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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 45 Records
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1957 (1) TMI 41 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stant Commissioner in the present case has given clear and detailed reasons for asking the Income-tax Officer to make a further investigation into the case and there can be no manner of doubt that the interests of justice required a remand. The Appellate Tribunal did not exceed the authority conferred upon it by law by declining to interfere with the order of the Assistant Commissioner. Indeed, the order passed by the Tribunal was the only order which could be passed in the circumstances of the case. For these reasons I entertain no doubt in my mind that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the order of the Tribunal maintaining that passed by the Assistant Commissioner was not erroneous in point of law. The question which has been referred to us by the Tribunal must, in the circumstances, be answered in the negative. Let an appropriate answer be returned. The Department will be entitled to costs of this case. CHOPRA, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (1) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nds of the beneficial owner of the shares. We are unable to entertain this argument. The decision in Shree Shakti Mills' case 1948 16 I.T.R. 187 is binding upon this Court. It may be pointed out that this decision has also been followed by other Courts (e.g., Bikaner Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1953 24 I.T.R. 419 and Jaluram Bhikulal v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1952 22 I.T.R. 490). On the view taken by us, the rule is made absolute and the order passed by the Income-tax Officer on 12th October, 1955, modifying the total world income of the assessee, is set aside. The consequent demand notice and the chalans for recovery of excess tax are also quashed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, and especially the circumstance that the petitioners are succeeding on a question which was not raised before the Income-tax Officer and not clearly set up even in the petition to this Court, we make no order as to costs of this application. Rule made absolute.
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1957 (1) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dicially taken, we apprehend that the learned Chief Justice himself would not have felt called upon to interfere with the order of the Magistrate in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction. 17. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion, for all the above reasons, that the order of the High Court should be set aside and the appeals allowed. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is hereby restored. 18. There was some question raised before us as to whether the private complainants could be allowed to participate in these proceedings at the various stages. Nothing that we have said is intended to indicate that the private complainant has a locus standi. 19. It is unfortunate that this prosecution which is still pending at its very early stages has got to be proceeded with against all the rest of the accused, after the lapse of nearly three years from the date of the murder. It is to be hoped that the proceedings which must follow will be speeded up. 20. Appeals allowed.
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1957 (1) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mited was left unimpaired by the transfer effected by the assessee in favour of Gopal Naidu of the transferee's share in the partnership concern, R.G.S. Naidu and Company. No doubt, thereafter the assessee was not entitled to claim any share in the profits earned by R.G.S. Naidu and Company, but it could hardly be said that the transaction between the assessee and Gopal Naidu should be viewed as compensation for loss of future profits which R.G.S. Naidu and Company could hope to earn. Our answer to the second question is that the sum of ₹ 1,00,000 was paid by Gopal Naidu as consideration in part for the transfer of a capital asset. In addition, as we pointed our above, Gopal Naidu transferred his share in the other two partnership concerns to the assessee. Our answer to the first question is in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, he will pay the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (1) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at all material times well knew that the plaintiffs had purchased the same for resale and for fulfilment of contracts of sale and supply. The plaintiffs claim damages as per particulars. " This appeal must accordingly be allowed, the decree under appeal set aside, and the suit remanded for rehearing to the trial court. The defendants will file their written statement to the amended claim and the suit will be tried and disposed of in accordance with law. There remains the question of costs. As the plaintiffs are getting an indulgence, they must pay the costs of the defendants both in the suit and in the appeal to the Bombay High Court. So far as costs of this appeal are concerned, as the defendants persisted in their contention that the plaintiffs were only acting as their agents, a contention which, if upheld, would have furnished a conclusive answer to the amended claim as well, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1957 (1) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ists should not be given a narrow construction, they include within their scope and ambit all ancillary matters which, legitimately come within the topics mentioned therein. In the matters before us, moreover, the concerns or undertakings are all industrial concerns and fall squarely within the definition of the term " industry " strictly so called and it is not open to the pursuers, situated as they are, to challenge the same. This contention also has no substance and must be rejected. It, therefore, follows that the Act is intra Vires the Constitution and Civil Appeals Nos. 333,334 and 335 of 1955 as also Petitions Nos. 203, 182 and 65 of 1956 must be dismissed. There will, however, be one set of costs payable by the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 333 to 335 of 1955 to the respondents therein So far as Petitions Nos. 203 of 1956, 182 of 1956 and 65 of 1956 are concerned, each party will bear and Pay its respective costs thereof. Appeals and Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (1) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n that section whose default attracts the penal consequences takes in partners jointly liable for the assessment. Nor can we accept the argument that the Act has not prescribed a machinery for imposing penalty on and for collecting the same from the erstwhile partners of a discontinued firm. As we have pointed out, the words in the last limb of section 44 making applicable all the provisions of Chapter IV attract those of section 28. The words " so far as may be " in the clause of section 44 far from supporting the assessee's contention permits the application of section 28 to the extent applicable to a given situation. We, therefore, hold that section 28 is attracted to the assessment made under section 44. In this view the Income-tax Officer has jurisdiction to proceed against the partners for collecting the share of the penalty imposed on the firm. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Appeal dismissed.
