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Showing 1 to 20 of 1495 Records
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2016 (6) TMI 1504
Deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) on interest income received from the various Cooperative Banks and other Banks - HELD THAT:- As we find that the issue involved is covered in favour of the assessee by a catena of decisions from ITAT as well as a decision of jurisdictional High Court. In this regard we may gainfully refer in the case of Solapur Nagri Audyogic Sahakari Bank Ltd [2009 (6) TMI 15 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held there being no dispute that the funds in the voluntary reserves which were utilised for investment in KVP/OVP by the cooperative banks were the funds generated from the banking business, we hold that in all these cases the Tribunal was justified in holding that the interest income received by the co-operative banks from the investments in KVP/IVP made out of the funds in the voluntary reserves were eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i).
The above case law fully supports the assessee’s case. Here also surplus funds not immediately required for day to day banking were kept in Bank deposits. The income earned there from thus would be income from banking business eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). Decided against revenue.
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2016 (6) TMI 1503
Rejection of books of account - Tribunal justification in holding that the rejection of books of account by AO was without reasons and in the absence of any specific defects being pointed out? - Appeal is admitted on question no.(i).
Tribunal justification in restoring the assessment for denovo adjudication after providing copies of all evidence collected by the AO in respect of which additions was sought to be made by the AO - We find that the impugned order of the Tribunal on the above issue is unimpeachable. The basic principles of natural justice require that before any addition is made by the Assessing Officer on information obtained from third parties/own source, he must confront the assessee with the material so obtained. This above would enable the assessee to explain the correctness/incorrectness or unreliability of the evidence so obtained. In the absence of the necessary evidence sought to be used being given by the Assessing Officer to the Assessee, it would amount to condemning a person without a proper hearing. No substantial question of law.
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2016 (6) TMI 1502
Fraudulent and manipulative activities in the trading of shares - Exit Providers and allotees artificially increased the volume of the scrip and misused securities market system for making illegal gains and to convert ill-gotten gains into genuine one to avail fictitious long term capital gains (LTCG”) - Whether the interim order issued by SEBI against the Noticees, restraining them from accessing the securities market, should be confirmed, vacated, or modified during the pendency of the investigation?
HELD THAT:- The interim order passed by SEBI was not in disregard of the principles of natural justice since, reasons for passing the interim order have been clearly stated in the interim order and, in accordance with the settled law, the Noticees were afforded a post-decisional opportunity to file their replies and avail personal hearing. I, therefore, reject the contention of the Noticees in this regard.
As brought out in the interim order, the ultimate beneficiaries of the whole scheme in question are the preferential allottees (including the Noticees). It is beyond reason to hold that the company and other entities mentioned in the interim order, except the preferential allottees, would devise the impugned plan/scheme for the benefit of the entities who are neither party to the plan/scheme nor have any complicity in the plan with others.
Since, the Noticees amongst other preferential allotees are the ultimate beneficiaries, they cannot pretend to be oblivious to the scheme/plan. The facts and circumstances of this case, in my view, strongly indicate that the issue of these shares was under a prior arrangement between them for the ulterior motive or the end objective of the scheme that has been brought out explicitly in the interim order. Also, the Noticees’ contention that no specific allegation has been levelled against them in the interim order does not hold any merit in light of the fact that the Noticees have prima facie been found to be a part of the holistic scheme as discussed hereinabove and in the interim order. Thus, reject the contentions of Noticees in this regard.
Noticees, at this stage, have failed to give any plausible explanation for the charges as described in the interim order and for complete removal of restraint. Therefore, in this case, reject the prayer for setting aside the interim order or for complete removal of restraint imposed by it.
Thus in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under sections 11 and 11B of the SEBI Act read with sections 19 thereof, hereby confirm the directions issued vide the ad interim ex parte order qua the Noticees herein subject to the interim relief(s) provided to the Noticees as mentioned above.
