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Showing 1 to 20 of 2006 Records
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2018 (4) TMI 2012
Admissibility of Mines Closures Plan as permissible expenditure - HELD THAT:- As decided in Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. [2017 (10) TMI 1458 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] as the assessee itself mentioned in his reply that the expenditure has not been debited in the books of accounts for the assessment year under consideration therefore no question of its allowability arises. Even otherwise, legally also the claim of the assessee is not valid in view of the decision in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. [2006 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT] that claim of deduction not made in the return cannot be entertained by AO otherwise than by filing revised return.
As not reflected in the books of accounts without taking closure of a mining is a statutory liability and the same is for the subsequent year reflected, therefore, in view of the decision rendered by the tribunal, we are of the opinion that the tribunal has not committed any error. No substantial question of law arises.
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2018 (4) TMI 2011
Exemption u/s. 11 & 12 - Depreciation claim - HELD THAT:- Supreme Court in the case of CIT-III, Pune vs Rajasthan and Gujarati Charitable Foundation, Poona [2017 (12) TMI 1067 - SUPREME COURT] held that when the charitable body applies its income on acquisition of capital assets, depreciation on such assets should be allowed and hence the AR pleaded that the Revenue’s contentions are untenable and hence its appeal may be dismissed. Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
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2018 (4) TMI 2010
Legality in passing an order of remand to the original adjudicating authority to first decide the issue of jurisdiction - HELD THAT:- The appeals preferred before the Tribunal are restored to their original position. The Tribunal would decide the appeals on merits including the question of jurisdiction of the officer of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence who had issued show cause notices. The said issue would be examined by the Tribunal without being influenced by the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mangli Impex Limited [2016 (5) TMI 225 - DELHI HIGH COURT] - there are no opinion on merits of the appeals or on the procedure that the Tribunal should adopt and follow.
Appeal disposed off.
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2018 (4) TMI 2009
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - assessment after completion of four years - AR contended that as per the reasons recorded, there is no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts - assessee has not incurred any cost of acquisition of the said property, therefore, action of assessee to consider acquisition cost and working of indexation cost is not in order and has to be disallowed - HELD THAT:- It is clear from the above reasoning that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose the fact that no cost has been incurred for the acquisition of the said property. Accordingly, there is not merit in the legal ground taken by the assessee.
Addition made u/s.50C - We had carefully gone through the orders of the authorities below and found that issue under consideration is squarely covered not only by the order of the Tribunal in the case of Mrs Tauqeer Fatema Rizvi [2014 (5) TMI 315 - ITAT MUMBAI] but also by the decision of Abrar Alvi [2000 (3) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] CIT(A) has decided the issue by following the decision of the Tribunal in case of Mrs Tauqeer Fatema Rizvi [2014 (5) TMI 315 - ITAT MUMBAI] Respectfully following the order of the Bombay High Court as well as Tribunal as stated above, we do not find any infirmity in the order of CIT(A) for confirming the addition made u/s.50C of the IT Act. Appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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2018 (4) TMI 2008
Seeking release of funds deposited as a bank guarantee and the conditions under which these funds should be handled during the arbitration process - HELD THAT:- As far as the apprehension of the appellant that in case the insolvency proceedings are initiated against the respondent, it would not be able to encash the bank guarantee as ordered by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Arbitral Tribunal holds that presently this is only a vague and unsubstantiated apprehension without any justification and in any case, the bank guarantee that would be furnished pursuant to the order of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be subject to its further orders. It further holds that in any case, the appellant would not be prejudiced if the money is kept deposited with the Registrar General of this Court or the money is converted and secured in form of a bank guarantee in favour of the appellant. The Arbitral Tribunal further balances the equity by directing the respondent to give the bank guarantee of a higher amount, including the interest at a higher rate than the interest being earned in the fixed deposit.
The Arbitral Tribunal has balanced the equity between the parties and has considered the submissions made by the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal. This Court in exercise of its power under Section 37 of the Act cannot interfere with the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act unless the discretion exercised by the Tribunal is found to be perverse or contrary to law. As an Appellate Court, the interference is not warranted merely because the Appellate Court in exercise of its discretion would have exercised the same otherwise.
This Court in Bakshi Speedways v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation [2009 (8) TMI 1306 - DELHI HIGH COURT], has held that the same principles will apply even in case of an appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act.
