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1987 (3) TMI 532
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Collector under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act.
2. Presumption of Government ownership of land.
3. Validity of actions taken under Section 7A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act.
4. Application of principles of natural justice.
5. Right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution.
6. Procedural fairness and the rule of audi alteram partem.
7. Appropriate relief and directions for compliance.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Collector:
The primary issue was whether the Collector had jurisdiction to act under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, particularly after the land was transferred to the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority. The court held that the land remains vested in the Government and the transfer was only for public purpose utilization. Therefore, the Collector's jurisdiction was upheld, as the Government's title was not divested.
2. Presumption of Government Ownership:
The court addressed the statutory presumption under Section 7A(2) that the land in question is Government property until proven otherwise. For the purpose of the proceedings, it was presumed that the land was Government-owned. The petitioners' claim of title was not adjudicated in the writ petition as it was premature and could be addressed in the pending title suit.
3. Validity of Actions under Section 7A:
The court examined the Collector's actions under Section 7A, which allows for eviction without notice if a group of persons without entitlement occupies Government land. The provision was upheld as constitutionally valid. The court noted that the Collector's actions must comply with mandatory steps outlined in Section 7A, including forming an objective satisfaction of encroachment and issuing a demand for vacating the land.
4. Application of Principles of Natural Justice:
The court emphasized the necessity of adhering to principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem, which requires giving affected persons an opportunity to be heard. The court found that the procedure adopted by the respondents lacked this opportunity, rendering the action illegal.
5. Right to Livelihood under Article 21:
The petitioners argued that the eviction without due process violated their right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court agreed that any deprivation of livelihood must conform to just and fair procedures. The court referenced the Supreme Court's ruling in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, underscoring the intrinsic link between the right to life and livelihood.
6. Procedural Fairness and Rule of Audi Alteram Partem:
The court held that the rule of audi alteram partem must be read into Section 7A, requiring pre-decisional or post-decisional hearings based on the urgency of the situation. The court mandated that the District Collector must provide a written demand and an opportunity for the encroachers to present their claims before eviction.
7. Appropriate Relief and Directions:
The court declared the respondents' actions illegal due to non-compliance with statutory requirements and lack of opportunity for the petitioners to be heard. The court ordered the continuation of the status quo as per the Division Bench's direction, allowing the petitioners to submit representations to the Collector. The Collector was directed to provide a hearing and, if necessary, issue an eviction order with reasonable time for compliance. The writ petitions were allowed with specific directions, and each party was directed to bear its own costs.
The judgment underscores the balance between Government authority to manage public land and the procedural rights of individuals, emphasizing adherence to principles of natural justice and constitutional rights.
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1987 (3) TMI 531
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Entitlement to equal wages for contract labour.
3. Liability of principal employer for payment of wages.
4. Impact of previous Central Government decision on maintainability of the claim.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The petitioner argued that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the right of respondents to claim wages equal to regular employees under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court, however, held that it could inquire into the existence of the right to claim a benefit in terms of money, provided the right was not the subject matter of an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the Act. The Labour Court concluded that since the dispute did not require a reference under Section 10(1), it could proceed with the computation of benefits.
2. Entitlement to Equal Wages for Contract Labour:
The respondents claimed wages equal to those of regular employees under the principle of "equal pay for equal work." The Labour Court found that the respondents performed the same type of work as regular employees. Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules, 1971, mandates that contract workers performing similar work as regular employees should receive the same wages. The petitioner did not dispute the similarity in work. Therefore, the Labour Court held that the respondents were entitled to equal wages.
3. Liability of Principal Employer for Payment of Wages:
The petitioner contended that the claim for wages should be against the contractor, not the principal employer, as there was no direct master-servant relationship. The court referred to Section 21 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, which holds the principal employer liable for wage payment if the contractor fails to pay. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Hussainbhai v. Alath Factory Thozhilali Union, which established that the principal employer is liable for wages even if intermediaries are involved. Thus, the petitioner, as the principal employer, was held responsible for paying the respondents' wages.
