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TMI Blog1989 (5) TMI 324X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions contained in a deed of lease executed between the parties on 17th January, 1980. Clause (11) (c) of the lease deed contains one of the lessee's covenants in the following terms. (C)"To use the demised premises for residential purpose only." While in possession of the demised promises, the appellant has purchased a vacant residential house No. F-77A, Green Park, New Delhi, hereinafter called the 'acquired property.' The respondent raised this as a ground to seek eviction of the appellant under Clause (h) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. The appellant has pleaded in the written statement that it "is using the premises presently as a guest House, and officers' Club as also for holding Company functions including officials get-together and conference etc." It is contesting eviction on the plea, inter alia, that a company cannot reside; and that neither the demised premises is being actually used nor can the acquired property be used by it as "a residence". After the pleadings were completed, the respondent made an application under Order Xii rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 praying for an order ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r officer of the company and whether such officer has an independent interest in the premises. However, after hearing [earned counsel for the parties at length on these matters, we feel that it would be inappropriate in this case to specifically answer the questions envisaged by the learned single judge as it is not the case of either party that the premises were let for use as actual residence of the officers or of any particular officer of the appellant company. In our opinion, Therefore, the basic question which really arises in this appeal is the one stated by us in para 1 above. (5) Mr. Kapur, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended : (1) that Clause (h) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act does not apply to the appellant as a company cannot reside or acquire 'a residence'; (2) that the said clause applies only to such premises as are actually used by a tenant for his residence when be acquires another residence; and (3) that, neither the demised premises, let "for residential purposes" and indeed being used for housing the visiting guests of the company, nor the acquired property can be said to be 'a residence' of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... right can be vicariously enjoyed or how the principle of dwelling in the premises by an agent can be admitted." In the same case, Slesser, L J. said : "...it is impossible to say that a company such as this one can be a tenant." After noting the observations of Godard J. in the earlier case, he went on to say "...It is to my mind evident that this trading company cannot have that domestic quality, it cannot have a home, and it cannot in that sense reside". Lesser L.J. noted what Lord Loreburn said in De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. v. Howe (1906) Ac 455 :- "A company cannot eat or sleep". He further observed "They cannot by the nature of things reside in a domestic sense. They cannot come or go to these particular premises and they are outside the Act." In G.E. Srevens Ltd. v. High Wycombe Corporation, (supra) Diplock J. said, "... a company is in the very nature of things incapable of occupying a house as a private dwelling house, and it seems to be common sense that such an occupation by a company could not be by a Manager occupying on its behalf." (8) At first sight, the above mentioned decisions do appear to support the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gments of different courts in India, while dealing with Clause (h) and similar provisions in other Act, that the said clause applies only to living persons and not to corporate bodies. This argument ignores the fact that in each of those cases the tenant happened to be a living person, and, Therefore, the courts referred to the tenant by use of the word 'he' and described the possession of such a tenant by the word 'his'. (10) In Dunlop Rubber Co. (supra) in the context of Section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 which envisages eviction of a tenant on the ground that the landlord required the premises for "his own occupation", the Calcutta High Court held that use of the masculine term 'his' in relation to a tenant includes artificial persons as the statute does not use anywhere any term of the neuter gender but uses the masculine term in all places and that this ground is available to a company to evict its tenant. The three English cases cited by Mr. Kapur were relied upon in that case as well. While dealing with them, the Calcutta High Court also observed that these cases "are mainly distinguishable, having regard to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Kapur. (12) In order to appreciate the proper effect of the phrase 'a residence' in the context of Clause (h) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 it is necessary to advert to the object, scheme and content of some of the relevant provisions of the Act in general and of this clause in particular. (13) The object of the Act is to provide, inter alia, for the control of rents and evictions in the Union territory of Delhi. To achieve this object provision is made regarding rent in Sections 4 to 13 in chapter Ii and regarding control of eviction in Sections 14 to 25 in chapter Iii of the Act. Since reference has to be made to some of these provisions, their relevant extracts are set out hereunder :- "2.Definitions-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires "(i) "premises" means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately/or use as a residence or for commercial use or/or any other purpose and includes (I)XXXXXX (II)xxxxxx (1)"tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for a special contract, would be, payable, and includes ; ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... writing of the landlord; or (II)if the premises have been let before the said date without obtaining his consent ; (D)that the premises were let for use as a residence and neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filling of the application for the recovery of possession thereof. (E)that the premises let for residential purposes are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Explanation .For the purposes of this having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes ', (H)that the tenant has, whether or after the commencement of this Act, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence; (BEFORE the Act came into force in 1958 there was a similar provision made in Section 13(l)(h) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952(38 of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation of the premises at such rates as he considers proper in the circumstances of the case for the period from the date of such order till the date of actual vacation by the tenant. 