Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 272 Records
-
1993 (7) TMI 368 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e evidence that a document is not as old as it purports to be. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is important to know that the color of the ink on a suspeted document, if it is promptly examined, may thus be the means of showing that the document is not genuine. If a writing of this kind purports to have been written long before and it can be shown that the ink has not yet reached its final depth of color, and it actually goes throgh those changes that are characteristic of ink during the first months or year of its history, it is only necessary to prove this fact to invalidate the document." 9. Hence, the reasons given by the learned District Munsif for allowing the application are perfectly justified in the particular circumstances of the case. C.R.P. No. 3549 of 1992 and C.R.P.S.R. No. 61610 of 1992 therefore, fail and accordingly they are dismissed. No costs. 10. Petitions dismissed.
-
1993 (7) TMI 367 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... s open to the party to show that the cheque was drawn on a date antecedent to the date which the cheque bears. 8. Here the complainant's case is that the cheque was a post-dated one. Even the petitioner admitted that the cheque was issued before the date which is shown in the cheque. Hence, the question of presumption has no significance, for, the parties practically admitted that the cheque was drawn on a previous day. Of course, the complainant has to establish on the facts of this particular case that on the date the cheque was drawn, the petitioner had a live account with the bank concerned. 9. Learned counsel lastly contended that there is want of jurisdiction for the court before which the complaint has been filed. It is for the petitioner to raise that question before the lower court and if it is raised, I am sure the lower court will decide the question before proceeding further. 10. With the aforesaid observations, this criminal miscellaneous case is disposed of.
-
1993 (7) TMI 366 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ore, inherent animosity is licit and by itself is not tended to cloud the veracity of the occusation suspected to have been committed, provided it is based on factual foundation. 40. While it is the duty of this Court to give relief to a person to whom injustice had been done, it is necessary to judge that the weapon of P1L is not misused creating a bottleneck in the Court preventing other genuine cases being considered by the Court. 41. The learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 urged that the petitioner did not implead Ramjipura Samiti and claim relief against it by seeking declaration that its scheme approved was illegal or invalid. The petitioner did so as suggested by the respondents with ulterior motive or for gain which could be guessed from the circumstances of the case. As I have rejected the writ petition on other grounds, I would not like to base my decision on this circumstance only. 42. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1993 (7) TMI 365 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
... ... ... ... ..... Control Panels, Air Circuit Breakers for the purpose of computing the value of generating sets is likewise untenable. He has observed that the value of Control Panel and Air Circuit Breaker is includible in the value of the generating sets because the same increases the value of the end product at the time of marketing. The very same reason should support the appellants’ case, particularly, where it is conceded by the Department that these inputs are connected to the final products. Not only is the inclusion of the value of the inputs in question in the assessable value of the final product the material factor but the fact that these inputs are actually fitted in the generating sets and perform specific functions therein to make it properly functional will remove any doubt in this regard. The Appeal is fully merited and is allowed with consequential reliefs to the appellants. The operative part of the order was pronounced in the open Court after the end of the hearing.
-
1993 (7) TMI 364 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... he C.R.P. will abide by the maximum fee that may be prescribed by the Government under Rule 18(1), till the disposal of the suit. 33. Before closing the case, we would like to observe that the controversy could have been well avoided by the functionaries of the Education Department if there was follow-up on their part after the Education Rules were framed in the year 1988. Years -rolled by without fixing the maximum fee in terms of Rule 18. But, in answer to the present litigation, the respondents would like to say that the previous representation made by the Advocate General on the basis of the instructions obtained from the respondents had no sanctity and they would still enforce the fee scales prescribed as long back as in 1985. If there was an application of mind to the crucial issue, we are sure that instead of taking such unwholesome plea, the Government should have undertaken the simple exercise of fixing the maximum fee in accordance with R. 18. 34. Order accordingly.
-
1993 (7) TMI 363 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... his Court dated 8.10.1982, we direct the respondent to refund to the appellants the sum of ₹ 23,68,686.85 and ₹ 26,21,356.16 (total ₹ 49,90,043.01) with 12% interest per annum from the date when the amount was received by the respondent, within a period of eight weeks from today since the respondent has been unable to make goods its submission that it should not be burdened with the payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum, which was a specific condition contained in the interim order dated 8.10.1982. On the failure of the respondent to pay the amount as per the above direction, the appellants shall be entitled to encash the bank guarantee and/or take such other steps as may be available to it in law for recovery of the amount. The amount after recovery shall be appropriated by the appellants in the manner provided by the amended provisions of the Act. 29. In the peculiar circumstances of the case we however leave the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1993 (7) TMI 362 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ined under sub-section (1) of section 80V VA and not by virtue of anything contained in any other section of the said Act. This sum of ₹ 91,822 is the only amount which remains unallowed having regard to the restriction contained in subsection (1) of section 80VVA and this amount alone can be carried forward to the succeeding assessment year or years as provided in subsection (4) of section 80VVA. This is very clear on a plain reading of subsection (1) and sub-section (4) of section 80VVA. We also find that the Board in Circular No. 372, dated 8-12-1983 (See Taxmann's Direct Taxes Circulars, Vol. 2, 1985 edn., p. 960) while explaining the provisions of Finance Act, 1983, by which the said section 80VVA was brought on the statute books, also took the same view as stated by us earlier. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in this case in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. 7. There will be no order as to costs. Sen, J. - I agree.
