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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 93 of 93 Records
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1962 (2) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB
Winding up - Liability as contributories of present and post members ... ... ... ... ..... aid calls made before or after the winding up. Such calls can be recovered even if barred by limitation when the winding up order was made. In this view of the matter, the bar of limitation cannot be pleaded successfully. A shareholder who has failed to pay for shares allotted to him can, in the event of the company going into liquidation, be placed upon the list of contributories, and the liquidator can make a call upon him for what is due irrespective of any question of limitation. The issue as to limitation is, therefore, decided against the respondents. The result, therefore, is that the following respondents are settled on the list of contributories for amounts noted against each Rs. 1.Mangal Singh 7,000 2.Ram Rup Sharma 31,400 3.Smt. Sharbati Devi 33,340 4.S. Sardul Singh 39,640 5.Kartar Singh 29,400 6.Malik Hans Raj 37,800 7.Prem Singh 37.800 8.Kishan Singh Caveeshar 37,980 9. Maya Devi 37,980 10. Manpbool Singh Sharma 38,700 11. Parkash Wati alias Parbha Watt. 14,040
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1962 (2) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in an appeal filed by an assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can find a new source of income not considered by the Income-tax Officer and assess it under his powers granted by section 31 of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- In view of the provisions of sections 34 and 33B by which escaped income can be brought to tax, there is reason to think that the view expressed uniformly about the limits of the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to enhance the assessment has been accepted by the legislature as the true exposition of the words of the section. If it were not, one would expect that the legislature would have amended section 31 and specified the other intention in express words. The Income-tax Act was amended several times in the last 37 years, but no amendment of section 31(3) was undertaken to nullify the rulings, to which we have referred. In view of this, we do not think that we should interpret section 31 differently from what has been accepted in India as its true import, particularly as that view is also reasonably possible.Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee, namely, the Hindu undivided family, who is a partner in the partnership business of Hiralal Gulzarilal, is entitled to a deduction of ₹ 3,850 from the assessment of income-tax for the relevant year under section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- If the junior members of the coparcenary were serving the partnership, they were serving an entity, which was separate and distinct from the Hindu undivided family. If the coparcenary had no place in the partnership, any service to the partnership cannot be described as service to the Hindu undivided family, sufficient to attract the application of section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, because it cannot be said to be wholly and exclusively for the Hindu undivided family. The answer to the question was rightly stated by the High Court in the negative. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Whether High Court correct for granting certificates of fitness under article 133(1)(c)of the Constitution?
Held that:- the appeals have to be dismissed on a short ground which does not involve any consideration of the correctness of the construction adopted by the High Court of section 16(2) of the Income-tax Act.
The only persons who were entitled to be treated as shareholders to whom the provisions of sections 16(2) and 18(5) of the Income-tax Act were attracted were the three partners in whose names the forty shares stood registered, as detailed earlier. An error had therefore been committed by the Income-tax Officer in treating the registered firm as the owner of the shares in respect of the entire number of 40 shares. It was not this initial and fundamental error that was sought to be rectified by the proceedings under section 35 ; but the removal of an anomaly in that error which continued to be affirmed ; in other words the object of the proceedings under section 35 was to carry out to its logical conclusion the error which had been committed in the order of assessment dated October 12, 1955, passed after invoking the provisions of section 34. We consider the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction under section 35 to rectify errors but not to effect merely readjustments so as to avoid illogicalities in an error which is still permitted to continue is well founded. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Appeal By Special Leave, Application For Reference, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... a departure from the well-settled rule that we ordinarily do not in exercise of our jurisdiction under article 136, enter upon a re-appraisal of the evidence on which the order of the court or Tribunal is founded. The legislature has expressly entrusted the power of appraisal of evidence to the taxing authorities, and the decision of those authorities would ordinarily be regarded as final. This is not to say that in a proper case this court may not, in the interest of justice when occasion demands it, review the evidence. The power of this court under article 136 is not restricted but it is only in very exceptional cases that this court enters upon appraisal of evidence in appeals filed with special leave and this case does not disclose any such exceptional circumstances. On this ground the Appeals Nos. 238 and 239 of 1961 filed by the assessees and the Commissioner against the order of the Tribunal must fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the loss of ₹ 5,19,590 of the year 1948-49 is liable to be set off against the assessee's business income for the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52 ?
Whether the unabsorbed depreciation of the years 1948-49 and 1949-50 is liable to be set off against the income of the assessee for the assessment years 1950-51 and 1951-52 ?
Held that:- For determining the nature of the losses under consideration in the present appeals, the relevant year was 1948-49, the year in which the losses occurred and the High Court rightly took the view that for the application of sub-section (2) of section 24, the losses must be such losses as could have been set off under sub-section (1) of section 24. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court that the loss amounting to ₹ 5,19,590 was not such a loss as could have been set off either under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 24. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in law in adding to the total income of the assessee the sum of ₹ 1,45,706 and/or ₹ 48,185 or any part thereof ?
Whether there was any material on record to support the finding that ₹ 1,45,706 and/or ₹ 48,185 or any part thereof represent the income of the assessee ?
