TMI Blog1976 (8) TMI 2X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s and circumstances of the present case, are certain lands situated at Begumpet, Lalguda, Jaiguda, Subsimandi, Yerraguda, Zamboorkhana and Vicarabad, "agricultural lands" within the meaning of section 2(e)(i) of the Wealth-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") ? If any of the lands mentioned above are agricultural lands, as defined by the Act, they would be excluded from the definition of "assets" given in section 2(e) of the Act, and, therefore, exempt from wealth-tax. Section 2(e) says: "2(e) 'assets' includes. property of every description, movable or immovable, but does not include-- (i) agricultural land and growing crops, grass or standing trees on such land..." The word "agricultural land" occurs in entries 86, 87 and 88 of List I to the 7th Schedule of our Constitution relating to matters on which Parliament may legislate. Entry 86 here says: "Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of companies." Entries 87 and 88 deal with estate duty and duties of succession to property and each of them excludes agricultural land from property on which taxes may be levied by Parli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... asic idea that there must be at the bottom of it cultivation of land in the sense of tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting, and similar work done on the land itself. This basic conception is the essential sine qua non of any operation performed on the land constituting agricultural operation. If the basic operations are there, the rest of the operations found themselves upon the same. But if these basic operations are wanting the subsequent operations do not acquire the characteristic of agricultural operations." In Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy's case the question before this court was whether income from forest lands derived from sal and piyasal trees "not grown by human skill and labour" could constitute agricultural income. The test applied there was whether there was some integrated activity which could be described as agricultural operation yielding income. It was pointed out that, although a mere wild or spontaneous growth of trees, not involving the employment of any human labour or skill for raising them, could not be agricultural income, yet, when there was a forest more than 150 years old, which had been carefully nursed and attended to by its owners, the in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ies which are not authorities on what Parliament must have meant. Nevertheless, it was also indicated there that where there is nothing better to rely upon, dictionaries may be used as an aid to resolve an ambiguity. The ordinary dictionary meaning cannot be discarded simply because it is given in a dictionary. To do that would be to destroy the literal rule of interpretation. This is a basic rule relying upon the ordinary dictionary meaning which, in the absence of some overriding or special reasons to justify a departure, must prevail. Moreover, it was held there that the dictionary meanings of the word "agricultural" were wider than what was meant by "agricultural income" as that term was used in the Income-tax Act. Even if we could give a wider connotation to the term "agricultural" than the one it carries with it in the Income-tax Act, we cannot dispense with credible evidence of at least appropriation or setting apart of the land for a purpose which could be regarded as agricultural and for which the land under consideration could be reasonably used without an alteration of its character. This, we think, is the minimal test of "agricultural land" which should be applied in su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es, including Sarojini Devi v. Sri Krishna, which had not been followed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Manyam Meenakshamma v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax on the ground that the Madras view, that it was enough that the land was capable of being used for agricultural purposes, was no longer good law in view of the pronouncement of this court in Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy's case. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had said in Smt. Manyam Meenakshamma's case: "We are inclined to agree with the observations of Hegde and Ahmed Ali Khan JJ. in Sri Krishna Rao L. Balekai v. Third Wealth-tax Officer that the present characteristics and not the potentialities of a land are the proper criterion. If a land is ordinarily used for purposes of agriculture or for purposes subservient to or allied to agriculture, it would be agricultural land. If it is not so used, it would not be agricultural land. The question how a land is ordinarily used would be one of fact depending on the evidence in each case. If, for instance, an agricultural land, as we have interpreted above, is left fallow in a particular year owing to adverse seasonal conditions or to so ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... its compound said: "The land is of a large extent of 108 acres and abuts Hussain Sagar tank and has two wells in the land itself. These indicate that the land possesses all the characteristics of agricultural land and that it is capable of being put to agriculture. It is also not disputed that the land is vacant and has not been actually put to any purpose other than agriculture and that the physical character of the land is not such as to render it unfit for immediate cultivation. The other relevant fact is that the land has been admittedly assessed to land revenue as "agricultural land" under section 50 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act. These factors, in our opinion, strongly indicate that the land in question is agricultural land." We think that it is not correct to give as wide a meaning as possible to terms used in a statute simply because the statute does not define an expression. The correct rule is that we have to endeavour to find out the exact sense in which the words have been used in a particular context. We are entitled to look at the statute as a whole and give an interpretation in consonance with the purposes of the statute and what logically follows from the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... formulating a test of what is agricultural land. Conclusion No. 5 seems to have been the real or positive test, based on entries in revenue records, actually adopted by the Full Bench for determining the nature of the land. The attempted application of the principles laid down by the Full Bench shows that what were treated as tests were really presumptions arising from the following facts: firstly, that the area was 108 acres abutting Hussain Sagar tank; secondly, that this land had two wells in it; thirdly, that it was capable of being used for agricultural purposes; fourthly, that it had not been actually put to any use which could change the character of land by making it unfit for immediate cultivation; and, fifthly, that it was classified and assessed to land revenue as "agricultural land" under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Act 8 of 1317 Fasli perhaps on the assumption that it could be used for agriculture. We may observe that the first four indicia set out above are based on the absence of any user for non-agricultural purposes. Hence, they are inconclusive. The last feature does seem to provide some evidence of the character of the land from the po ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y at the time of classification of land as "agricultural" under the provisions of section 50 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Act. There must have been some evidence given for such a classification. Learned counsel for the assessee-respondents submitted that no evidence had been led on the question of intended user before the taxing authorities as the "prima facie evidence", provided by the entries in the revenue records, was considered enough. It has, however, to be remembered that such entries could raise only a rebuttable presumption. It could, therefore, be contended that some evidence should have been led before the taxing authorities of the purpose or intended user of the land under consideration before the presumption could be rebutted. If the "prima facie" evidence of the entries was enough for the assessee to discharge his burden to establish an exemption, as it seemed to be, evidence to rebut it should have been led on behalf of the department. We think that this aspect of the question was not examined by the Full Bench from a correct angle. Although it seems to have based its conclusion primarily on the "prima facie" evidence provided by the entries under section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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