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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 83 Records
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1975 (2) TMI 92 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y him outside the State when he proved that he had done so by producing railway receipts. The assessee s contention that all the remaining sales should also be treated as sales of goods exported by him outside the State was negatived on the ground that he was entitled to deduction only in respect of those sales which were proved to have been exported outside the State. These facts have no relation to the facts of the case before us. The assessee here maintained account books. The only suppressed sale which was found was from a registered dealer. The assessee s business was such that all his purchases would normally be made from registered dealers. These facts cannot give rise to any inference that he must have, therefore, made certain purchases from unregistered dealers which he must have suppressed. In the result, we answer the question submitted to us in the negative. The applicant will pay to the respondents the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1975 (2) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Central Act, could be made liable for penalty under the provisions of the State Sales Tax Act, hereinafter referred to as the State Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The question is answered in the negative, viz., that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that penalty could be levied under section 16(4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953
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1975 (2) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of the levy and collection of excise duty, education cess, health cess and sales tax challenged - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Section 23 provides that excise duty shall be levied on the excisable articles issued from a warehouse also thus no reason to think that a warehouse established or licensed under section 16(e) is not a warehouse within the meaning of that expression in section 23. We, therefore, think that the power to fix the rate of excise duty conferred on the Government by section 22 of the Act is valid. The dilution of parliamentary watch-dogging of delegated legislation may be deplored, but, in the compulsions and complexities of modern life, cannot be helped.
We do not think that section 19 is ultra vires the powers of the legislature.
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1975 (2) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
Whether section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, in terms, or, in principle, can be invoked for excluding the time spent in prosecuting an application under rule 68(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules for setting aside the order of dismissal of appeal in default under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 from computation of the period of limitation for filing a revision under that Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The object, the scheme and language of section 10 of the Sales Tax Act do not permit the invocation of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, either, in terms, or, in principle, for excluding the time spent in prosecuting proceedings for setting aside the dismissal of appeals in default, from computation of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision under the Sales Tax Act. Accordingly, we answer the question referred in the negative.
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1975 (2) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Compromise and Arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... may be possible to check from the energy consumed the number of heats out of each furnace, and this may itself act as a possible check on abuse. Liberty to give such further directions, in the matter of such further safeguards as may be necessary in the light of the further working of the Globe Steels division particularly in the light of such reports as may be forthcoming from not only the internal auditor but also from the person with technical competence whom I propose to appoint to serve on the managing committee and to rearrange the schedule and time of payments, if necessary, is hereby reserved. Subject to the above conditions, the further proposals of V.K. Mundhra are accepted and the working of the scheme extended accordingly. The proposals made by V.K. Mundhra from time to time will be consolidated by him in one compact affidavit to be filed before the registry within a week from today, and will, after being seen and approved by me, be made an annexure to this order.
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1975 (2) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up - Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... ere is no prohibition to file separate or successive petitions under different clauses of section 433 since they constitute separate and independent reasons for which the company is to be wound up. It would not be fair in the circumstances of the case to amend the petition by adding the grounds which fall admittedly under clause (f) in a petition which has been originally drafted as one under clause (e). In the circumstances, we are of the view that the amendment could not have been allowed. We thus allow this appeal and set aside the order dated 8th January, 1975, allowing the amendment of the original petition. The petition will now go back to the learned company judge for further disposal according to law on the basis that the original petition has been admitted and is to be finally heard on the merits. The appellant-company will be entitled to its costs in this court. The costs before the company judge will be costs in the cause and in the discretion of the company judge.
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1975 (2) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the difference of 10 per cent, between an industrial company and other companies in the levy of income-tax provided in the Finance Act, 1966, is to be construed as a "rebate" or "relief" in the payment of any direct tax, for the development of an industry for the purposes of section 7(e) of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965?
Held that:- the language of section 7(e) is crystal clear and self-contained. It indicates in unmistakable terms that the "rebate or relief" in the payment of any direct tax in order to fall within the purview of this clause must satisfy two conditions, viz., (i) that it must be a rebate or relief "allowed under any law for the time being in force relating to direct taxes or under the relevant annual Finance Act", and, further, (ii) that it must be a relief or rebate for the development of any industry. In the present case, condition (i) is lacking.