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2016 (6) TMI 1501
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - addition on estimation basis - HELD THAT:- As decided in BOMBAYWALA READYMADE STORES [2014 (11) TMI 1099 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] There was no scope to levy the penalty under Section 271(1)(c), the appellant had been assessed by the Income Tax. Tribunal has very rightly considered that both the additions are on a estimated basis. Therefore, just because estimates are made, penalty cannot be levied u/s 271(1)(c).
Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (6) TMI 1500
Assessment order passed beyond the period of limitation - HELD THAT:- From the final assessment order we could see that DRP had issued directions by its order dated 19.12.2014 and this order was received by the AO on 20.3.2014. The provisions of sub-section (13) of Sec. 144C mandates that upon receipt of the directions issued under sub-sec (5) by DRP, AO shall inconformity with the directions, complete the assessment within one month from the end of the month in which such directions are received by him.
Apparently, in this case, the AO having received the directions on 23.12.2014, he should have completed the final assessment within one month from the end of the month in which he received the order i.e. by 31.1.2015.
The final assessment order was passed on 27.2.2015 making the assessment beyond the stipulated period. Therefore, since the final assessment made was barred by limitation, the order passed is null and void. Thus we quash the assessment order dated 27.2.2015 passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Act. Appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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2016 (6) TMI 1499
Deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) - income derived from investment in other co-operative societies - HELD THAT:- Applying the legal provision u/s 80P to the gross total income earned as enumerated in the chart, we hold that the Assessing Officer was right in allowing the deduction u/s 80P only to the extent of interest earned from members who availed the credit facility. Further from the column of interest earned from investments with Co-operative Banks / Societies, the assessee has neither been able to establish before us nor before the authorities below that interest has been earned exclusively from investment with other cooperative banks.
Allowability of deduction of expenses under section 57 regarding income from other sources - AO disallowed the expenditure on the ground that there was no direct correlation between the expenditure incurred and the interest income earned on deposits made with banks by the appellant - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the source of such income was due to the investment of surplus funds which the assessee did not require for its business activities. It is logical that when Revenue is permitted to assess the interest income u/s.56 by treating the income earned by way of interest as income from other sources, the assessee should be entitled for proportionate expenses incurred in mobilizing the deposits placed with banks/ cooperative societies. What can be taxed is only the net income earned after deducting the expenditure attributable to such earning. We accordingly direct the TPO to allow the allocation of expenses as per the method of calculation arrived by the assessee.
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2016 (6) TMI 1498
Estimation of income @ 15% of the contract receipts - adopting a higher rate of percentage, especially in the case of the assessee where he was executing the repairs of roads/buildings of the Government - HELD THAT:- Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in CIT vs. Target Construction Co. Ltd.[2014 (9) TMI 57 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] while adjudicating the case of road contractors had laid down the proposition that the net profit rate of 5% as estimated by the ITAT should be applied.
Admittedly, when an estimation has to be made in the hands of any of the assessee, fair estimate should be made keeping in mind the nature of activity carried on by the said person and also taking into consideration the past or the future results shown by the assessee in this regard.
There is no merit in estimating the net profit in the case of the assessee @ 15% especially in view of the past and future results shown by the assessee from year to year where the assessee is an association of labourers who, in turn, were taking up the Government contract for the repair of roads/buildings.
AO is directed to compute the income in the hands of the assessee by applying net profit of 5%. The assessee is not entitled the claim of deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(vi) of the Act - Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2016 (6) TMI 1497
Cenvat credit - input services received by assessee at its un-registered premises - credit taken for the service under ‘Renting of Immovable Property’ for rent paid for the unregistered premises - Held that:- the premises are not covered in the listed premises in their Centralised R.C. Thus, this premises cannot be said to be used for providing output service.