4. Impact of Previous Central Government Decision on Maintainability of the Claim:
The petitioner argued that a previous decision by the Central Government, which refused to refer the termination dispute for adjudication, estopped the respondents from filing the application under Section 33C(2). The court found that the previous decision did not affect the respondents' right to claim wages. Additionally, the respondents had challenged the Central Government's refusal in a separate writ petition, which was still pending. Therefore, the court held that the application under Section 33C(2) was maintainable.
Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed with costs, affirming the Labour Court's order that the respondents were entitled to equal wages as regular employees and that the petitioner, as the principal employer, was liable to pay these wages. The court emphasized the principle of "equal pay for equal work" and the statutory obligations under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.
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1987 (3) TMI 530
Issues Involved:
1. Authority to file the complaint.
2. Jurisdiction of the court at Kharar.
3. Validity of the charge under Section 420 IPC.
4. Nature of the dispute (civil vs. criminal).
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Authority to File the Complaint:
The petitioner questioned the authority of Mr. Ashok Chhabra, Secretary of Messrs Punjab Tractors Limited, to file the complaint. The court examined a resolution from the Board of Directors dated November 4, 1982, which authorized Mr. Chhabra to file complaints. The petitioner's counsel argued that prior approval from the Vice-Chairman or Managing Director was necessary, but no such approval was on record. The court noted that this objection was raised for the first time in revision and found a clear statement by P.W. 1 Ashok Chhabra confirming his authorization to file the complaint. The court concluded there was no basis to hold that the complaint was filed by an unauthorized person.
2. Jurisdiction of the Court at Kharar:
The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Kharar court based on a precedent from the Allahabad High Court in *Sushil Chandra Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh*. The court analyzed Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which extends jurisdiction in cases of cheating involving deception by letters or telecommunication. The court referred to the Supreme Court judgment in *K. Satwant Singh v. The State of Punjab*, which held that jurisdiction could be at either the place of misrepresentation or where the consequence occurred. The court found no merit in the petitioner's jurisdictional challenge, holding that the Kharar court had proper jurisdiction.
3. Validity of the Charge under Section 420 IPC:
The petitioner argued that no offence under Section 420 IPC was made out, citing letters (exhibits D/2, D/7, and D/8) indicating continued business relations post the alleged deception. The court dismissed this argument, stating that the letters did not negate the elements of cheating established by the complaint and evidence. The petitioner also contended that charges under Sections 406 and 420 IPC were mutually exclusive. The court clarified that the complaint and evidence clearly established the false representation leading to the delivery of tractors, thus justifying the charge under Section 420 IPC.
4. Nature of the Dispute (Civil vs. Criminal):
The petitioner contended that the dispute was civil, as it involved the non-payment for tractors, and should be adjudicated in a civil court, especially since a civil suit was already filed. The court emphasized that the pendency of a civil suit does not bar criminal proceedings for cheating. The court distinguished this case from *Trilok Singh v. Satya Deo Tripathi* and *Nandu Babu v. Rajendra Kumar Singh*, where disputes were purely civil. The court found that the elements of cheating were prima facie established, warranting criminal proceedings.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the revision petition, affirming the trial magistrate's order framing a charge under Section 420 IPC against the petitioner. The court directed the trial magistrate to expedite the trial.
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1987 (3) TMI 529
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Rajasthan Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1961.
2. Competence of the State Legislature to enact laws affecting winding up of companies.
3. Interpretation of "Legal Proceeding" under Section 4(b) of the Act.
4. Applicability of Entries 43, 44, and 95 of List I versus Entries 23 and 33 of List III in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Rajasthan Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1961:
The creditor-petitioners challenged the validity of the Act, arguing that it falls under Entries 43, 44, and 95 of List I (Union List), thus beyond the competence of the State Legislature. The non-petitioner company contended that the Act falls under Entries 23 and 33(a) of List III (Concurrent List). The court examined the preamble, statement of objects and reasons, and relevant sections of the Act, concluding that the Act aims to prevent unemployment and ensure the continued operation of certain industrial undertakings. The court found the Act to be valid, emphasizing its primary objective of social security and economic stability, which falls under Entries 23 and 33 of List III.