The Finance Act, 1966, does not say that this difference of 10 percent, in the rates of tax applicable to an industrial company and any other company is to be deemed to be a rebate or relief for the development of industry. Nor has it been shown that this difference in the rates is allowed as a rebate or relief under any other extant law relating to direct taxes.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that it was not permissible to use the speech of the Finance Minister to construe the clear language of the statute. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 41 - AHMEDABAD HIGH COURT
Cotton fabrics ... ... ... ... ..... im was not admissible, the claim was rejected. Therefore, even the passing of the order or its communication sanctioning the alleged refund is totally denied and Mr. Mehta from his file made a statement that no such order was passed. Therefore, the whole contention of Mr. Shelat in this behalf is thoroughly misconceived. Mr. Shelat next argued that for the subsequent period from July, 1962 upto June 1963 a demand of Rs.1,99,636-79 P. was sought to be made and was ultimately quashed. From that order Mr. Shelat could draw no inspiration for the simple reason that Mr. Mehta has rightly pointed out that the demand being not within the time, it had to be quashed on that short -ground. Therefore, that order could never come in the way of the authority refusing refund in the present case in view of the aforesaid legal position. Therefore, no ground whatever survives and the petition must fail. Rule is, therefore, discharged with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.
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1975 (2) TMI 37 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ee to show that there is no omission or such omission, if any was not wilful. It is possible to avoid penalty even in case of best judgment addition where it is shown that the omission was not intended. Denial of opportunity therefore strikes at the root of the penal proceedings. Besides, the appellant rsquo s case is also peculiar in the sense that the tax on those transactions was remitted even on 18th July, 1968, and the assessment relates to the year ending 31st march, 1969. The assessing authority considered this to be one of grounds for not initiating penalty proceedings. Though this factor has been given a limited recognition by the AAC, the question as to whether this is sufficient to entitle the appellant to full relief on the preliminary ground itself, it is not necessary for us to go into this question also. Under the circumstances, the penalty is deleted. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The penalty of Rs. 1,500 confirmed by the AAC in appeal is concelled.
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1975 (2) TMI 35 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... belongs to the family is on the Department. Where the income of a member of an HUF was held by the Tribunal to belong to the family on the following grounds, (1) the very fabric of the business of the firm came into existence by use of the family funds (2) there had been no partition in the family and (3) from the very commencement of the business of the firm the business premises had been provided by the family Held, on the facts, that the finding of the Tribunal was justified and the income received by the member of the family was assessable as that of the family . 9. In the result, the ITO has not been able to place any material before me to show that the decision of the AAC is wrong. On the other hand, the facts and circumstances of the case clearly go to show that Malkhansingh had entered into the partnership only in his individual capacity and that the share income earned by him belonged only to him and not to the HUF. 10. In the result, these two appears are dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 34 - ITAT DELHI-D
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... ... ..... ve also seen from the same chart furnished before us that the rent of the first floor let out to foreign tenants increased from Rs. 900 to 2,400 but when the foreign tenants vacated the premises in 1974 and the same was let out to Indian Company the rent declined from Rs. 2,400 to Rs. 2,000 only. Taking this as an index to the element of fancy rent paid by foreign tenants, we direct that the actual rent received by the assessee during all the relevant years should be reduced in the same ratio as Rs. 2,400, Rs. 2,000 in respect of both the ground and first floor and the multiple of 14 should be applied. In this way we feel that the element of fancy rent contained in the rent paid by foreign tenants will as far as possible be eliminated. The valuation should be recomputed on the above basis. 11. In the result Departmental appeals for all the six years fail and are dismissed while the assessee rsquo s cross objections for all the six years are partly allowed as indicated before.
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1975 (2) TMI 33 - ITAT DELHI-C
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... ... ..... l is allowed. 4. The Departmental Representative contended in the present appeal proceeding before us that the order of the Tribunal dt.30th March, 1972has been challenged in reference proceedings and hence we should considered the merits of the penalties levied. The assessee rsquo s learned counsel contended that the effect of the Tribunal rsquo s order dt.30th March, 1972was No penalties under ss. 271(1)(a) and 273(b) could be levied that therefore the penalties levied by the ITO lacked a valid legal basis. 5. We have looked at the order of the Tribunal dt.30th March, 1972. We find the submissions for the assessee to be correct. The Tribunal cancelled the order of the CITs under s. 263 in so far as it related to levy of penalties under s. 271(1)(a) and 273(b). The penalties levied by the ITO are, therefore, clearly barred by limitation considering the fact that the assessment was completed on16th Nov., 1968. We, therefore, decline to interfere. 6. The appeals are dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 32 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... presentative also drew out attention to the change in law for the asst. yrs. 1966-67 and 1970-71 and pointed out that these times would come under reserves and provisions in the balance-sheet of the company according to the Schedule giving the form of balance-sheet in Part I of of Sixth Schedule of Companies Act 1956. It is now well settled that we have to go by the substance of the matter and not what a company chooses to describe a particular asset or liability. The Madras High court has pointed out in CIT vs. Indian Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. 92 ITR 78 (Mad) that the manner in which the balance-sheet of a company has been prepared will not decide the question as to whether an amount really is a reserve or not. What has to be seen is the substance of it. We have already noted out finding that in substance these are general reserves and not for liquidating any specific liability. 11. In the result, the Departmental appeals are dismissed while the assessee s appeal is allowed.