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2016 (6) TMI 1496
Cenvat credit - Violation of provisions of Cenvat credit rules read with rule 2(iii) of Notification No. 8/2003 - Appellant took credit prior to 18/11/2009, date from which SSI exemption limit has been exceeded - Held that:- the appellant have only taken and not utilized the Cenvat credit prior to 18/11/09, when it started paying tax on the clearances, I hold that it is only a venial breach of the provisions. In such circumstances the substantial benefit should not be denied to the appellant. Accordingly this issue is decided in favour of the appellant and the appellant is held entitled to the Cenvat credit so availed. However, as the appellant have made venial breach of the provisions, the penalty of ₹ 5000/- imposed under Rule 27 is confirmed. - Decided partly in favour of assessee
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2016 (6) TMI 1495
Eligibility of refund - recovery proceedings - Held that:- The admitted fact is that the Original Authority found that the refund is correctly eligible to the appellant. However, he appropriated the amount against the confirmed demands without due notice for recovery to the appellant. It is a fact that all the confirmed demands were taken up on appeal and were pending with higher appellate Forum with a request for stay of recovery. Before any decision was taken on such stay/appeal coercive action of recovery of such due was taken by the original authority. The appellant was not put to notice.
On such coercive recovery Tribunal in Anna Petrochem Pvt. Ltd. (2009 (5) TMI 716 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI) and Jay Kay Synthetics (2001 (9) TMI 208 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI ) held that show cause notice/personal hearing is required before such appropriation. In Voltas Ltd. [2006 (5) TMI 232 - CESTAT, BANGALORE ], the Tribunal examined the scope and applicability of Section 11. It was held that sums due to Government become arrears only after finality is reached on such demand. The Appellate Authority also confirmed such appropriation without examining the legality of action of recovery proceedings. However, as shown now by the appellant, none of the confirmed demands survive as on date. This being not disputed by Revenue also. In any case, in view of non-existence of any confirmed demand as on date, the appellant is rightly eligible for full payment of refund as originally sanctioned by the jurisdictional Asstt. Commissioner with applicable interest. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (6) TMI 1494
Demand of Service tax and imposition of penalty - Section 77 and 78 read with Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 - International Courier Service - neither service tax paid nor ST-3 returns filed even after collecting from their customers - reason for non-payment is that the courier/cargo industry was facing severe recession - Held that:- it is to be noted that the appellant's act of not paying tax, collected from their clients, to the Revenue is totally unjustified. The facts would not have come to light but for the visit by the department officials. In these circumstances, the imposition of penalty is wholly justified. However, in this case the penalty from ₹ 16 lakhs was reduced to ₹ 8,00,660/-. This is not a case where the tax was not paid on account of any interpretative issue of law. This is a case where the tax was collected but not paid to the exchequer. This warrants no leniency. Accordingly, the impugned order is upheld. - Decided against the appellant
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2016 (6) TMI 1493
Depreciation for software license - @60% OR 25% - software license should be restricted to 25% rate and treated as Intangible Asset and shall not be included in Block of computers - HELD THAT:- In assessee’s own case assessment year 2010-2011 [2016 (2) TMI 737 - ITAT CHENNAI] the Coordinate of this Tribunal has allowed the depreciation on software licence @60% and supported his submissions with the decision of Srinivasa Resorts [2013 (10) TMI 1459 - ITAT HYDERABAD] as observed that the computer software alongwith computer has to be treated as capital asset and Higher rate of depreciation @60% has been allowed based on the life and usage of computer software. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (6) TMI 1488
Interpretation of Section 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act with reference to its applicability to Arbitral proceedings - by virtue of sub-section (3) whether the expression “other proceedings” contained therein will include Arbitral proceedings and can be equated to a suit filed in a Court and thereby the ban imposed against an unregistered firm can operate in the matter of arbitral proceedings? - HELD THAT:- In order to invoke sub-section (3) of Section 69 and for the ban to operate either the firm should be an unregistered one or the person who wants to sue should be a partner of an unregistered firm, that its / his endeavour should be to file a suit in a Court, in which event even if it pertains to a claim of set off or in respect of ‘other proceedings’ connected with any right arising from a contract or conferred by the Partnership Act which is sought to be enforced through a Court by way of a suit then and then alone the said sub-section can operate to its full extent.