-
1993 (7) TMI 361 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the observations extracted above, we feel it desirable that the matters be placed for decisions before a larger Bench so that if the aforesaid observations are held to be approving the ratio in Kanhaiya Lal case 1959 SCR 1350 1959 AIR(SC) 135 that Bench may not have any difficulty in dealing with contentions which may arise therefrom in these matters in relation to the decision in Kanhaiya Lal case 1959 SCR 1350 1959 AIR(SC) 135 3. We, therefore, in the above circumstances, direct that the papers be placed before the learned Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to decide the questions which arise in this batch of matters. Having regard to the urgency of the matters we would request the learned Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench as early as possible, more so because those matter wherein the interpretation and constitutionality of the provisions introduced by the Excise and Customs Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991 arise, also have been tagged along with these cases.
-
1993 (7) TMI 360 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... duty at rates applicable to conveyance. Such a demand can be made only by taking resort to Explanation to Item 25 of Schedule I to the Bombay Stamp Act which, however, is not applicable to the present case. 8. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 24th September, 1986 of the Deputy Collector, Valuation and Stamp Duty, Bombay and the notice of demand issued in pursuance thereof are set aside and quashed. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order, as to costs., The learned counsel for the petitioner states that he has already deposited the amount demanded by the Deputy Collector in this court in pursuance of the interim order passed by this court which should be directed to be refunded to him. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that the refund should be deferred by two months. The prayer is allowed. The amount deposited in the court by the petitioner shall be refunded after two months from today. Certified copy expedited. 9. Order accordingly.
-
1993 (7) TMI 359 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... mited v. Union of India and others, to point out that the expression in relation to must be construed widely. In our judgment, the reference to the decision is not appropriate. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 3 are wide in its ambit but it would certainly not include an unenforceable right. For example, if a person hands over his car to the textile mill for gratuitous use then it cannot be claimed that the car is an asset of the undertaking or the user of a car is a right vested in the undertaking and consequently it is open for the Custodian to take possession of the car. In our judgment, the action of the respondents by addressing letter dated January 16, 1984 seeking possession and control of unspecified portion of Bombay House is without jurisdiction and consequently, the petitioners are entitled to relief. 8. Accordingly, petition succeeds and rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1993 (7) TMI 358 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n a city like Pune. He must have had savings from the professional income. It would be natural for him to invest the same in a manner by which he can derive maximum return. If he has chosen to advance his savings on interest to reputed and known traders through a Hundi Dalal on few occasions, it cannot be said that he was a professional money-lender. l business always imports a notion of system, repetition, and continuity. These elements have been held to be absent in the instant case and I see no perversity in reaching that conclusion. Neither law, nor equity is in favour of the - defendant who is trying to delay and defeat the just claim and avoiding his solemn liability to honour his commitment. The last point is also therefore without any substance. 8. To conclude, this Second Appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 9. Needless to mention that the respondent will be free to apply for the discharge of the security given to Court as an interim arrangement.
-
1993 (7) TMI 357 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
... ... ... ... ..... to the dispute which cannot be settled in the domestic forum of the company and continuation of such a dispute will not be in the interests of the company and the shareholders in general. Therefore, the relief that can be granted, considering the objectives of Section 397, is for the shares of the oppressed to be bought by the oppressor. However, we find that a dispute relating to the family settlement dated October 18, 1991, which also deals with the transfer of the shares of the petitioner, in lieu of the other family properties, to the respondents in the present case, is pending before the Calcutta High Court and all the parties including Ringtong Company are parties to the dispute before the Calcutta High Court and the decision therein will bind all the parties. In view of these facts, we do not think that the circumstances warrant invoking the discretionary powers of this Bench in this matter and, therefore, the petition is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
-
1993 (7) TMI 356 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... i) The valuation report shall be submitted by the Official Liquidator and the appellants jointly before the Company Judge and the learned Company Judge shall fix a reserve bid in respect of the said property and shall give appropriate directions regarding the manner of conducting the sale and in connection therewith. (iii) The sale proceeds shall be deposited in Court. (iv) The appellants, thereafter, shall apply to the Company Judge for Withdrawal of the proportionate amount coming to their share after notice to the Official Liquidator and any other concerned parties. (v) The Official Liquidator shall, in the meanwhile, invite claims from the workmen and shall ascertain the extent of the claim of the workmen under Section 529 of the Companies Act which is charged pari passu on these securities. 30. Appeal is allowed as above with no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited. Official Liquidator to act on a certified copy of the minutes of the order. 31. Order accordingly.