Conclusion - The Arbitral Tribunal having exercised its discretion and found a balance of equity between the parties, this Court in exercise of its power under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act would not interfere with the same unless it is shown that the discretion so exercised is perverse in any manner or contrary to the law. In the present case, no such exception has been made out by the appellant.
Appeal dismissed.
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2018 (4) TMI 2007
Exemption u/s 10(23C) - assessee claimed that it is an educational institution and the gross receipts are less than Rs. 1 crore, hence, the assessee is entitled for exemption - AO held that the assessee is not entitled for exemption u/s 11 and for the assessee’s failure to produce books of accounts and the relevant vouchers, the A.O. disbelieved the claim of the assessee that it is existing solely for educational purpose - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, though the assessee is claimed to have running educational institution solely for educational purpose, the assessee has not established with relevant evidences, books of accounts and the documents that the assessee is solely engaged for the education. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the lower authorities, hence, the assessee’s ground for treating the institution as educational institution existing solely for the purpose of education is dismissed. Accordingly, the assessee is not entitled for exemption u/s 10(23C) of the Act.
Submission of the assessee is that the entire gross receipts should not be treated as income and only the profit element required to be assessed to tax - Once it is believed that the assessee is carrying on business activity, the expenditure relatable to earning income required to be allowed as deduction. In the instant case, as per the books of accounts and the profit & loss account, the gross receipts of the assessee were Rs. 19,65,000/- and the expenditure was Rs. 19,64,330/- resulting in profit of Rs. 18,670/-. As per the assessment order, the assessee has claimed the expenditure such as salaries, vehicle maintenance, office expenses, insurance, depreciation, interest on loans and telephone charges, etc., but there was no proper evidence. During the appeal hearing, for a query from the bench, the Ld. A.R. expressed no objection for estimation of income @ 20% of the gross receipts.
Thus direct the A.O. to estimate the income @ 20% on gross receipts and assesses the same as income. The assessee’s appeal on this ground is partly allowed.
Taxing the income at maximum marginal rate - As per section 167B of the Act, in case of an assessee registered under Societies Act, the same is excluded for taxing the income at for maximum marginal rate.
The assessee is a society registered under Societies Act, 1860 as evidenced from the registration certificate. The facts are similar in this case, therefore, following the decision of coordinate bench and section 167B we hold that the income of the assessee is to be taxed at normal rates but not at maximum marginal rate, accordingly, we set aside the order of the CIT(A) and allow the appeal of the assessee on this ground.
Appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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2018 (4) TMI 2006
Rejction of refund claim on the premise that the same has been barred by limitation as prescribed under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - HELD THAT:- Considering the fact that the Larger Bench of this Tribunal in the case of M/S VEER OVERSEAS LTD. VERSUS CCE, PANCHKULA [2018 (4) TMI 910 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH], wherein, it has been held that in the case where the refund claim has been filed under Section 11B of the Act, in that circumstances, the time limit prescribed under Section 11B of the Act is applicable, therefore, there are no infirmity in the impugned order rejecting the refund claim as time barred.
Therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed.
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2018 (4) TMI 2005
Anti-competitive action - abuse of dominant position in the online general web search and web search advertising services markets in India - imposition of monetary penalty - infringement of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of Competition Act, 2002 - levy of penalty - HELD THAT:- The Commission has failed to establish from the evidence on record that there is an imposition of unfair or discriminatory condition in purchase or sale of goods or services or there is a restriction of production of goods or provision of services or market, technical or scientific development or indulgence in practice or practices which result in denial of market access to some player(s) in the relevant market. In the conclusion, they held that the Appellant- Google creating large online platforms can wield substantial power over all market participants. By virtue of their access to the entire internet landscape as also to large volumes of personal data, they may be in a position to deter new innovation or dampen consumer welfare. But it further held that market power or dominance in itself is not an antitrust concern; it is the conduct of such players that warrants careful competition scrutiny, which the majority of Members have failed to prove.
Levy of penalty - HELD THAT:- Without deciding the question what should be the criteria of relevant turnover for the purpose of imposition of penalty which will be decided after final hearing, it is directed that if the Appellants’ deposit 10% of the penalty amount imposed on Appellant(s) by way of FDR in favour of Registrar, NCLAT within four weeks, the impugned order so far it relates to penalty also shall remain stayed.
Post the matter for hearing on 28th May, 2018.