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1957 (1) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
Vires of s. 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 (Assam Act No. 4 of 1948) and of the’ validity of the notification No. Rex. 184/52/39 issued by the Governor of Assam on July 5, 1955, in exercise of powers conferred on him by sub-a. (3) of a. 3 of the said Act appointing the Commissioner of Hills Division and, Appeals as, the appellate authority under the 1948 Act questioned
Held that:- It cannot possibly be argued that the old 1946 Act tribunal, notwithstanding its abolition, continued to exist for the purpose of the 1948 Act, for subs. (2) of s. 7 quite clearly authorised the High Court and the Authority referred to in s. 3(3) but not the 1946 Act Tribunal to decide the appeals and applications for revision, which were pending before the old Assam Revenue Tribunal.
It is clear that the tribunal was to sit in appeal over the decision of the Excise Commissioner and that by itself gives some indication that the person or persons to be appointed to the tribunal should have the requisite capacity and competency to deal with appeals from such high officials. We do not consider that there has been an excessive delegation of legislative power.
The possibility of an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of a Division coming up before the authority referred to in s. 3 (3) cannot in our opinion affect the validity of the Notification whereby the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals was appointed as the authority contemplated by s. 3 (3). At the highest it may be that the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals exercising the powers of the authority referred to under s. 3 (3) may be disqualified from entertaining appeals from his own order, but that does not affect his power to entertain appeals from the Excise Commissioner. Even that situation will not arise, for under r. 341 of the Excise Rules appeals arising out of cases decided in the excluded areas by the Commissioner of Hills Division and reseals would go to the Governor. In any event the drop not appear to be any repugnancy between the Notification and the so called principle or policy of a. 9 of the 1910 Act as regards the hearing of appeals from the decisions of the Excise Commissioner. In our opinion there is no substance in this point. Appeal allowed.
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1957 (1) TMI 33 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... earned Judges of the Madras High Court rejected this contention and held that electrical goods covered not only these things but also such articles which could not be used except with the application of electric energy. Learned counsel then said that batteries were not electrical goods inasmuch as they only stored electric energy and did not generate it like a dynamo. Such a distinction is altogether untenable. There is no difference between the electric energy produced by voltaic or galvanic action as in a battery or that generated by a dynamo rotated by mechanical or any other kind of power. A battery is electrical goods, equally as is a dynamo. In our view, there can be no doubt that torch battery cells are electrical goods for the purposes of item No. 30 of the schedule of the rate of tax published on 22nd May, 1950. The third question is answered accordingly. 4.. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. SAMVATSAR, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (1) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 2), the dealer is not bound to allow any inspection of his goods or accounts or registers on a holiday in view of the significant phrase at all reasonable times contained in section 14(2). But in the present case the inspection has been made at a reasonable time, viz., during the lunch hour when the proprietor would be free to attend to the requirements of the inspecting officer as contradistinguished with the peak hours in the rice mill when the proprietor would be otherwise busy and would (sic) be able to attend to the inspecting officer without detriment to the working of the rice mill. Therefore, the decision cited above has no application whatsoever to this case. The convictions are therefore correct. In view of the contritions felt by the accused then and there and the apologies tendered to the officer instantaneously, the fines of Rs. 500 and Rs. 100 seem to be excessive. The fine amounts are halved and the excess amounts collected will be refunded. Sentence modified.
