TMI Blog1988 (11) TMI 360X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... long term mortgages in the present inflationary market in fast moving conditions are clogs on equity of redemption and as such the mortgages are redeemable at the mortgagors' instance before the stipulated period and whether the tenants who have been inducted by the mortgagees can be evicted on the termination of the mortgage or do these tenants enjoy protection under the relevant Rent Restriction Acts. One basic fact that was emphasised in all these cases was that all these involve urban immovable properties. In those circumstances, whether the mortgages operate as clogs on equity of redemption is a mixed question of law and facts. It is necessary to have a conspectus of the facts involved in each of the cases herein. We may start with the facts relating to Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8219 of 1982 because that is a typical case. 2 . In this matter by our order dated 9th January 1988 we had directed that this special leave petition should be heard first in these series of matters. We do so accordingly. We grant leave and dispose of the appeal by the judgment herein along with other appeals. 3. This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssession was to be handed over to the mortgagees, they took condition for interest on the part of principal amount in the mortgage deed. Moreover, the mortgagees were given liberty to spend any amount they liked for the improvement of the suit property. They were also permitted to rebuild the entire property. Thus the terms and conditions, according to the Appellate Judge, were incorporated in the mortgage deed to ensure that the mortgagors are prevented for ever from redeeming the mortgage. The terms and conditions, according to the Assistant Judge, Bhuj, being the first Appellate Court were unreasonable, oppressive and harsh and amounted to clog on equity of redemption and, as such, bad and the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem the mortgage even before the expiry of the term of mortgage. A registered notice to the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was given to redeem the mortgage but they failed to do so, hence, the present suit was filed to redeem the mortgage and to recover actual possession from the defendants Nos. 4 to 9 who were the tenants inducted by the mortgagees. 4. The defendant No. 1 resisted the suit. It was his case that the term of mortgage was for 99 years, so the suit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n. When the suit was filed in the year 1972, the mortgagees were entitled to recover interest on 10,000 koris for a period of 29 years. That interest will be 17400 koris so the total mortgage amount will be ₹ 47400/- which will be equivalent to ₹ 15800/- and the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to try such suit so the plaint should have been returned for presentation in the proper court. It was further alleged that the court fees paid by the plaintiffs was also not sufficient. Moreover, it was not true that the father of the plaintiffs was of weak economic condition. The grand father of the plaintiffs was an Advocate and the father of the plaintiffs was the clerk of an Advocate. The plaintiff No. 1 was also working as an Advocate at the time of the mortgage, so they knew the legal position. It was further alleged that at the relevant time the prevalent custom in Kutch State was to take mortgages of long term for 99 years and when it was permissible to take mortgage deeds with such a long term, it was also necessary to give permission for rebuilding the whole property, for better enjoyment of it. So the conditions in mortgage deed for long term mortgage and for reconstruc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... from the defendants Nos. 4 to 9 who were the tenants inducted by the mortgagees. Accordingly, a preliminary decree was passed in the suit. 6. Aggrieved thereby the mortgagees filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 149/78 and the tenants filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 150/78. These were disposed of by the judgment of the first Appellate Court. The learned Judge of the first Appellate Court framed the following issues: Whether the terms and conditions in the mortgage deed dated 20.4.1943 amount to clog on equity of redemption? Whether the decree passed is bad for want of jurisdiction with trial court? Whether the mortgagees are entitled to the interest on 10.000/- koris? Whether the tenants are protected from the effect of redemption decree by virtue of the provisions of Bombay Rent Act? Whether the decree passed by the trial court is legal and proper? What order? 7. It is not necessary any longer in view of the findings made and the subsequent course of events to detain ourselves on all the issues. For the purpose of the present appeal as well as the connected appeals we are concerned with two issues, namely, Issue Nos. 1 and 4 stated above, in other words, whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rom that bondage. 9. Shri Rajinder Sachar, Shri B.K. Mehta as well as Shri Dholakia urged on behalf of their respective clients that in former Kutch district, there was a custom to take mortgages for long term of 99 years and when the period was long, naturally the mortgage would be required to give full authority to repair and reconstruct the mortgaged property with a view to keep pace with new demands of changing pattern, so the condition permitting the mortgage to reconstruct the whole premises was natural consequence of long term and it should not be treated as clog on equity of redemption. The learned Assistant Judge had rejected the similar contention made before him on behalf of the mortgagees and tenants in view of the decisions of the Gujarat High Court which were also arising out of the decisions in the suits filed in Kutch district and in those cases it was held that there was clog on equity of redemption. We will deal with the Gujarat cases separately, presently. The learned Assistant Judge referred to another circumstance i.e., to the condition of mortgage which indicated the oppressive nature of the term. By mortgage deed being Ext. 103 usufructuary