2. Competence of the State Legislature to Enact Laws Affecting Winding Up of Companies:
The creditor-petitioners argued that matters related to winding up of companies fall exclusively under Entry 43 of List I, and thus, the State Legislature lacks the competence to enact laws affecting such matters. The court acknowledged that while Section 4(1)(b) of the Act does affect pending winding up proceedings, the true character of the Act is to provide relief to certain undertakings and prevent unemployment. The court applied the doctrine of pith and substance, determining that the Act's primary objective falls within the State Legislature's competence under Entries 23 and 33 of List III, despite its incidental effect on winding up proceedings.
3. Interpretation of "Legal Proceeding" under Section 4(b) of the Act:
The creditor-petitioners contended that the term "legal proceeding" should not include winding up proceedings and that the word "court" should not include the High Court. The court found that the expression "legal proceeding" is of the widest amplitude, encompassing any proceeding before any court, including winding up proceedings before the High Court. The court noted that excluding such proceedings would defeat the Act's objective, as most industries are incorporated companies.
4. Applicability of Entries 43, 44, and 95 of List I versus Entries 23 and 33 of List III in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India:
The court examined the relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule. Entries 43 and 44 of List I deal with the incorporation, regulation, and winding up of corporations, while Entry 95 deals with the jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court. Entries 23 and 33 of List III cover social security, employment, and trade and commerce in certain industries. The court concluded that the Act falls within Entries 23 and 33 of List III, as its primary objective is to prevent unemployment and ensure the continued operation of certain industries. The incidental effect on winding up proceedings does not alter the Act's true character.
Conclusion:
The court overruled the objections raised by the creditor-petitioners, upholding the validity of the Rajasthan Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1961. The proceedings of winding up shall remain stayed in view of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act.
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1987 (3) TMI 528
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi allowed the appeal by the Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta against the order of the Appellate Collector. The Tribunal held that scrap arising in the course of manufacturing tyres and tubes, as well as scrap from scrapping fully manufactured tyres and tubes, is liable for duty under Tariff Item 68 Central Excise Tariff. The order of the Appellate Collector was set aside, and the order of the Assistant Collector was restored.
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1987 (3) TMI 527
Issues:
Validity of usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1:
The main question in this appeal is whether a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court was correct in following the decision that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding was only valid to the extent that the mortgagee could retain possession until repayment of the mortgage debt. The case involved a suit under Section 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, where the appellants claimed they were sirdars and not liable to ejectment. The High Court, following precedent, held that such transactions were not valid mortgages but still fell under Section 21(1)(d) of the Act.
Issue 2:
The appellants contended that the usufructuary mortgage in question was valid under the Recovery of Rents (Bengal) Act, 1859, as it was executed before the Act's repeal. However, the High Court reiterated that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding did not transfer any interest to the mortgagee beyond possession rights until the debt was repaid. The court emphasized the long-standing view that such mortgages did not extinguish the right of an occupancy tenant and were not subject to redemption suits.
Issue 3:
The appellants argued that observations in a previous case supported the validity of the mortgage under the Bengal Act. The court disagreed, stating that the consistent view of the Allahabad High Court was that such mortgages were not valid as traditional mortgages but only allowed the mortgagee to retain possession until repayment. The court invoked the doctrine of stare decisis to maintain legal certainty and prevent disruption of established law.
Issue 4:
The court also rejected the argument that Section 6 of the Recovery of Rents (Bengal) Act allowed for such mortgages, citing a judgment that occupancy rights were non-transferable under the Act. The court clarified that the terms of the mortgage bond governed the relationship between the parties, allowing the mortgagee to retain possession until the debt was paid off, in line with the U.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding did not confer full mortgage rights but only allowed the mortgagee to retain possession until the debt was cleared. The court emphasized the long-standing legal precedent in the Allahabad High Court and the legislative intent behind the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951.
