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TMI Blog1996 (11) TMI 276X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ibunal- (1) .................... (2) .................................... (3) Every appeal under this section shall be filed within three months from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the Collector of Central Excise, or, as the case may be, the other party preferring the appeal. (4) .......................... (5) The Appellate Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross-objections after the expiry of the relevant period referred to in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. (6) .........................." In the case presently under consideration the question relates to consideration of delay in the Collector filing the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. 3.& ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad with the copy of the said order to do the needful. The matter was therefore directed to come up for hearing on 21-3-1996. 7. On 17-1-1996 Member (J) of the Bench which considered the matter on 15-1-1996 sent a note to the Hon'ble President, CEGAT seeking the President's instructions on the question whether another Bench of the Tribunal may be directed to decide the application in view of the Hon'ble High Court observation that it is a matter to be considered by the Tribunal and not for the court. The President directed that the matter be heared by 'C' Bench of the Tribunal as constituted then. 8. When the matter subsequently came up before the 'C' Bench of the Tribunal on 21-3-1996, the Bench found that the affidavit filed by the Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad in pursuance of the Hon'ble High Court's direction dt. 19-12-1995 was defective. The Departmental Representative therefore requested for time to file a proper affidavit. The request was vehemently opposed by the Respondents. After considering the submissions the Bench gave a last opportunity to the Revenue to file a proper affidavit or to bear the consequences. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rabad. The matter was subsequently adjourned to 22-7-1996. 11. By an affidavit dated 18-4-1996 sworn by Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Hyderabad and filed before the Tribunal the Commissioner stated that the affidavit was being filed on the directions of the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court contained in its order in Writ Petition No. 23910/95, dated 19-12-1995 remanding the matter back to this Tribunal to consider afresh the application for condonation of delay. In para 3 of the affidavit the Commissioner submitted as under :- "3. I submit that the relevant facts leading to the filing of application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before CEGAT are as follows :- In compliance of the direction passed by the Hon'ble "C" Bench of the CEGAT, New Delhi on 28-7-1994 a separate application for condonation of delay is made before your Lordship. There has been a delay of 43 days in filing the appeal beyond the statutory period of three months for the following reasons :- during the period for appeal, the concerned Commissioner Shri Moheb Ali, Collector-II was on leave from 3-5-1993 to 18-6-1993 (Annexure-A). Shri A.K. Chabra, Collector-I was holding ad ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 85 (S.C.) Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (5) 1996 (83) E.L.T. 30 (Ker. HC) Standard Threads Pvt. Ltd v. CCE, Cochin (6) 1996 (83) E.L.T. 248 (S.C.) CCE v. National Chemical Industries (7) 1994 (69) E.L.T. 250 (T) Surendra Overseas v. CCE, Bhubneshwar (8) 1993 (64) E.L.T. 258 (T) CCE v. Alliance Udyog (9) 1993 (66) E.L.T. 425 (T) CCE v. Speedway Rubber Co. He contended that the Supreme Court itself had stated that a pragmatic approach needs to be taken in the case of the appeals filed by the State in view of the inherent nature of the governmental function. He submitted that in the instant case delay had occurred because the concerned Collector was on leave from 3-5-1993 to 18-6-1993 and another Collector was holding ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es, what was being considered was the "sufficiency" of the cause shown for purpose of considering condonation of delay in filing appeal. In the present case, the learned Counsel submitted, the question was not whether there was sufficient cause but whether the existence of any cause had been shown. He drew specific attention to the direction given by the Hon'ble High Court in the penultimate paragraph of the order by which the Tribunal was directed to give an opportunity to the Collector to file an application and "to submit an affidavit in support of the said application and also to place all material sought to be relied upon before the Tribunal". Ld. Counsel pointed out that the Tribunal had, pursuant to the direction of the Hon'ble High Court given the applicant sufficient opportunity to file such application and had given a clear direction by its order dated 19-9-1996 to place the necessary material before the Bench including the Collectorate file, in support of how the matters had moved in regard to those days when the Collector was present at the Head Quarters. The Tribunal had also categorically stated in its order dated 19-6-1996 that inspite of the specific order of the Be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the community ................ Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause........." Reliance was also placed by the ld. DR on the Allahabad High Court judgment in E. Sefton & Co. v. Union of India, 1993 (63) E.L.T. 626 (All. H.C.) in which a delay of 11 days was condoned. 15. In another case relied on by the ld. DR the Apex Court had condoned a delay of 12 days by the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y on the part of the Collector. The High Court had, therefore, set aside the Tribunal's Order condoning the delay and remanded the matter for reconsideration on the basis of any further material which may be relied upon by the Collector. Since the applicant had not, inspite of sufficient opportunity being given placed any further material before us, we do not find any reason for condoning the delay even after adopting the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in the State of Haryana v. Chandramani & Others, supra. The Department had referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Jeramdas Punjabi v. Union of India, 1992 (57) E.L.T. 36 (Bom.) as the A.P. High Court had directed that this matter was to be considered by the Tribunal. We find that the said decision deals with the question where the petitioner had not been given sufficient opportunity to defend his case in view of the late supply of documents relied upon by the adjudicating authority and where the adjudicating authority was directed to hold de novo proceedings and pass a fresh order. Even though the facts in this case do not involve the question of late supply of documents relied upon by the adjudicati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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