mortgage was cr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... decree by virtue of the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, it may be mentioned that the tenants had filed regular civil appeal and it was urged before the learned Assistant Judge that even if the mortgage was redeemed, the tenants inducted by the mortgagees would be entitled to continue in possession of the properties in question as they were protected by the provisions of the said Rent Act. There was no dispute in this case and in the facts of the other three appeals that the tenants were inducted by the mortgagees after the mortgage was created. It is also true that in all these mortgage deeds, there was provision that the mortgagees were competent to lease out the suit property and if in exercise of that power, they inducted the tenants in the suit properties their tenancies would not come to an end on the redemption of mortgage, it was argued. The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Lalji Purshottam v. Thacker Madhavji Meghaji 17 GLR 497 held that the mortgage in possession might lease the property, but authorisation to the mortgage to let out the property to any other tenant would not amount to an intention to create tenancy beyond the term of mortgage. Following the said ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iven in the decree to the judgment debtors to hand over the possession of the mortgaged property within three months on the decree-holder making payment of dues in respect of the mortgage in the Court. In pursuance of the final decree the decree-holder took out the execution proceedings and deposited the dues in the Court. At the same time the decree-holder claimed possession of the mortgaged property from one Shambhulal Vallabhji Thacker, the appellant herein, stating that he was a tenant in the possession of the property. The notice was issued to Shambhulal Vallabhji, who appeared before the Court and submitted his objections stating that he was a tenant protected by law and he could not be evicted in the execution of the decree obtained by the decreeholder. He also stated that he was entitled to get the protection under the Bombay Rent Control Act. The learned District Judge held that there was no conduct on the part of the decree-holder which would stop him from claiming physical possession from the tenant of the mortgage in possession. It was contended that when the mortgage leased out the mortgaged property under the ordinary prudent management of the mortgaged property the m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iz Khan v. Duni Chand and Ors. A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 48, where it was held that where the transaction in question was undoubtedly improvident in the absence of any evidence to show that the money-lender had unduly taken advantage of his position, it was difficult for a Court of justice to give relief on grounds of simple hardship. Shri Sachar tried to urge in the facts and circumstances of the instant case that there is no evidence to lead to the conclusion that there was any undue influence. Great deal of reliance, however, by the appellants as well as the respondents was placed on the observations of this Court in Seth Ganga Dhar v. Shankar Lal and Ors. (supra). There, this Court observed that the rule against clog on equity of redemption embodied in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act empowers the Court not only to relieve a mortgagor of a bargain whereby in certain circumstances his right to redeem the mortgage is wholly taken away, but also where that right is restricted. The extent of the latter power is, however, limited by the reason that gave rise to it, namely, the unconscionable nature of the bargain, which, to a court of equity, would afford sufficient ground for reli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urity is redeemable on the payment or discharge of such debt or obligation, any provision to the contrary notwithstanding. That, in my opinion, is the law. Any provision inserted to prevent redemption on payment or performance of the debt or obligation for which the security was given is what is meant by a clog or fetter on the equity of redemption and is therefore void. It follows from this, that once a mortgage always a mortgage 17. The right of redemption, therefore, cannot be taken away. The Courts will ignore any contract the effect of which is to deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem the mortgage. It was further reiterated at page 515 of the report in Seth Ganga Dhar's case (supra) that the rule against clogs on the equity of redemption no doubt involves that the Courts have the power to relieve a party from his bargain. If he has agreed to forfeit wholly his right to redeem in certain circumstances, that agreement will be avoided. But the Courts have gone beyond this. They have also relieved mortgagors from bargains whereby the right to redeem has not been taken away but restricted. It is a power evolved by the early English Courts of Equity for a special reas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and if it turned out to be in truth one of mortgage simply, to place it on that footing. It was, in ordinary cases, only where there was conduct which the Court of Chancery regarded as unconscientious that it interfered with freedom of contract. The lending of money, on mortgage or otherwise, was looked on with suspicion, and the court was on the alert to discover want of conscience in the terms imposed by lenders. 19. The reason justifying the Court's power to relieve a mortgagor from the effects of his bargain is its want of conscience. Putting it in more familiar language the Court's jurisdiction to relieve a mortgagor from his bargain depends on whether it was obtained by taking advantage of any difficulty or embarrassment that he might have been in when he borrowed the moneys on the mortgage. Length of the term, according to Sarkar, J. in the aforesaid decision, was not by itself oppressive and could not operate as a clog on the equity of redemption. There was a term in the mortgage deed that the mortgagees could spend any amount on repairs and those expenses would be paid, according to the account produced by the mortgagees. All that it meant was that in claiming ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rge number of decisions have been cited at the Bar. Shri T.U. Mehta, Shri Rajinder Sachar, Shri B.K. Mehta and Shri Dholakia very ably and painstakingly argued this case in respect of their contentions. 