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Showing 21 to 40 of 68 Records
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1964 (11) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sence could have been treated as leave without pay the workmen might even have been warned and fined. It is impossible to think that any other reasonable employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire permanent staff in this manner. Assuming for a moment, that three (1) 1961 1 L.L.J. 511. (2) 1960 2 L.L.J. 56. (3) 1959 11 L.L. J. 666. (4) 1960 11 L.L. J. 222. Sup.165 -7 workmen were warned and taken back, the employer knew very well that they could not join in view of the intervention of the Union. On the whole, therefore, though we emphasis again that a Tribunal should not interfere with the kind or severity of punishment except in very extraordinary circumstances, we think that interference was justified in this case because the punishment was not only severe and out of proportion to the fault, but one which, in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... held as a hard and fast rule that a. sentence is not to exceed a certain period of imprisonment when the law has itself laid down the extent up to which a sentence can be inflicted for a certain offence and has left discretion to the Court to adjust the sentence according to the circumstances of each case. We need not detail the circumstances of these cases, but would simply note that they do not justify taking any lenient view about the sentences for the offences committed by the appellant who held a very responsible position as Sarpanch of the Societies and as such had to deal with the proper disbursement of public money for the purposes of public benefit. He miserably failed in discharging these duties in the manner expected of him. A deterrent sentence is always essential so that others in such responsible Positions and having occasions to deal with large sums of public money do not victim to greed and dishonesty. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals. Appeals dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 102 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... time when he decided to build on the plots or to make other non-agricultural use of them. The fact that the plots were assessed for agricultural purpose and no application was made by the assessee for permission to make non-agricultural use of the plots is, therefore, not such a factor as would outweigh the other factors to which we have referred a little earlier. As a matter of fact the inclusion of the plots in the town planning scheme and the plotting out of the land comprised in the plots as building sites would clearly show that the plots were not agricultural lands. We are, therefore, of the view, on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances to which we have adverted, that the assessee has failed to show that the plots in question were agricultural lands within the meaning of section 2(e)(i). We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner. Question answered in the negative.
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1964 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the ground that the revocation at the late stage would prejudice the appellant; for if the objection had been taken at the earliest point of time, the appellant would have had the opportunity to prefer a Letters Patent Appeal and the appellant could not be made to suffer for the default of the respondents. In that case, the special leave had not been obtained in contravention of any mandatory rule. Moreover, the delay in filing the application for revocation had pre- judiced the appellant. In the instant case, the special leave to appeal was obtained in contravention of the mandatory provisions of 0.13, r. 2. Moreover, it is not shown that the appellant suffered any prejudice for any default of the respondent or any delay in raising the objection. We direct that the special leave to appeal granted to the appellant be revoked. The order of stay, if any, granted by this Court stands vacated. The parties will pay and bear their own costs -if the appeal. Special leave revoked.
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1964 (11) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... our decision on the main point is rendered against the Union of India, the Union of India will place the matter before the President within a fortnight after the pronouncement of our judgment inviting him to decide the question about the appellant’s age under Art. 217(3). Both parties have agreed before us that in case the decision of the President is in favour of the appellant, the appellant will be entitled to claim that he has continued to be a Judge notwithstanding the order passed by the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and will continue to be a Judge until he attains the acre of superannuation. On the other hand, if the decision of the President goes against the appellant, the said order of the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court would be held to be valid and proper. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, we think that the present appeal should be disposed of in terms of this order. There would be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 99 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s contention about the applicability of section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. But, as we have endeavoured to point out earlier, there is no re-enactment by the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955, of the provision in the local Act authorising the State Government to impose duty under the Excise Act, 1915, on medicinal preparations containing alcohol, and for this reason, with respect to the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court, we do not find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by him in Jagannathan s case(1). 10.. For the foregoing reasons, our conclusion is that the petitioner has been rightly assessed to sales tax on its turnover of medicinal preparations during the material years. The result is that all these petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee in each case is fixed at Rs. 100. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, after the deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petitions dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 98 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ine the question as regards the true nature of the sales on merits, but the appeal having already been disposed of, we cannot ask the Tribunal to reopen the appeal or to rehear it on merits unless the decision of the Tribunal on the preliminary question is set aside which the petitioners obviously do not want except as a last alternative. The only ground on which Mr. B.R. Sompura could ask us not to interfere with the order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax was that the petitioners had an alternative remedy but even that ground was not available to him because alternative remedy was already exhausted by the petitioners and he rightly did not urge that ground before us. We cannot, therefore, send the matter back to the Tribunal as contended on behalf of the revenue. In this view of the matter a writ of certiorari must issue quashing and setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax. The petitioners will get the costs of the petition from the State. Petition allowed.
