advice and the clearance from the Directorate General of Technical Development (DGTD) and the Capital Goods (CG) Committee. The court emphasized that the grant of an import license is an administrative action and does not require a quasi-judicial process involving a full-fledged hearing and a reasoned order.
  
  2. Compliance with the procedure for import of Capital Goods:
  
  The petitioners claimed that Respondent No. 3 did not follow the procedure outlined in the Import Policy, specifically the requirement to advertise the need for Capital Goods exceeding Rs. 20 lakhs in Trade Journals to allow indigenous manufacturers to respond. The court noted that Respondent No. 3 initially filed an application for an import license before the expiry of 45 days from the advertisement date, which was not considered. However, a fresh application was filed on April 22, 1981, after the 45-day period, and the reasons for rejecting the petitioners' offer were stated. The court found no procedural lapse in this regard.
  
  3. Validity of the Government's decision to grant import licenses:
  
  The petitioners argued that the Government's decision to grant import licenses to Respondent No. 3 was influenced by unfair considerations and that the Government did not communicate the grounds for rejection of the petitioners' offer. The court held that the Government's decision was based on technical advice and the clearance from DGTD and the CG Committee. The court also noted that the petitioners themselves had applied for an import license for two machines in April 1981, which undermined their claim of being able to manufacture those machines indigenously. The court concluded that the Government's decision was justified and did not require further communication or personal hearing.
  
  4. Allegations of suppression of facts and unfair competition:
  
  Respondent No. 3 alleged that the petitioners were guilty of suppressing relevant facts and that their claim to manufacture the required machinery was false and frivolous. The court observed that the petitioners' efforts were aimed at preventing Respondent No. 3 from commencing their plant and entering the market as a competitor. The court found that the Government had acted fairly in considering the claims and representations from both parties and that the petitioners' allegations were without substance.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court dismissed the petition, finding that the Government had acted fairly and in accordance with the Import Policy. The petitioners' claims of unfair treatment and procedural lapses were not substantiated, and the court concluded that the petitioners' primary motive was to prevent competition from Respondent No. 3. The rule was discharged with costs.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 216
  
  Issues: Classification of goods under Customs Tariff Schedule - Whether "shells" are to be classified under sub-heading (3) or sub-heading (1) of Heading No. 85.18/27.
  
  In this case, the Revision Application was filed by the Appellant under Section 131 of the Customs Act, 1962, which was transferred to the Appellate Tribunal for disposal as an appeal. The goods in question are "shells" claimed to be part of lightning arresters with a 400 KV rating. The dispute arose regarding their classification under sub-heading (1) or sub-heading (3) of Heading No. 85.18/27 of the Customs Tariff Schedule. The Appellate Collector had rejected the classification under sub-heading (3), arguing that insulators are separate from apparatus for the protection of electric circuits, thus classifying them under sub-heading (1).
  
  During the appeal, the appellants emphasized that the goods were specially designed and manufactured for use as components of 400 KV lightning arresters and were integral parts of such equipment. They argued that the shells should be considered parts of apparatus for the protection of electrical circuits and classified under sub-heading (3). The appellants presented photographs showing how the shells were assembled in a lightning arrester, highlighting their function in maintaining gaps for lightning to pass through without damaging the equipment.
  
  The Department contended that even though the goods could be considered parts of a lightning arrester, if they functioned as insulators, they should be classified as such. Referring to Section Note 2 to Section XVI of the Customs Tariff Schedule, the Department argued that parts of machines should be classified in their respective headings rather than along with the machine itself. The Department maintained that since insulators were mentioned separately in the main Heading No. 85.18/27, the correct classification for the shells was under sub-heading (1) as "insulators of any material."
  
  The Tribunal acknowledged that the goods were intended for use in high voltage lightning arresters and could be considered parts of such equipment. However, it noted that the Customs Tariff separately mentioned "insulators of any material," indicating that insulators were distinct from apparatus for the protection of electrical circuits. The Tribunal applied Interpretative Rule 1, stating that the classification of goods within a Heading should follow similar rules as between sub-headings. The Tribunal found that the shells, despite being made of special ceramic material with heat-resisting properties, primarily functioned as insulators against electricity.
  