23. Our attention was drawn to the observations of the Allahabad High Court in Chhedi Lal v. Babu Nandan AIR1944All204 where it was held that the provision inserted to, prevent redemption on payment or performance of the debt or obligation for which security was given, was a clog on equity of redemption. Condition in mortgage was in that case that if mortgage constructed new building by demolition of mortgaged property which was kachcha structure, mortgagor would pay cost of construction at the time of redemption. Stipulation in circumstances of the case, it was held, did not amount to clog on equity of redemption. It was argued before us by the mortgagees that the provision for the payment towards cost and expenses of repairs and construction did not amount to a clog on the equity of redemption because the repairs and construction were to be effectuated to keep the property in good condition. In the aforesaid decision Verma, J. at page 207 of the report observed that in the case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ccepted by this Court in this country, looks with disfavour at clogs on the equity of redemption. Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, in India, also recognises the same position. 26. It is a right of the mortgagor on redemption, by reason of the very nature of themortgage, to get back the subject of the mortgage and to hold and enjoy as he was entitled to hold and enjoy it before the mortgage. If he is prevented from doing so or is prevented from redeeming the mortgage, such prevention is bad in law. If he is so prevented, the equity of redemption is affected by that whether aptly or not, and it has always been termed as a clog. Such a clog is inequitable. The law does not countenance it. Bearing the aforesaid background in mind, each case has to be judged and decided in its own perspective. As has been observed by this Court that long-term for redemption by itself, is not a clog on equity of redemption. Whether or not in a particular transaction there is a clog on the equity of redemption, depends primarily upon the period of redemption, the circumstances under which the mortgage was created, the economic and financial position of the mortgagor, and his relationship vis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion then keeping in view the financial and economic conditions of the mortgagor, the clause obliging the payment of interest even in case of usufructuary mortgage not periodically but at a time of ultimate reduction imposing a burden on the mortgagor to redeem, the clauses permitting construction and reconstruction of the building in this inflationary age and debiting the mortgagor with an obligation to pay for the same as a ground for redemption, would amount to clog on equity. 29. Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, conferred on the mortgagor the right of redemption. This is a statutory right. The right of redemption is an incident of a subsisting mortgage and it subsists so long as the mortgage subsists. See the observations in R. Ghose Law of Mortgage 6th Edn. page 227. 30. Whether in a particular case there is any clog on the equity of redemption, has to be decided in view of its background of the particular case. The doctrine of clog on equity of redemption has to be moulded in the modern conditions. See Mulla: Transfer of Property Act', 17th Edn. 402. Law does not favour any clog on equity of redemption. 31. It is a settled law in England and in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on a combined reading of all the terms of the mortgage. The learned Judge found that this long term of lease along with the cost of repairing or reconstruction to be paid at the time of redemption by the mortgagor indicated that there was clog on equity of redemption. The learned Judge referred to certain observations of Mr. Justice Macklin of the Bombay High Court where Justice Macklin had observed that anything which does have the appearance of clogging redemption must be examined critically, and that if the conditions in the mortgage taken as a whole and added together do create unnecessary difficulties in the way of redemption it seems that is a greater or less clog upon the equity of redemption within the ordinary meaning of the term. In our opinion, such observations will apply with greater force in the present inflationary market. The other decision to Which reference may be made is the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Soni Motiben v. Hiralal Lakhamshi 22 GLR 473. This also reiterates the same principle. In Vadilal Chhaganlal Soni and Ors v. Gokaldas Mansukh and Ors. AIR1953Bom408 also, the same principle was reiterated. In that case, it was held by Gajendragadkar J., ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... emphasised by the First Appellate Court that the fact that the son of the mortgagor subsequently became Civil Judge would not affect the position because what was relevant was the financial condition at the time of the transaction. We have further to bear in mind that it has come out in the evidence that the father of the plaintiff was residing in the suit property at the relevant time and there was no other residential house except the suit property. The First Appellate Court, therefore, emphasised in our opinion rightly that if there was no pressure from the creditor, no body would like to mortgage the only house which is sole abode on the earth. 