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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 68 Records
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1964 (11) TMI 84 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Act . The preamble to the Act shows that the object of the Act was to levy tax on the purchase or sale of goods in the State of Mysore. It is not denied that the Legislature has competence to levy tax on all sales whether made in the course of trade or business or otherwise. In the case of some classes, it may choose to tax in one manner and in the case of others in a different manner, taking into consideration, their status, function, etc. In the case of taxation measures the presumption of validity is stronger than in others. Hence, the contention based on Article 14 fails. 17.. In conclusion, we declare that sections 2(1)(k) and 2(1)(t) of the Act to the extent they attract supplies made by clubs, registered as well as unregistered, to their members, to tax under the Act are ultra vires of the powers of the State Legislature and consequently void and inoperative. The petitioners are entitled to their costs in these petitions. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (11) TMI 83 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rtain a writ petition and afford redress to the aggrieved person Vide State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh 1958 S.C.J. 242 A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86. In Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Companies District-I, Calcutta 1961 41 I.T.R. 191., the Supreme Court reiterated that where an impugned order passed by an assessing authority acting without jurisdiction subjected or was likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts would issue appropriate orders or directions under Article 226 to prevent such consequences and that the existence of such alternative remedies as appeals and references to the High Court should not always be regarded as a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action. In view of what I have stated above, these writ petitions are allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each petition. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (11) TMI 82 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the light of the observations made above. In this case also there will be no order as to costs. Civil Writ No. 273 of 1964.-In Civil Writ No. 273 of 1964, notices have been issued by the respondents from Chandigarh in regard to three years, assessment proceedings in respect of which were also pending with the appropriate Assessing Authority at Amritsar. It is conceded at the Bar that this writ petition must also be allowed as a result of our view expressed in Civil Writ No. 382 of 1964. We accordingly grant this writ petition as well and quash the notices issued by the respondent on the same terms on which we have quashed the earlier two writ petitions. Civil Writ No. 784 of 1964.-In Civil Writ No. 784 of 1964 also it is conceded that on the view that we have taken, it should be allowed, leaving it to the authorities concerned to pass appropriate orders of transfer and proceed in accordance with law. In this case also, there would be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1964 (11) TMI 81 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... transport does not involve any evasion of legitimate taxation in the State cannot be said to offend anybody s legitimate freedom to move the goods. All freedoms are within the precincts of law, not outside and Article 301 of the Constitution provides no exception thereto. So long as the sales tax law is not impugned, provisions designed for its efficient administration cannot also be impeached. Such provisions not only aid the collection of tax, but assure the fair distribution of its impact lest a tax-evader shall steal a march over the honest taxpayer and thereby affect the latter s legitimate freedom in trade, commerce and intercourse. 2.. The differences in the character of the operators and in their modus operandi are so telling that the classification between railways and motor transport has to be found a reasonable one in relation to the purpose of the enactment. 3.. We do not find any merit in this petition, which is therefore dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 80 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nts before the Deputy Commissioner, the bill given to the customer was in fact a consolidated one and it is also clear from the application that that was the bill which was entered in their books of account. The bill shows that the charge was for a lump sum of Rs. 5 or Rs. 4-8-0 per sari, depending upon the design that the customer wanted the applicants to execute. That being the position, the mere fact that the applicants produced together with the consolidated bill a break-up of that bill would not make any significant difference. Taken as a whole, the contract in question in our view was essentially one of work and labour and the supply of the jari materials in the execution of the embroidery work was merely ancillary. In that view, our answer to the question is that the agreement was a contract of work and not a composite one which included a sale of the jari materials. The respondent will pay to the applicants the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1964 (11) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
it was held that gratuity is a lump sum payment considered necessary for an orderly and humane elimination from the industry of superannuated or disabled employees, who but for such retiring benefits would continue in employment even though they function inefficiently.
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1964 (11) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the coffee powder had been sold by the assessee inside the State of Mysore instead of selling it in the course of inter-State trade, no sales tax could have been demanded from him under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, or the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957 - Appeal allowed.
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1964 (11) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the application for registration submitted by the opponent to the Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur Circle, on 22nd August, 1949, was valid and was pending till 11th September, 1951?
Whether rule 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947, as it stood at the time of filing the aforesaid application for registration, contemplated application for registration under section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, to be made on a date when the prescribed minimum limit of gross turnover might not have been actually reached?
Whether the certificate of registration granted to the opponent on application made subsequent to the date of accrual of his liability to pay tax remained valid for the entire financial year during which the application was made and the registration certificate was granted; and whether proceedings for assessment for the quarter ending on 30th June, 1951, which commenced on 23rd November, 1953, should have been instituted under section 12(2) or section 12(4) and not under section 12(5) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947?
