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1968 (7) TMI 91
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED The Supreme Court of India considered several core legal questions in this case: - Whether the appellant, as a Girasdar, was entitled to allotment of land for personal cultivation under Section 19 of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, despite conditions imposed by a prior government grant that prohibited eviction of tenants.
- Whether the conditions incorporated in the letter dated November 2, 1949, which prohibited eviction of tenants, were enforceable under Section 18 of the Act.
- Whether the rights and privileges of tenants arising from the conditions of the grant could be limited or abridged by an order for allotment of land under Chapter IV of the Act.
- The applicability of Section 18 of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act concerning the existing rights and privileges of tenants.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Entitlement to Allotment of Land for Personal Cultivation - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, particularly Sections 18 and 19, governs the rights of Girasdars and their tenants. Section 19 allows Girasdars to apply for land allotment for personal cultivation.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court interpreted that the appellant's application for allotment of land under Section 19 sought to contravene the condition of the grant that prohibited eviction of tenants.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The condition prohibiting eviction was part of the grant confirmed by the government and accepted by the appellant.
- Application of Law to Facts: The court found that the appellant's application under Section 19 was incompetent as it sought to limit or abridge tenant rights protected under Section 18.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant argued that the conditions did not debar him from benefits under the Act, but the court held that the conditions were binding and enforceable.
- Conclusions: The appellant was not entitled to allotment of land for personal cultivation under Section 19 due to the binding conditions of the grant.
Issue 2: Enforceability of Conditions under Section 18 - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 18 of the Act ensures that existing rights or privileges of tenants are not limited or abridged by the Act.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court reasoned that the condition prohibiting eviction was a privilege arising from the grant and was protected under Section 18.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The letter dated November 2, 1949, incorporated conditions that were intended for tenant benefit.
- Application of Law to Facts: The court applied Section 18 to uphold the conditions of the grant, thereby protecting tenant rights.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant's acceptance of the grant conditions was crucial, and the court found no grounds to override these conditions.
- Conclusions: Conditions of the grant were enforceable under Section 18, protecting tenant rights from being limited or abridged.
Issue 3: Limitation or Abridgment of Tenant Rights by Allotment Order - Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Chapter IV of the Act allows for land allotment to Girasdars but must comply with existing rights under Section 18.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court held that an allotment order under Section 19 could not limit or abridge tenant rights protected by the condition of the grant.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The court emphasized that the appellant had no right to evict tenants due to the grant conditions.
- Application of Law to Facts: The court applied Section 18 to prevent any order that would contravene tenant rights.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court rejected the appellant's argument that the allotment order was independent of the eviction condition.
- Conclusions: Tenant rights arising from the grant conditions could not be limited or abridged by an allotment order.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS - Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "The condition is annexed to the grant to the appellant. The right or privilege of the tenant arising out of this condition is a right or privilege arising out of a grant within the meaning of Section 18."
- Core Principles Established: The court established that conditions attached to a government grant are binding and enforceable under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, and tenant rights under such conditions are protected by Section 18.
- Final Determinations on Each Issue: The appellant's application for land allotment was dismissed, and the conditions of the grant were upheld as enforceable, thereby protecting tenant rights.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs, affirming the decisions of the Revenue Tribunal and the High Court, which upheld the conditions of the grant and the protection of tenant rights under Section 18 of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951.
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1968 (7) TMI 90
Issues:
- Determination of whether a payment made to the company in consideration of surrendering rights under a royalty agreement is a trading receipt or a capital receipt.
Analysis:
The judgment involved an appeal by a company against assessments to income tax and profits tax for specific periods. The key issue was whether a payment of lb900,000 made to the company in 1964 for surrendering its rights under a royalty agreement constituted a trading receipt, as held by the special commissioners, or a capital receipt, as claimed by the company. The company argued that the payment was a capital receipt based on two alternative grounds. Firstly, it contended that by surrendering the royalty agreement, it was giving up an important area of trading operation, thereby disposing of a capital asset. Secondly, the company asserted that the royalty agreement had become a fixed asset over time. The special commissioners initially viewed the royalty agreement as stock-in-trade but acknowledged the possibility of it transforming into a fixed asset.
The judgment analyzed the facts presented and found that the company's board perceived the royalty agreement as a permanent income-producing asset, investing royalty receipts in stocks and shares for future dividends. The balance sheets also reflected the transformation of the royalty agreement into a fixed asset over time. Despite the special commissioners' view that the surrender of the royalty agreement was a method to exploit former concessions, the judgment concluded that the company had appropriated the royalty agreement as a fixed capital asset long before 1964. The inference drawn from the evidence supported the conclusion that the payment constituted a capital receipt. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, overturning the assessments for income tax and profits tax in favor of the company.
In summary, the judgment delved into the characterization of a payment received by the company in exchange for surrendering rights under a royalty agreement as a trading or capital receipt. Through a detailed analysis of the company's perception of the royalty agreement as a fixed asset, supported by the evolution of balance sheet entries, the court concluded that the payment was indeed a capital receipt. The judgment emphasized the importance of factual evidence in determining the nature of receipts and upheld the company's appeal against the tax assessments.
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1968 (7) TMI 89
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Punjab Ordinance I of 1968.
2. Constitutionality of Punjab Appropriation Acts Nos. 9 and 10 of 1968.
3. Legality of the Governor's prorogation and resummoning of the Legislative Assembly.
4. Validity of the Speaker's ruling and subsequent adjournment.
5. Certification of Money Bills by the Deputy Speaker.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of Punjab Ordinance I of 1968:
The Ordinance was promulgated by the Governor of Punjab on March 13, 1968, to address the political crisis and ensure the timely completion of financial business. The High Court held the Ordinance unconstitutional by a majority, but the Supreme Court upheld its validity. The Court emphasized that Article 213(6) allows the Governor to promulgate Ordinances during the recess of the Legislature, and the power under Article 209(7) enables regulation of financial business in the Legislature. The Ordinance was deemed necessary to prevent the adjournment of the House without completing financial business and was thus validly enacted.
