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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 83 Records
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1975 (2) TMI 112 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ood care of this point and the appellants had not been penalised for any default committed by them during the period occurring between the dismissal of the petition and its restoration under the orders of the appellate Tribunal. The defaults with which the appellants have been charged were those which had been committed by them long after the main petition for eviction had been restored. The appellants have, therefore, clearly violated the terms of the order passed under section 15(2) of the Act. (12) Under Section 15(7) of the Act, it was discretionary with the Controller whether or not to strike off the defense and in the facts and circumstances of the case he thought fit to strike off the defense of the appellants. His order has been affirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal in the appellate order. In second appeal under the Act, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this court to interfere with the exercise .of discretion by the Courts below who have exerised it according to law.
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1975 (2) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an order for removal from service contrary to regulations framed under the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959; the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948; and the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 would enable the employees to a declaration against the statutory corporation of continuance in service or would only give rise to a claim for damages?
Whether an employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to claim protection of Articles 14 and 16 against the Corporation?
Held that:- Rules and regulations framed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation have the force of law. The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions. By way of abundant caution we state that these employees are not servants of the Union or the State. These statutory bodies are "authorities&" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.
The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to a declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions.
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1975 (2) TMI 110 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e 226 of the Constitution. However, if an objection has been filed by him denying his status as a partner in the assessee-firm, it is the duty of the authority concerned to decide it before taking further proceedings. We, accordingly, direct the 3rd respondent, the Deputy Collector, Sales Tax (Collection), Betia Hata, Gorakhpur, to decide the petitioner s objection after giving him due opportunity to lead evidence and until then he shall not proceed with the recovery proceedings. With the above observations, we dismiss the writ petition. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner today on payment of usual charges. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 109 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e sent to Ajmer on railway material consignment notes. Moreover, in his judgment Mr. Dutt has observed as follows ..... That the goods ultimately went out of the State of Maharashtra is common ground but the applicants (respondents) maintain that in view of their being held responsible for deterioration, etc., until the goods reached their destination, the sale should be deemed to have been completed outside the State. This makes it quite clear that it was the accepted position that the goods did, in fact, move from Bombay to Ajmer and were actually delivered in Ajmer. The contract provided for such delivery at Ajmer. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the goods moved from Bombay to Ajmer under the conditions of the contract. This submission of Mr. Shah must also, therefore, be rejected. In the result, we answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 108 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... other product altogether and, they would, therefore, presumably be the last purchasers of groundnuts as groundnuts . They may be selling their products in forms other than groundnuts. The same reasonings apply to the petitioner s case who purchases raw jute and converts them into finished products, which are different commodities. In the above view of the matter, all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner fails. Before I close this judgment I must express the desirability of expeditiously completing pending assessments against the petitioner under the Bengal Raw Jute Taxation Act, 1941, and the two sales tax laws. I accordingly discharge these rules. There will be no order as to costs. On the prayer of the learned Advocate for the petitioner I direct that the respondents will remain restrained for a period of 8 (eight) weeks hence from communicating the assessment order or from serving demand notices in respect of the year ending March, 1971. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 107 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nder the terms of the said contract the goatskins were shipped by the applicants from Bombay to a Russian port. Raznoexport had the right to examine the goatskins at the applicants godown as also at the port prior to the loading of the goods on board the ship. The goods were packed in bales bearing certain specified marks. It is clear from the terms of the contract that these sales were of unascertained goods and at the time of their appropriation to the said contracts they were within the State and accordingly the sale of these goods by the applicants to Raznoexport took place within the State. In the result, in both the said references we answer the question reframed by us in the negative. The respondent will pay to the applicants the costs of both these references. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicants in each of the two references under sub-section (1) of section 34 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, will be refunded to the applicants. