|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 35 of 35 Records
-
1960 (5) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... emove elementary and obvious ambiguities in voluntary statements, under No. (7) of the Judges' Rules but the prohibition should cover all persons who, although not in custody, have been charged and are out on bail while awaiting trial." This is a matter for the legislature to consider. In view of what I have said above and the reasons given by Shah, J., I agree that the appeal be allowed, as proposed by him. BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and s. 162, sub-s. (2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as "that section relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act", are intra vires and do not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. The order of the High Court acquitting the respondent is also set aside and the order of the Court of Sessions convicting the accused (respondent) under s. 302 of the Indian Penal ("ode and sentencing him to death is restored. Appeal allowed.
-
1960 (5) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955, (Madras Act 32 of 1955) questioned
Held that:- We declare that Madras Act 32 of 1955 is void and ultra vires the Constitution and issue a writ of mandamus restraining the State of Kerala from enforcing the provisions of the said Act against the petitioner and his sthanams. In the result, Petition No. 443 of 1955 is allowed with costs; Petition No. 40 of 1956 is allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs ; and Petition No. 41 of 1956 is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
-
1960 (5) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an insurer will also include a person who was an insurer but has closed his business?
Whether the insurer admits them or not and whether a decree has been finally passed in respect of them or not?
Whether the Company is entitled to take into account the security deposit under s. 7 in order to show that the liabilities have been otherwise provided for?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. When s. 2D speaks of satisfaction or " provision otherwise " for the liabilities of insurance business which is closed it contemplates such satisfaction or " provision otherwise" over and above the deposit made under s. 7. It is not in dispute in this case that there are some liabilities still pending; it is also not in dispute that they are not satisfied and no provision has been made otherwise for them irrespective of the security deposit. This also appears to have been the position when the order was made in July, 1957. In the circumstances the order is good and cannot be called in question by the Company.
-
1960 (5) TMI 24 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... made of imitation gold set with imitation stones. Though there might have been some doubt prior to the issue of the aforesaid notification, as to whether an ornament made of imitation gold and set with imitation stones was jewellery or not, that doubt was set at rest by the aforesaid notification. In the present case, it is admitted that the ornaments were made of pure gold though set with imitation stones. That would bring them within the dictionary meaning of the expression jewellery . Moreover, it appears that the notification was issued only by way of clarification and was not meant to enlarge the meaning of the expressions ornaments and jewellery occurring in the earlier notifications. 5.. I would therefore answer the question referred to this Court by the Tribunal in the affirmative, and further add that the value of the imitation stones set in the jewellery is wholly immaterial. There will be no order for costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1960 (5) TMI 23 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nt is untenable in view of the express provision in rule 70. It is the look-out of the petitioner to appear personally or through a counsel on the date actually fixed for delivery of judgment or on any other date to which it was adjourned. The mere fact that by virtue of rule 73 he was entitled to a free copy of the order without even applying for the same would not save limitation. Section 24(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act expressly says that the period of thirty days shall count from the date of refusal by the Tribunal, and the date of refusal in this case must be the date on which the petitioner would have known of the order if he had appeared before the Tribunal. 9.. For these reasons it must be held that this application is timebarred and we have no power to condone the delay. The preliminary objection raised by Mr. G.K. Misra is accordingly upheld. The petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances there will be no order for costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
-
1960 (5) TMI 22 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... reight or delivery or cost of installation when separately charged is to be excluded from the sale price . No authority has been cited before us to show that in spite of the express words used in the section the freight and the other things would be inclusive of the sale price when they are separately charged. Admittedly the petitioner had charged separately the railway freight on the vehicles as also the forwarding charges and incidental charges. The learned standing counsel on behalf of the Sales Tax Authorities did not seriously oppose this application. Thus we are of opinion that the sale price does not include the cost of freight or delivery or the cost of installation when such cost is separately charged. Accordingly we must answer the question in the affirmative. The petition is allowed, but there would be no order for costs. The petitioner is entitled to get back the sum of Rs. 100 in deposit with the Sales Tax Authorities. NARASIMHAM, C.J.-I agree. Petition allowed.
-
1960 (5) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... scription that the amount of the receipts of prescriptions may represent and include also the amount of consultation charges. But that is a matter entirely in the region of speculation. If it is shown that the receipts from the prescriptions would include an amount of consultation fees charged by Dr. Desai, that certainly cannot constitute a sale of goods within the meaning of section 2(8), but in the absence of any material one can only conclude, so far as this case is concerned, that the amount of the receipts represented by the prescriptions cannot be other than the sale of goods for the purpose of section 8. This being our view on the materials of the record of this case, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mehta that the receipts of Rs. 6,998-8-0 are not taxable in the hands of the applicants. In view of this conclusion, the order which is sought to be revised is clearly right. The application must, therefore, fail and will be dismissed. Application dismissed.