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2018 (4) TMI 2004
CENVAT credit - capital goods received prior to the date of registration - Held that: - it is evident from a plain reading of Rule 6(4) that it carves out an exception with respect to the factories or the assessees whose product is otherwise dutiable but are enjoying exemption based upon value or quantity of clearance in a Financial Year - Learned Commissioner have erred in holding that the appellant is not entitled to the Cenvat credit as they were not manufacturing any excisable goods, prior to the date of registration - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2018 (4) TMI 2003
CENVAT credit - inputs - Cement have been used in laying foundation of new machinery - Held that: - Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of ‘India Cement Ltd’ [2015 (3) TMI 661 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] has held that staging and supporting structures are essential part of the machinery, so as to run the same for manufacture of dutiable finished products - credit allowed.
Light fitting - Held that: - the same are also essential inputs for the purpose of manufacture of dutiable finished goods as no production can take place in darkness. Admittedly such light fitting are used in the factory of production - credit allowed.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2018 (4) TMI 2000
Applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, and more particularly Article 137 to the statutory arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 - initiation of Arbitration proceedings u/s 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act for determination of the value of the lands belonging to the landowners whose lands were acquired for the purpose of construction of National Highways - Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Article 137 would apply to an application seeking Arbitration under Section 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956?
HELD THAT:- In Momin Construction Company [1995 (1) TMI 423 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 provides for an application to file an arbitration agreement in Court. Here again the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not called upon to decide as to whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to a statutory arbitration.
Similarly the Division Bench of this Court in O. Ramakrishna Reddy [1995 (8) TMI 353 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] had also held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to a suit under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for reference of the dispute to an Arbitrator. Here again the Division Bench was not called upon to decide whether the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to statutory arbitrations.
In T.P. Kunhaliumma [1976 (10) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to an application under Section 16(3) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 where again the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to a statutory arbitration was not an issue. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had also held that the words “any other application” under Article 137 cannot be said to be an application under the Code of Civil Procedure alone.
A similar question arose in Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited Vs. PPN Power Generating Company Private Limited [2015 (11) TMI 1287 - SUPREME COURT], wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 to a statutory arbitration under the Electricity Act, 2003 had concluded that in view of Section 2(4) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the provisions of Section 43 will not apply to a statutory arbitration.
The lands belonging to the land owners who are the respondents in the Writ Appeals and petitioners in the Writ Petitions were acquired for the purpose of widening the National Highways under the National Highways Act, 1956. The competent Authority passed orders under Section 3-G(1) of the said Act. The landowners had filed applications though belatedly seeking re-determination of the compensation by referring the matter to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government in terms of Section 3-G(5) of the Act. The applications were dismissed by the Arbitrator on the ground that they have been filed beyond 3 years.
The provisions of the Limitation Act and more particularly Article 137 would not apply to an application for reference to arbitration under Section 3G() of the National Highway Act, 1956 - the orders of the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petitions directing initiation of arbitration proceedings are confirmed. The order passed by the 1st respondent in the Writ Petitions dated 27.10.2015 and 31.12.2015 are quashed.
The Writ Petitions are allowed.
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2018 (4) TMI 1999
Set off of interest paid against interest earned - Whether interest income has to be assessed under the head “Income from other sources”? - whether the assessee is entitled to reduce the work-in-progress to the extent of the net interest by treating it as business income?
HELD THAT:- In the case of Bokaro Steels Ltd [1998 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT] held that when the activities of the assessee in connection with a receipt is directly connected with or incidental to the business, such receipts be allowed to be adjusted against the work-in-progress and are capital receipts and not income of the assessee from an independent source.
Here, in this matter, the very purpose of assessee receiving Rs. 157 crores from RINL was to increase the paid up share capital in furtherance of their business and such an amount accrued interest during the period of their study for acquiring coal mines, during which period on day to day basis the assessee incurred an expenditure.
Assessee is entitled to net of the interest paid against the interest received and the balance to reduce the work-in-progress. The interest received in this matter is not taxable under the head “Income from other sources”. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal are allowed and the learned AO is directed to delete the addition made on account of the interest earned. Assessee appeal allowed.
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2018 (4) TMI 1998
Disallowance on account of administrative and selling expenses - AO was of the opinion that since the projects were not completed and no transaction of sale has been made, it cannot be said that the assessee has commenced its business and therefore the expenses charged to the profit and loss account should be treated as pre-operative expenses - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that the assessee had purchased the lands in earlier years on which it has started constructing flats. Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee has not commenced its business.
As only indirect expenses have been charged to the Profit and Loss account and all other direct expenses have been shown as part of work-in-progress.
