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TMI Blog1979 (8) TMI 206X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itioners that permission to import films will be granted provided all the shares of the petitioner Company are held by Indians. In pursuance of this direction from the Government on December 9, 1970, the petitioners converted entire share-holding and thereafter all the share-holders of the petitioner company are Indian citizens. 3. The Government of India declared its import policy for the year 1970-71 in respect of the exposed cinematograph films. The import of such films was allowed only through the S.T.C., New Delhi. The petitioners addressed a letter to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade on December 24, 1970 for approval of agreement dated March 11, 1969 between the petitioners and the Crompton Group Limited and also sought permission to import feature films. The petitioners thereafter sent several reminders and ultimately on January 18, 1971, an agreement was arrived at between the petitioners and respondent No. 1-the Union of India-in regard to the import of films by the petitioners. A copy of the agreement is annexed as Ex. C to the petition and it sets out that the terms of agreement will apply to all films imported from U.K. through M/s. Crompton Internat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... January 18, 1971, the petitioners have altered their position. The petitioners claimed that the Government of India entered into an agreement in spite of the fact that on an earlier date, import policy regarding the cinematograph films was announced canalising the import of the films only through S.T.C. The petitioners contend that as the petitioners have altered their position, the Government of India is estopped by principles of promissory estoppel from refusing import licence during the subsistence of the agreement. The petitioners further claimed that the two orders rejecting their applications give no ground save and except that the films can be imported only through S.T.C. and this fact was known to the respondents even prior to January 18, 1971 when the agreement was entered into. 5. In answer to the petition, a return has been filed sworn by P. Govinda Raju on April 11, 1979. It is claimed by the respondents that the petitioners are not entitled to enforce the contract by adopting the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also claimed that the agreement entered into by respondent No. 1 with the petitioners was void being opposed to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... strictly adhered to as it is well-known that pleadings on the Original Side of this Court are drafted by experienced counsel with due care. Mr. Taraporewala submits that in view of these observations of the Supreme Court, the mere denial by the respondents of the averments made in paragraph 17(g) of the petition is not sufficient to hold that the petitioners have not altered their position. I am satisfied from the material on record that the petitioners did alter their position in view of the contract dated January 18, 1971. 7. Mr. Taraporewala then relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Company Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others - A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 621 and claimed that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been held to be applicable against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. The learned counsel relied on the observations of the Supreme Court set out in head note (6) and especially the following observations :- "The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... from the liability : The Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands." Mr. Taraporewala relying upon this decision rightly contended that the doctrine of promissory estoppel clearly applies to the facts in the present case and the action of the respondents in denying the import-licence to the petitioner is untenable. The submission of the learned counsel is correct and must be upheld. Mr. Sethna, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, contended that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable to the facts of the present case and no relief should be granted to the petitioners because they have not altered their position. The submission has no merit and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, in my judgment, the petitioners have altered their position and the principle of promissory estoppel clearly applies. 8. Mr. Taraporewala then invited my attention to the two orders passed by respondent No. 2 rejecting the applications for grant of import licences and pointed out ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ondent No. 2 from grant of licence to an individual if the item of import is canalised. "Rule 6(l)(c) of the Import Control Order reads as follows : 6. Refusal of licence.-(1) The Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports may refuse to grant a licence or direct any other licensing authority not to grant a licence :- * * * * * (c) if it has been decided to canalise imports and distribution thereof through special or specialised agencies or channels." Mr. Sethna contends that this Rule 6(1)(c) requires the respondent No. 2 to refuse import licence as the item of films was a canalised item. The submission has no merit and must be turned down. In the first instance, the item is not completely banned and Rule 6(1)(c) is merely regulatory or discretionary. There is no total prohibition to grant import licence. Moreover, what respondent No. 2 has clearly overlooked is that in spite of such canalisation of the item, the respondent No. 1 h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this Court in K.N. Guruswamy's case, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 305= (AIR 1954 SC 592) there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory power." From these observations, it is clear that the petitioners can resort to a writ jurisdiction even if the right to relief arises out of an alleged breach of contract provided the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory power. It is not disputed that the orders which are challenged are of public authority invested with statutory powers and in view of this judgment, I have no hesitation in holding that the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is perfectly maintainable. 12. It is not in dispute that even now the import of films is not a banned item and the petitioners can be granted relief in respect of that item. For the reasons stated hereinabove, in my judgment, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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