36. In that view of the matter and in view of the position in law, we are of the opinion that the First Appellate Court was right in the view it took. 37. The First Appellate Court referred to the decision of Kunjbiharilal v. Pandit Prag Narayan AIR 1922 Oudh 283. In that case there was a condition that the mortgagor should pay interest along with the principal amount at the time of redemption after 50 years. It was held that the intention was to see that right of redemption could never be exercised. If the condition was such which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee. Further the mortgagee, who takes possession of the mortgaged property, must manage it as person of ordinary prudence would manage if it were his own; and he must not commit any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the property. Reliance maybe placed for this purpose on Section 76, Clauses (a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1832. It was held that the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, did not apply to the lessees since they were not 'settled raiyats' and the lessees could not claim to have secured under the statute occupancy rights in the land. It was further held that the mortgagor was entitled to the possession of the land upon redemption of the mortgage. In a slightly different context in Harihar Prasad Singh v. Must, of Munshi Nath Prasad [1956]1SCR1 this Court was concerned with a mortgage with possession effected on agricultural land. This Court had to consider in that decision whether under the provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act the tenant inducted on the mortgaged property during the pendency of the mortgage could claim right to remain in possession after th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... led to the protection. It must be noted as observed by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court that all the cases that we have so far considered are cases of agricultural lands and in each of these cases the question was examined from two points; first, whether the lease could be said to be a lease granted in the course of prudent management and, in the alternative, whether the rights of the tenant inducted by the mortgage with possession had been enlarged as a result of a special statute dealing with the rights of tenants of agricultural lands. 40. This question, however, has been agitated before this Court in the background of the non-agricultural lands especially in urban areas. In All India Film Corporation v. Raja Cyan Nath [1970]2SCR581 , the question was in respect of lease of a cinema house granted by the mortgage with possession. Hidyatullah, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Court, observed in paragraph 7 that a general proposition of law is that no person can confer on another a better title than he himself has. A mortgage is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing repayment of a loan. A mortgage's interest lasts onl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n instant the mortgage is redeemed and, unless there is a fresh forging of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the mortgagor and the erstwhile tenant by (i) the voluntary act of the parties or (ii) a deemed forging of the relationship by express provision in the Act itself, the 1st while tenant cannot claim protection under the Act so as to perpetuate his occupation of the building as a tenant. The rule of exception contained in Section 76(a) of the T.P. Act cannot be readily and automatically invoked by a tenant let into possession of urban property by a mortgage with possession. The principle of exception afforded by Section 76(a) of that Act applies ordinarily to the management of agricultural lands and has seldom been extended to urban property so as to tie it up in the hands of lessees or to confer on them rights under special statutes. It may be open to a tenant inducted upon urban property by a mortgage with possession to rely upon Section 76(a) to claim tenancy right for the full term of the tenancy notwithstanding the redemption of the mortgage earlier. But, it is for the person who claims such benefits to strictly establish the binding nature of the tenancy, c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on to allow expressly the creation of a tenancy beyond the terms of the mortgage, the mere fact that the mortgage deed authorises the mortgage with possession to induct a tenant would not create a tenancy binding on the mortgagor after the redemption of the mortgage. In such a case a tenant inducted on the property by a mortgage with possession when the tenancy of that tenant is not binding on the mortgagor after the redemption of the mortgage, is not protected under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid view expressed by the Chief Justice given on behalf of the Full Bench represents the correct position in law in respect of the second aspect of the question canvassed before us. 42. We have noticed the view of the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court on this aspect. This question was again envisaged by this Court in the background of the Rajasthan Premises Act in Om Prakash Garg v. Ganga Sahai and Ors. : AIR1988SC108 holding that on passing of the final decree of redemption of the mortgage, the lease did not subsist and the tenant is not entitled to protection under the Rajasthan Premises ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... already in force when the mortgage granted lease to the appellant and it was only from January 64 the Bombay Rent Act came to replace the Saurashtra Act. In Civil Appeal No. 9993 of 1982, Pomal Kanji Govindji and Ors. v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit and Ors., Shri B.K. Mehta took us to the factual background. The appellants who are tenants in the mortgage properties being defendants Nos. 4 to 9 in the original suit had resisted the suit for redemption and contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession from them since their rights are protected under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and the said Act has applied to the area of Kutch in the Bombay State. Therefore, no decree for eviction could be passed against them except in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. The High Court held that redemption of mortgage was possible and the suit was maintainable as mentioned hereinbefore. However, as regards the question of protection of the tenants under the Bombay Rent Act, Shri Mehta proceeded to submit that the learned Judge did not make any finding as to when the tenants were inducted nor did he express his opinion about the ev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nandan v. Roshan Lal (supra). But in view of the facts that there was no definite finding the question is whether the alleged lease was an act of prudent management on the part of the mortgage in possession in terms of Section 76(a) was left open and that to be determined by the learned trial Judge. It has been held by this Court in numerous decisions that in case of immovable properties in urban areas, unless the leases specifically and categorically make an exception in favour of the tenant that they would continue in possession even after the expiry of termination of the leases, and those leases were acts of prudent management in no other case, the tenants inducted by the mortgage would be entitled to the protection under the Rent Act after the redemption of mortgage. 