2. Constitutionality of Punjab Appropriation Acts Nos. 9 and 10 of 1968:
The High Court unanimously held the Appropriation Acts unconstitutional, primarily due to the invalid certification by the Deputy Speaker. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, stating that the Deputy Speaker, acting as Speaker under Article 180(2), could validly certify Money Bills. The Court concluded that the provisions of Article 199(4) are directory, not mandatory, and substantial compliance was sufficient. The Appropriation Acts were thus upheld as constitutional.
3. Legality of the Governor's Prorogation and Resummoning of the Legislative Assembly:
The Governor prorogued the Assembly on March 11, 1968, and resummoned it on March 14, 1968, following the issuance of the Ordinance. The High Court unanimously held the prorogation and resummoning regular and legal. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the Governor acted within his constitutional powers under Article 174(2)(a) to prorogue the Assembly and under Article 174(3) to summon it. The prorogation became effective upon public notification on March 11, 1968, and was necessary to restore the legislative machinery.
4. Validity of the Speaker's Ruling and Subsequent Adjournment:
The Speaker's ruling on March 18, 1968, declared the prorogation and resummoning of the Assembly invalid and adjourned the House for two months. The Supreme Court found the Speaker's ruling based on a wrong assumption, as the prorogation was validly effected on March 11, 1968. The Speaker's adjournment was null and void because it contravened Section 3 of the Ordinance, which required the House's majority consent for adjournment. The Deputy Speaker's subsequent ruling, which declared the Speaker's adjournment null and void, was upheld as correct and binding.
5. Certification of Money Bills by the Deputy Speaker:
The certification of Money Bills by the Deputy Speaker was challenged as invalid under Article 199(4), which mandates the Speaker's certification. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Speaker, acting as Speaker under Article 180(2), could validly certify Money Bills. The Court emphasized that the provisions of Article 199(4) are directory, and substantial compliance was sufficient. The certification by the Deputy Speaker was thus upheld as valid, and the Appropriation Acts were deemed constitutional.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the writ petitions with costs. The Court upheld the validity of Punjab Ordinance I of 1968, the constitutionality of Punjab Appropriation Acts Nos. 9 and 10 of 1968, the legality of the Governor's prorogation and resummoning of the Legislative Assembly, and the certification of Money Bills by the Deputy Speaker.
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1968 (7) TMI 88
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of the nature of the land (Kharaba land).
2. Assessment of the compensation rate for the acquired land.
3. Evaluation of the admissibility and relevance of sale instances as evidence.
4. Consideration of the potential value of the land for building purposes.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of the nature of the land (Kharaba land):
The lands acquired from the villages of Ravapur and Ugedi were classified by the Land Acquisition Officer as "Kharaba lands," meaning waste lands unfit for any use. The Assistant Judge upheld this classification but acknowledged that the land in Ravapur had building potentiality, thus awarding compensation accordingly.
2. Assessment of the compensation rate for the acquired land:
The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 2-25nP per acre, deeming the lands as waste. Dissatisfied, the claimant sought higher compensation, arguing the land's potential for building. The Assistant Judge awarded Rs. 1000 per acre for Ravapur land, recognizing its building potentiality, but upheld the initial assessment for Ugedi land. The claimant appealed, seeking compensation at Rs. 1 per square yard for Ravapur land, based on adjacent land sales.
3. Evaluation of the admissibility and relevance of sale instances as evidence:
The claimant cited sale instances of adjacent plots to justify higher compensation. The court emphasized that sale instances must be comparable in time and quality. The claimant's evidence (Exs. 37-40) was challenged as mere rojmal entries, not sale deeds, and lacked corroboration from vendors or purchasers. The court reiterated that proving the contents of documents requires testimony from knowledgeable parties. The claimant failed to provide such evidence, rendering the sale instances inadmissible.
4. Consideration of the potential value of the land for building purposes:
The court examined whether the land's potential for building justified higher compensation. It noted that potential value must have a present market impact and not be speculative. The court considered factors like proximity to village housing and recent nearby land sales. Despite the land being classified as waste, its closeness to village sites and some development activity indicated potential for future building use. The court concluded that the land's building potential justified the awarded compensation of Rs. 1000 per acre.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the Assistant Judge's award of Rs. 1000 per acre for the Ravapur land, recognizing its building potential despite being classified as Kharaba land. The claimant's appeal for higher compensation based on sale instances was dismissed due to insufficient evidence. The judgment emphasized the necessity of concrete, corroborated evidence to substantiate claims for higher compensation based on market value and potential use.
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1968 (7) TMI 87
Issues:
Validity of notice under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code
Analysis:
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a notice issued under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code was defective, rendering the suit not maintainable. The plaintiff had sent a notice demanding compensation for lost goods, but the High Court held the notice invalid, leading to the dismissal of the suit. The plaintiff operated a business under a specific name and sent several notices regarding the lost goods. The notice in question was issued by the plaintiff as the proprietor of the concern "Raghunath Dass Mulkraj." The High Court relied on a previous decision to argue that the notice did not meet the legal requirements as the person issuing the notice was not the same as the plaintiff in the suit.