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1957 (1) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... duced an inequality which is actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary. Adapting these observations to the case before us we would hold that the inequality produced is not palpable, the favoured class 1. 68 L.Ed. 690 at 695. 2. 261 U.S. 379. of non-licensees being so few as to be considered negligible if not non-existent. Further as the decision in Syed Mohamed s case 1952 3 S.T.C. 367. which held rule 16(5) to be ultra vires of the rule-making power was rendered only on 29th August, 1952, it is possible that most if not all the unlicensed dealers or at least such of those whose turnover was above the taxable limit during 1951-52, which these petitions are concerned with, was dealt with under rule 16(5) and taxed on their sales. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the tax imposition is therefore rejected. No other point having been raised in these revisions for our consideration, the Tax Revision Cases fail and are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1957 (1) TMI 30 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bour which goes into its manufacture. 6.. We are satisfied, therefore, that the process indulged in to shape stones into metal is a manufacturing process and therefore the assessee was within the definition (i) of section 2 of the Act. We only pause to say that the position has now been cleared by the introduction of the definition of the word manufacture . But, as we have already stated above, the definition does no more than bring out the essential meaning of the word manufacture as used in the Act. 7.. That there are sales is quite clear from the discussion in paragraph 2 of the order of the President dated 26th March, 1955. We see no reason to differ nor anything to add to what the learned President has observed. 8.. Our answers to both the questions are thus in the affirmative. A copy of this opinion shall be sent to the Tribunal concerned as provided in the Act. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order about costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1957 (1) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of the Sales Tax Act, the tax upon them became obnoxious to the provisions of Article 286(2), and, therefore, they would have been exempt from tax. The Ordinance, therefore, applies to such sales, and the tax liability arising thereon, and after the Ordinance, the exemption based upon Article 286(2) would no longer be applicable. The conditions of the Ordinance are therefore fully satisfied. With great respect we cannot agree with the aforesaid observations. The reasoning of the learned Judges was based upon the assumption that the Explanation added to section 22 could be read as an Explanation to the definition of sale. We regret our inability to share the same opinion. In the result, as the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act is not applicable, the respondent must be deemed to be the first dealer in this State and is, therefore, liable to tax. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the respondent will pay the costs of the petitioner. Advocate s fee Rs. 50. Order set aside.
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1957 (1) TMI 28 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in their basic or essential properties. The decisions in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Wasudeo 1955 6 S.T.C. 30. and The State of Bihar v. Chrestien Mica Industries Ltd. 1956 7 S.T.C. 626. do not take any different view. On a consideration of the relevant sections of the Act and the meaning of the word manufacture , I have no doubt that the assessee who is engaged in the work of printing and dyeing textiles purchased by him and in the business of selling or supplying the printed and dyed material, is a manufacturer within the meaning of the definition given in section 2(k). In my opinion, the Sales Tax Authorities were right in holding the assessee liable to pay sales tax on sale transactions of cloth printed and dyed by him and sold by him. I would, therefore, answer the first two questions in the negative and the third question in the affirmative. 5.. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. SAMVATSAR, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (1) TMI 27 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aid in that year under rule 13. 10.. The petitioner s net turnover exceeded Rs. 20,000 and the firm could have adopted the method of assessment prescribed in sub-rules (2) to (5) in lieu of the method described in rules 10 to 15 provided the firm had complied with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of rule 17. The firm had not done so and in view of that the mere fact that the firm had filed some monthly returns-the return in respect of December, 1951, on 4th February, 1952, in respect of January, 1952, on 7th March, 1952, in respect of February, 1952, on 8th April, 1952, and in respect of March, 1952, on 14th May, 1952-should be considered as not sufficient to enable the firm to be assessed according to the method described in sub-rules (2) to (5) of rule 17. 11.. Such being my conclusions on the three contentions raised before me, this petition should be dismissed and is hereby dismissed though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1957 (1) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the sale of the motor car was a part of the business activity of the assessees. It is true that they have found that the motor car was a part of the assets of the assessees but a transaction of sale of a part of the assets is not necessarily a part of the business of the assessees. In order to regard a transaction a part of a business, the test of volume and the degree of frequency of similar transactions must be fulfilled and the fact that there has been a casual sale of a single item of the assets of the assessee does not make the sale a part of the business of the assessee. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal were in error in holding that the assessees were liable to pay sales tax on the sale of the motor car in question. We accordingly answer the question referred to us by the Sales Tax Tribunal in the negative. The State to pay the costs of this reference. The deposit of Rs. 100 made by the assessees to be refunded. Reference answered in the negative.