43. In this connection, it will be appropriate here to refer to the position as mentioned in the Mulla's 'Transfer of Property Act', 7th Edn. pages 513 and 514, which is as follows: Whether a mortgage in possession can by reason of Clause (a) grant a lease of the mortgaged property has been considered in several decisions of the Supreme Court. In Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain [1952] 1 SCR 775 , t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld bind the mortgagor ordinary applies only to agricultural lands and has seldom been extended to urban property. This observation is strictly speaking, obiter, as the Court found that the lease in question was neither bona fide nor prudent in view of the long term and the low rent. It is respectfully submitted that there is no warrant for limiting Section 76(a) to agricultural land. Whether a particular lease is bona fide or prudent is a question of fact; obviously a lease of urban land which would confer on the lessor the protection of special statutes such as the Rent Acts would prima facie be imprudent. In Sachalmal Parasram v. Ratanbai AIR1972SC637, however, the Supreme Court has repeated the obiter observation in the Film Corporation case (supra) that except in the case of agricultural land acts of a mortgage would not bind the mortgagor. It is respectfully submitted that the position could be more satisfactorily stated with reference to the language of Clause (a). The right conferred by that clause is to manage the property during the subsistence of the mortgage. It is unlikely that a prudent manager would create a lease for a period longer than the mortgage, or in circu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in respect of agricultural land is sufficiently long to induce the tenant to put in the best efforts which would incidentally benefit the owner of the land by improving the fertility of the land itself. In contrast, to the agricultural lands, so far as non-agricultural and urban lands are concerned, on determination of the lease the tenant who has been on the property under the terms of the lease is bound to put back the property in the condition in which it was at the time when he entered into possession and nothing is normally done by the tenant which is likely to improve the quality of the soil property by his own efforts put in during the terms of the tenancy. There is, therefore, no question of a prudent owner of urban immovable property granting a long term lease merely with a view to improve the quality of the land. Barring Rent Control and Rent Restriction Acts which deal with urban immovable property, in areas where there is scarcity of accommodation both for residential and nonresidential purposes, there is no concept of protection to tenants of urban immovable property. We are of opinion that this is the rationale behind the distinction which the Supreme Court has pointe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntext, we are of the opinion that the submissions on behalf of the tenants cannot be entertained. 46. As mentioned hereinbefore, Sh. B.K. Mehta, especially in the background of the facts in C.A. No. 9993/83, has made certain submissions relying on the observations of this Court in Jadavji Purshottam's case (supra). That decision requires recapitulation of the basic principle. That decision reiterated that the tenant-appellant therein was not inducted into possession soon after the mortgage deed was executed and the mortgage was put into possession of the property but long thereafter. It is not necessary to detain us on the facts of this case. The basis of that decision was: whether the Saurashtra Act was already in force. The appellant therein was inducted into possession and his tenancy rights could not have become enlarged after the mortgage granted him the lease by a subsequent legislation enacted for affording protection to tenants. In this case, relying on the said decision, it may be reiterated that the tenancy right was not created by a mortgage in possession, wherein the mortgagor had not concurred in the grant of a lease beyond the period of mortgage. The question i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es to grant tenancy beyond the period of mortgage, and had imposed an obligation that on the expiry of the period of mortgage, mortgagors were entitled to the possession of the demised premises. In our opinion, these contentions cannot be entertained. 49. Incidentally, it may also be mentioned that in C.A. No. 1286/81, the suit property was mortgaged in 1948 for a period of 5 years. The tenant was inducted by the mortgage in 1955. The period of mortgage had expired in 1953. Apparently, the mortgage had inducted the tenant after expiry of the period of mortgage, and such a conduct was grossly imprudent management, and was not bona fide. Such tenant cannot, in any event, claim any protection. 50. Having considered the facts and the circumstances and the ratio of the decision in Jadavji Purshottam's case (supra), we are clearly of the opinion that the tenancy rights did not come to be enlarged by the Tenancy Legislation after the tenant was put into possession by the mortgage and the tenancy created in favour of the tenants by the mortgagor did not have the concurrence of the mortgagor so as to claim tenancy rights even after redemption of the mortgage. See the observations ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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