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1975 (2) TMI 31 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... oint at issue has already been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Tolly Gunge Club Ltd(2). the question raised is only of academic interest. In this connection attention is invited to the Supreme Court Judgement in Mathura Prasad vs. CIT(6) Question Nos. 1 and 2 are thus not required to be referred. The third question suggested is pure question of fact. While allowing full depreciation on the jeep, the Tribunal s finding is that the jeep had been purchased mainly for the purpose of the assessee s business. The Tribunal has only stated that the use of the jeep by the partners for their personal purposes is not ruled out and on the account a disallowance of Rs. 1,200 out of the running expenses was made. The Tribunal has not given a finding that the jeep exclusively used for purposes of the assessee s business. No referable question thus arises in this case. The application for reference is therefore, rejected. 7. In the result, the reference application is dismissed.
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1975 (2) TMI 30 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Seizure, confiscation and penalty - Illegal export ... ... ... ... ..... rohibitions imposed. On the basis of this finding, the confiscation cannot be said to be illegal. Again, under Section 114, penalty can be imposed on any person who in relation to any goods does any act which would render such goods liable to confiscation under Section 113. On the basis of those findings, the petitioner made himself liable to the penalty provided under Section 114. Therefore, the fine imposed on the petitioner also is not illegal. I may make it clear that it was not suggested that either the notice under Section 124(a) of the Act was illegal or the subsequent conduct of the proceeding was bad in any way. The mica contained in the 25 cases has been confiscated and under Section 126 of the Act it now vests in the Central Government. In that view of the matter, no direction can be issued for their return. The application, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 7. per B.D. Sharma, J. . - I agree.
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1975 (2) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Metallised yarn - Affidavit - Alternative remedy - Existence of - Article 226 ... ... ... ... ..... of natural justice had been made out, the existence of alternative remedies would not stand in the way of the petitioner seeking enforcement of his fundamental rights. The present demand as per the settled legal position was clearly without jurisdiction and on a complete misconception of law that entry 18 of synthetic yarn was attracted to this case. The demand being, therefore, ultra vires demand, the threat to property by such ultra vires demand would clearly justify the petitioner in approaching this court and availing of this extraordinary remedy at public law. The existence of alternative remedy would hardly be material in such a case when the tax demand is ultra vires the Act. In that view of the matter this petition is allowed for the same reasons and the rule is made absolute by issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned demand notices and by restraining the authorities from proceeding further in that connection. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs.
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1975 (2) TMI 28 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Electric insulators - H.R.C. Cartridge Fuselinks - Porcelain - Connotation of - Classification of goods
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1975 (2) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
Trade discount - Uniformity - Valuation - Sale under agreement - Number of wholesale sales - Post manufacturing expenses
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1975 (2) TMI 25 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Special Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... or revision of pay of an individual employee. In the above passage in Corpusjuris Secundum, the word fixed conveys the idea that the remuneration payable to an employee is determined at the commencement of the period for which he is paid and is not dependent on variable factors like the volume of work done by him during that period. Mr. Rajasekhara Murthy was not able to, state any convincing reason why special allowance paid to the respondent-assessee should not be regarded as a part of his salary. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is in favour of the assessee and as follows The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the term salary occurring in section 10(10) of the Act includes dearness allowance and special allowance for purposes of calculating the exempt portion of gratuity received by the assessee for the assessment year 1968-69. The income-tax department shall pay costs to the respondent-assessee Advocate s fee, Rs. 250.
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1975 (2) TMI 24 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Withdrawal Of Development Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... arned counsel for the assessee, on the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dewas Cine Corporation, in support of his contention that when the properties belonging to the firm are distributed among the partners, there would not be a transfer. That decision is clearly distinguishable from the case on hand. In that case, there was dissolution of a firm and distribution of its assets among its partners. In the instant case, the assessee-firm continues to carry on business with all the original seven partners even after a part of its assets were transferred to some of its partners on March 31, 1965. It was not dissolved and there was no distribution of its assets among the partners. Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court is of no avail. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of revenue. The assessee shall pay costs to the income-tax department. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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