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1964 (11) TMI 97 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f an existing commodity by performing a process though the basic and essential properties of that commodity may remain unchanged. We are, therefore, of the view that when the stock of grey or unfinished cloth held by the assessee on the appointed day was converted into finished cloth by bleaching, dyeing and printing and the finished cloth so produced by the assessee was sold on and after the appointed day, there was no sale of the stock of scheduled goods held by the assessee on the appointed day and remaining unsold on the day immediately preceding the appointed day within the meaning of subsection (2) of section 4 and the sales of finished cloth effected by the assessee were not covered by sub-section (2) of section 4. Our answers to the questions referred to us will, therefore, be in the affirmative as regards question No. 1 and in the negative as regards question No. 2. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 96 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... relief of set-off. The relief of set-off under section 18B(2) is not against the taxes paid by a dealer, namely, the general sales tax or the purchase tax on the purchase of raw materials, but against the sales tax paid by him under section 8 on goods manufactured or processed by him. The former tax decides the quantum of relief while the latter tax is the tax against which the relief of set-off is granted. In our view, as the applicants did not have to pay any sales tax under section 8, they were debarred from claiming set-off by reason of the very provisions of section 18B(2) themselves irrespective of rule 11(1A). In that view, there would be no necessity of going into the question of the vires or the validity of rule 11(1A). For the reasons aforesaid, our answer to question No. (2) is in the negative. As regards question No. (1), it is not necessary to give any answer. The applicants will pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 95 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... etitioners, we would be stultifying the provision enacted in sub-section (4) of section 21 and refusing to give full effect to the intention of the Legislature. The language used by the Legislature in sub-section (4) of section 21 being clear and unambiguous, we must give to its plain and natural meaning and hold that it covered in its width and amplitude not only amounts collected by way of tax by a registered dealer in respect of sales, but also amounts collected by way of tax by a registered dealer in respect of transactions which were not sales. Since in the present case the petitioners were admittedly registered dealers and the transactions in respect of which the amounts were collected by the petitioners by way of tax were transactions in the course of business, the amounts collected by the petitioners were rightly forfeited by the Sales Tax Officer under sub-section (4) of section 21. The petition, therefore, fails and will be dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 94 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ness at Padra to three of the partners and the transfer of the business at Vasad to the remaining two partners along with two others were simultaneous in point of time under an arrangement arrived at between the partners and if that be so, it cannot be disputed that when the business at Vasad was transferred to Messrs. Gokalbhai Tribhovandas and Co., consisting of two partners of the respondentfirm and two others, no part of the business remained with the respondent-firm, because simultaneously the other part of the business, namely, that at Padra, was transferred to the other three partners of the respondent-firm. The second condition was, therefore, clearly not fulfilled and the State is not entitled to rely on section 26(2) for taxing the stock of goods transferred to Messrs. Gokalbhai Tribhovandas and Co. The first question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative. The State will pay the costs of the reference to the respondentfirm. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 93 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t have been converted into a commercially different commodity. This decision cannot help us in deciding what should be the test to be applied for the purpose of determining the applicability of rule 12(1A). We are, therefore, of the opinion that in order to attract the applicability of rule 12(1A), the goods sold must be commercially the same commodity as the goods purchased and since in the present case bidi pattis were commercially not the same commodity as raw tobacco, the sales of bidi pattis effected by the assessees could not be said to be sales of raw tobacco purchased by the assessees and the condition for the applicability of rule 12(1A) was, therefore, not fulfilled. The assessees were consequently not entitled to claim remission of the purchases tax paid by them under rule 12(1A). The question in each of the four references must, therefore, be answered in the negative. The assessees will pay the cost of the State in each reference. References answered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 92 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... two steel trunks are not set out in the statement of the case, it is clear from the two similar steel trunks produced by Mr. R.C. Mankad before us that the depth of the steel trunk twenty-seven inches long was not more than about eight inches while the depth of the other steel trunk twenty-one inches long was even less and this was in fact not disputed by Mr. R.C. Mankad. Steel trunks of this size are clearly articles for carrying clothes which are easily and conveniently portable on a journey and though they may not have the same finish and elegance as travelling bags made of rexine or aluminium and may be a little heavier than those bags, they still satisfy the test for determining what is a suit-case and must therefore be regarded as suit-cases within the meaning of entry 12 of Schedule E. Our answer to the question referred to us will, therefore, be in the affirmative. The applicants will pay the costs of the reference to the State. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (11) TMI 91 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as an accessory to the principal garment, namely, the sari. In its popular understanding also, though a palav is called a palav, it is understood by all who are conversant with such articles as a trimming, if not as a border or a lace to a sari piece. That being so, we agree with the Tribunal that a palav piece would fall within the ambit of entry 47(i) of Schedule B to the Act. In that view, our answer to question No. 1 would be in the affirmative. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, Mr. Mody himself stated that if a palav is covered by entry 47(i), question No. 2 would not arise and, at any rate, would not become necessary. Since in our view a palav falls under entry 47(i), the further question, whether entry 47(i) would prevail over entry 10 of Schedule B need not arise. That being so, it is not necessary for us to answer question No. 2. The applicants will pay to the respondent in each of the two references the costs of the reference. References answered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 90 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of these observations of the Supreme Court, we do not think that it is possible to take any other view as regards the character of the provision enacted in section 12A(4). That provision was clearly a provision providing for penalty to be imposed on a person who collected any amount by way of tax in contravention of the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 12A or on a registered dealer who collected any amount by way of tax in excess of the amount payable by him under the Act. This being the true nature and character of the provision enacted in section 12A(4), the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Quader s case 1964 15 S.T.C. 403. cannot apply and we must hold that this provision was a valid exercise of incidental or ancillary power of legislation under Entry 48 and was, therefore, within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature. In this view of the matter, the petition fails and will be dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 89 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... omer, he would not be entitled to sell copies of such photographs to persons other than the customer without his consent. A photographer carrying on his business of producing photographs and selling them to customers does not for that reason cease to be a dealer within the meaning of the Act and the transactions entered into by him with his customers do not for that reason cease to be sales amenable to the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. As pointed out earlier, such transactions have in fact been held, both by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the High Court of Patna, to be sales falling within the respective Sales Tax Acts applicable in the aforesaid States. For the reasons aforesaid, it is not possible for us to accept the contentions urged by Mr. Mody, on behalf of the applicants. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, will be in the affirmative. The applicants will pay to the respondent the cost of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1964 (11) TMI 88 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d as cloth. The test is not whether borders are used as an adjunct of wearing apparel. This would be an entirely wrong way of looking at the matter. The question which must be asked is what in common parlance according to the understanding of common man is the meaning of cloth ? Would cloth include borders or, in other words, would men in the trade, men who have to deal with this commodity, regard borders as cloth or would they regard borders as a distinct commercial commodity not described by the word cloth according to its ordinary popular meaning? To that our answer clearly is that in ordinary parlance borders cannot be regarded as cloth and they are, therefore, not covered by entry 29 of Schedule A. In the result our answer to the first question referred to us is in the negative. In view of this answer to the first question, the second question does not arise for consideration. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the State. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 87 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erroneously any question of law. That is a statutory right given to an assessee. That right will be lost to the assessees whose appeals are dismissed for default, if we hold that the Appellate Tribunal is competent to dismiss appeals for default of appearance of appellants. A construction which leads to such a conclusion should be avoided. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that regulation 8(2), to the extent it purports to empower the Appellate Tribunal to dismiss an appeal before it for default of appearance of the appellant or his Advocate, is ultra vires of section 22(4) of the Act . In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 4th day of September, 1963, in S.T.A. No. 42/1963-64, dismissing the appeal for default of appearance of the appellant before it (petitioner herein) is quashed and that Tribunal is directed to take the appeal on its file, and dispose of the same in accordance with law. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1964 (11) TMI 86 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ns in each other s produce and manufactures, in which the superfluities of one are given for those of another. Commerce strictly relates to the dealings with foreign nations, colonies etc. trade, to mutual dealings at home. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (third edition) gives the following meaning to the word commerce Exchange between men of the products of nature and art buying and selling together exchange of merchandise, especially on a large scale between different countries or districts. The meaning of the word commerce also therefore does not require a profit motive as an essential requisite. I am of the opinion that there is nothing illegal or ultra vires the power of the State Legislature in excluding the profit motive when it amended the definition of business in the amending Act 15 of 1964. Section 9 of the amending Act 15 of 1964 will validate the present levy. The petitions are, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 85 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... applied, first, in the redemption of the priority wool certificates and next in paying off, under schemes of reduction sanctioned by the Court, the capital credited as paid on the shares of the association. As a result of this procedure-a procedure which it will be seen was the nearest possible approximation, while the association was still a going concern, to the normal distribution made by a company in liquidation-10s. per share were distributed in April, 1923, and 9s. per share in February, 1924. Further it was held that the sums available for distribution were in no way profits earned by the association. In my view, there is nothing in this judgment which helps the assessee before us. The only similarity seems to be that the wool disposed of there was received as surplus war material. In the result, the question must be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee who will pay the costs of this Reference. MASUD, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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