The Court examined the requirements of Section 80, Civil Procedure Code, emphasizing that the notice must state the name, description, and place of residence of the plaintiff. Despite the notice being issued by the plaintiff as the proprietor of the concern, the High Court found it insufficient. However, the Court highlighted that the purpose of the notice is to provide an opportunity for the concerned parties to reconsider and settle claims without litigation. The Court stressed that the notice should not be used as a trap against individuals and should be interpreted reasonably.
The Court referred to a previous case to illustrate that strict compliance with Section 80 is necessary but should not be devoid of common sense. The Court concluded that the Union of India did not challenge the validity of the notice and that the person issuing the notice was the same as the plaintiff. Unlike a previous case where the notice indicated a partnership firm without specifying the sole proprietor, in this instance, the notice clearly identified the plaintiff as the sole proprietor. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and reinstated the trial Court's decision, ordering the Union of India to pay the appellant's costs.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, emphasizing the importance of interpreting legal requirements with common sense and ensuring that the purpose of legal provisions is not misused. The Court clarified that the notice issued by the plaintiff was valid, meeting the essential criteria under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code, and thus, the suit was maintainable.
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1968 (7) TMI 86
Issues:
1. Review of a judicial decision based on a subsequent binding authority taking a different view of the law.
Analysis:
The judgment by P. T. Raman Nayar, J., discusses the grounds for reviewing a judicial decision based on a subsequent binding authority that presents a different interpretation of the law. The judge emphasizes that a subsequent binding authority, which differs from the original decision, can be considered a valid reason for review. The judge cites the importance of discovering new and significant matters or errors apparent on the face of the record as per Order XLVII of the Code. The judgment highlights that the phrase "error apparent on the face of the record" encompasses both factual and legal errors, as established by legal precedents such as the Court Fees Act, 1870, and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
The judgment further explains that the timing of the binding authority demonstrating the error, whether before or after the original decision, does not affect the review process. The judge clarifies that judicial decisions only interpret the law and do not create or modify it. Therefore, a subsequent authoritative judicial decision altering the interpretation of the law holds significant weight in the review process. The judgment draws parallels between a binding judicial authority and a statute, emphasizing that the law remains constant despite changes in judicial interpretations.
Moreover, the judgment references legal precedents, such as the case of Venkatachalalam, I.T.O. v. Bombay D. & M. Co. Ltd., to support the argument that a subsequent binding decision declaring an earlier decision as erroneous is a valid ground for review. The judge highlights that the purpose of a review based on a subsequent binding authority is not to alter a decree that was correctly made initially but to rectify errors in legal interpretation. The judgment concludes by allowing the application for review and ordering a rehearing of the case without imposing any costs.
In summary, the judgment underscores the significance of a subsequent binding authority in reviewing judicial decisions, clarifies the scope of "error apparent on the face of the record," and establishes the legal basis for reconsidering decisions based on changed legal interpretations.
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1968 (7) TMI 85
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the exchange of raiyati lands under Section 27(1) of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 3 of 1872.
2. Legal necessity and benefit of the estate concerning the sale deed and deed of exchange.
3. Adverse possession claim by the respondents.
4. Applicability of Section 11 of the Regulation to bar the appellants' suit.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Exchange of Raiyati Lands Under Section 27(1):
The central issue was whether the exchange of raiyati lands situated in Sonthal Parganas was invalid under Section 27(1) of the Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 3 of 1872. The lands in question were raiyati and governed by the Regulation. The High Court initially dismissed the contention based on Section 27, stating it was raised for the first time during arguments. However, the Supreme Court found that the District Court had already considered this issue, thus the High Court was incorrect in disallowing the contention.
Section 27(1) explicitly prohibits any transfer of a raiyat's holding unless the right to transfer is recorded in the Record of Rights. Sub-section (2) further enjoins courts from recognizing any such transfer. The Supreme Court held that the language of Section 27 is clear and comprehensive enough to include transfers by exchange. Consequently, the exchange of Schedule B properties was invalid as it was not recorded in the Record of Rights.
2. Legal Necessity and Benefit of the Estate:
The appellants contended that the sale deed and the deed of exchange executed by Nilmoni Dasi were neither for legal necessity nor for the benefit of the estate of Tonu Mandal. The trial court and the District Court found that these transactions were not for legal necessity or for the estate's benefit. The High Court, however, held that the exchange was for the benefit of the estate, even if not for legal necessity. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, emphasizing that the transactions were neither for legal necessity nor for the estate's benefit.
3. Adverse Possession Claim:
The respondents claimed that their long possession of the properties had ripened into title by adverse possession. Both the trial court and the District Court rejected this plea, applying Article 141 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which allows reversioners to file a suit for possession within twelve years after the widow's death. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the reversioners' right to recover possession is not barred by the widow's negligence or sufferance. The High Court's disallowance of the adverse possession claim was thus upheld.
4. Applicability of Section 11 of the Regulation:
The respondents argued that under Section 11 of the Regulation, the appellants' suit was not maintainable as the validity of the exchange could not be agitated in court once decided by a settlement officer. The Supreme Court found that neither Section 11 nor Section 25A applied to this case, as the issue of the exchange's validity was not decided by any settlement officer or court. Therefore, the bar under Section 11 did not apply, and the appellants' suit was maintainable.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the trial court's decree, which was confirmed by the District Court. The exchange of Schedule B properties was declared invalid under Section 27(1) of the Regulation, and the appellants were entitled to possession of these properties. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and those incurred in the High Court.
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1968 (7) TMI 84
Issues Involved
1. Premature Application
2. Jurisdiction of the Collector
3. Compliance with Rule 19
4. Right of Reconveyance
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis
1. Premature Application
The appellant filed an application for reconveyance of land under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, XII of 1962, before the registration of the sale deed was completed. The High Court held that the right of reconveyance arises only upon the completion of the transfer, which is evidenced by the registration of the sale deed. Therefore, the application was deemed premature as the transfer was not completed when the application was filed.