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1987 (3) TMI 526
Issues:
1. Validity of an ex parte injunction order under Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. Necessity of an injunction restraining transfer of suit property despite the doctrine of lis pendens.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addresses the challenge to an ex parte injunction order under Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. The appellant argued that the order was defective as it lacked the court's opinion and reasons for proceeding ex parte. While the rule mandates recording reasons, the court opined that such recording is not mandatory to overturn a justifiable ex parte order solely due to the omission of reasons. Citing precedents, the court emphasized that the failure to record reasons does not vitiate the order if there are materials on record justifying the injunction. The court rejected the contention that the absence of reasons necessitates reversal of the order.
2. The second issue pertains to the necessity of an injunction restraining the defendant from transferring the suit property despite the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The appellant argued that such an injunction was unnecessary as Section 52 already addresses pendente lite transfers. However, the court held that the doctrine of lis pendens may not always fully protect the plaintiff's interest, especially in cases of specific performance suits. Referring to Rule 1 of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, the court highlighted that it allows for interim injunctions to restrain property transfer during litigation, indicating the need for such injunctions in appropriate cases. Citing legal authorities, the court rejected the argument that the doctrine of lis pendens renders injunctions against pendente lite transfers redundant.
3. On the merits, the court found that the trial judge was justified in issuing the impugned injunction order. The defendant had not filed a response to the plaintiff's application for injunction, requiring the court to accept the application's statements as true at that stage. The court emphasized that the final decision on the injunction would be based on the materials presented during the final hearing, and any findings made during the interim stage would not replace the final decision in the suit. The court dismissed the appeal, directing the trial judge to expedite the hearing on the application for temporary injunction pending before him.
In conclusion, the judgment upholds the validity of the ex parte injunction order and emphasizes the necessity of injunctions to prevent harm to the plaintiff's interests during litigation, despite the existence of the doctrine of lis pendens. The court's decision underscores the importance of considering all relevant factors in granting interim injunctions and highlights the distinction between interim findings and final decisions in legal proceedings.
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1987 (3) TMI 525
Issues:
1. Whether land owners owning land in both the States of Punjab and Haryana can claim to retain the permissible area in each State separately after a specific date.
2. Whether an order declaring the area to be surplus, passed prior to a certain date but not implemented, would continue to have effect after that date.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a displaced person, Balwant Singh, who owned land in both Punjab and Haryana. A dispute arose regarding the surplus area declared on his land by the Special Collector under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1930. The question was whether he could retain permissible area separately in each state post the re-organization of Punjab in 1966. The High Court ruled against the landowner's claim for separate allotments in each state, and the matter was appealed to a full bench. The full bench concluded that the order declaring surplus land before 1966 would remain valid even if not implemented, and landowners were not entitled to separate allotments in the newly created states.
2. Balwant Singh argued that he should be entitled to 50 acres in each state, Punjab and Haryana, based on the division of his land post-reorganization. However, the court held that the order declaring surplus land, which had not been implemented, would still be effective. The court emphasized that the government had the right to utilize surplus land for resettlement purposes without any time limit. The Re-organization Act provisions ensured that orders passed before 1966 would be implemented despite the state division. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that allowing separate allotments in each state would create anomalies and go against the purpose of the Act to protect tenant rights and facilitate resettlement.
3. The legal analysis focused on the interpretation of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1930, and the implications of the Punjab Re-Organization Act, 1966, on land ownership rights post-reorganization. The court clarified that the government's right to utilize surplus land for resettlement purposes was paramount, and landowners could not claim separate allotments in each state. The judgment emphasized the continuity of orders passed before the re-organization date and upheld the validity of such orders even if not immediately implemented. The decision aimed to maintain consistency and prevent unfair advantages for certain landowners based on the state division.
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1987 (3) TMI 524
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of the assessee regarding a deduction under section 23(2) of the IT Act, 1961. The deduction of interest from dividend income was not pressed and therefore not answered. No costs were awarded. (Case Citation: 1987 (3) TMI 524 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT)
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1987 (3) TMI 523
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the demand for electricity charges raised after more than three years.
