TMI Blog1977 (3) TMI 174X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vember 17, 1973 somewhere in the evening one customer came to purchase wheat. It is alleged that the purchased 10 kg. of wheat and a bill to that effect was prepared by the petitioner and when he started weighing the quantity of wheat in the scales, one Mr. Thakarda who was in charge of the food grains section and one Antiben which appears to be the name by which witness Bhanuben Vakil was addressed found that the quantity of wheat, in the scale appeared to be more than what the customer had purchased and they stopped the petitioner from putting the wheat in the cotton cloth handbag which the customer had brought and 5 kg. of wheat were taken out and put back in the jute bag from which the wheat was taken. Mr. Thakarda in charge of the food grains section immediately submitted a report dated November 17, 1973 soon after the occurrence addressed to the assistant manager in which after setting out the aforementioned facts it was stated that the petitioner by mistake was likely to give 5 kg. wheat more than the quantity purchased to the customer and that such act of neglect was likely to cause loss to the employer and, therefore, the petitioner is required to be seriously reprimanded. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the employer before the Labour Court. The presiding officer of the Labour Court after a narration of facts held that no inducement appears to have been given by the employer to the petitioner at the time of making the inquiry to make the statement in the manner and in the way in which he had made it. It was further observed that even if the statement of the petitioner is excluded, there was unchallenged evidence of three witnesses. He then observed that there is no contention that the order of the inquiry officer is perverse of mala fide. Then comes the pertinent observation which may be re-produced to show how perfunctorily the whole case has been disposed of by the Labour Court. Observed the Labour Court : On misconduct being proved, it was in interest of company not to continue the workman in service. It is also held that there was a full-fledged inquiry in consonance with principles of natural justice. Having held that the misconduct is proved, the presiding officer of the Labour Court proceeded presumably to decided whether the penalty was out of all proportion to the gravity of the charges. In this connection he observed that there was no evidence to esta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mposed upon him. It provides that if on the conclusion of the inquiry or as the case may be, of the proceedings on a criminal charge, the workman has been found guilty of the charges framed against him and it is considered, after giving the workman concerned a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, that an order of dismissal or discharge or suspension or fine or stoppage of annual increment or reduction in rank would meet the ends of justice, the employer shall pass an order accordingly. Sub-clause (6) casts an obligation upon the manager to take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravation circumstances that may exist while awarding punishment. Standing Order 24 provides that a workman may be warned, censured or fined for any of the acts therein mentioned. We must take note of clause (c) and (d) which provide for negligence in performing duties and neglect of work. 5. The first contention is that on facts alleged there is no misconduct in respect of which an inquiry could have been held or punishment could have been imposed. On behalf of the petitioner it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ti is a forbidden field, let us clear the ground as to under what circumstances the High Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 can interfere with the finding recorded in the disciplinary inquiry or by the Labour Court. As serious controversy about our jurisdiction in a petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 is raised, it is necessary to clear the ground. The law in relation to the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in entertaining a plea for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution is well-settled. In order to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari it must be shown that the impugned order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. It is clear that the error must be an error of law and not an error of fact because an error of fact though serious and though it may be apparent on the face of the record cannot sustain a claim for a writ of certiorari. It is only errors of law that justify the issuance of said writs provided, of course, they are of such a character as would reasonably be treated as error apparent on the face of the record. If a finding of fact is made by the impugned order and it is s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... while deciding a dispute arising out of dismissal or discharge of a workman They are (i) there is want of bona fides; (ii) it is a case of victimisation or unfair labour practice or violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) there is a basic error of facts; or (iv) the finding is perverse in the sense that no sensible man acting fairly could ever come to the conclusion to which the Tribunal reached. The principles herein crystallized are supported by a number of decisions and it is not necessary to refer to each one of them in detail. To this one can add one more limb that where the inquiry which is either required to be held according to procedure prescribed in the Standing Order or according to the principles of natural justice and it has not been so held, the order recorded in such an inquiry would be a nullity. 