  Additionally, the Tribunal analyzed Note 2 to Section XVI of the Customs Tariff, concluding that since the goods fell under the description of "insulators of any material" in Heading No. 85.18/27, they should be classified under sub-heading (1) as "not elsewhere specified." The Tribunal referenced the Explanatory Notes to the Customs Co-operation Council Nomenclature, noting their persuasive value in interpreting the Tariff but ultimately relied on the wording of the Customs Tariff Schedule itself.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal upheld the Appellate Collector's classification of the goods under sub-heading (1) of Heading No. 85.18/27, rejecting the revision application and affirming that the shells were rightly classified as "insulators" under the Customs Tariff Schedule.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 215
  
  Issues:
  1. Validity of the show cause notice issued by Customs authorities.
  2. Confiscation of truck and goods by Customs authorities.
  3. Justification for not allowing redemption of the truck on payment of fine.
  4. Claim for compensation for damage caused to the truck.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The petitioner, a transport company owner, had goods seized by Customs authorities after the truck was abandoned and the occupants fired at the authorities during a stop. The petitioner challenged the confiscation through a writ petition, claiming the show cause notice was defective. The court held that even if the notice contained errors in section or notification, it was not defective as it detailed the incident adequately. The authorities provided valid reasons for the confiscation based on the circumstances of the incident, where firing occurred during a routine stop. The court found no grounds to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction based on the facts presented.
  
  2. The Deputy Collector, Appellate, and Revisional authorities confirmed the confiscation of the truck and goods. The court noted that while the confiscation was justified based on the incident's circumstances, the subsequent orders preventing the petitioner from redeeming the truck on payment of a fine were deemed unjustified. The authorities failed to justify the increased redemption amount of Rs. 19,318, as no legal basis was provided for the higher sum. The court also observed damage to the truck while in Customs possession, suggesting the petitioner could claim compensation for negligence. Consequently, the court quashed the orders disallowing redemption of the truck for Rs. 7,000.
  
  3. The court partially allowed the petition, setting aside the orders preventing redemption of the truck for Rs. 7,000 and the increased amount of Rs. 19,318. The petitioner was granted the right to redeem the truck on payment of the original fine amount, and the authorities were criticized for the lack of legal basis for the higher redemption sum. No costs were awarded in the judgment, indicating a resolution in favor of the petitioner on the issue of redemption while dismissing the claim for additional compensation.
  
  This analysis provides a detailed overview of the judgment, addressing each issue raised in the case comprehensively while retaining the legal terminology and key aspects of the original text.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 214
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether the claim for refund of duty made by the importer was barred under section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
  
  Analysis:
  The case involved M/s. Ruby Products, who imported acrylic sheets and claimed a refund of countervailing duty based on an exemption notification. The claim was rejected as time-barred by the Assistant Collector and the Appellate Collector of Customs. The key issue was whether the claim for refund was valid under section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
  
  The importers argued that the duty payment was a result of mutual mistake of fact and law, and they had the right to claim back the excess amount paid. They contended that the recovery of excess duty was without lawful authority and should be governed by section 72 of the Contract Act, not section 27 of the Customs Act. They also cited precedents where similar revision applications were allowed due to the goods not attracting additional customs duty.
  
  The Tribunal examined the arguments presented by the importers, including the claim of mutual mistake and the applicability of section 27. The Tribunal referred to a Supreme Court judgment in a similar case involving duty refund applications filed beyond the prescribed period. The Court established that applications for refund under the Customs Act get barred if made beyond the specified period under section 27, emphasizing that the Limitation Act's three-year limit is not applicable to refund applications under the Customs Act.
  
  Ultimately, the Tribunal found that the duty was paid on a certain date, and the refund claim was received much later, exceeding the time limit specified by section 27 of the Customs Act. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the lower authorities' decision to reject the refund claim as time-barred, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
  
  In conclusion, the judgment focused on the timeliness of the refund claim under section 27 of the Customs Act, highlighting that the claim being beyond the prescribed period rendered it invalid. The case underscored the importance of adhering to statutory time limits for refund claims under the Customs Act and clarified the inapplicability of general limitation periods under other laws to such claims.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 213
  
  Issues involved: Central Excise Tariff classification for High Density Polyethylene Tapes (HDPE tapes) and applicability of duty exemptions under various notifications.
  
