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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 93 Records
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1962 (2) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n contending that the work carried on by the firm is industry under s. 2(j). The work of a solicitor is, in a loose sense, of course, of business, and so if the solicitors entered into an agreement in restraint of trade, its validity would have to be judged on the basis that their work in the nature of business. That, however, is hardly relevant in determining the question as to whether the said work is an industry under section 2(j); as we have already made it clear, the definition of the word ,'industry" is couched in words of very wide denotation. But that precisely is the reason ,why a line has to be drawn in a just and fair manner to demarcate the limitations of their scope and that necessarily leads to the adoption of some working test. Therefore, in our opinion, the argument that the respondents themselves have called their work as "business" is of no assistance. The result is, the appeal fails; there would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o guarantee. Even if treated as an offer by Anirudhan to the Bank, the Batik accepted the amended offer and Sankaran must be deemed to have had the authority to reduce the amount, though not to increase it. The document was altered while in the possession of the very person who, as the agent of Anirudhan, brought it to the Bank on both the occasions. Anirudhan must be deemed to have held out Sarikaran as his agent for this purpose and this creates an estoppel against Anirudhan, because the Bank believed that Sankaran had the authority. The offer thus remains in its amended form an offer of Anirudhan to the Bank and the Bank by accepting it turned it into a contract of guarantee which was backed by the past consideration on which the offer of Anirudhan was originally based. In my opinion, the appeal must fail. I would, therefore, dismiss it. By COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 94 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ointed out we must so by the actual facts of the case and not the courses which might have been open to an assessee. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Meyer to the following observations of Lord Greene M.R. in Henriksen (Inspector of Taxes) v. Grafton Hotel Ltd. 1942 2 K.B. 184, 193; 1942 24 Tax Cas. 453 "It frequently happens in income-tax cases that the same result in a business sense can be secured by two different legal transactions, one of which may attract tax and the other not. This is no justification for saying that a taxpayer who has adopted a method which attracts tax is to be treated as though he had Chosen the method which does not, or vice versa." With respect, the same can be said here. We, accordingly, hold that the assessee's contention cannot be accepted and the question referred to us must be answered in the negative. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel. RAY J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (2) TMI 93 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been spread over the entire property including the portions let out and out of the balance the value of 5/6th portion used for the assessee's business should be computed. The Tribunal pointed out that in applying the third proviso to section 12B(2) mentioned above no differentiations was made between the portions let out to tenants and the portion which was in the occupation of the assessee for the purpose of his business and that depreciation was allowable only on the portion which was used for the business purpose. This depreciation could clearly not be allowed in respect of the tenanted portion because section 9 of the Act does not contain any provision for allowances on depreciation. The third question must be answered against the assessee. In view of the fact that the determination of the first question in favour of the assessee makes the answers to question Nos. 2 and 3 redundant the assessee must have the cost of this reference. RAY J.--I agree. Order accordingly.
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1962 (2) TMI 92 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... gines. I have given my reasons for distinguishing this case from Evans Medical Supplies 1961 1 W.L.R. 897. If the licensing fees are not capital receipts on the basis of the decision in Evans Medical Supplies 1961 1 W.L.R. 897, I do not see any other conclusion than that they are trading receipts. The matter can be expressed in different ways. I prefer to base my conclusion upon the view that the licensing agreements were a development of the general trade carried on by the appellants. The royalties are admittedly included among the appellants' profits of the trade as manufacturers of aero engines. These could not have been earned so easily without the licensing which enabled the foreign governments to manufacture the aero engines. It was an integral trading activity and the licensing agreements were incidental to the manufacture of aero engines. I would dismiss the appeals. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors Claremont, Haynes & Co.; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1962 (2) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e other and appropriate proceedings to vindicate his rights. Before concluding, it has to be noted that in Writ Petition No. 148 of 1961 there, are as many as 72 Petitioners. some of whom are stated not to belong to the category of CisSutlej jagirdars. Their joinder is clearly improper. 'It is also said that three of them, Petitioners Nos. 66, 68 and 69, had filed Writ Petitions under Art. 226 of the Constituation in the Punjab High Court, raising the same contentions as in the present, that the said petitions had been dismissed on the merits, and no appeal had been preferred against the Orders of dismissal, and in consequence, the concerned petitioners cannot, on the decisions of this Court, maintain this petition. But as we are dismissing these petitions on the merits, no further notice need be taken of these points. In the result, the petitions are dismissed with costs, one hearing fee, and the appeals are dismissed with costs one set. Petitions and appeals dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as the medium of instruction at the university level, but other universities are following a more cautious policy. It is for the university to decide its own course. If the statute has conferred the power, as I have said it has, these considerations are of no avail. It is not disputed that if the University has the power to prescribe an exclusive medium of instruction under a statute, s. 38A of the Act which is a consequential provision would be valid. For the aforesaid reasons I hold that the University was well within its rights in prescribing, by statutes, the said two languages as media of instruction to replace English by stages. In the result the order of the High Court is set aside and the appeals are allowed with costs of the appellants here and in the High Court. BY COURT In accordance with the view of the majority, both the appeals stand dismissed in the manner indicated in the majority judgment, with costs. There will be one set of hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 89 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o be received was rejected by the income-tax authorities, they were entitled to treat the credits as business receipts chargeable to tax. The following observation of Venkatarama Aiyar J., who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court, relied on by Mr. Meyer, appears at page 424 "When an amount is credited in business books, it is not an unreasonable inference to draw that it is a receipt from business." It must be added that their Lordships did riot think it necessary to pursue the matter further as this was not one of the questions referred under section 66(2). However that way be, the observation is there, and no reason has been shown as to why we should not accept the above dictum. In my opinion the answer to the question should be against the assessee and the finding that the amount of ₹ 131,957 was business income from some undisclosed activities is not unwarranted. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. RAY J.--I agree. Order accordingly.