2. Compliance with Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act.
3. Basis for calculating electricity consumption in case of a defective meter.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of the demand for electricity charges raised after more than three years:
The petitioner challenged the demand for electricity charges amounting to Rs. 1183.36, raised by a revised bill dated 1st November 1980, for the period from 11th January 1973 to 29th September 1973. The petitioner argued that no demand can be raised for a period more than three years after the consumption of electricity, citing Section 24 of the Electricity Act and Section 455 of the Municipal Corporation Act. Section 24 allows the licensee to cut off the supply of electricity if charges are not paid after giving seven clear days' notice. Section 455 states that no proceeding for recovery of any sum due shall be commenced after three years from the date the sum becomes due.
The court held that the amount of charges becomes due and payable only with the submission of the bill and not earlier. The word "due" in Section 24 means due and payable after a valid bill has been sent to the consumer. Therefore, the respondents are at liberty to send a bill for consumption of electricity even three years after the electricity has been consumed. The court concluded that the period of limitation for recovery of the amount would commence after the submission of the bill, and if payment is not made within three years, the right to file a suit would be lost.
2. Compliance with Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act:
The petitioner contended that the provisions of Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act had not been complied with. Section 26(6) requires that if there is a dispute about the correctness of a meter, the matter must be decided by an Electrical Inspector. If the Inspector finds the meter to be defective, he shall estimate the amount of energy supplied during the period not exceeding six months. The court emphasized that the Electrical Inspector must follow the principles of natural justice, giving both parties a reasonable opportunity to present their case.
The court referred to the case of Hamidullah Khan v. The Chairman, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, where it was held that the Board could not unilaterally decide the correctness of the meter or estimate the quantity of energy consumed. Such decisions must be made by the Electrical Inspector, and the revised estimate could cover only a period of six months. The court agreed with this interpretation, stating that the maximum period for which a bill can be raised in respect of a defective meter is six months, ensuring better checking and maintenance by the licensee.
3. Basis for calculating electricity consumption in case of a defective meter:
The petitioner argued that the basis for calculating the correct consumption of electricity during the period should not be with reference to the subsequent period but should be with reference to the period earlier than the period in question. The court referred to Clause 22(d) of the Conditions of Supply, which states that if a meter is found defective, the consumption should be determined by averaging the recorded consumption for the previous three season months.
In this case, the respondents estimated the consumption for the period from January 1973 to September 1973 by reference to the actual consumption from January 1974 to September 1974, which was incorrect. The court held that the respondents should have compared the period in question with the corresponding months of the previous three years (1970, 1971, and 1972) and not the subsequent year (1974). This was a clear violation of Clause 22(d).
Conclusion:
For the aforementioned reasons, the court allowed the writ petition and quashed the bill dated 1st November 1980, whereby a demand for Rs. 1183.36 was raised. The petitioner was entitled to costs, with counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 500.
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1987 (3) TMI 522
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 17(2A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Act, 1956.
2. Whether the delayed payment of rent for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 warranted the striking out of the defense.
Summary:
Issue 1: Entitlement to the Benefit of Section 17(2A)(b)
The appellant filed an application u/s 17(2A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Act, 1956, seeking to pay arrears of rent in installments. The High Court held that the application was not maintainable as it was filed beyond the time limit specified in Section 17(1). However, the Supreme Court found that the High Court erred by not considering the overriding effect of Section 17(2A) and Section 5 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1967, which provided retrospective effect to the amendments. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to file the application within one month from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance, and thus, the application was maintainable. Consequently, the appellant had complied with the court's orders regarding the payment of arrears and was entitled to the protection u/s 17(4).