-
1993 (7) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ble. It succeeded before the Tribunal only on drawing inferences from the statements of the objection and his witness, overlooking that the onus of proof of the sole issue lay on it. That onus could not be discharged merely on inferences drawn from the evidence of the objector. Ratner the burden was on the SGPC itself to prove by cogent, reliable and independent evidence that the institution, right from its inception was meant for public worship by the Sikhs. Its establishment as propounded by the objector could have been rebutted, at least in so far as the purchase of the land over which the institution stood built was concerned, by suitable evidence. The SGPC failed in that regard. 14. For the afore view of the matter, it is clear to us that the SGPC, the appellant, has no case to have the judgment and order of the High Court reserved. We have thus no hesitation in affirming that judgment and order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal, but do not make any order as to costs.
-
1993 (7) TMI 354 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... taken, subsequent impleadment of any other person as accused would not affect the judicial process already adopted in taking cognizance of the offence. 7. In the aforesaid context, a reference to Section 319 of the Code, is necessary. Under Sub-section (1), the court is given power to proceed against any other person who appears to have committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned in the case. Once the court decides to proceed against such other person then Sub-section (4) will save the earlier act of taking cognizance of the offence. Sub-section (4) says that "the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced". Hence the stage at which the new accused was brought in the array of the accused has no legal impact on the proceedings. 8. In the result, I dismiss both criminal miscellaneous cases in limine.
-
1993 (7) TMI 353 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... about 3-1/2 months in passing the detention order and no explanation for the delay was forth coming. It was held that the detention order was unsustainable and the same was quashed. ( 10. ) In the instant case the detention order was passed after a period of six months of the alleged activity and the delay has not been explained. So, a serious doubt arises with respect to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and the detention order is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. Even otherwise, detention order passed against Darshan Lal Anand on similar grounds was quashed on 19.1.1993. Copy of that judgment has been placed on cord. The grounds of detention and the allegations against Darshan Lal Anand and the present petitioner being the same, the impugned order is also liable to be quashed in order to maintain parity. In view of the findings recorded above. I allow this petition and quash the detention order dated 17.9.1992, annexure P-15. Petition allowed.
-
1993 (7) TMI 352 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ent of the Supreme Court (1993 (2) S.C.C. 470) (supra), their Lordships have held that the Court has a bounden duty to correct its own error. In this case, the error is apparent, and when it has been brought to the notice of the Court, it cannot be allowed to remain. For all these reasons, I allow C.R.P. No. 17.95 of 1990 and restore E.P. No. 797 of 1988 to the file of the Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, for proceeding further in accordance with law. In view of the relief granted in C.R.P. No. 1795 of 1990, no detailed order is necessary in C.R.P. No. 1946 of 1990, except to observe that the court below could have numbered the Application filed under Order 46, Rule 1, C.P.C. and considered the arguments advanced by the counsel for the applicant before it, instead of dismissing the application without numbering the same, by observing that the Court entertained no doubt. In the result, C.R.P. No. 1795 of 1990 is allowed. No order is necessary in C.R.P. 1946 of 1990.
-
1993 (7) TMI 351 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... w. The appeal is dismissed. We, however, grant six months time to the appellant to deposit the central excise duty which has become due as a result of the dismissal of this appeal.
-
1993 (7) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of the U.P. Police so that there may not remain any lingering doubt regarding the credibility of the investigation. The U.P. Police, we hope, will give up its obstructionist attitude and cooperate with the investigation entrusted to the CBI in its larger interest. 8. It is also unfortunate that the petitioner who was nowhere in the picture has permitted himself to be used for preferring this petition, and that too after two of the high ranking officers had assured this Court that they would ensure compliance with this Court's order of May 15, 1992. It was on that assurance that this Court had accepted their apology and dropped the proceedings by discharging the notices. We do hope that a situation will not be created which may compel us to initiate similar proceedings once again. The petitioner will also be more circumspect and careful in future and not become a tool in the hands of others. 9. For the above reasons, we see no merit in this petition and dismiss the same.
-
1993 (7) TMI 349 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... thin the category of vulnerable persons in terms of section 40(c) would not fall within its mischief. 13. But the ultimate decision would depend on the nature of the service rendered. If services rendered are of a contractual origin and nature and involves such liability as exposed the payee to the likelihood of special jeopardy, de hors the relation with the company as director, the conclusion will be that the commission paid therefor could not be equated with remuneration for services. 14. It does not appear to us that the authorities below have looked into the matter from the point of view from which the payment of commission is to be adjudged. There are no facts available to come to a finding. We, therefore, decline to answer the fourth question and remand it to the Tribunal with direction to examine the whole matter afresh in the light of our observations, after giving to the parties due opportunity to lead evidence, if necessary. 15. There will be no order as to costs.
........
|