2. Jurisdiction of the Collector
The Collector's jurisdiction to entertain the application was questioned on the grounds that the transfer was not complete at the time of the application. The High Court and the Board of Revenue held that the Collector had no jurisdiction to entertain the application as the right of reconveyance had not accrued to the appellant. However, the Supreme Court found that the application was placed before the Collector on November 30, 1964, when the registration was completed, thereby validating the Collector's jurisdiction to entertain the application.
3. Compliance with Rule 19
Rule 19 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Rules, 1963, requires the application to be accompanied by a copy of the registered sale deed. The appellant annexed a certified copy of the sale deed presented for registration but not the registered deed. The High Court held that this non-compliance was fatal to the application. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the requirement to annex a copy of the registered deed is directory, not mandatory. The purpose of this rule is to furnish necessary information to the Collector, and substantial compliance, such as providing a certified copy of the sale deed, is sufficient.
4. Right of Reconveyance
The right of reconveyance under Section 16(3) is intended to prevent fragmentation of holdings and to facilitate land consolidation. The High Court emphasized that this right is contingent upon the completion of the transfer and the deposit of the purchase money along with an additional 10% as solatium. The Supreme Court agreed that the right of reconveyance arises only upon the completion of the transfer, which is evidenced by the registration of the sale deed. The Supreme Court found that the appellant had complied with the necessary conditions, including the deposit of the requisite amount, and therefore, the right of reconveyance had accrued.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Board of Revenue, and restored the order passed by the Collector and confirmed by the Commissioner. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appeals as well as the costs incurred in the High Court. The Supreme Court emphasized that the requirement to annex a copy of the registered deed is directory and that substantial compliance is sufficient to validate the application for reconveyance.
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1968 (7) TMI 83
Issues involved:
Contempt of court, Disobedience of court orders, Acceptance of bond, Delay in executing court orders, Contempt proceedings, High Court's jurisdiction.
Contempt of Court:
The case involved five appellants who were District Magistrate of Nadia and his assistants found guilty of contempt of the High Court of Calcutta and the Sessions Court of Nadia. The appellants appealed by special leave granted by the Supreme Court against the judgment and order of the Calcutta High Court. The High Court framed questions regarding disobedience of the Sessions Judge's order, compliance of the bond with the order, and intentional violation of the stay order. The High Court found fault with the bond and the acceptance of the bond by officers other than the District Magistrate. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's findings, stating that the bond substantially complied with the Sessions Judge's order and that the Additional District Magistrate had the authority to accept the bond.
Delay in Executing Court Orders:
The judgment highlighted the delay in executing court orders and the transmission of orders between different offices. The High Court took a strict view of the delays, but the Supreme Court opined that the delays did not amount to contempt of court. The Supreme Court noted that the delays were a result of the system of transmission of orders through multiple offices and were not intentional or in defiance of the superior courts. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of promptly handling orders from superior courts to avoid any inference of indifference or contumaciousness.
Contempt Proceedings:
The High Court's observations and findings regarding contempt of court were scrutinized by the Supreme Court. The High Court had accused the appellants of intentional disobedience of orders and failure to offer an apology. The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's conclusions, stating that there was no evidence of a deliberate scheme to violate the stay orders or undermine the authority of the courts. The Supreme Court emphasized that contempt proceedings should be approached with circumspection and that punishment should be reserved for clear cases of contumacious conduct.
High Court's Jurisdiction:
The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's jurisdiction in the contempt proceedings. The High Court had taken a strict view of the delays and the acceptance of the bond, leading to the finding of contempt. However, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of the appellants, emphasizing that the delays were a systemic issue and not a deliberate act of contempt. The Supreme Court cautioned all concerned to give close and prompt attention to orders from superior courts to avoid unnecessary delays that could be misconstrued as indifference or contumaciousness.
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1968 (7) TMI 82
Issues Involved:
1. Rejection of the nomination paper of Ram Kishen.
2. Allegations of corrupt practices by the returned candidate and his election agent.
Detailed Analysis:
Rejection of the Nomination Paper of Ram Kishen:
The first issue concerns the rejection of Ram Kishen's nomination paper by the Returning Officer. Ram Kishen was registered as a voter in the Harda Tehsil, not in the Khategaon Tehsil. He produced a certificate from the Tehsildar of Harda, which was not a certified copy of the electoral roll but merely a gist of the entry based on an affidavit. Section 33(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, mandates that a candidate registered in a different constituency must produce a certified copy of the electoral roll or relevant entries. Ram Kishen failed to comply with this requirement, and the Returning Officer's rejection of his nomination paper was justified. The court held that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the nomination paper was wrongly rejected, affirming that the rejection was appropriate.
Allegations of Corrupt Practices:
The second issue involves allegations of corrupt practices against the returned candidate and his election agent, specifically related to oral speeches connected with the Jan Sangh's manifesto on cow slaughter. The High Court found that the returned candidate and his agent made speeches in 19 villages, claiming that voting for Congress was equivalent to committing the sin of gohatya (cow slaughter) and that the Congress candidate, Shrimati Manjulabai, ate beef.
The court examined evidence related to speeches made in two villages, Khategaon and Kannod. Witnesses testified that the returned candidate and his election agent made statements implying that voting for Congress would result in divine displeasure or spiritual censure, thus constituting undue influence under Section 123(2)(ii) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The court found the witnesses credible and concluded that the corrupt practice was established.