When under sub-section (3) which also relates to a ban concerning ‘other proceedings’, the law makers wanted to specifically exclude from such ban such of those proceedings which also likely to arise in a suit, but yet the imposition of ban of an unregistered firm need not be imposed. Keeping the said intent of the law makers in mind, on reading sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3), it can be understood that even though such other proceedings may be for the enforcement of any right to sue but yet if it is for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm or any right or power to realize the property of a dissolved firm, the same can be worked out by way of a suit in a Court or by way of other proceedings in that suit and the same will not be affected by the ban imposed under sub-section (3).
Whether Section 69(3) is attracted to the Arbitral Proceedings and the ultimate award passed therein by construing the same as falling under the expression “other proceedings"? - HELD THAT:- In the case on hand, the contract between the parties contained an Arbitration Clause. The respondent invoked the said clause and an Arbitrator came to be appointed. After the respondent filed its statement of claim, the appellant filed its reply and also its counter claim dated 30.08.2003 - The Arbitrator took the correct view that Section 69 has no application to the proceedings of the Arbitrator and held that the objection of the respondent was not sustainable. The Arbitrator allowed the counter claim to the extent of Rs. 1,36,24,886/- (Rupees One crore thirty six lacs twenty four thousand eight hundred eighty six only). When the award of the Arbitrator was challenged by the respondent under Section 34 of the Act, the very same objection was raised as a ground of attack. The learned Single Judge of the High Court also found no merit in the said contention and upheld the award of counter claim.
The scope and ambit of the power and jurisdiction of ‘Court’ defined under Section 2(e) of the 1996 Act is circumscribed to certain specified extent as set out in Sections 8, 9, 14, 27, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 56, 58 and 59. A comparative consideration of the 1940 Act and 1996 Act disclose the extent of control and operation of a Court under the former Act was far more intensive and elaborate than the latter Act. The more significant distinction as between the 1940 Act and the 1996 Act is clear to the position that the former Act does not merely stop with the initiation and enforcement of an Arbitration and its award, but effectively provides for intervention at every stage of the Arbitral proceedings upto its final consideration and enforcement as if it were a regular civil suit, whereas under the 1996 Act, the scope of intervention is not that of a Civil Court as it could do in the matter of a suit. Such clear distinction could be discerned from the reading of the various provisions of both the Acts.
Having regard to our conclusion that Arbitral Proceedings will not come under the expression “other proceedings” of Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act, the ban imposed under the said Section 69 can have no application to Arbitral proceedings as well as the Arbitration Award.
Therefore, the appeal stands allowed.
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2016 (6) TMI 1487
Interpretation of statute - Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013 - land acquisition proceedings - HELD THAT:- The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others, [2014 (1) TMI 1643 - SUPREME COURT], interpreted Section 24(2) of the New Act as 'Under Section 24(2) land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed where award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and possession of the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid. The legal fiction under Section 24(2) comes into operation as soon as conditions stated therein are satisfied.'
In view of the law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the only question that arises in this petition is whether either of the conditions under Section 24(2) of the New Act are satisfied in the Petitioner's case.
It is found that neither the possession of the land has been taken from the petitioners nor has the compensation ever been paid to them. The petitioners have also filed Jamabandis with respect to the said land issued on 16.01.2015 to demonstrate their possession. This is in spite of the Award having been passed as early as 2006 and the supplementary award in 2007. Given the same the case of the petitioner satisfies both the tests of Section 24(2) as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
The acquisition proceedings with respect to the petitioner no. 1's land comprised in Rectangle No. 1, Khasra No. 16/1/1 (7-3), 16/1/2 (0-4), 25/2/1 (2-12), 17 (8-0), 24/1 (1-0), 24/2 (7-0), 23/3 (3- 0), Rectangle No.2, Khasra No. 19/2/1 (3-4), 19/2/2 (1-4), 22/2/1 (0-10), 23/1 (0-3), 3/2/1/1 (1-02) and the petitioner no. 2's land comprised in Rectangle No. 2, Khasra No. 20 (7-7), 21/1 (6-4), situated in Gurgaon, is deemed to have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the New Act - Petition allowed.