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1957 (1) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... paid by such dealer in excess of the amount lawfully due by him under the Act. But having regard to the fact that the Legislature has not conferred a right of review upon the Collector we are of the view that refund can only be awarded consistently with the order of assessment already made. The Sales Tax Tribunal have raised four questions which we have already set out, but we do not think that the questions have been correctly framed. In our view, only one question falls to be determined on the judgment of the Sales Tax Tribunal and that questions is, whether an application for refund of sales tax paid under an order of assessment can be entertained by the Sales Tax Officer on the plea that the order was made on an erroneous view of the law, without having the order set aside in proper proceedings by way of appeal or revision. In our view, the answer is in the negative. The assessees will pay the costs of this hearing to the State of Bombay. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (1) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under that section is one who has escaped assessment or has been under-assessed or assessed at a lower rate, but the wording seems to imply that there has been a return made by the assessee. The five years period is provided for where the Collector has reason to believe that a dealer has concealed the particulars of sales or supplies or deliberately furnished incorrect returns, while the three years period seems to have been provided in cases where there has been no concealment or deliberate furnishing of incorrect returns. In our opinion, therefore, section 11A of the Sales Tax Act would be inapplicable to the case of the assessee. In that view of the matter, we must answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative and the answer to the second question would be that sub-section (5) of section 11 of the Sales Tax Act would be the proper provision to be applied in this case. The assessee will have to pay the costs of the respondent. Reference answered accordingly.
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1957 (1) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... absolute and there will issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the assessment orders dated 11th May, 1954, and 24th November, 1954, mentioned in the petition as also the Certificate No. 152 S.T. (B.D.) 53-54 mentioned in the petition. There will be issued a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to either the said assessment orders or the said certificate or to continue any further certificate proceedings in respect thereof. The respondents are directed to deal with the assessment of the petitioner for the Bengali years 1357-58 in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. In this matter the respondents ask for a certificate in terms of Article 132 of the Constitution to the effect that it involves substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution so that they may file an appeal direct to the Supreme Court. The petitioner does not object. I give the necessary certificate. Rule made absolute.
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1957 (1) TMI 22 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uestion of limitation involved in this case. We accordingly answer all the three questions formulated by the Board of Revenue in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 411 of 1952 against the petitioner and in favour of the Sales Tax Department. In Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 412 of 1952 the sole question is whether the assessment of sales tax upon the petitioner under section 13(5) of the 1947 Act is legal and valid. We have already dealt with the argument of the petitioner on this point in considering the same question referred in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 411 of 1952. For the reasons already given we hold that the assessment of sales tax upon the petitioner is legal and valid also for the period form the 1st of April, 1947, to the 31st of March, 1948, and this question must also be answered against the petitioner and in favour of the State of Bihar. The petitioner must pay the costs of these references. Hearing fee Rs. 100 in each case. References answered accordingly.
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