22.Special provision for recovery of possession in certain cases- Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance of its activities, then notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or any other law, the controller may. on application made to him in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may, be in occupation thereof, if the controller is satisfied- (A)that the tenant to whom such premises where let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service of employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment ; or (B)that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy such premises; or (C)t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the statutory provisions made in the Rent Acts in India, a status of removability and an estate in the premises is created and despite the determination of the tenancy, by efflux of time limited by the lease or otherwise, the tenant retains an interest in the premises. At the same time, these Acts also seek to safeguard legitimate interest of the landlords and seek to preserve social harmony and promote social justice. Gian Devi v. Jeevan Kumar, AIR1985SC796 . (16) The word "Premises", is defined in Section 2(i) of the Act. In Gopal Dass v. Dr. S K. Bhardwaj, [1962]2SCR678 , Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Supreme Court, has clearly expressed an opinion that this definition refers to "three kinds of user" which are "residence, commerce and any other purpose which necessarily must include residence and commerce combined". The first of the three kinds of premises is described in the said definition as "any building or part of a building which is...let separately for the use as a residence," The same word 'residence' is used in Section 2(i), in clauses (d), (e) (h) and (i) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 as also i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n this ground cannot be sought from premises let for commercial use or for any other purpose. (18) According to Mr. Kapur, use of the phrase 'a residence 'in Clause (h) indicates requirement of actual residence as a condition for attracting this clause. He has urged that the question in issue is not one about possession or occupation through officers by the company but it is regarding residence of the tenant. This, in our view, is me real fallacy in the case of the appellant.. The vital question is whether use of the phrase 'a residence' in clause (h) indicates the kind of the premises to which this clause applies or it indicates the actual manner of use of the premises to attract the liability of eviction on this ground. There is a fundamental difference between these two concepts. For the reasons discussed above, the former and not the latter concept is the key to the interpretation of this clause in the context of Section 14 and in its setting in the Act, In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to discuss the plea of Mr. Kapur that possession or occupation are not synonymous with residence and that the mere user of the premises by the company cannot give r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h respect, we disapprove of this observation of the learned single judge. As already discussed earlier, Clause (h) has to be read in the context of the proviso to Section 14(1). The word 'Premises' in the proviso has to be read in the light of the definition thereof in Section 2(i) which uses the words 'a residence'. The same expression has been used in Clause (h). It has to be construed in the same sense and for the same purpose, that, is, to distinguish residential premises or premises let for residential purpose from commercial or other premises. As such, in the context of Clause (h), the word 'residence' or the phrase 'a residence' cannot be qualified to mean actual residence or a dwelling place or abode of a person, This aspect does not appear to have been placed before the learned sine judge in Sobha Singh v. Vinod Kumar (supra). In any event, the question of applicability of Clause (h) to a company was not involved in that case and we do not accept the suggestion of Mr. Kapur that the above mentioned observation was made to restrict the applicability of the said clause only to tenancy of a dwelling house. (20) Unlike the position in England, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not use the premises as a residence may arise when recovery of possession of residential premises is sought under Clause (c) or Clause (d) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14. This question is not relevant for the purpose of Clause (h). However, one or more grounds specified in the proviso may apply to the facts of a given case and in some case grounds (c), (d) and (h) together may be attracted: but it is incorrect to say that Clause (h) would apply only to premises actually used as a residence by a tenant. (24) The test of actual use as a residence, in respect of the premises from which eviction is sought or in respect of the acquired property, as suggested by Mr. Kapur, would lead to absurd results. For example a tenant could vacate the hired premises or lock it and shift to the acquired place and contended that the premises let out to him are not in his actual use as a residence and, Therefore, he cannot be evicted under Clause (h). Similarly. applying the test to the acquired property even after acquiring vacant possession, the tenant may keep it locked or may use it for some other residential purpose (not as his actual residence), then also Clause (h) would not ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e word 'suitable' before the word 'residence'. That word was omitted when the Act came into force in 1958. (28) In our opinion, intention of the tenant or his unilateral act to use or not to use the demised premises or the acquired properly, or the later being a suitable alternative to or a substitute for the former, are not relevant factors to determine the applicability of Clause (h). This clause is attracted to premises let for use as 'a residence', if the tenant has acquired vacant possession of 'a residence'. The phrase 'a residence' has to be understood in the same sense in which it is used in the definition of 'premises', that is, to distinguish residential premises from the other two kinds of premises. In view of the difference in the concept of protected tenancy in England and in India, particularly in the Act with which we are concerned, it cannot be said that the 'domestic' or 'personal' quality of 'actual' residence or a dwelling house noted in the English decisions is equally a feature of the phrase 'a residence' in Clause (h). (29) The demised premises have been let for use "for res ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ses and that too till the tenant has acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted another residential accommodation in Delhi. Otherwise, the object and the purpose of this clause would be defeated as a company could easily afford to take on rent any number of residential premises and thus deprive the really needy person of a residence in Delhi. (31) The appellant has, admittedly, acquired vacant possession of a residential house in Green Park. In ground (vii) of the memorandum of appeal, it is admitted that the demised premises and the acquired property "were used and intended to be used" for the same purpose which is stated in the said ground to be "for housing staff members". In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the appellant has 'domain' over the acquired property which the appellant can alternatively use a substitute for the demised premises. This condition envisaged in B. R. Mehta v. Alma Devi, [1987]3SCR1184 to attract Clause (h) is satisfied in the present case. (32) So far as the officers of the company are concerned. Section 25 expressly provides that in case any order is made by the Controller for the recovery of possession o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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