Issue 2: Striking Out of Defense for Delayed Payment
The trial court and the High Court struck out the appellant's defense due to delayed payment of rent for September 1968 and March 1969, citing non-compliance with Section 17(1). The Supreme Court held that Section 17(3) should be read in conjunction with Section 17(4) and its proviso, which allows relief if the subsequent default is for less than four months within a twelve-month period. The appellant's default was for only two months within thirteen months, entitling him to protection under the proviso. Additionally, the Supreme Court interpreted the word "shall" in Section 17(3) as "may," making the provision directory rather than mandatory. This interpretation vested the court with discretion to either strike out the defense or not, based on the circumstances. The Supreme Court concluded that the delayed payments were of a technical nature and did not warrant striking out the defense.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, dismissed the suit filed by the first respondent, and held that the appellant was entitled to the benefits of Section 17(2A)(b) and protection under Section 17(4). The petitions for impleadment were dismissed as unnecessary. The parties were ordered to bear their respective costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 520
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Government is entitled to claim the 'excise duty component' in the issue price of unlifted liquor.
2. Validity of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Amendment Act X of 1984.
3. Whether the issue price includes excise duty and its implications on the excise contractors.
Summary:
1. Government's Entitlement to Claim 'Excise Duty Component':
The primary question was whether under the 'Excise-Law' prevailing in Andhra Pradesh, the Government could claim from the Excise Contractors who failed to lift the 'Minimum Guaranteed Quantity' of liquor the amount representing the 'excise duty component' in the issue price of such unlifted liquor. Initially, a Full Bench of three judges in V. Narasimha Rao v. Superintendent of Excise, AIR 1974 AP 157 held that the Government could, but this was overruled by a Full Bench of Five Judges in Atluri Brahmanandam v. Tahsildar of Gannavaram AIR 1977 AP 196, which held that the Government could not. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Five Judge Full Bench, stating that the amount required to be paid by the contractors was not excise duty on undrawn liquor but part of the price agreed for the privilege to sell liquor.
2. Validity of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Amendment Act X of 1984:
To cure the defects pointed out by the Five Judge Full Bench and validate the demands raised, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature enacted the Andhra Pradesh Excise Amendment Act X of 1984. The Supreme Court found that the amendments to Sections 17 and 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act were sufficient to remove the defects pointed out by the Full Bench. The amendments clarified that the payment was for the exclusive privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor and not merely excise duty. The petitions challenging the amending Act were dismissed, and the demands made by the excise authorities were upheld.
3. Issue Price and Excise Duty:
The Court emphasized that the 'issue price' is a single pre-determined sum and not the total of separate sums representing various components like cost price, excise duty, etc. The issue price, once determined, becomes a chemical compound and not a mechanical mixture, meaning the excise duty loses its identity and becomes an inseparable part of the issue price. The Court rejected the argument that excise duty, as a part of the issue price, retains its character and can be severed and dealt with separately. It was held that the amount which contractors were required to pay or have adjusted was not excise duty on undrawn liquor but part of the price for the privilege to sell liquor.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh, reversing the judgment of the High Court in Atluri Brahmanandam v. Tahsildar of Gannavaram. The amendments made by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature were deemed effective in removing the defects pointed out by the Full Bench, and the demands made by the excise authorities were validated. Appeals and petitions challenging the amending Act and the demands were dismissed.
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1987 (3) TMI 519
Issues involved:
1. Banning of import, manufacture, sale, and distribution of harmful drugs.
2. Constitution of a high-powered authority to address drug-related hazards.
3. Enforcement of drug regulations and quality standards.
4. Role of multinational corporations in the Indian drug industry.
5. Implementation of the 1979 drug policy.
6. Judicial review of drug policy and legislative measures.
7. Representation of consumers in drug regulatory bodies.
8. Establishment of regional drug laboratories.
9. Expeditious disposal of pending court proceedings regarding drug regulations.
Summary:
1. Banning of Harmful Drugs:
The petitioner, an advocate and General Secretary of Public Interest Law Service Society, sought directions u/s Article 32 of the Constitution to ban the import, manufacture, sale, and distribution of drugs recommended for banning by the Drugs Consultative Committee. He also sought the cancellation of all licenses for 471 such drugs.
2. Constitution of High-Powered Authority:
The petitioner requested the Central Government to establish a high-powered authority to investigate the hazards caused by these drugs and suggest remedial measures, including compensation.