10. Reverting to the facts of this case two things appear on the face of the record. They do not call for an inquiry or examination of disputed questions of facts which we would treat for the time being as forbidden field in which we would not enter. But the two salient features of the domestic inquiry held in this case are so staggering and they appe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n after by Mr. Tharkarda in charge of the food-grains section possibly reveals the whole truth. Mr. Thakarda says in Ext. 10 prepared immediately after the occurrence that after writing the bill for 10 kg. of wheat sold to the customer, when he was weighing the wheat, Mr. Thakarda and Antiben in time looked at the quantity of wheat and the petitioner was stopped before the wheat passed from the scale to the hand-bag of the customer. Therefore, the wheat was never handed over to the customer. The wheat still remained the property of the employer. It was still in the scale. Before that Antiben and Thakarda both pointed out that the wheat was more than what was purchased and from the scale itself 5 kg. were returned to the jute bag from which wheat was taken. This is the initial allegation. Two things are worth noting. There is not the slightest reference to Udesing who appears to be the villain of the piece who has subsequently interposed himself and given a different colour to this modest possible error to be, as the most heinous crime. There is not the slightest reference to Udesing being present at the time. There is not the slightest reference in Ext. 10 that Udesing ever drew at ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ager who held the inquiry must be conscious of the requirements of clause (6) of Standing Order 23 which requires that before awarding punishment of dismissal, the entire record of the workman has to be examined and though the record reveals that he is oblivious of the requirements and provisions of the Standing Orders, normal presumption is that he knows the relevant provisions and would ordinarily comply with them. He must examine the same and yet he does not say that this petitioner was in the past guilty of slightest negligence in the discharge of his duties. The immediate superiors or co-workers whichever way we look at, Thakarda and Antiben described the incident soon after the occurrence as a mistake committed by the petitioner. Now look at the degree of the consequences because Mr. Nanavati has relied on one or two authorities to show how frightful are the consequences. Loss to the employer would be ₹ 8-50 ps. If the lapse was not detected in time and the goods had gone out of the employer's institution. Could it be said to be serious or irreparable or even atrocious or very harmful consequences. However what is worth noting is that loss of not even a pie has been ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or who carelessly places a plus sign instead of a minus sign in a question paper may cause numerous examines to fail; a compounder in a hospital or chemists' shop who makes up the mixtures or other medicines carelessly may cause quite a few deaths; the man at an airport who does not carefully filter the petrol poured into a plane may cause it to crash; the railway employee who does not set the point carefully may cause a head-on collision. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil. Vide Royal Printing Works v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, [1959-II L.L.J. 619]. 13. Taking all these illustrations together is it possible with an extreme bias in favour of the employer, an employee who is so very touchy about his financial affairs, that one possible mistake detected in time before loss occurred, styled in the inquiry report as a mistake, can constitute gross misconduct, apprehended loss being of ₹ 8.50 only, so that an employee whose record is spotless can be straightway dismissed ? 14. We may take a leaf from the decided case. In Andhra Scientific Co v. Seshagiri Rao, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 408, the misconduct alleged was habitual negligence as work of arranging the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erse that there was no misconduct at all on facts alleged and taken as admitted ? Let the facts alleged be taken as wholly admitted. Could a man acting fairly in possession of full faculties of his mind having a sensible approach to the problem posed before him write an epitaph that this is a case of gross negligence. No one can say that. There was no misconduct. We are not looking into adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. We are always conscious of the forbidden field. It is the function of the Tribunal to find whether the evidence was adequate or sufficient. We are taking the evidence as produced to be wholly correct at the initial stage and feel that there is no misconduct. Can we not say that under Art. 226 ? If writ can be issued to advance the cause of justice, then it is justice if we say that what is suggested as misconduct by any standards does not appear to be misconduct. It has to be a misconduct in law. In other words, it has to be a misconduct as understood in the Standing Orders and that Standing Orders refers to gross misconduct. If there was no misconduct, the adjective gross is futile. If there was no negligence, it could never be said to be gross negligence. It ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed over 15 kg. of wheat and the entire quantity was in the handbag of the customer and, therefore, he developed a suspicion and, therefore, he took out the wheat from the cloth bag of the customer and weighed them again and he himself took out 5 kg. of wheat in presence of Thakarda and returned 10 kg. to the customer. Then he informed Bhanuben about the occurrence. It is this Udesing's evidence which is relied upon by the inquiry officer. Udesing's name was never mentioned in the charge-sheet, his presence was never referred to. What he says is not to be found in the charge-sheet. Till the charge-sheet was served it was nobody's case that 15 kg. had gone into the customer's handbag and Udesing took them out. If such a thing had occurred, Thakarda would not have missed mentioning about it in Ext. 10, a report submitted by him soon after the occurrence. And look at Thakarda's performance. He falls in line with Udesing. Bhanuben says that her attention was draw by Udesing. She also falls in line with Udesing. If the employer was acting fairly, how did it become necessary to introduce Udesing who was never shown as a witness in the preliminary complaint or in the ch ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the charge was of gross negligence as envisaged in Standing Order 24(m), the inquiry has to be held according to the provisions of Standing Order 25. One of the requirements in clause (4) was that the workman shall be permitted to be defended by a workman working in the same department as himself. The clause appears to be mandatory in character in that if the permission was asked for, it has got to be granted. The only distinction made by Mr. Nanavati was that the permission has to be asked for and no such permission was asked for. This aspect more often assumes importance in number of matters. If a workman is a member of some organized union, the union may step in having its won source of knowledge of law and the rights. But a man like the petitioner, possibly not member of any