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2016 (6) TMI 1486
Assessment of trust - claim of depreciation - AO disallowed the claim of depreciation observing that it would amount to double deduction - HELD THAT:- As decided in . M/s. G.D. Birla Medical Research and Educational Foundation [2016 (2) TMI 901 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] relying upon another decision of Institute of Banking Personnel Selection [2003 (7) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] a trust can claim depreciation on assets, even if, cost of assets has been fully allowed as application of income under section 11 in past years - There is no question of double deduction in allowing the depreciation in respect of assets acquired and used by the trust.
Assessment of income from the pharmacy store as business income - addition invoking provisions of section 11(4A) - treating the receipts from the pharmacy were separate from the charitable activity of the assessee - AO noted that the turnover of the assessee’s pharmacy store was very high which was around 13.18% of the total hospital collections from inpatient and outpatient profit from the pharmacy store came at 17.18% of its turnover - HELD THAT:- Bombay High Court in the case of “Baun Foundation Trust [2012 (4) TMI 172 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that the activity of a chemist shop is an activity which is incidental or ancillary to the dominant object and purpose which is to run a hospital. This is a facility which is intended to be used predominantly by the patients and their relatives. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court (supra) observed that where the running of a chemist shop was not the dominant object or purpose of the trust and where the surplus, which was earned from the operation of a chemist shop in the hospital, was utilized for the purpose of hospital and the establishment of a chemist shop in the hospital is incidental or ancillary to the dominant purpose of the trust/hospital, then, under such circumstances, exemption on this ground cannot be denied to a charitable trust under the provisions of section 10(23C)(via) of the Income Tax Act.
Asobserved from the language used in section 11(4A) and section 10(23C) that since the pharmacy business run by the hospital was not an independent business activity and in fact the same constitutes an integral part of the running of hospital and the assessee has undisputedly maintained the books of accounts for the hospital, hence the assessee fulfils the condition of maintaining the separate books of accounts for the integral business activity of the running of a hospital including pharmacy shop. Thus, has held that the running of pharmacy which was the necessary requirement of running a hospital and for providing timely medical aid to the patients, thus, was not only incidental but was integral part of the objects of the assessee trust and thus was not hit by the provisions of section 11(4A) of the Act - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (6) TMI 1485
Computation of deduction u/s 80HH and section 80I - Tribunal directing to exclude only the net income from FDR interest, interest on loans, discounting income and transport income - HELD THAT:- This Court in the case of Nirma Ltd. [2010 (8) TMI 1184 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] has held that in computing the special deductions under sections 80-I, 80-IA and 80HH net incomes not derived from industrial undertaking should be excluded and that the Tribunal was right in granting benefit of deduction u/s 80-I of the Act on various incomes such as job work receipt, sale of empty soda ash bardan, sale of empty barrels and plastic waste.
Therefore we are of the opinion that the Tribunal is justified in directing to exclude the net income from FDR interest, interest on loans, discounting income and transport income. We do not see any infirmity in the same and therefore the said question is required to be answered in favour of assessee and against the revenue.
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2016 (6) TMI 1484
Exemption u/s 11 - addition of unproved donation, unproved loan credits - assessee has claimed exemption u/s 10(23C) of the Act - HELD THAT:- In this case, it is an admitted fact that the trust has not been registered u/s 12A of the Act and therefore, the assessee cannot claim any exemption under section 11 of the Act. Thus, the income received during the year by the assessee was assessed in the status of AOP. During the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee has furnished copies of ledger accounts of their bank account from Bank of India and Karur Vysya Bank.