3. Enforcement of Drug Regulations:
The petitioner alleged inadequate enforcement of the 1979 drug policy and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, as amended in 1982. Despite the Act's provisions, enforcement was sluggish, and harmful drugs continued to circulate.
4. Role of Multinational Corporations:
The petitioner argued that multinational corporations dominated the Indian drug industry, making huge profits with minimal government control, and that harmful drugs banned in the West were still available in India.
5. Implementation of 1979 Drug Policy:
The petitioner contended that the objectives of the 1979 drug policy remained unimplemented, and indigenous drug technology development was neglected.
6. Judicial Review:
The Court acknowledged the complexity and technical nature of the issues, stating that judicial proceedings were not appropriate for determining such matters. The Court emphasized the State's obligation to ensure public health and eliminate injurious drugs.
7. Consumer Representation:
The Court suggested that the Central Drugs Technical Advisory Board and the Drugs Consultative Committee should have adequate consumer representation to advise the government effectively.
8. Regional Drug Laboratories:
The Court recommended the establishment of regional drug laboratories in addition to the Central Laboratory to facilitate research and coordination.
9. Expeditious Disposal of Court Proceedings:
The Court urged the Central Government to seek impleadment in pending High Court cases challenging the vires of Sections 10-A and 26-A of the Act and request expeditious disposal. The Court refrained from dissolving interim directions but suggested the Central Government apply to the High Courts for resolution within two months.
Conclusion:
The Court appreciated the petitioner's efforts and directed the Ministry of Health to compensate him with Rs. 5000 for expenses. The petition was disposed of with recommendations for improved drug regulation and enforcement.
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1987 (3) TMI 518
The Supreme Court upheld the promotion of the respondent and confirmed the quashing of the order of reversion. The Court clarified that prior approval of the Central Government is not necessary for matters like travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation, and departmental promotion. The appeal was dismissed with no costs. (Case Citation: 1987 (3) TMI 518 - SC)
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1987 (3) TMI 517
Issues Involved:
1. Violation of Section 4 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976.
2. Applicability of the Act to the petitioner's business.
3. Whether the work performed by male and female stenographers was the same or similar.
4. Discrimination in pay based on sex.
5. Impact of the 1975 settlement on the remuneration of female stenographers.
6. Financial ability of the management to comply with the Act.
Summary:
1. Violation of Section 4 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976:
The core issue was whether the petitioner violated Section 4 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 by paying female stenographers less than their male counterparts for the same or similar work. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the lower authorities and the High Court that the petitioner had indeed violated Section 4 of the Act by paying female stenographers less than male stenographers for the same work.
2. Applicability of the Act to the Petitioner's Business:
The petitioner contended that their business was not covered under the establishments listed in sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act. However, it was established that the petitioner's business fell under "Water Transport" and was therefore subject to the Act.
3. Whether the Work Performed by Male and Female Stenographers was the Same or Similar:
The Authority, the Appellate Authority, and the High Court all found that the work performed by male and female stenographers was the same or similar. The female stenographers were designated as "Confidential Lady Stenographers" and performed tasks identical to their male counterparts.
4. Discrimination in Pay Based on Sex:
The Court noted that the female stenographers were paid less than male stenographers despite performing the same work, which constituted discrimination based on sex. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the difference in pay was justified by the 1975 settlement, stating that Section 3 of the Act overrides any inconsistent agreements or settlements.
5. Impact of the 1975 Settlement on the Remuneration of Female Stenographers:
The 1975 settlement had reduced the basic salary of female stenographers while increasing their dearness allowance, resulting in a lower total remuneration compared to male stenographers. The Court held that this settlement could not justify the discriminatory pay structure as it was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.
6. Financial Ability of the Management to Comply with the Act:
The petitioner argued that their financial position made it difficult to pay equal remuneration. The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the Act does not permit discrimination in pay based on the financial ability of the employer.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's judgment that the petitioner had violated Section 4 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. The Court emphasized that the Act mandates equal pay for equal work regardless of the employer's financial condition and any pre-existing settlements. The petitioner's financial difficulties did not justify non-compliance with the Act.