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (2) TMI 106 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of resins (natural or artificial) or of asphalt in drying oils the other class is spirit varnishes , which are solutions of resins (natural or artificial), asphalt, cellulose, esters, etc., in volatile solvents, as alcohol, spirits or turpentine or amyl acetate. A common spirit varnish is a solution of shellac in alcohol (vide Webster s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Volume 2, page 2820). It is common ground that french-polish is shellac dissolved in alcohol. Therefore, it is clear that french-polish is a spirit varnish. Item No. 97 of the Second Schedule to the Act includes both classes of varnishes, oil varnishes and spirit varnishes. The Tribunal, therefore, was right in the view that it has taken that french-polish comes within the meaning of the word varnish and, as such, liable to be assessed at the rate provided under the Second Schedule to the Act, at item No. 97. Accordingly, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 105 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is a reference to the agency commission of five per cent payable by the respondent to the said parties. From the letter dated 8th June, 1960, addressed by Sivaram and Swamy to the respondent, it appears that Sivaram and Swamy submitted their quotation to the Kerala Government as suggested by the respondent to the said Sivaram and Swamy. These letters leave no doubt at all that Sivaram Swamy were merely the agents of the respondent. In our view, therefore, both the aforesaid distributors were merely distributing agents of the respondent in respect of the goods despatched by the respondent to them and the despatch of these goods by the respondent to the said distributors and the receipt of the same by the said distributors do not amount to sales within the meaning of the said term in the said Act. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondent the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 104 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Hyderabad 1955 6 S.T.C. 650., it was held that the word groundnut in rule 5(2) of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Rules meant unshelled groundnut and not the kernel and that the said judgment had been reversed by the Supreme Court in appeal. If, therefore, when the word groundnut is used its kernel is included, and if the word cashew is used, its kernel is also included, we fail to see why when the word tamarind is used, its seeds should not be included, particularly when it is the case of the department itself that the only parts of the tamarind which can be powdered are either the seeds or the skin. For these reasons, we hold that the Tribunal was justified in holding that tamarind seed powder fell under entry No. 12 of Schedule A to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. Accordingly, we answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 103 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt of the Tribunal or on the record to show that any new or different commercial commodity came into existence as a result of the process of hand-blending applied by the respondent to the oil purchased by it. If such was the case of the department, it was for the department to prove it and it has failed to do so. In fact, it does not seem to have been contended at all by the department before the Tribunal that a different commercial commodity had come into existence as a result of the process of hand-blending applied to the goods in question by the respondent. The process of hand-blending applied by the respondent cannot, therefore, be said to amount to manufacture as contemplated under section 2(17) of the said Act, and the contention of Mr. Andhyarujina in this regard must be rejected. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative. As the respondent has not appeared, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 102 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the respondents. Mr. Naik was, however, unable to give us any enlightenment in this regard. The only submission he made in this connection was that once the aforesaid repairs were carried out on the aforesaid drums, they could not be said to be the same goods. This contention, in our opinion, is clearly erroneous for the reasons which we have already indicated earlier and must be rejected. It was next urged by Mr. Naik that once the activity of manufacture had been carried out on the said old drums, they must, in any event, be deemed to have become different goods. This contention also must be rejected, as we have already taken the view that the activity carried out by the respondents on the said old drums does not amount to manufacture within the purview of section 2(17) of the said Act. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 101 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s and liabilities not with a view to enable the transferor to run a part of the business transferred but to enable the transferee to run the business unhampered by the load of debts or for any other appropriate collateral purpose cannot detract from the totality of the succession. Even if this principle were to be applied to the present case, the reservation by the assignors in the case before us of the right as well as the liability to perform the outstanding contracts would clearly enable the assignors to run a part of the business transferred, and hence there could not be said to be a change of ownership of the business as to amount to succession. This decision also does not in any manner help Mr. Naik. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative. The applicant must pay to the respondents the costs of the reference in S.T.R. No. 48 of 1969. There will be no order as to costs in S.T.R. No. 4 of 1974. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 100 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... evying a tax on the subject. We really consider it unnecessary to decide between these rival contentions with respect to the construction of the said entry No. 14 for we find that even accepting the interpretation sought to be placed on the said entry by Mr. Parekh, the result is that his contention that the respondents depots were not eating houses must be negatived. The Tribunal has found, as a matter of fact, that at these depots ice-cream was sold for consumption. It follows, therefore, that according to the facts which were before the Tribunal, ice-cream sold by the respondents could be consumed by the respondents customers at the respondents depots. If so, even applying the test canvassed before us by Mr. Parekh, the depots would be eating houses. In the result, we answer the question, as reframed by us above with the consent of the counsel, in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 99 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... us there is no written contract but there must have been oral contracts between the respondent and the shipping companies purchasing the goods. In our view, this circumstance can make no difference. If there was an oral contract or contracts under which the respondent was entitled to charge dock charges separately, the respondent should have proved the same. In the absence of any such proof, it cannot be said that the bills submitted by the respondent to the purchasers evidenced what the terms of the contracts must have been. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered as follows Even on the assumption that the said dock charges constitute the cost of delivery for the purpose of section 2(14) of the said Act, the Tribunal erred in holding that the said dock charges should be excluded while levying tax on the taxable turnover of the respondent. The respondent to pay to the applicant the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (2) TMI 98 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , which is the highest legislative body in the State, declared on and after 1st April, 1974, that the turnover relating to dyes should be subject to tax at the rate of 8 per cent of the turnover. The notification issued earlier by the State Government which was inconsistent with the legislative declaration cannot be held to prevail over the amending Act. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act would be of no avail to the petitioner because the said section can be pressed into service only when there is no inconsistency between the notification issued earlier and the subsequent legislative declaration. The petitioner is, therefore, liable to pay sales tax at the rate of 8 per cent in respect of his turnover relating to dyes in accordance with the amending Act until the State Government again by notification reduced the rate of sales tax to 4 per cent with effect from 1st July, 1974. Hence, there is no substance in this petition and it is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 97 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mine whether the goods sold fell under one entry or the other would depend upon what the terms of the contract between the parties were, and if the intention of the parties was to sell an article as such and it was not specified in the contract that it was being sold as a component part or an accessory of a motor vehicle, it could not be taxed under entry No. 58(2). We are unable to accept this submission. It is the nature, character and description of the goods in question and the use to which it is ordinarily put which determine under which entry in the schedule to the said Act it will fall and not what the parties choose to describe it as. According to us, therefore, the terms of the contract between the parties, though it may in some cases be relevant, are not determinative of the question, In the result, we answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 96 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ations of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. S.N. Brothers 1973 31 S.T.C. 302 at 306 (S.C.). It may be mentioned that in that case the department sought to rely on the meanings attributed to the words in question in the Random House Dictionary. In this connection, the Supreme Court has observed as follows This dictionary gives all the different shades of meanings attributable to the words referred but that is hardly helpful in solving the problem raised in the present controversy. The words dyes and colours used in entry No. 10 and the words scents and perfumes used in entry No. 37 have to be construed in their own context and in the sense, as ordinarily understood and attributed to these words by people usually conversant with and dealing in such goods. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative. The applicant to pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (2) TMI 95 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f any merits. On a perusal of the impugned notices, I am satisfied that the assessing authority has already arrived at a conclusion that without the production of the bills or cash memoranda or certificates as required by rule 45(3)(b), the turnovers pertaining to such disputed sales must be taxed. That view of the assessing authority is illegal and erroneous for the reasons stated above. In the result, the impugned notices must be and are hereby quashed as they are illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice. The assessing authority has to now determine afresh the question whether the transactions in dispute are second sales of jaggery within the State as contended by the dealers or first sales, after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner-dealers to establish their plea by any evidence, oral or documentary. The writ petitions are allowed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 75 in each. Petitions allowed.
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1975 (2) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion 42 of the Revenue Recovery Act would directly apply and the resultant of such impact would be that the sale would be free from all encumbrances. We are, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Sivamani, having regard to the weight of authorities against him, that a sale under the Central Sales Tax Act read with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, which provides for the recovery of arrears of Central sales tax or sales tax as if it were land revenue, would make the purchaser a person who could own the property so purchased in a public sale free from all prior encumbrances. The learned Judge was right in having upheld the claim of the plaintiffs. The fourth defendant is bound by the mortgage. The judgment of the trial court is correct. The appeal is dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. We are thankful to the learned Additional Government Pleader for the timely assistance rendered by him. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 93 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ginal assessment order by the Commercial Tax Officer. By the Amendment Act 28 of 1969, the said rule was deleted and it was inserted as section 8A in the Central Act. The deduction allowed by section 8A is not a new provision which has to be applied in the case of the petitioners for the first time after the amending Act came into force. It is stated by the learned counsel for the department that the petitioners did not claim any deduction permissible under rule 11(2) of the Rules. That is a matter which cannot be gone into in these revision cases. The Tribunal has given a direction to the assessing authority to redetermine the taxable turnover of the appellants allowing the deductions permissible under section 8A of the Central Sales Tax Act. This question whether they are entitled to any deductions under section 8A has to be determined by the assessing authority. In the result, these revision cases are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 each. Petitions dismissed.
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