Held that:- It was open to the Tribunal in appreciating the evidence to rely upon the statements made by Achaldas and Poonamchand before the Income-tax Officer and to disbelieve the statements made by them before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The jurisdiction of the High Court under section 66 of the Income-tax Act is merely advisory. The High Court does not sit in appeal over the judgment of the income-tax authorities : it is not concerned to decide whether the conclusion of the Tribunal on appreciation of evidence is correct. There was apparently a mass of evidence on which the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal could be founded and the question which fell to be determined by it was purely one of fact. It is true that a finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence or is unreasonable and perverse may be open to challenge on the ground that it is not supported by any material on the record, but, as we have already observed, there was material on which the Income-tax Tribunal could reasonably arrive at the conclusion which it did. The High Court was, therefore, right in recording the answers to the two questions submitted to it. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, the assessee's assessable profit on the sale of shares is the difference between the sale price and the cost price, or the difference between the sale price and the market price prevailing on April 1 1945 ?
Held that:- The approach of the High Court was correct and normally the commercial profits out of the transaction of sale of an article must be the difference between what the article cost the business and what it fetched on sale. So far as the business or trading activity was concerned, the market value of the shares as on April 1, 1945, was what it cost the business. We do not think that there is any question of a notional sale here. The High Court did not create any legal fiction of a sale when it took the market value as on April 1, 1945, as the proper figure for determining the actual profits made by the assessee. That the assessee later sold the shares in pursuance of a trading activity was not in dispute ; that sale was an actual sale and not a notional sale ; that actual sale resulted in some profits. To adopt the language of Lord Radcliffe, the only fair measure of assessing trading profits in such circumstances is to take the market value at one end and the actual sale proceeds at the other, the difference between the two being the profit or loss as the case may be. In a trading or commercial sense this seems to us to accord more with reality than with fiction. The answer given by the High Court to the question of law referred to it was correct. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 5 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Seizure (Customs) - Burden of proof ... ... ... ... ..... s for the requisite of reasonable belief to be engendered by the officer on the question whether the goods are smuggled or not. 7.In the present case the petitioner was clearly trying to evade customs officials when he was caught handing over a packet of diamonds to his friend. If the diamonds were not contraband, there was no reason for Ratilal to have become frightened and to have delivered back the diamonds to the petitioner. The conduct of the petitioner and his friend at the time of the interception by the authorities, the immediate statements made by them were sufficient to warrant and induce a reasonable belief in the minds of the customs officials that the diamonds were smuggled goods. I have no hesitation that Section 178A of the Act was properly invoked. The petitioner singly failed to establish the fact that he pleaded, namely, that he acquired the diamonds through the normal trade channels. 8.The Petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Rule Nisi is discharged.
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1962 (2) TMI 4 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Assessment (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... er makes it plain that the Customs were injuncted and that the appeals were directed to be heard and determined in due course. 21.Accordingly, we allow the appeals and set aside the orders of G.K. Mitter, J. 22.The Customs Authorities will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law on the footing that the assessments have been made in terms of Section 29A of the Sea Customs Act. 23. We direct refund of the deposit made and order discharge of the bond executed by or at the instance of the appellant. This part of the order will however be stayed for period of three months from date. 24.Let two writs of mandamus issue directing the Customs authorities to forbear from giving effect to the three orders complained of being orders dated the 28th January, 1960 and the 6th February, 1960 (in appeal No. 45 of 1960) and order dated the 10th February, 1960 in Appeal No. 46 of 1960. 25.There will be no order as to costs in these two appeals. Assent per H.K. Bose, C.J. . -26. I agree.
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1962 (2) TMI 3 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Natural justice - Evidence - Confessional statement ... ... ... ... ..... according to the learned counsel, will clearly show that there has been a formal accusation as against the petitioner. 59.I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. There has been no accusation, much less a formal accusation, as against the petitioner on 27-1-1960. If at all, that accusation must be considered to have been made only on 13-2-1960, when the Show-cause notice was issued by the Department to the Petitioner, under Rules 9 and 52A of the Central Excise Rules, charging him of having violated those rules. Therefore, in this case it cannot certainly be said that Ext. R2 cannot be put into service by the Department as against the petitioner. There is also no question of violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution coming into the picture. 60.Therefore, the various contentions raised by Mr. M.I. Josesph, learned Counsel for the petitioner, are negative. 61.In the result, the writ petition fails, and is accordingly dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the power of exemption conferred upon the Union Government violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) & (g) of the Constitution on the ground that it is uncontrolled and unguided?
Whether, assuming that the power is not unconstitutional, the exemption granted by the nofications, aforesaid, is in excess of the power granted by Rule 8?
Held that:- There is no substance in either of the two contentions. Rule 8 is as much a part of the Statute as Section 37(2) clause (xvii). It is always open to the State to tax certain classes of goods and not to tax others. The legislature is the best judge to decide as to the incidence of taxation, as also to the amount of tax to be levied in respect of different classes of goods.
The respondent No. 5 has been exempted from payment of excise duty in respect of goods produced by the weavers. It has not been exempted from the payment of a personal tax, like income-tax. The exemption must, therefore, have reference to the same kind of tax which would otherwise have been leviable but for the exemption. From the notifications set out above, it is manifest that the Government has exempted cotton fabrics produced on powerlooms owned by a co-operative society, and in the present instance owned by the members of the Co-operative Society. It has not been contended before us that the conditions laid down for granting the exemption have not been fulfilled by the members of the Co-operative Society, the respondent No. 5. Hence, the exemption granted is within the terms of the notifications aforesaid, which have effect as if enacted as a part of the Statute. The vires of the Statute as already indicated, has not been questioned. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (2) TMI 1 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Whether interim dividend, credited in the accounts of the shareholders of the company, was a distribution of dividend as contemplated by the Finance Act of 1956
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