union or any union appearing to take any interest in him and who was getting a consolidated wage of ₹ 145 per month, was he expected to know the provisions of clause (4) of Standing Order 25 ? We positively pointed out that the manager who claims the power of dismissal does not know it. We will be pointing out at two or three places that he was completely oblivious of the requirement of Standing Orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the same and they were taken out of the bag and reweighed and thereafter 5 kg. wheat were taken out. That is wholly absent in the charge-sheet yet the final order is based on that allegation. Therefore, while the charge was one way, the inquiry has proceeded in a different way. The subject-matter of the charge having been held proved, the punishment has been imposed. But there is a still greater defect in the inquiry. Clause (5)(c) requires that if on the conclusion of the inquiry or as the case may be, of the proceedings on a criminal charge, the workman has been found guilty of the charges framed against him and it is considered, after giving the workman concerned, a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, that an order of dismissal or discharge if it would meet the ends of justice, it can be passed. This is something akin to the second notice as contemplated by Art. 311 of the Constitution before its present amendment and it is a well-settled principle that failure to give a second opportunity would vitiate the order. Not even Mr. Nanavati could at least tell us how the record shows that the employer had satisfied or met with the requirements ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to whether the inquiry was held consistent with the provisions of the standing orders. The situation which prevailed with the Manager appear to have prevailed with the Labour Court also. Now if the misconduct was as alleged by the management, namely, gross misconduct, the punishment of dismissal would follow as a matter of course. Having held that misconduct is proved, it would mean that the Labour Court held that the petitioner was guilty of gross negligence in discharge of duty. The Court then observed there is no evidence to establish that the customer concerned was known to the workman which finding completely excludes any suggestion of any improper motive on the part of the workman. The Labour Court then observed that the workman has a clean record, a fact which the Manager had omitted to note. Then the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the value of 5 kg. of wheat would be ₹ 8.50 meaning thereby that it was a flee-bite on which no action should have been initiated. If a simple question was asked to the Manager as to what was the turnover of this employer's institution, probably this possible loss which had not occurred of ₹ 8.50 would have at least show ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... em posed before it. Therefore, it is proper that this Court must interfere. 20. It is at this stage that Mr. Nanavati formulated three propositions for our consideration. They may be reproduced in his own words : (1) The High Court would have no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Labour Court particularly when the Labour Court has found on facts that a misconduct is committed and in exercise of discretion has converted the order of dismissal into discharge; (2) Misconduct alleged and proved against the employee consists of gross negligence in discharge of his duty which would attract the penalty of dismissal; and (3) Assuming that the order of the Labour Court is required to be set aside, the matter will have to be remanded to the Labour Court so far as the claim to reinstatement and back wages is concerned. 21. Taking the first proposition it is answered by the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs. The domestic inquiry was bad as it was contrary to the principles of natural justice and in complete violation of the provisions of the relevant standing orders. The order of the Labour Court suffers completely from non-application of m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded the employee would continue to serve. All this gloss, whether reinstatement should be given or compensation should be given, developed after a question was raised about loss of confidence. Even if the dismissal is not justified, it was contended that the employer having lost confidence in the employee, reinstatement should not be ordered, compensation should be paid for wrongful termination. In days gone by it was said that if a cook or a driver or a wallet is reinstated against the employer's wish, he would remain in perpetual fear from his cook or driver. Every time he sits for his meal, the unwanted cook can generate mental agony. While using his car he has continuous apprehension that the driver would jeopardise his life. For persons holding such posts it was considered that ordinarily reinstatement should not be ordered because the employer's peace of mind will be disturbed. This was further expanded to domestic peace and harmony. But to-day in large concerns, between employer and ultimate employee, there is hierarchy of officers. The director or Managing director could even hardly claim to personally know persons serving in the lower echelons of service. If they e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... next question is about back wages, Mr. Nanavati contended that there is no evidence to show as to what the petitioner was doing during the period he was dismissed from service and by the time he is asked to go back to service under the orders of this Court and, therefore, the matter must go back to the Labour Court for an inquiry into this aspect. We would like to take three steps while negativing this contention. Standing Order 25(5)(b) casts an obligation that if an employee is suspended pending the inquiry he should be paid subsistence allowance. Admittedly nothing was paid in this case. There is a further provisions that the inquiry must be finished in four day. The inquiry was over, of course, by November 23, 1973 and we would say it was over in four days. But the Deputy Manager submitted his report on December 15, 1973. The Manager took action on December 19, 1973 four days after the report and the petitioner was not reinstated. He was neither paid any subsistence allowance nor was he taken back in service. Of course after the dismissal there was no question of paying anything but this would reinforce our conclusion that any reference to standing order was conspicuous by its ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... reinstatement was granted. Against the order of the Tribunal granting reinstatement, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court and a stay of operation of the order was obtained. It was unconditionally granted. When the appeal came up for final hearing and it was being dismissed, it was observed by the Supreme Court that it saw no reason for depriving the workmen of their full wages from the date the award became operative to the date of their reinstatement. It may be mentioned that the Tribunal had awarded one third of the wages for the period between dismissal and the award granting reinstatement and the Supreme Court granted full back wages from the date of award till reinstatement after the dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court. 