Whether completion of assessment in respect of quarters ending 31st December, 1950, and 31st March, 1951, under section 12(5) was illegal?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
Whether packing is an integral part of the re-drying process?
Whether after the re-drying and packing, the tobacco bales are kept in the factory for any length of time to undergo further re-drying process?
Whether there is a sale of the packing material by the respondent to its customers?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In the present case, it must be held on the finding recorded by the High Court, that it was intended by the parties that the "packing material" should form an integral part of the process of re-drying and without the use of the "packing material" re-drying process could not be completed, and that there was no independent contract for sale of "packing material". It is only as an incident of the re-drying process and as a part thereof that the respondent-company has to seal up the package of tobacco, after it emerged from the reconditioning chamber, with a view to protect it against atmospheric action. In the absence of any evidence from which contract to sell "packing material" for a price may be inferred, the use of "packing material" by the respondent- company must be regarded as in execution of the works contract and the fact that the tobacco delivered by the constituent is taken away with the "packing material " will not justify an inference that there was an intention to sell the "packing material".
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1964 (11) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
Whether sales which were not "first sales" within the Mysore State being not exigible to tax under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, no tax was payable thereon under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no reason why the Central Act made a departure in the manner of levy of tax on the specified goods which are taxed only at a single point under the State Act; if any such radical departure was intended, the Central Act would have expressly stated so. The Central Act was passed to levy and collect sales tax on inter-State sales to avoid con- fusion and conflict of jurisdictions; the tax is also collected only for the benefit of the States. Therefore, the construction we accept avoids the anomaly of the State collecting tax on powerloom textiles only at a single point and the Centre, through the agency of the State authorities, collecting the said tax for and on behalf of the State at multi- points.
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1964 (11) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
Whether tax liability could be fastened on the appellant immediately it entered into the agreement of hire-purchase?
Whether the tax could only be constitutionally and legally levied after the intending purchaser had exercised the option which resulted in the transfer of property in the vehicle to such person?
Held that:- Allow the appeals in part and set aside the order of the High Court and the assessments made, and direct that the Sales Tax Authorities will determine the price in accordance with what we have said above that The first part may be determined after finding out the proper amount to be paid as hire in the market for a vehicle of the type concerned, or in such other way as may be available to the Sales Tax Authorities. The second method may be to take the original price fixed in the hire- purchase agreement and to calculate the depreciation and all other factors that may be relevant in arriving at the price when the second sale takes place to the hirer including the condition of the vehicle at the time of the second sale. It is therefore for the Sales Tax Authorities to find out the price of the vehicle on which tax has to be paid in either of the ways indicated by us above or such other way as may be just and reasonable and thereafter proceed to levy sales tax according to law.
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1964 (11) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up – Powers of liquidator and Fraudulent preference 7552. ... ... ... ... ..... enquiry with the correctness of the order of the District Judge refusing to set aside the sales as being of the nature of fraudulent preference and direct the respondent to deliver the buses to the appellant. It is he that invoked the jurisdiction under section 531 of the Act to have the sale set aside. For these reasons, the order of the liquidator is of no avail to the appellant. We cannot, therefore, give effect to this argument either. It follows that the order under appeal should be confirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs. C.M.A. No. 494 of 1960. mdash Consequent upon our judgment in C.M.A. N0.39 of 1958 upholding the right of the appellant in this C.M.A. (494 of 1960) to these buses, we have to hold that the appellant herein is entitled to withdraw the amount of Rs. 5,000 which he offered as security. There is no opposition to this appeal in view of our decision in C.M.A. No. 39 of 1958. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.
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1964 (11) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Power of registrar to strike defunct company off register ... ... ... ... ..... the court giving such directions as are necessary. The contention of Mr. B.C. Jain is that the plaintiff s remedy was only to apply under clause 6 for the company being restored to the register before he could maintain the suit or to apply for its restoration and to pray for its winding up. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-first-respondent again sought to rely upon the proviso to clause (5) of section 247. It will be noticed that the said proviso proceeds on the basis that the company itself is dissolved and is no longer in existence. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the suit against the first defendant, the Hyderabad Bullion Exchange Ltd., which was struck off from the register under clause (5) of section 247 of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 and thereby stood dissolved, is not maintainable. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed against defendants Nos. 1 to 10 also. The plaintiff shall pay their costs here and in the court below.