-
1960 (5) TMI 20 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... eclaration required by the rule should be filed before the sales tax authorities at the time of the assessment. There is no question of any such declaration being in existence on the date of the actual transaction between the selling dealer and the purchasing dealer. Moreover it may be noted that the words used in the proviso are, has not been renewed for the year during which purchase is made . So long as the renewal takes place for the year in question proviso has no application irrespective of the actual date of 7.. There is thus no provision either in the Sales Tax Act or in Sales Tax Rules to compel this Court to take the view that the actual date on which the order of renewal of registration was passed by the sales tax authorities would be the relevant date for the purpose of claiming exemption under section 5(2)(a)(ii). The reference must therefore be answered in the affirmative. There will be no order for costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1960 (5) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... d that relief by way of rectification of the register of members is available to the company on the facts of this case, as, according to the company, the register as it stands at present requires no rectification at the instance of the company. The names of respondents Nos. 1 to 6 are borne on the register of members and they already figure as shareholders. It is rather for them to seek rectification by omission of their names but they have not made any such application, and have merely contented themselves by opposing this application. Under these circumstances there is no occasion for this court to order rectification of the register, not having been moved by any aggrieved persons. Though evidence has been recorded in this case I do not consider it proper to give any findings on the issues raised on merits as the matter can be effectively determined on the question of the competency of the petition. The petition is therefore dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
-
1960 (5) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... also of the opinion both that some other remedy is available to the petitioners and that they are acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing that other remedy. According to Buckley on the Companies Acts, 12th edition, page 478, the principal effect of the sub-section will be in deadlock cases. Substantially the two provisions are the same. It does not appear to me, however, that on the facts of this case an application under section 398 of the Indian Companies Act would be of much use to the petitioner. I am not satisfied that the petitioner is acting unreasonably in seeking the winding up order. Continued existence of the company with its present board of directors can only benefit the group of shareholders who are interested in the Goenka concerns. Shareholders qua shareholders will derive no benefit therefrom. It is, therefore, just and equitable that the company should be wound up. There will, therefore, be the usual winding up order.
-
1960 (5) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to assess the assessee firm under the Business Profits Tax Act by issue of a notice under section 11(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act on January 12,1953, in respect of the chargeable accounting period November 13, 1947, to October 31, 1948, without having recourse to section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act ?
Whether the business profits tax assessment could be considered to have been validly made ?
Held that:- In view of the construction we have placed on section 14 of the Act on the words "profits escaping assessment" that they apply to assessments where notice has been given and has resulted in no assessment and where due to inadvertence, oversight or other circumstances no notice was given, it is difficult to interpret section 11 in the manner contended for by the appellant.
In our opinion the assessment which was sought to be made was without jurisdiction and the appeal must therefore fail.
-
1960 (5) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether additional income-tax has been legally charged under clause (ii) of the proviso to paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951, as applied to the assessment year 1953-54, by the Indian Finance Act, 1953, read with section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- Even if one considers the dividends as having come out of the profits of preceding years, they do not become the income of the relevant previous year, and unless the Finance Act expressly laid down that it should be taxed as part of the total income, the purpose is not achieved. Indeed, the Finance Act continues to say that the tax shall be on the total income, as defined in the Indian Income-tax Act and as determined under that Act. It is impossible to say that the additional income-tax was properly laid upon the total income, because what was actually taxed was never a part of the total income of the previous year.
The High Court was right in answering the question, which it had framed, in the negative. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (5) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was any excess dividend declared by the assessee company ?
Whether the assessee company is liable to pay additional income-tax in respect of the excess dividend paid by the assessee company ?
Held that:- The income-tax law seeks to put in the net certain class of income, and can only successfully do so, if it frames a provision appropriate to that end. If the law fails and the taxpayer cannot be brought within its letter, no question of unjustness, as such, arises. The answers given by the High Court to the two questions, i.e. first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative were correct in the circumstances of the case. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (5) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee company was liable to pay additional income-tax ? and
Whether the levy of the additional income-tax is ultra vires ?
Held that:- Agree with the High Court in the answer given to the first question in the negative. As pointed out by the High Court, the second question does not survive after the first question is answered against the Department. Appeal dismissed.
-
1960 (5) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the managing agency commission @ 3 1/2 on sales made by the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd., between April 1, 1944, and December 31, 1944, accrued to Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani, or to the assessee ?
Held that:- View of the managing agency agreement of March 15, 1925, concludes the appeal. If the remuneration accrued at the end of the financial year, then undoubtedly it accrued in the hands of the assessee company.
On the view which we have taken of the relevant clauses of the managing agency agreement, no income arose or accrued on the sale proceeds at the time of each transaction of sale the income accrued at the end of the financial year at the rate of 3 1/2 per cent. on the gross proceeds of all sales of yam, cloth, waste etc. earned in any one year. In that view of the matter, the High Court correctly answered the question. Appeal dismissed.
|