They also furnished details of corpus fund received during the year and the details of unsecured loan received by the assessee. It was stated that there was no activity of any kind in the trust. The loans and corpus donations received were stated to have been fully utilised towards purchase of land for the trust. As per the details filed, the Assessing Officer has observed that the assessee has received ₹ 18,90,000/- during the year as corpus fund from eight different individuals apart from the managing trustee's contribution of ₹ 40,000/-. On the basis of the details furnished by the assessee, summons was issue to various donors as well as the loan creditors who appeared before the AO and statements were recorded from them.
The above, at Sl. No. 1, 7 and 8, i.e., D. Jayakumar has confirmed that he has given ₹ 2,00,000/- from his salary savings through his bank account and furnished details before the Assessing Officer; similarly, Shanmugam and Sundaram VN have also confirmed having given the donations of ₹ 50,000/- and ₹ 2,00,000/- from their salary savings through banking channel and therefore, the above three amounts cannot be brought under section 68 of the Act as unexplained credits.
With regard to other donors, the donors are either related to the assessee or closely known to them. Concrete proof for giving these donations was not given by five donors and the sources explained by them are inadequate to support the payment of such donations. The income of a trust would not be exempt unless it has obtained registration u/s 12A of the Act. A conjoint reading of sections 11, 12 and 12A of the Act makes it clear that registration u/s 12A is a condition precedent for availing benefits under sections 11 and 12 of the Act. Unless and until an institution is registered under section 12A of the Act, it cannot claim the benefit of section 11(1)(a) of the Act.
This being the situation, the assessee cannot take shelter of section 12 to claim that what has been received is corpus donation and subject the same to claim of exemption under sections 11 & 12 of the Act. Therefore it is held the credits appearing in the names of above five persons have not been satisfactorily explained as per the provisions of Section 68 of the Act. Accordingly, the donations stated to have been received from the five parties amounting to Rs. 14,40,000/- was rightly treated as income and taxed in the status of AOP. In view of the above, the amount of donations received from three parties as stated above in Sl. No. 1, 7 & 8 in para 5, which cannot be brought under section 68 of the Act.
In view of the above the assessee could not prove the genuineness of the credits appearing in their books amounting to ₹ 70,00,000/-, in the names of above four parties. Moreover, we have also noticed that the assessee has indulged into fraudulence activity with the creditor, Shri S. Balamurugan, which is in the nature of criminal offense and subjected to judicial proceedings. Having credited the amounts in the books, the onus of proving the genuineness of the credits is on the assessee. The Assessing Officer has given sufficient opportunities to the assessee to prove the same. Inspite of this, the assessee was unable to adduce any evidence to substantiate the claim of existence of the loans.
The explanation offered for the nature of the sources for these credits are mostly fabricated and not to the satisfaction of the AO, within the meaning of section 68 of the Act. Moreover, in this case, the Enquiries made with all the creditors revealed that the assessee Trust/Trustees have used their money and created the loans by using the names/bank accounts of the creditors. Therefore the total unproved loan credits in the above four names amounting to ₹ 70,00,000/- was the income of the trust and assessed under section 68 of the Act by the Assessing Officer was found to be rightly confirmed by the ld. CIT(A).
Claim of exemption u/s 10(23) - The claim made as an afterthought in anticipation of disallowances cannot be accepted for the reasons as stipulated in the assessment order that it is unambiguously provided in section 10(23C) (iiiad) that the exemption is available to "any university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit if the aggregate annual receipts of such university or educational institution do not exceed the amount of annual receipts as may be prescribed". From the details filed it can be seen that the assessee trust has utilised the funds brought in as discussed above only for procurement of lands as admitted by the assessee in its letter dated 20.10.2011. Evidently no other activities were found to have been seen or established. They also have stated that the trust has not commenced any activities. The assessee trust has also filed a copy of the trust deed before the Assessing Officer and on scrutiny of the trust deed, as per Clause 6 of the trust deed there are 42 items listed as objects of the trust and according to the Assessing Officer it is obvious that the trust is certainly not existing solely for the purpose of education, thereby disqualifying itself for the possible claim of exemption under section 10(23C) of the Act.