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1962 (2) TMI 88 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der section 34 on 12th April, 1954, the date of the above letter, and even so there is valid service as required by law; but the point urged is that, since the assessee refers to the notice under section 34 in his letter, it must be presumed that the notice has been served before the relevant date, viz., March 31, 1954. We are unable to accept this contention. It is for the department to establish that there has been a service of notice on the assessee before then relevant date. Their attempt to prove such service on March 29, 1954, as we have held above, has failed. It is not possible to presume that in view of the letter of the assessee dated 12th April, 1954, he had received notice on or before March 31, 1954. On the basis of the conclusions reached above, we answer both parts of question No. 2 referred to us in the negative and in favor of the assessee. The assessee will have his costs and we fix counsel's fee at ₹ 150. Questions No. 2 answered in the negative.
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1962 (2) TMI 87 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... een effected. That is the first thing. The finding that these stocks or shares had been purchased with that object seems to me to be a finding, which in order to justify the conclusions of the Commissioners, must have been followed by a further finding that at some time, in some manner, by some operation or other, the object had been reversed and the intention fundamentally altered." It seems to us that the above observation of Vaisey J. which we respectfully adopt are apposite and can govern our decision in this case. It follows that the sale of shares of Rajapalayam Mills Ltd. and Venkatesa Mills Ltd. constitutes only realisation of capital assets of the assessee and does not amount to conversion of the assessee's stock-intrade. Question No. 1 is answered in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 does not arise for consideration. As the assessee has succeeded it will get its costs from the department. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (2) TMI 86 - ASSAM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t ₹ 200. Civil Rule No. 16 of 1961. A petition has also been filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The main ground taken in this petition is that the notice under section 34 of the Income-tax Act was not properly served and, as such, the foundation for the issue of the notice was not properly laid and the entire proceedings arising out of the notice under section 34 are invalid and must be quashed. As we have already decided in the reference before us that the proceedings were not properly initiated, it is not necessary to deal with this petition at all. This petition was filed as the petitioner thought that the question of proper service of notice on the assessee could not be argued in the reference. As we have already answered the reference in favour of the assessee, it is not necessary to deal with the points raised in this petition and it is accordingly rejected, but with no orders as to costs. S.K. DUTTA J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (2) TMI 85 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as distinctly observed that in the case of hiring it is the lessor who is entitled to claim depreciation allowance and the lessee would be excluded from so doing. Here the assessee was not the owner of the bus in the material year. The circular, which the learned counsel for the assessee prayed in aid of his argument, is only with regard to the method of calculation of the depreciation allowance. It does not lay down contrary to the provisions of clause (vi) that a hirer, who is not the owner of an asset, shall be entitled to the allowance. Even if it had done that, that would not have affected the construction of the clause. The directions issued by the department for the guidance of its officials cannot control or affect the meaning or construction of the provisions of the Act. For these reasons our answer to the question is in the negative. The department shall have the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 150. Questions answered in the negative.
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1962 (2) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be true and to act upon-such belief. Therefore before Mrs. Bose can be estopped from pleading that Mrs. Mitter was not the owner of the entire property it must be shown that by her showing the house as the property of Mrs. Mitter in her application for letters of administration she intentionally caused or permitted the appellant to believe that thing to be true and to act on that belief It is obvious that the "appellant cannot be said to have acted in her turn with respect to this house simply because Mrs. Bose said in her application for letters of administration that the house belonged to Mrs. Mitter. It appears that after the death of Mrs. Mitter the three sisters put forward three separate. wills each in her favour and there was no question of one sister acting on any representation made by another. We are therefore of opinion that no question of estoppel arises in this case. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 83 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he sums expended for replanting would not be affect the nature of the receipt itself. A somewhat close parallel on facts is found in the decision in Higgs v. Inspector of Taxes 1944 26 Tax Cas. 73. . There the assessee, the owner of agricultural land, was granted a ploughing grant under a statute, dependant upon the extent of pasture land which he brought under the plough. The contention that it was a capital receipt was repelled, relying on the provisions of the statute, which in their essence are no different from the Ordinance in the present case. We are accordingly of the opinion that the circumstances surrounding payment of these amounts clearly establish them to be of a revenue nature and were rightly treated by the department as income assessable to tax. The questions are answered against the assessees. The assessee will pay the costs of the department in Tax Case No. 115 of 1959. Counsels fee ₹ 250. There will be no order as to costs in Tax Case No. 36 of 1959.