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1964 (11) TMI 37 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... agees have brought before the court a cross application asking, in the event of my coming to a contrary conclusion to that which I have reached, that I should, pursuant to section 101, rectify the particulars of the charge on the register. That necessity does not arise, having regard to the view which I have taken of the construction and effect of the sections. But I might perhaps just say this. Having regard to what was said in the decisions in In re Abrahams (S.) and Sons 1902 1 Ch. 695 18 TLR 336 and In re Anglo-Oriental Carpet Manufacturing Co. 1903 1 Ch. 914 , it appears to me that a very exceptional case would have to be made out to justify the court in making any order under section 101 after a company had gone into liquidation and the rights of unsecured creditors in the liquidation had crystallized. But, as I say, it is unnecessary for me to arrive at any decision upon that summons, because the occasion for the relief thereby sought by the mortgagees does not arise.
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1964 (11) TMI 36 - IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... this view. The petitioners have failed to satisfy me on the facts that the society is no longer performing any function or serving any useful purpose. If it is less effective than it might otherwise be, this, in my view, is largely because plotholders have been unwilling to cooperate, and since Wares came on the scene have in some cases deliberately allowed their holdings to run down. The fact is, however, that the character of the estate as a semi-rural area has been maintained largely as a result of the existence of the society, and its demise would, in my view, be a great loss to that not inconsiderable number of plotholders who are members of the society and wish to remain smallholders in an area where their activities are safeguarded and assisted by its existence. In ray judgment it would be neither just nor equitable to wind the society up, and for that reason, as well as for the reason that I regard both petitions as oppressive and an abuse of process, I dismiss them.
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1964 (11) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the question referred by the Tribunal to the High Court was only a pure question of fact and, therefore, the High Court has no jurisdiction to give its opinion thereon ?
Whether where the transferor retains the goodwill and most of the assets and the transferee carries on the same business with a part of the assets of the principal business, it cannot be said that there is succession to the whole of the business within the meaning of section 25(4) of the Act ?
Held that:- The expression " succession ", as stated by Simon in his book on Income-tax, has acquired a somewhat artificial meaning. The tests of change of ownership, integrity, identity and continuity of a business have to be satisfied before it can be said that a person " succeeded " to the business of another. Unless the facts found by the Tribunal satisfy the said tests, the finding cannot be conclusive. The tests crystallized by decisions have given a legal content to the expression " succession " within the meaning of section 25(4) of the Act and whether facts proved satisfy those tests is a mixed question of law and fact. If so, it follows that a question of law arose out of the Tribunal's order and the High Court has jurisdiction to ascertain the correctness of the finding given by the Tribunal on the question of succession. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in respect of the income of a Hindu undivided family, once partition is effected, whether the partition is recorded or not under sub-section (1), all members of the family will be jointly and severally liable for the tax assessed on the total income received by or on behalf of the family?
Held that:- Because there has been before the orders of assessment no order recording that the property of the family has been partitioned among the members, the two respondents are not personally liable to satisfy the tax due by the joint family. The remedy of the income-tax authorities, in the circumstances of the case, was to proceed against the property, if any, of the Hindu undivided family. That admittedly they have not done.
The order of the High Court must, therefore, be confirmed and the appeals dismissed
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1964 (11) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the aforesaid order of the Commissioner under section 33B cancelling the registration of the firm for the three years 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55 is lawful ?
If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, whether the firm is registrable under section 26A for the aforesaid assessment years ?
Held that:- High Court came to the correct conclusion that the partnership was a genuine one, that the partition in the joint Hindu family allotting specific shares to the members of the family might have affected the accountability of the two partners of the firm to the other members of the family, but qua the partnership their relationship with the other partners had not in any way been affected and, therefore, the Tribunal went wrong in holding that the registration of the said partnership was rightly refused. In the result, it correctly answered the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Income-tax Officer can refuse to register a genuine partnership entered into between more than two persons on the ground that one of them is only a benamidar for another?
Held that:- When a firm makes an application under section 26A of the Act for registration, the Income-tax Officer can reject the same if he comes to the conclusion that the partnership is not genuine or the instrument of partnership does not specify correctly the individual shares of the partners. But once he comes to the conclusion that the partnership is genuine and a valid one, he cannot refuse registration on the ground that one of the partners is a benamidar of another. If the partnership is genuine and legal, the share given to the benamidar will be the correct specification of his individual share in the partnership. The beneficial interest in the income pertaining to the share of the said benamidar may have relevance to the matter of assessment, but none in regard to the question of registration. In the result, for the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the answer given by the High Court is correct. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (11) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case the throwing into the hotchpotch of the applicant's self-acquired property and the subsequent partition among the members of the Hindu undivided family is an indirect transfer of property so far as the wife and minor son are concerned, within the meaning of section 16(3)(a)(iii) and (iv) of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- When the joint Hindu family property was partitioned, there was no transfer of assets within section 16(3)(a)(iii) and (iv) to the wife or the minor son. Appeal dismissed.
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