We are unable to agree that the assessee can be termed as an institution existing solely for the purpose of education. Thus, we confirm the order passed by the ld. CIT(A) with regard to exemption under section 10(23C) of the Act and sustain the addition. The other addition towards unproved loan credits also hereby sustained.
Appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed.
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2016 (6) TMI 1483
Entitlement for higher compensation and allotment of land instead of quashing of acquisition proceedings - applicability of decision in SAVITRI DEVI VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. [2015 (5) TMI 1219 - SUPREME COURT].
Entitlement for higher compensation and allotment of land instead of quashing of acquisition proceedings - HELD THAT:- The compensation had already been disbursed to the extent of 76 per cent. Thereafter, for the entire land of village Chhapraula falling in Group No. 18, the relief granted is payment of additional compensation and allotment of land. As already noted, the part of the order where relief of quashing of notification has been given is not of the category of the present case. In these circumstances, there are merit in the contention raised on the behalf of the Appellant that the division bench was in error in distinguishing the present case from the judgment in GAJRAJ AND ORS. VERSUS STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. [2011 (10) TMI 753 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT].
Applicability of decision in SAVITRI DEVI VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS - HELD THAT:- As observed by this Court in Savitri Devi, in spite of the finding that invocation of urgency Clause was uncalled for, the relief of setting aside the acquisition was not granted having regard to the development that had already undertaken on substantial part of the land. However, to balance the equities higher compensation and allotment of land was ordered to meet the ends of justice.
The allotment of 10% of the acquired land to the concerned land owners is subject to maximum of 2500 sq. meters - the impugned judgment set aside - appeal allowed.
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2016 (6) TMI 1482
Validity of assessment order - short levy of tax - availment of excess ITC - discrepancies in reported sales - HELD THAT:- The petitioner along with their reply to the show cause notice have appended the statements, which were recorded by the Enforcement Wing and requested the respondent to sort out the matter at the earliest. However, the respondent while completing the assessment did not mention anything about the statements and as to whether the plea raised by the petitioner was a bona fide plea.
The petitioner submits that one more opportunity may be granted to the petitioner to place these materials and the respondents may be directed to consider the effect of those materials. However, to be entitled to one more opportunity to place all the materials before the respondents, this Court is of the view that the petitioner should be directed to pay a portion of the tax liability as demanded.
The petitioner is directed to pay 15% of the disputed tax within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and if such payment is effected by the petitioner within the time limit, then the petitioner would be entitled to treat the impugned proceedings as show cause notices and submit their objections to the same and the respondents are directed to afford an opportunity of personal hearing and conclude the proceedings in accordance with law - petition disposed off.
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2016 (6) TMI 1481
Nature of expenditure - Employee Stock Option Scheme Compensation - disallowance made treating it as capital in nature - HELD THAT:- Facts of the case for the present year being identical as in earlier years [2015 (8) TMI 319 - ITAT DELHI], for the same reasons and respectfully following the precedent, we set aside the impugned order of ld. CIT(A) and send the matter to the file of AO for deciding it in conformity with the decision taken in the case of Biocon Ltd. Vs. DCIT (2013 (8) TMI 629 - ITAT BANGALORE], wherein held that discount on issue of ESOP is allowable as deduction in computing income under the head 'Profits and gains of business or profession.' Since it is on account of an ascertained and not contingent liability, it cannot be treated as a short capital receipt. Thereafter, the Special Bench has laid down the mechanism for determining as to when and how much deduction should be allowed. It has been held that the liability to pay the discounted premium is incurred during the vesting period and the amount of such deduction is to be found out as per the terms of ESOP by considering the period and percentage of vesting during such period. Deduction of the discounted premium during the years of vesting should be allowed on straight line basis. Department’s appeal stands allowed for statistical purposes.
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9911796707