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1962 (2) TMI 82 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he family account books does not depict the true picture and that the entries therein are merely fictitious entries brought about to show an inflated value of alleged purchases. This is a finding of fact which we must accept and we must observe there are enough materials to support this finding. Necessarily and inevitably, the officer had to estimate the income of the family business arising out of the import of arecanuts from Colombo through Muthumaniratnam. It is only in this connection that the gross profit rates between the business in the name of Nagarajan and the other two businesses were compared by the officer. We are unable to say that there has been any wrong approach on the part of the department in making the addition or that the addition of ₹ 10,000 is, in any way, arbitrary or capricious. Both the questions are answered in the affirmative and against the assessee who will pay the costs of the department, ₹ 250. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (2) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng information which comes to them in the course of the performance of the duties of their office, to others. The information having been obtained by them in the course of their duties by virtue of their official position, rules or provisions of the law prescribing the circumstances in which alone such information might be given out or used do not infringe the right of freedom of speech as is guaranteed by the Constitution. We would therefore allow the appeal in part and grant the appellants a declaration that r. 4A in the form in which it now stands prohibiting "any form of demonstrations is violative of the appellants' rights under Art. 19(1)(a) and (b) and should therefore be stuck down. It is only necessary to add that the rule, in so far as it prohibits a strike, cannot be struck (own since there is no fundamental right to resort to a strike. As the appellants have succeeded only in part, there will be no order as to costs in the appeal. Appeal allowed in part.
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1962 (2) TMI 80 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts claimed was accepted as correct, whereas, in the case of these two amounts. The findings is that these payments were not at all genuine. Consequently, both these questions are answered in the negative against the assessee. In view of the fact that the question originally referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to this court under section 66(1) of the Act is being answered in favour of the assessee and in view of the fact that the amounts covered by questions Nos. 3 and 4 are very small as comported with the amounts covered by questions Nos. 1 and 2 we consider that it would be fair in this case to allow the assessee costs of these references. We consequently, direct that the assessee shall be entitled to the costs of these references from the department which we fix at ₹ 300 representing fee of learned counsel for the assessee. The same amount shall be treated as fee of learned counsel for the department for purposes of taxation. Question answered accordingly.
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1962 (2) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t when they filed false returns or produced false accounts and in fact they were rendering. themselves liable to punishment under the provisions of s. 24 of the Act. It observed as follows - "The test whether an act is done or intended to be done under a certain law might well be whether the person who committed it can, if challenged, reasonably justify his act under any provision contained in that law". This opinion is, in our view, not sustainable. When the appellants submitted their returns they did so under s. 10 of the Act and when they produced their accounts they did so under s. 15 of the Act. Therefore both the making of the returns and production of the accounts were done under the Act and cannot be said to be outside the provisions of the Act. In our opinion the High Court was in error in rejecting the Reference. The appeals are therefore allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside aid the proceedings in the trial court are quashed. Appeals allowed.
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1962 (2) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... all deal with the under charges or overcharges, as the case may be, on the same principles as apply to undercharges and overcharges in regard to Railway freight charges." It is suggested that, under this rule in the case of an undercharge, the Railway Administration can collect the deficit either from the consignor on consignee. The rule does not say that if the consignee does not pay the consignor is,, liable to pay. The rule does not purport to enlarge the statutory liability of the consignor of the consignee, as the case may be and, therefore, it must be understood to provide only for the recovery of undercharges from persons statutorily' liable to pay in accordance with the principles governing the railway freight charges ca. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 183 of 1959 is dismissed with costs of the first respondent, and Civil Appeal No. 184 of 1959 is allowed with costs to be paid by the first respondent. C. A. 183 of 1959 dismissed. C. A. 184 of 1.959 allowed.
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1962 (2) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in our. view has happened in this case, the exercise of the power becomes bad. The difficulty, if any, in deciding what is a rule of evidence, cannot make a power to frame rules of evidence vague or too wide. For the disposal of the present petitions in the view that we have taken however, it is necessary that the question whether the petitioners have acquired foreign nationality should be considered and determined by the Central Government in accordance with law. We would therefore direct the Central Government to decide the question whether the petitioners have voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan after the 26th January, 1950, in accordance with law, leaving out of account r.3 of Sch. III of,’ the Citizenship Rules, 1956, and on receipt of the result to the enquiry we would proceed with the further hearing of these petitions. By COURT. In accordance with the decision of the majority, the petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no Order as to costs.
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