The court emphasized that the statement about committing the sin of gohatya if voting for Congress was an attempt to induce voters to believe they would be objects of divine displeasure or spiritual censure. This fell within the scope of Section 123(2)(ii), making the returned candidate guilty of corrupt practices.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed with costs, upholding the High Court's decision to set aside the election of the returned candidate due to the established corrupt practices. The court did not express an opinion on the allegation that the Congress candidate ate beef, as she did not appear to deny this claim.
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1968 (7) TMI 81
Issues:
1. Determination of market value of orchard acquired under Land Acquisition Act 1894.
2. Assessment of compensation payable to appellants for the acquired orchard.
3. Evaluation of evidence presented regarding the value of the orchard.
4. Consideration of statutory allowances under Section 23(2) of the Act.
5. Dispute over costs awarded by the trial court and High Court.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a civil appeal concerning the market value of an orchard acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 for the construction of Hirakud Dam in Orissa State. The primary issue in question is the compensation payable to the appellants for their acquired lands, specifically focusing on the valuation of the orchard comprising Orange, Mosambi, and Guava trees. The appellants initially claimed compensation of &8377; 7,95,770/-, but the Special Land Acquisition Officer awarded only &8377; 59,494/6/-. Subsequently, the Additional District Judge increased the compensation to &8377; 3,29,480/-, valuing the trees at specific amounts per tree. The High Court modified the decree, setting the compensation at &8377; 1,47,751/7/-, based on a reassessment of the tree values to &8377; 58,566/-, relying on official reports and publications.
The judgment addresses the evaluation of evidence presented by the appellants regarding the orchard's value. The High Court found the appellants' claims exaggerated and the supporting witness testimony unreliable. Despite the absence of documentary evidence, the Additional District Judge heavily relied on oral evidence, which the High Court deemed unacceptable. The court excluded additional documents considered post-arguments, emphasizing the importance of allowing rebuttal opportunities for such evidence.
Regarding statutory allowances under Section 23(2) of the Act, the High Court's decision to disallow the 15% allowance over the tree values was deemed erroneous. The court failed to recognize that the trees were part of the acquired land, necessitating the statutory allowance. Citing precedents from Madras and Allahabad High Courts, it was established that tree values must be included in the market value of the land for the 15% allowance under Section 23(2).
Lastly, the judgment addressed the dispute over costs awarded by the trial court and High Court. The courts had directed parties to bear their own costs, considering the appellants' exaggerated claim and unreliable evidence. The appellate court partly allowed the appeal, granting the statutory 15% allowance on the tree values but upheld the costs decision, emphasizing the discretionary nature of cost awards based on the circumstances of the case.
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1968 (7) TMI 80
Issues Involved
1. Applicability of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965.
2. Entitlement to claim bonus dehors the Act.
3. Interpretation of the Act's provisions.
4. Legislative intent and historical context of the Act.
5. Exemptions under the Act.
6. Relationship with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis
1. Applicability of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965
The primary issue was whether the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (the Act) applies to establishments not being factories and employing less than 20 persons, and to public sector establishments exempted under sec. 32(x). The Supreme Court noted that the Act's applicability is determined by sec. 1(3), which states that the Act applies to every factory and every other establishment employing 20 or more persons. The Court emphasized that the Act was intended to be comprehensive in dealing with the subject of bonus, and the exclusion of establishments with less than 20 employees was a deliberate legislative choice.
2. Entitlement to Claim Bonus Dehors the Act
The Court examined whether employees in establishments excluded or exempted by the Act could still claim bonus under other laws. The respondents argued that the Act did not categorically deprive such employees of their right to claim bonus under other laws. However, the Court concluded that the Act was intended to be exhaustive and that no bonus could be claimed outside its provisions. The Court reasoned that if Parliament intended to retain the right to claim bonus under other laws, it would have made an express provision for such retention, as seen in sec. 35 which saves the provisions of the Coal Mines, Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948.
3. Interpretation of the Act's Provisions
The Court analyzed various provisions of the Act, including sec. 22 and sec. 39, to determine the legislative intent. Sec. 22 deems certain disputes as industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, while sec. 39 states that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court clarified that sec. 22 creates a legal fiction to bring certain disputes within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act, whereas sec. 39 ensures that the machinery for dispute resolution under the Industrial Disputes Act is available for disputes arising under the Act.
4. Legislative Intent and Historical Context of the Act
The Court referred to the historical context and the legislative intent behind the Act. It noted that bonus was initially a gratuitous payment and later became a right enforceable through industrial adjudication. The Act was enacted to provide a statutory obligation for bonus payment, replacing the formula evolved through industrial adjudication. The Court emphasized that the Act was a comprehensive legislation intended to cover the entire subject of bonus, and the legislative history indicated a deliberate exclusion of certain establishments and employees from its scope.
5. Exemptions Under the Act
The Court examined the exemptions provided under sec. 32 of the Act, which excludes certain establishments and employees from its application. The Court noted that the exemptions were based on specific policy considerations, such as the absence of profit motive in public sector establishments and the peculiar nature of employment in certain industries. The Court rejected the argument that exempted establishments could still be liable for bonus under other laws, stating that such an interpretation would frustrate the purpose of the exemptions.
6. Relationship with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
The Court addressed the relationship between the Act and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It clarified that the Industrial Disputes Act did not confer a statutory right to bonus but provided a mechanism for resolving disputes, including those related to bonus. The Court concluded that the Act was intended to replace the adjudication-based bonus system with a statutory formula and that the machinery of the Industrial Disputes Act was made available for disputes arising under the Act through sec. 39.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, was a comprehensive legislation intended to cover the entire subject of bonus. The Act excluded certain establishments and employees from its scope as a matter of legislative policy, and no bonus could be claimed outside its provisions. The Court set aside the orders of the Tribunals and allowed the appeals, concluding that the Tribunals' interpretation of the Act was incorrect. There was no order as to costs.