29. The question really is as to from what date back wages should be paid ? It is the termination that brings about cessation in getting it. If at the date on which he has stopped rendering service by an order which is found to be illegal, that must be the relevant date from which the back wages must start subject to the general principle that if the employee has thereafter served somewhere else, the amount so earned by him should be adj ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Part III or for any other purpose. Article 227(1) before its amendment by the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act provided that every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. By the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act Art. 226(1) has been recast and it reads as under : 226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Art. 32 but subject to the provisions of Art. 131A and Art. 226A, every High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directors, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them - (a) for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III; or (b) for the redress of any injury of a substantial nature by reason of the contravention of any other provision of this Constitution or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance or any order, rule, regulation, bye-law or other instrument made thereun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... passed, it could not be said that in a pending matter this jurisdiction is lost. It was not submitted that this petition has abated. It was only said that we cannot exercise jurisdiction under Art. 227(1). It is not necessary to finally decided this question in this petition because we are in a position to deal with the submission of Mr. Nanavati even if we confine ourselves to the amended Art. 226. 33. Under Art. 226 with its recent amendments, this Court can in appropriate cases grant writ in the nature of habeas corpus, or any other direction or order amongst other things under clause (b) for redress of any injury of a substantial nature by reason of the contravention of any other provision of the Constitution or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance or any order, rule, regulation, bye-law or other instrument made thereunder. That is one power enjoyed by this High Court. The High Court can also grant a writ, direction or order under clause (c) for redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in sub-clause (b) where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice. Now ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... person . It is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, another to authorise its free exercise like a bull in a China shop. The Supreme Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those whole some inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and the potent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in critical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writ power has, by and large, been the people's sentinel on the qui vive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights. Vide Rohats Industries v. Its Union, [1976-I L.L.J. 274]; A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 425 at page 429. Approaching the matter from this angle it was in terms held that a writ could go against an award made under S. 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act by an arbitrator appointed by the parties. It was, however, said that the purpose for which power may be exercised is entirely different from not only the manner of exercise but the ultimate order that is passed. The submission is that Court may exerc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as a failure to exercise jurisdiction or there was an excess in exercising jurisdiction but that the quasi judicial Tribunal has acted in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules governing it and it has caused harm to the petitioner by wrongfully terminating his services. In such a case for a writ of certiorari should the Court content itself by merely quashing the order by which termination was provided for ? In other words, is it a correct approach to the problem for in every case where a writ of certiorari is prayed for, the jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226(1) comes to an end as soon as the impugned order is quashed. That would be denuding the vital power conferred on the Court by Art. 226. It can not only issue a writ the nature of habeas corpus but appropriate direction an order and this has been more often recognised. In a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court is required to pass final order so as to grant relief. If the petition is to be dismissed, there is an end of the matter, but if the petition is to be allowed, one has surely to mould the order. To say that a writ of certiorari can be granted only by quashing t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in terms said that when a petitioner complains of violation of his statutory rights and approaches the High Court under Art. 226, it has power and jurisdiction to grant consequential relief. 38A. In Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 81, it was said that the High Court under Art. 226 can issue directions, order or writs other than prerogative writs and thereby the High Courts are enable to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Issuance of a writ of certiorari means one thing and one thing only that of quashing the order. There is no question of moulding the reliefs because there is only one relief that the order need be quashed. Therefore when the Supreme Court on two occasions said that the Court can grant consequential relief in a appropriate case it only meant one thing that even when issuing a writ of certiorari, the Court has to mould the reliefs so as to be effective. Otherwise it will remain a paper relief only. 39. Two or three further illustrative cases can be looked at. In Behari Lal Baldeo Prasad v. Commissioner, Jhansi Division, (1967) 63 I.T.R. 555, a question arose before the Allahabad H ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as to grant full and complete relief to the petitioner to which he is entitled. 