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2023 (5) TMI 175 - BOMBAY HIGH COURTRefund of entry tax recovered by the State from the Petitioners - constitutional validity of Sections 2(g), 2(m), and Section 3 of the Goa Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000 as being ultra vires Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 265, 301 and 304(a) of the Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- The scheme of the impugned Act and the charging section stipulate that there shall be a levy and collection of tax on the entry of goods into the State of Goa into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Schedule I lists the goods taxable under Section 3(1) of the impugned Act - Section 3(2) of the impugned Act makes it obligatory for the dealer and manufacturers to pay the tax. Section 3(3) of the impugned Act provides certain exemptions from the levy of entry tax for the dealer alone regarding goods on which tax has been paid or becomes payable. Schedule II, read with Section 3(4), provides a general exemption on entry tax for certain goods. Recently, in OCL India Ltd. vs State of Orissa and ors. [2022 (11) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of interpretation of "local area" occurring under Entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This was in the context of the Orissa Entry Tax Act, 1999, which defined local area to include industrial townships, including areas within the industrial township constituted under Section 4 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, subjecting goods entering into such areas to entry tax - The Court held that reliance upon Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. vs State of Uttar Pradesh [1960 (12) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT] was misplaced because, in that decision, the Apex Court had to deal with a different set of facts. The levy on sugarcane imposed by the State of U.P. was on the incidence of entry into factory premises. The Court, therefore, correctly concluded that factory premises per se could not constitute a local area. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is also a cardinal rule of interpretation that words of a taxing statute should be read in their ordinary, natural, and grammatical meaning. Further, in construing the words in a constitutional enactment that confers legislative power, a liberal construction should be placed upon them to have effect in their widest amplitude. The object of the levy, i.e., entry tax, is the regulation of entry of goods in a regular area for consumption, i.e., manufacture, use or sale. There is no dispute that entry of goods into an industrial area or estate is for their use for manufacturing or processing or the purposes of their delivery as their ultimate destination, i.e. for consumption, use or sale within that area. It could even be that the goods enter within the industrial area or estate as the ultimate point of destination for their use. In any case, the levy would be attracted because the incidence is the entry into the local area. The limited surviving challenges in this Petition based upon the alleged violation of Articles 14, 301 and 304 or the entire State being declared as a local area and, consequently, the legislation being ultra vires for such reasons cannot be accepted - Petition dismissed.
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