As decided in Dhoomketu Builders & Development (P.) Ltd. [2013 (4) TMI 668 - DELHI HIGH COURT] the commencement of Real Estate business would normally start with the acquisition of land or immovable property. In another case, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in ESPN SOFTWARE INDIA P. LTD. [2008 (3) TMI 90 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has held that business commenced with first purchase of stock in trade, the date when the first sale is made is not material in that respect. Moreover, Accounting Standard 7 issued by the ICAI states that in cases where the expenditure could not be attributed to a particular activity carried on by the assessee, the same may be allowed as a period cost.
Thus, as the indirect expenses debited to the Profit and Loss account are not pre-operative expenses and these deserve to be allowed as expenses and carried forward or set off as per the provisions of the Act. We do not find any error or infirmity in the findings of the ld. CIT(A). Ground No. 1 is accordingly dismissed.
Disallowance u/s. 40A(3) - AO found that the assessee has incurred expenditure of substantial amounts towards purchase of lands and the payments have been made in cash in violation of provisions of Section 40A(3) - HELD THAT:- On identical set of facts, the Hon'ble High court of Gujarat in the case of Anupam Tele Services [2014 (2) TMI 30 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] held neither the genuineness of the payment nor the identity of the payee were in any case doubted. These were the conclusions on facts drawn by the Appellate Commissioner. The Tribunal also did not disturb such facts but relied solely on Rule 6DD (j) of the Rules to hold that since the case of the assessee did not fall under the said exclusion clause nor was covered under any of the clauses of rule 6DD, consequences envisaged in section 40A(3) must follow.
As in the present case also neither the genuineness of the payment nor the identities of the payee were in any case doubted. Considering the totality of the facts qua the business of the assessee.
Profit on sale of flats - additions made on the basis of loose papers found from the premises of a third party - A.O. observed that the loose papers give record balances in different brokers accounts and the transaction with the brokers are also found to be recorded in the books of accounts of the assessee - HELD THAT:- As loose papers were found during the course of the survey operation at the premises of V.K. Nagwani. It is also not in dispute that the loose papers did not contain the name of the assessee firm nor its partner. The loose papers may contain some notings relating to the Real Estate brokers to whom the assessee has given commission/brokerage but at the same time no enquiry has been made by the A.O. from those brokers/commission agents.
Loose papers and documents cannot possibly be construed as books of accounts regularly kept in the course of business. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the A.O. is not justified in resting findings based on the loose papers and documents found from the premises of a third party even if such document contain narration of transaction with the assessee company. See V.C. Shukla & ORs. [1998 (3) TMI 675 - SUPREME COURT] and Chuharmal [1988 (5) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT]
Addition made on account of Short Term Capital Gain - There is no dispute that the sale consideration was duly shown as part of sales in the Profit and Loss account meaning thereby that the impugned profit has already been reflected in the Profit and Loss account, therefore, there is no occasion for making further addition under the head 'Short Term Capital Gain'. We decline to interfere. Ground No. 4 is dismissed.
Addition of undisclosed income on the basis of entries on loose papers recovered from the premises of a third party - As the loose papers were found from the premises of a third person which did not bear the name of the assessee nor its partner nor any enquiry/verification has been done by the A.O. to substantiate its claim that the entries in the loose papers belong to the assessee. Further, as mentioned elsewhere, while deciding the appeal for A.Y. 2011-12, the indirect expenses have to be debited to the Profit and Loss account which the assessee has rightly done so and therefore the quantum of indirect expenses cannot be a basis for the rejection of the book results.
In our understanding of the law, the presumption u/s. 132(4A) of the Act would in any case be applicable to a third party from whose possession such papers/documents have been found by the revenue - addition of undisclosed income could not be made simply on the basis of entries on loose papers recovered from the premises of a third party.
Addition made u/s. 40(a)(ia) - As assessee has never claimed such payments as expenditure in its books of accounts. It is also true that the A.O. has not brought anything on record which could suggest that the assessee has actually spent these expenditures on the persons found to be mentioned in the loose papers. In the absence of any enquiry made by the A.O, the impugned additions cannot be sustained and the ld. CIT(A) has rightly deleted the same which calls for no interference.
Appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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2018 (4) TMI 1997
Addition u/s.68 - Estimation of net profit @ 10% of turnover by CIT(A) - HELD THAT:- We are unable to see any ambiguity, perversity or any other valid reason to interfere with the same as the ld. CIT(A) has not only taken on account GP and NP rate of assessee during immediately previous years, but also considered the percentage of GP and NP after making additions/disallowance made by the A.O. In this situation, we decline to accept allegation of the A.O that the ld. CIT(A) has erred in granting relief to the assessee and thus, we uphold the first appellate order. Accordingly, Ground No.1 & 2 of Revenue are dismissed.
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - AO made additions by disallowing various expenses and the ld. CIT(A) after considering entire facts and circumstances restricted the addition to 10% of turnover and it was done by estimation of income by following basis of preceding year profit percentage. In this situation, we have no hesitation to hold that addition has been made on estimation basis.
In the case of Reliance Petro [2010 (3) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT] held that merely because claim of assessee was not accepted or was not found to be acceptable by the Revenue authorities, does not automatically allow to impose penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. In the present case, it is not an allegation of A.O that the assessee made a bogus or malafide claim. However, in absence of verification the authorities below raised a doubt regarding claim of assessee on certain expenses and finally the ld. CIT(A) restricted the addition by estimating the profit @ 10% of turnover which is on the estimation basis. In this situation, allegation of either concealment of particulars of income or allegations of furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income cannot be made against the assessee for imposing penalty u/s. 271(1)(c)
We reach of a logical conclusion that the A.O imposed penalty without any valid reason on the basis of addition based on estimation basis and the same was upheld by the ld. CIT(A) without any reasonable and acceptable cause. Hence, penalty order as well as first appellate order is not sustainable and we direct the AO to delete the penalty. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2018 (4) TMI 1996
Dismissal of petition - Whether the allotment dated 01.09.2003 was a fresh allotment or a continuation of the earlier allotment dated 07.06.1997? - HELD THAT:- The fresh allotment was made on 01.09.2003 in pursuance of which Letter of Intent was issued on 11.12.2003, thus, the eligibility has to be seen as per condition of Annexure-A of the Government Resolution dated 09.07.1999. On the strength of Resolution dated 01.09.2003 in so far as it modifies the rate of premium per sq.mtr., it cannot be said that the same allotment which was made on 07.06.1997 has been continued on 01.09.2003 and the eligibility of members has to be pegged on the date of Resolution dated 07.06.1997 or 05.11.1998 i.e. issue of Letter of Intent. There are no substance in the above submission of the learned Counsel of the Appellants.
The submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants that eligibility with regard to being in service has to be seen on the date 07.06.1997 or 05.11.1998, thus, cannot be accepted. The Society itself has given approval vide its communication dated 10.05.2001 to consider the allotment to the Society in its forthcoming meeting on 17.05.2001 on the basis of Government of Maharashtra Resolution dated 09.07.1999. It is thus clear that the Society itself has requested for a fresh consideration and fresh Resolution on the basis of the eligibility laid down by Resolution 09.07.1999 - the Society was conscious of the fact that eligibility of members has to be seen as on 11.12.2003 that is the date on which Letter of Intent was issued in pursuance of allotment. The Society having accepted the aforesaid Clause of eligibility and accepted the offer of allotment as given by the Authority, it is failed to see that how the eligibility as on 11.12.2003 be permitted to be questioned.
There is one more fact which needs to be noted. The Authority has proposed allotment of 13,700 sq.mtr of land which is apparent from its Resolution dated 01.09.2003 as well as letter dated 11.12.2003. After scrutinising the list of eligibility, ultimately, the allotment was made only for land admeasuring 10,700 sq.mtr. by letter dated 09.12.2005. The Authority had not taken into consideration the area for non-eligible members while finalising the list and due to the aforesaid reasons the area allotted to the Society has been reduced from 13,700 sq.mtr. To 10,700 sq.mtr.
Thus, no relief can be granted to the Appellants. The High Court did not commit any error in dismissing the writ petition - appeal dismissed.
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2018 (4) TMI 1995
Penalty u/s 271AAA(2) - assessee declared the surrendered amount under the head “additional income” which was accepted by the Revenue - as alleged absence of specific query raised by the Authorized Officer - HELD THAT:- Identically in Crossings Infrastructure P. Ltd. [2014 (2) TMI 131 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] where Revenue authorities, passed penalty order without showing as to how and in not manner conditions of section 271AAA(2) had not been complied with, imposed penalty. The penalty order was set aside.
