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1961 (12) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURTWhether the general or special orders mentioned in the section subject to which it has the power to impose tax, are orders which were in existence before the rule prescribing the tax was framed and once a rule has been framed by it and the Government has accorded its sanction to that rule, the Government has no power to control the imposition of tax under it by any order made under section 59? Held that:- It is the imposition after the making of the rule authorising the tax, that is subject to the Government's orders and not the making of the rule itself which authorises the tax. It is plain from section 59 that the control over a municipality's power to tax imposed by the requirement of the Government's sanction of the rule prescribing the tax contained in section 61, is not the same thing as the control contemplated by the general or special orders mentioned in section 59, for both are mentioned in section 59. If it were not so, it would have been unnecessary to provide for the general or special orders controlling the imposition of the tax in section 59. This is the first reason why we think that the appellant municipality's contention is untenable. The imposition contemplated by section 59 is clearly not the passing of the resolutions under section 60 selecting the tax and making the rule prescribing the tax to be levied in terms of section 46(1), for section 56(1)(a) expressly makes the imposition something happening after section 60 has been complied with. This seems to us to be another reason for not accepting the appellant municipality's contention. " Impose " in section 59 means the actual levy of the tax after authority to levy it has been acquired by rules duly made and sanctioned, and it is such imposition that is made subject to the general or special orders of the Government. Therefore, the Government can at any time by any such order prohibit the imposition of the tax. Apart from the very interesting question raised by the learned Attorney-General that the municipality, being a local authority, was a State, and was not therefore entitled to the benefit of article 14, as to which we think it unnecessary to express any opinion, we are on the facts satisfied that there is no discrimination. The Government has now, it is not disputed, prohibited all municipalities from levying any octroi tax on milk. Furthermore, it has not been shown to us that all municipalities stand on the same footing with regard to milk. The last objection that the order had been mala fide made is completely without foundation as the Government had earlier requested the appellant municipality to drop the tax on the ground, among others, that milk was really being purchased for the Government and that the Government was not liable to be taxed by a municipality. Appeal dismissed.
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