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1987 (3) TMI 516
The Allahabad High Court allowed a writ petition under Article 226, directing the Sales Tax Officer not to assess the petitioners' unit as a new industrial unit after they were granted an eligibility certificate under Section 4-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Court relied on a previous decision and issued a mandamus in favor of the petitioners. (Case Citation: 1987 (3) TMI 516 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT)
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1987 (3) TMI 515
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the agreement to sell the house under Section 7 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act.
2. Effect of the exemption order under Section 24 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act.
3. Impact of the mortgage and subsequent decree on the property.
4. Applicability of Section 23 of the Contract Act.
5. Finality of proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Agreement to Sell the House under Section 7 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act:
The core issue was whether the agreement to sell the house, made on May 4, 1958, was valid under Section 7 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. The High Court had previously ruled that the agreement was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act due to the prohibition under Section 7 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. However, the Supreme Court found that the restrictions under Section 7 pertain to "exchange, gift, sale, mortgage, or lease" and do not explicitly include an agreement to sell. The Court clarified that an agreement to sell does not transfer any rights in immovable property and, therefore, is not prohibited by Section 7. Thus, the agreement to sell was held to be valid.
2. Effect of the Exemption Order under Section 24 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act:
The respondents had obtained an exemption order under Section 24 on March 26, 1943, which exempted the house from being sold during proceedings under the Act. The Supreme Court noted that this exemption made the house free from any mortgage or charge. The Court emphasized that the language of the provision, rather than the specific wording of the exemption order, was crucial. The exemption under Section 24 was intended to allow the debtor to retain a residential house and necessary furniture, free from encumbrances.
3. Impact of the Mortgage and Subsequent Decree on the Property:
The property in question had been mortgaged, and a decree based on the mortgage had been passed. The Supreme Court observed that once the Special Judge passed a simple money decree under Section 14(7) of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, the rights of the mortgagee were extinguished, and the decree substituted all previous rights. Therefore, at the time of the suit for specific performance, the house was free from any mortgage or charge.
4. Applicability of Section 23 of the Contract Act:
The High Court had ruled that the agreement to sell was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act due to the prohibition under Section 7 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. However, the Supreme Court found that Section 7 did not apply to agreements to sell, as they do not transfer any rights in immovable property. Consequently, the agreement was not void under Section 23 of the Contract Act.
5. Finality of Proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act:
The respondents contended that proceedings under the Act were still pending, which would invoke the restrictions under Section 7. However, the Supreme Court noted an order dated May 7, 1976, which indicated that no proceedings were pending under the Act. The Court held that the restrictions under Section 7 cease to be effective once the proceedings are concluded. Therefore, a decree for specific performance could be passed without objection under Section 7.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the decree passed by the trial court and maintained by the appellate court. The Court directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 20,000 to the respondent as compensation, considering the escalation in property value. The main appeal was allowed, and no orders were necessary in the other appeal. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1987 (3) TMI 514
The Supreme Court confirmed the High Court's decision in a case involving compensation amount. Respondent No. 1 must approach the civil court to establish their claim by July 15, 1987, or the compensation will be given to the appellants. If a suit is filed, appellants can withdraw the amount with a bank guarantee. No costs were awarded.
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1987 (3) TMI 513
The High Court of Patna ruled in favor of the Revenue in a case involving the assessment of a lady taxpayer under the IT Act, 1961. The Court held that the taxpayer was incorrectly assessed under a scheme that excluded ladies and minors. The Court also found that the Income-tax Officer did not conduct a proper inquiry before assessment. The Court concluded that the Commissioner of Income Tax was justified in setting aside the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer. The Court referred to previous decisions that clarified the scheme did not apply to ladies and minors. The Court answered all three questions in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1987 (3) TMI 512
The Bombay High Court set aside a detention order issued under COFEPOSA due to the detaining authority's failure to consider all material together before passing the order. The court emphasized that the detention order must be based on the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction after considering all relevant material at one time. The petition was allowed, and the detenu was ordered to be released immediately.
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