In the absence of specific query raised by the Authorized Officer, while recording the statement u/s 132(4) of the Act about the manner in which undisclosed income was derived, the Ld. AO was not justified in imposing penalty u/s 271AAA - See Brij Bhushan Singhal [2015 (3) TMI 797 - ITAT DELHI]
While initiating the penalty proceedings the Ld. AO nowhere stated as to why the penalty proceedings were initiated and whether the conditions laid down in the section were satisfied or not. AO without assigning any reason and merely on the basis of surrender made by the assessee initiated penalty proceedings.
The amount of surrender was made by the assessee on the basis of certain loose papers found and seized during search operation upon tecpro group at Gurgaon. There is a further observation that these papers were dictated by the search team and further from the statement tendered by the assessee there is a condition that the surrender made by the assessee shall be without penal action by the Department whatsoever and the surrender was made to buy peace and to avoid litigation with the Department in the spirit of cooperation.
As per case Suresh Chander Mittal [2001 (6) TMI 63 - SC ORDER] we find merit in the conclusion drawn by the Ld. CIT (A) and confirm the same, resultantly the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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2018 (4) TMI 1994
Addition u/s 68 - addition of entire sundry creditors transacted during the year by merely verifying only 8 parties out of the total sundry creditors - HELD THAT:- Before us, Legal heir of Assessee has filed an affidavit wherein it is inter alia submitted that Madhusudan Banshilal Dhoot was under treatment since 2010-2011 because of which he could not furnish necessary documents/details before Authorities below and he expired on 08.05.2012 and after his death, business is closed.
Before us, AR submitted that in the earlier year and subsequent year, additions on account of unexplained creditors u/s. 68 has been made to the extent of 10% of purchases. The aforesaid contention of the Ld. AR and legal heir of the Assessee has not been controverted by Revenue.
We also find that CIT(A) has passed an ex-parte order. In a normal situation, we would have remitted the issue back to the file of CIT(A) to pass a de-novo speaking order. However, in the peculiar facts of the present case, we are of the view that remitting the mater back to CIT(A) would result into multiplicity of proceedings.
we are of the view that in the present case to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, interest of justice shall be met if the addition is restricted to 10% of the total purchases. Appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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2018 (4) TMI 1993
Sanction of Scheme of Amalgamation - Sections 230 to 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and on perusal of the Scheme and the documents produced on record, it appears that the requirements of the provisions of Sections 230 and 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 are satisfied. The Scheme appears to be genuine and bona fide and in the interest of the shareholders and creditors.
The Composite Scheme of Arrangement, which is at Annexure - H to the Petition, is hereby sanctioned and it is declared that the same shall be binding on the Petitioner Companies, namely, Safal Constructions Private Limited and BSafal Infraheights Private Limited, their Equity and Preference Shareholders, Secured Creditors and Unsecured Creditors and all concerned under the Scheme - this petition is allowed.
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2018 (4) TMI 1992
Maintainability of review petition - error apparent on the face of record or not - unauthorized construction - HELD THAT:- The basic principle to entertain the review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. is to correct the errors but not to substitute a view. The judgment under review cannot be reversed (or) altered taking away the rights declared and conferred by the Court under the said judgment; once a judgment is rendered, the Court becomes functus officio and it cannot set aside its judgment or the decree; no inherent powers of review were conferred on the Court; the review Court cannot look into the trial Court judgment; it can look into its own judgment for limited purpose to correct any error or mistake in the judgment pointed out by the review petitioner without altering or substituting its view in the judgment under review; the review court cannot entertain the arguments touching the merits and demerits of the case and cannot take a different view disturbing the finality of the judgment; the review cannot be treated as appeal in disguise, as the object behind review is ultimately to see that there should not be miscarriage of justice and shall do justice for the sake of justice only and review on the ground that the judgment is erroneous cannot be sustained.
It is settled law that even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the Court to undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order under review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.
This Court does not find any error apparent on the face of the order in order to entertain the present review application - this Review Petition is dismissed.
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2018 (4) TMI 1991
Condonation of delay of 546 days in filing the appeal suit - no sufficient reasons for delay - suit for recovery of money as against the petitioner/appellant - HELD THAT:- The reasons stated by the petitioner was not accepted by the trial court as well as the Apex Court. The petitioner has not chosen to file the first appeal in time. But he has filed the present petition to condone the delay in filing the appeal suit, by narrating the same reasons stated in the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree. The said reasons stated by the petitioner was also not accepted by the Apex Court. Hence, this court come to the conclusion that the reasons stated in this petition are not sufficient and they are not acceptable.
This Civil Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed.
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9911796707