41. In this connection, however, it was said that as in such a situation ordinarily the Court exercises both the power, one under Art. 226 and one under Art. 227, the line demarcating the jurisdiction under both the Articles was not exactly maintained because the High Court exercised jurisdiction under both the Articles. It was said that sometimes writ jurisdiction was exercised by a High Court under Art. 227 and superintendence jurisdiction was exercised under Art. 226 but now that there is no superintending jurisdiction over the Tribunal, specific demarcating line will have to be drawn. It was said that if these two separate and independent jurisdictions are clearly demarcated and kept in view, once there is no superintending jurisdiction under Art. 227, the only course left open to the Court is to quash the order and leave the matter at that, because in some cases a direction that the matter should go back to the Tribunal and be decided in accordance with the observations made in the judgment of the High Court was also considered in excess of jurisdiction. 42. Reliance was placed o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dustrial Court to dispose of the appeal of the petitioner according to law. An incidental discussion took place whether such a direction could be given in a petition under Art. 227 and it was observed that Art. 227 appears to have been used in effect as a substitute for Art. 226 for seeking a direction in nature of a writ for quashing the orders of the subordinate tribunals. And the proceeding before the High Court was treated in that fashion. A word of caution was uttered by the Supreme Court that it should not be understood to have expressed its approval of the use of Art. 227 for seeking relief by way of writs or directions in the nature of writs for which purpose Art. 226 is expressly and in precise language designed. It was, however, also observed that as the petition was under Art. 227 and as the relief granted has finally settled the points affecting the rights of the parties, the order should be treated as the final order made under Art. 226 and the matter was left at that. 45. Reference in this connection was also made to Thakur Birendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (1969) 3 S.C.C. 489. In that case a petition was filed challenging the orders o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e petitioners should succeed. The case would have ended with quashing of the offending Government order but it was urged before the Court as to what would happen to those who pursuant to the offending Government order were superannuated and were out of service and whether any relief could be given to them. The Court proceeded to answer this problem by observing that it would create an anomaly if such persons who have already left the service and who have sought necessary relief from the Court should not be provided with an effective relief but only a paper advantage. As directions can also be given even though the rule asked for is one for certiorari as such directions are issued to advance the remedy and to prevent the mischief, a direction was given that in such cases wherein the Social Welfare Workers were asked to quit the service on the strength and application of the impugned rule, they should be deemed to have continued in the service. The matter was put on principle observing that as the Courts in India need not be confined to the time honoured concept attaching to the time honoured concept attaching to the high prerogative writs issued in England but must keep in mind the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es back to the Labour Court. What has the Labour Court to do but merely to pass an order for reinstatement and back wages ? Even on the question of back wages the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court which are binding have not been taken into consideration. Should we merely pay a lip sympathy to the form rather than the substance of the matter ? Therefore, having examined the arguments of Mr. Nanavati from all possible angles, we cannot persuade ourselves to accept the submission and our hands are further fortified by the language in which Art. 226 as at present stands on the Constitution is couched. 50. A writ can issue under Art. 226(1) for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. Formerly the language was for the enforcement of any of the right conferred by Part III and for any other purchase . The expression other purpose were construed wide enough to include various illegalities. The expression other purpose is omitted. But look at the language employed in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 226(1). It clearly envisages the situation with which we are confronted. A writ, direction or order can issue from this High Court for the redress of any injury of a substantial ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . It has to be given full meaning and effect. The amendment we have been told has been done after examining what has gone on while exercising writ jurisdiction and to make it possibly more effective. The words used are grant relief where injury is of a substantial nature by redressing it. We may also turn to the language of clause (c). There the expression used is redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority . Labour Court is certainly an authority. The proceedings were before the Labour Court. The Labour Court did not look at the law of the land. The Labour Court did not redress itself to the first question whether what was alleged was a misconduct at all the proceeding was a proceeding initiated by the workman for redress of grievance, namely, reinstatement and back wages the proceedings was started by the petitioner before an authority constituted under a statute. The illegality committed by the Labour Court is patent on the record in the sense that it did not care to look at the problem according to the law as laid down in this country and in force in this country. Therefore, after the introduction of clause (b) and (c) in A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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