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1968 (7) TMI 79
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the inquiry conducted by the Vice Chancellor.
2. Non-provision of the Inquiry Officer's report to the appellant before the show cause notice.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Inquiry Conducted by the Vice Chancellor:
The appellant was a student at the Engineering College, Trichur, and was accused of malpractice during the April 1965 examination. The Vice Chancellor debarred him from appearing in any examination until April 1966. The inquiry into the malpractice was conducted by a committee formed by the University, which concluded that the appellant was guilty. The Vice Chancellor then appointed a retired Principal as the Inquiry Officer, who also found the appellant guilty. The appellant argued that the formal inquiry should have been conducted by an officer designated by the Principal of the College where he appeared for the examination, making the inquiry improper.
The Supreme Court held that the Kerala University Act, 1957, and its statutes gave the Syndicate the power to delegate disciplinary control to the Vice Chancellor. The rules under which the Vice Chancellor acted were not statutory but merely for guidance, and thus, the Vice Chancellor did not contravene any law by appointing the Inquiry Officer himself. The court found no breach of natural justice principles, as the Inquiry Officer was impartial and qualified. The Divison Bench of the High Court rightly negatived the contention that the Vice Chancellor had breached any statutory rule or contravened any principle of natural justice.
2. Non-provision of the Inquiry Officer's Report to the Appellant:
The appellant contended that the impugned order was invalid because he was not provided with a copy of the Inquiry Officer's report before being asked to submit his explanation in response to the show cause notice. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant had been informed of the charges, the inquiry was held with due notice, and he was allowed to cross-examine witnesses and present his case. No rule required the Vice Chancellor to provide a copy of the report, and the appellant did not request it. The court emphasized that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and must be applied based on the case's facts and circumstances.
The court cited several precedents to illustrate that the requirements of natural justice depend on the nature of the inquiry and the tribunal's rules. It concluded that the inquiry against the appellant was fair, and there was no breach of natural justice. The appellant's grievance about not receiving the report appeared to be an afterthought.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Vice Chancellor's actions were within legal bounds and did not violate principles of natural justice. The inquiry was fair, and the procedural requirements were met, justifying the disciplinary action taken against the appellant. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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1968 (7) TMI 78
Whether ss. 3 and 4 are in conflict with cl. 12 of the Schedule of the Electricity Act ?
Held that:- We see no conflict between cl. 12 of the Schedule in the Electricity Act and ss. 3 and 4 of the Bombay Act. Clause 12 prescribes a procedure for settling the price of electricity supplied by the licensee for street lighting. It merely lays down the machinery for settling the price if there is dispute between the contracting parties. That clause does not fix the price to be paid or even the maximum price payable. We fail to see how that clause takes away the power from the State legislature to impose additional burden on the consumer. All that clause means is that the licensec cannot dictate his terms to the authority responsible for street lighting. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that in incorporating cl. 12 of the Schedule, the central legislature intended that under no circumstance the liability of the consumer can be increased beyond what is asked during the continuance of the contract. In our opinion it imposes no fetters on the powers of the provincial legislatures in the matter of hanging the price of the electricity supplied by the licensec for street lighting.
unable to agree with the High Court that either the suit is bad because of want of a valid notice under s. 233 of the Ajmer Merwar Municipalities Regulation or that the notification imposing surcharge is invalid for any reason.Appeal allowed.
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1968 (7) TMI 77
Issues:
1. Whether the company-principal of the assessee, acting as a sole selling and del credere agent of a sugar company, is liable for sales tax on sales made outside the State of Bihar?
2. Whether the assessee, who acted as a selling agent for the sugar company, is liable to pay sales tax on transactions where he endorsed railway receipts in favor of buyers outside Bihar?
3. Whether the transactions between the assessee and purchasers constitute sales liable for taxation under the Bihar Sales Tax Act?
Analysis:
The High Court of Patna addressed three reference cases with identical legal questions. The Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, raised a question regarding the liability of the company-principal of the assessee, who acted as a sole selling and del credere agent for a sugar company, for sales tax on sales outside Bihar. The assessee contended that since the company had already paid tax on these sales, he should not be liable. However, the Board of Revenue rejected this argument, emphasizing that the assessee was the principal seller of the goods to the purchasers, irrespective of being a commission agent (paragraph 3).
The Court examined the definition of a "dealer" under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, which includes any person selling goods for commission. It concluded that even though the assessee was selling goods on a commission basis, he qualified as a dealer under the Act. The Court highlighted that when goods were dispatched by the factories with the assessee listed as the consignee in railway receipts, it constituted delivery to the assessee until he endorsed the receipts to the purchasers, making him liable for sales tax (paragraph 4).
Regarding the argument that the company had already paid tax on these transactions, the Court held that the assessee remained liable for sales tax. It clarified that the nature of the transaction between the assessee and the purchasers was deemed a sale under the Act, regardless of the company's tax payments. The Court reframed the question to focus on the assessee's liability for sales tax on sugar dispatched from the factories outside Bihar, ultimately ruling in favor of the department and holding the assessee accountable for sales tax on the mentioned transactions (paragraph 5-7).
In conclusion, the High Court of Patna determined that the assessee, despite acting as a selling agent for the sugar company, was liable for sales tax on transactions where he endorsed railway receipts to buyers outside Bihar. The Court emphasized the legal implications of the transactions and upheld the assessee's liability under the Bihar Sales Tax Act.
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1968 (7) TMI 76
Issues Involved:
1. Refund of tax paid under a mistake of law.
2. Applicability of Supreme Court decisions and principles under the Indian Contract Act.
3. Jurisdiction and discretion of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. Limitation period for filing writ petitions for refund.