  Summary:
  The case involved the correct classification of HDPE tapes under the Central Excise Tariff and the eligibility for duty exemptions. The appellants argued that the HDPE tapes should be classified as articles of plastic under Item 15A(2) and be exempt from duty under Notification No. 68/71-C.E. The Department contended that the tapes should be classified as man-made yarn under Item 18 and were not eligible for the exemption due to non-compliance with Chapter X procedure. The key point of contention was whether the HDPE tapes should be considered as filament yarn or not.
  
  The Tribunal considered the definitions provided by the ISI in the Glossary of Textile Terms, which defined filament yarn as a single filament of sufficient size to function as yarn in textile operations. The Tribunal noted that HDPE tapes, being split film yarns used for weaving fabrics, could be considered as yarn. However, the appellants argued that the tapes were not filament yarn as per trade understanding. The Tribunal agreed with this argument, stating that the HDPE tapes did not fit into any specific category of man-made fibres and yarn under Item 18. As HDPE is a plastic raw material, the tapes were classified as articles of plastic under Item 15A(2) and were exempt from duty under Notification No. 68/71-C.E.
  
  Therefore, the appeal was allowed on the grounds that the HDPE tapes were not man-made filament yarn falling under Item 18 but were articles of plastic falling under Item 15A(2) and exempt under Notification No. 68/71-C.E.

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• 1982 (12) TMI 212
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Claim for refund of excess customs duty.
  2. Applicability of Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.
  3. Ignorance of exemption notification.
  4. Applicability of general law of limitation.
  5. Jurisdiction and authority of customs officials.
  6. Precedents and case law references.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Claim for Refund of Excess Customs Duty
  The appellant, M/s. Afro Asian Associates, Bombay, imported two consignments of Glass Chatons and paid customs duty under Heading No. 70.01/05 of the Customs Tariff at 100%+20% and additional (CV) duty of 30%. They later contended that these items were eligible for a concessional rate of duty under Exemption Notification No. 29-Cus., dated 10-2-1979, which they were unaware of at the time of payment.
  
  2. Applicability of Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962
  The Assistant Collector rejected the refund claim, stating it was filed beyond the six-month time limit prescribed by Section 27(1) of the Customs Act. The Appellate Collector upheld this decision, emphasizing that the claim was time-barred and there was no ground for interference.
  
  3. Ignorance of Exemption Notification
  The appellant argued that the excess duty was paid in ignorance of the exemption notification, which they became aware of only after other importers successfully appealed for the concessional rate. They claimed that the delay in filing for a refund should be condoned due to this ignorance and the subsequent discovery of the notification.
  
  4. Applicability of General Law of Limitation
  The appellant contended that the excess duty paid was without the authority of law, invoking Article 265 of the Constitution of India, which prohibits the State from collecting any duty not authorized by law. They argued that the duty paid in ignorance of the notification should be treated as a mutual mistake, attracting the provisions of Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, which allows for a three-year limitation period from the date the mistake becomes known.
  
  5. Jurisdiction and Authority of Customs Officials
  The Tribunal noted that the claim for refund was made within the framework of the Customs Act, and thus, the time limit prescribed by Section 27(1) was applicable. It was emphasized that statutory authorities are bound by the provisions of the Act, and it is not open to them to bypass these provisions by invoking general principles of limitation.
  
  6. Precedents and Case Law References
  The Tribunal referred to several precedents to support its decision:
  - M/s. Burmah Construction Co. v. State of Orissa: The Supreme Court held that once a party relies on a statutory right, they are bound by the restrictions imposed by that statute.
  - Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur: The Court emphasized that statutory provisions must be given effect without adding or implying anything not expressed by the legislature.
  - M/s. Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. v. Union of India: The Supreme Court held that claims for refund must be within the time limit prescribed by Section 27(1) unless specific conditions are met.
  - Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International and M/s. Hindustan Sugar Mills v. The State of Rajasthan: These cases emphasized that the government should not defeat just claims by raising technical pleas of limitation, but the Tribunal noted these principles do not apply to the present case.
  
  Conclusion
  The Tribunal concluded that the claim for refund was rightly rejected by the customs authorities as it was filed beyond the six-month period prescribed by Section 27(1) of the Customs Act. The appeal was dismissed, and the principles of statutory limitation were upheld. The Tribunal also dismissed another appeal (No. CB/SB/T/A. No. 176/81-D) on identical grounds.

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