5. Interpretation of Section 8(2) and Section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
6. Applicability of amendments to Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
7. Distinction between declared and non-declared goods.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Refund of Tax Paid Under a Mistake of Law:
The petitioners, who are dealers in various goods, sought a refund of tax paid under a mistake of law. They argued that the assessments were made under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, and that the State had no power to exempt goods liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The court examined whether the tax paid under a mistaken interpretation of law could be recovered.
2. Applicability of Supreme Court Decisions and Principles Under the Indian Contract Act:
The petitioners relied on the Supreme Court decisions in *State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai* and *State of Kerala v. Aluminium Industries Ltd.*, which held that relief for refund of tax paid under a mistake of law could be granted. The court also referred to *Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf*, which discussed the recovery of money paid under a mistake of law under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act.
3. Jurisdiction and Discretion of High Courts Under Article 226 of the Constitution:
The court acknowledged that the High Courts have the power under Article 226 to order repayment of money paid under a mistake of law. However, it emphasized that this power is discretionary and should not supersede the modes of obtaining relief through civil courts. The court noted that the delay in seeking this special remedy and the nature of the controversy are crucial factors in exercising this discretion.
4. Limitation Period for Filing Writ Petitions for Refund:
The court recognized that while the Limitation Act does not apply to Article 226, the maximum period for filing a civil suit (three years) could be a reasonable standard for measuring delay in filing writ petitions. The court held that petitions filed beyond this period would generally be considered unreasonable.
5. Interpretation of Section 8(2) and Section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956:
The court discussed the interpretation of Section 8(2) and Section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *State of Mysore v. Lakshminarasimhiah Setty & Sons*, which clarified that the expression "levied" in Section 9(1) refers to the manner of levy under the State Act. The court noted that this interpretation avoids anomalies in tax collection at different points.
6. Applicability of Amendments to Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956:
The court examined the impact of amendments to Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It noted that the amendments introduced restrictions and conditions on the tax payable on declared goods. The court agreed with the Madras High Court's view in *Khader & Co. v. State of Madras* that the amendments made the levy under the State Act subject to refund if the same goods were taxed under the Central Act.
7. Distinction Between Declared and Non-Declared Goods:
The court differentiated between declared and non-declared goods. For declared goods, it held that the tax levied under the State Act must be refunded if the same goods were taxed under the Central Act. For non-declared goods, the court referred to its earlier decision in *State of Andhra Pradesh v. Oruganti Venkateswarlu & Bros.*, which dealt with the determination of the rate of tax on inter-State sales.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that they were filed beyond a reasonable period and that there were no exceptional circumstances to condone the delay. The court emphasized that the tax paid under a mistaken interpretation of law could not be recovered unless the assessment orders were quashed within a reasonable time. The court also clarified that the amendments to the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and the interpretation of relevant statutory provisions must be considered in determining the applicability of the Supreme Court's decisions.
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1968 (7) TMI 75
Issues:
1. Lack of notice of demand served to the petitioners.
2. Legality of recovery proceedings without serving notice of demand.
3. Liability of petitioners to pay arrears of sales tax.
4. Levying and realization of interest only against defaulters.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The petitioners, three sons of a deceased individual who was assessed for sales tax, raised a complaint that recovery proceedings were initiated against them without prior notice. They argued that without a notice of demand, they could not be considered defaulters, and thus, recovery proceedings against them were unjustified.
2. The Court examined the provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, particularly Section 8, which mandates the service of a notice of demand to the person liable for tax payment. The Court emphasized that failure to serve a notice of demand renders the individual not a defaulter, preventing the initiation of recovery proceedings against them. Citing a similar case, the Court highlighted that recovery proceedings without a fresh notice of demand were unauthorized.
3. Although the petitioners were liable to pay the arrears of sales tax as legal representatives of their late father, the Court reiterated that serving a notice of demand was a prerequisite to enforce this liability and initiate recovery as arrears of land revenue. The Court emphasized that the petitioners, not being served with a notice of demand, could not be considered defaulters, thus rendering the recovery proceedings against them unauthorized.
4. Regarding the levy and realization of interest, the Court clarified that interest could only be charged against defaulters. The U.P. Sales Tax Act stipulates that interest can be charged if tax remains unpaid after the specified time in the notice of assessment and demand. As the petitioners were not served with the required notice of demand, the Court concluded that the recovery proceedings against them, including interest, were unauthorized.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the recovery proceedings against the petitioners for interest. The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, emphasizing that without a notice of demand, the recovery proceedings initiated against them were unjustified. The petitioners were awarded costs from the respondents.
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1968 (7) TMI 74
Issues:
1. Whether the supply of ballast and boulders under a contract with the North Eastern Railway constitutes a sale or a works contract?
Analysis:
The petitioner entered into an agreement with the North Eastern Railway for the manufacture and supply of quarry products from a private quarry. The Sales Tax Officer assessed the petitioner to sales tax on the turnover of ballast and boulders. The Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax confirmed the assessment, finding that the ballast and boulders were collected by the petitioner from the river-bed, shaped to specifications, and supplied to the Railway at specified locations. The Judge concluded it was a sale rather than a works contract, as the materials were not property of the Railway, and the petitioner paid royalty to the Forest Department for collection rights.
Further, the Court examined the terms of the contract, specifically paragraph 14 of the Special Conditions, which stated that any surplus quarry product would be considered the property of the Railway if not required, allowing the petitioner to remove it on payment of specified charges. The Court noted that if the materials were not removed within two months of requisition by the Railway, the petitioner would forfeit all rights. This provision supported the conclusion that the transaction was a sale, as the materials were treated as the petitioner's property until payment was made by the Railway.
In conclusion, the Court upheld the finding that the supply of ballast and boulders constituted a sale by the petitioner to the Railway, not a works contract. The questions of law in all references were answered accordingly, and costs were awarded to the Commissioner of Sales Tax in the instant reference. The judgment clarified the nature of the transaction based on the contractual terms and the actions of the parties involved, emphasizing the ownership and payment aspects in determining the classification of the supply.
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1968 (7) TMI 73
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the principles of natural justice were violated by not recording statements and not allowing cross-examination.
2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in estimating the turnover of sales higher than the detected suppression of sales.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice:
The Tribunal had to determine if the principles of natural justice were violated by the Sales Tax Officer by not recording statements of A. Alibhai & Co. and the Angadia, and not giving the applicant-firm an opportunity to cross-examine them. The materials from the uplak books of A. Alibhai & Co. and the records of the Angadia were made available to the assessee-firm. The Tribunal observed that the uplak books contained khata of different persons, including the assessee-firm, and showed transactions of sales to A. Alibhai & Co. The Tribunal concluded that the goods shown in the extract of the Angadia account were despatched by the assessee-firm to A. Alibhai & Co. and payments were made accordingly. The Tribunal found that the sales not entered in the assessee-firm's account books were entered in the uplak books of A. Alibhai & Co. The Tribunal did not place reliance on a letter from A. Alibhai & Co. produced by the assessee-firm, as it did not explain the transactions in the uplak books.
The Tribunal held that the principles of natural justice were not violated as the materials were made available to the assessee-firm and the reassessment proceedings were conducted accordingly. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's observation in Raghubar Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar, which stated that evidence for departmental Tribunals means any material with probative value, not necessarily legal evidence. The Tribunal concluded that the Sales Tax Officer was justified in his actions based on the materials available.
2. Justification of Estimating Turnover Higher than Detected Suppression:
The Tribunal had to decide if it was justified in estimating the turnover of sales higher than the detected suppression of sales. The Sales Tax Officer had initially assessed the turnover and detected suppression of sales for two periods, 1955-56 and 1956-57. The Tribunal observed that the ratio of enhancement to the estimated suppressed sales was proper for 1955-56 and applied the same ratio for 1956-57. The Tribunal confirmed the suppression of sales for 1955-56 and partially allowed the revision application for 1956-57, estimating the suppressed sales at Rs. 837.
The Tribunal's decision was supported by the Supreme Court's ruling in Raghubar Mandal's case, which stated that once the returns and books of account are rejected, the assessing authority must make an estimate based on some material. The Tribunal found that there were materials before the assessing authorities to estimate the suppressed sales. The Tribunal also referred to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, which allowed reassessment proceedings to follow the same procedure as original assessment proceedings, including the power of best judgment.
The Tribunal rejected the assessee's contention that reassessment proceedings should not involve best judgment assessment, distinguishing the case from the Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Court decisions, which were based on different legislative provisions.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal answered both questions in the affirmative, holding that the principles of natural justice were not violated and that the estimation of turnover higher than the detected suppression was justified. The assessee was ordered to pay the costs of the reference to the State of Gujarat.
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1968 (7) TMI 72
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of rules 9(2)(a) and 9-B(3)(a) of the Central Sales Tax (Bihar) Rules, 1957.
2. Timing for filing declarations and certificates.
3. Authority of appellate or revisional bodies to accept late declarations and certificates.
4. Error of law by the Board in refusing late submissions.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Constitutionality of Rules 9(2)(a) and 9-B(3)(a)
The primary issue was whether the requirements under rules 9(2)(a) and 9-B(3)(a) of the Central Sales Tax (Bihar) Rules, 1957, which mandated the attachment and filing of declarations in Form C and certificates in Form D with returns, were constitutionally valid. The court held that these rules imposed a time-limit for filing the declarations and certificates, which was not authorized by the Central Sales Tax Act. The court found that the expression "in the prescribed manner" did not encompass the power to prescribe a rigid time-limit. Hence, the requirement of filing these documents with the returns was deemed ultra vires the rule-making power of the State Government.
Issue 2: Timing for Filing Declarations and Certificates
The court examined when the declarations and certificates should have been filed. It was concluded that these documents could be furnished after the filing of the returns and before the assessment order was passed. The court noted that the Central Act did not authorize the imposition of a rigid time-limit for the submission of these documents. Therefore, the requirement to file them with the returns was not valid.
Issue 3: Authority to Accept Late Declarations and Certificates
The court considered whether the appellate or revisional authority had the power to accept declarations and certificates if filed after the assessment order. It was held that both the appellate authority under section 30(5) and the revisional authority under section 31 of the Bihar Act had the power to set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to pass a fresh order after further inquiry. This included giving the assessee an opportunity to furnish the declarations and certificates. The court found that the Deputy Commissioner and the Board erred in their view that they lacked such power.
Issue 4: Error of Law by the Board
The court evaluated whether the Board committed any error of law in refusing to give the assessee an opportunity to file the declarations and certificates at a late stage. It was concluded that the Board did not err in law. The Board had considered whether sufficient cause was shown for the delay and found that the assessee had ample opportunity to submit the declarations and certificates before the assessment but failed to do so. The court noted that determining "sufficient cause" is generally a question of fact and held that the Board's decision in this regard did not constitute an error of law.
Conclusion:
The court reframed the question of law to focus on whether the assessee should have been given an opportunity to furnish declarations and certificates after filing the returns or after the assessment order. The court answered this question partly in favor of the assessee by holding that declarations and certificates could be submitted after filing returns but before the assessment order. However, it ultimately ruled against the assessee, finding no error of law in the Board's refusal to accept late submissions. The reference was answered accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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